UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA   SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  00808  1234 


N0i 


■■  >*    ;  rv"i 


>K 


*n 


W  3 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA   SAN  DIEGC 


3  1822  00808  1234 


2 


H.  h>  /«. 


7 


U*CHZ        ^LL^'il  Cc/v^Xa    C  ft^lt-L*^?;1' 


rA 


1 


gale  bicentennial  publications 

ON   PRINCIPLES   AND    METHODS 
IN    LATIN   SYNTAX 


gale  ^Bicentennial  publications 

With  the  approval  of  the  President  and  Fellows 
of  Tale  University,  a  series  of  volumes  has  been 
prepared  by  a  number  of  the  Professors  and  In- 
structors, to  be  issued  in  connection  with  the 
Bicentennial  Anniversary,  as  a  partial  indica- 
tion of  the  character  of  the  studies  in  which  the 
University  teachers  are  engaged. 

This    series   of  volumes    is    respectfully  dedicated  to 

ST&e  45raDuate0  of  ttje  zamtaraitp 


ON 


PRINCIPLES  AND  METHODS 


IN 


LATIN    SYNTAX 

BY 

E.   P.   MORRIS 

Professor  of  Latin  in  Yale  University 


NEW  YORK:   CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

LONDON:    EDWARD   ARNOLD 

1901 


Copyright,  1901, 
By  Yale   University 

Published,  September,  iqoi 


UNIVERSITY   PRESS    •  JOHN    WILSON 
AND    SON   •    CAMBRIDGE,   U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

Two  things  only  need  to  be  said  by  way  of  preface 
to  this  book.  In  the  first  place,  it  makes  no  claim  to  the 
character  of  a  systematic  statement  of  the  principles  of 
syntax.  It  is  a  discussion  of  certain  principles  and  of 
the  methods  of  investigation  to  which  these  principles 
lead.  In  the  second  place,  it  deals  primarily  with 
Latin.  If  some  of  the  chapters  are  equally  applicable 
to  the  syntax  of  other  languages,  that  is  only  because 
it  is  impossible  to  write  of  the  fundamental  questions 
of  syntactical  method  without  going  beyond  the  phe- 
nomena of  a  single  language.  The  illustrations  are  all 
from  Latin,  and  nearly  all  from  Plautus,  many  of  them 
being  taken,  as  are  portions  of  some  chapters,  from 
articles  of  mine  in  the  American  Journal  of  Philology, 
to  which  reference  is  made  at  the  proper  place. 

My  obligations  to  other  writers  on  syntax  and  linguis- 
tics are  indicated  occasionally  in  the  notes,  but  the 
character  of  the  book  does  not  call  for  a  bibliography. 
I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  my  regret  that  the 
second  part  of  the  first  volume  of  Wundt's  Volker- 
psychologie  appeared  too  late  for  me  to  use  it. 

I  am  under  personal  obligation  to  several  of  my  col- 
leagues in  Yale  University:  to  Professor  Duncan  for 
a  patient  hearing  of  Chapter  II,  to  Professor  Sneath 
for  helpful  criticism,  to  Professor  Ladd  for  sugges- 
tions acknowledged  in  the  note  on  p.  145,  and  to 
my  philological  colleagues,  Professors  Goodell,  Hopkins 

vii 


PREFACE 

and  Lang,  for  much  suggestion  and  encouragement. 
But  my  heaviest  obligation  and  one  which  I  scarcely 
know  how  to  express  sufficiently  is  to  Professor  Oertel. 
Many  of  the  subjects  in  this  book  I  have  talked  over 
with  him  repeatedly  during  the  past  ten  years,  seldom 
without  enlightenment  and  quickening.  It  would  not 
be  possible  for  me  now  to  discriminate  in  certain  chap- 
ters between  what  I  owe  to  his  suggestion  and  criticism 
and  what  is  my  own,  and  I  must  content  myself  with 
this  general  and  grateful  acknowledgment. 


E.  P.  MORRIS. 


Yale  University, 
July,  1901. 


VU1 


CONTENTS 

[The  numbers  refer  to  pages.] 

Page 

I.    Introductory  and  Historical 1-35 

The  limitations  of  this  sketch,  1.  The  syntax  of  the 
middle  of  the  century,  2.  Lange,  3.  Logical  and  de- 
scriptive syntax :  Holtze,  Draeger,  Kuhner,  4.  The 
influence  of  comparative  philology :  Cdrtius,  6.  The 
psychological  tendency  :  Delbruck,  10.  The  American 
school:  Hale,  Bennett,  Elmer,  14.  Dittmar,  18.  The 
influence  of  morphology  :  Ziemer,  23.  Of  general  lin- 
guistics :  Probst,  24.  Of  semasiology  :  Ries,  26.  The 
later  descriptive  and  historical  syntax :  Blase,  Schmalz, 
Wolfflin's  Archiv,  27.     Summary  of  tendencies,  30. 

II.    The  Grouping  of  Concepts 36-47 

Wundt's  Volkerpsychologie,  36,  note.  The  steps  in  the 
arrangement  of  concepts,  38.  The  germ-concept,  39. 
The  relations  of  concepts  in  a  group,  40.  The  close  of 
the  process  of  analysis,  40.  The  concept-group  after 
speech,  42.  The  mental  process  of  the  hearer,  43.  Sub- 
stantive and  transitive  elements,  44.   General  comments,  45. 

III.  The  Means  of  Expressing  Relations  .  .  48-62 
The  musical  elements,  49.  Inflection :  the  agglutina- 
tive theory,  51.  The  unsystematic  character  of  inflection, 
52.  Word-forming  suffixes,  54.  Single  words  as  means 
of  expressing  relation,  56.  The  grouping  of  words,  58. 
These  means  not  invented  for  the  expression  of  rela- 
tion, 59.  Their  early  history  comparatively  unimpor- 
tant, 60.     The  interchange  of  different  means,  61. 

IV.  The  Process  of  Adaptation.  — Inflection  63-101 
The  nature  of  the  problem,  65.  The  method  of  approach 
to  it,  67.  Inflection  and  word-meaning :  word-formation, 
68.  Case-endings,  modes,  and  tenses,  69.  The  kind  of 
evidence  to  be  sought,  74.  The  influence  of  secondary 
inflection,  75.  The  effect  of  the  context,  79.  Problems 
ix 


CONTENTS 

Page 

suggested,  89.  Illustrations  of  the  working  of  these 
influences :  the  optative  subjunctive,  92.  The  potential 
subjunctive,  94.     Summary,  100. 

V.    The    Expression    of   Relation   by   Single 

Words 102-112 

Prepositions,  103.  Conjunctions,  104.  The  subjunctive 
in  the  subordinate  clause,  104.  Deecke  on  qui,  107. 
Probst's  method,  108.  The  difficulties  of  the  problem, 
109.  The  origin  of  conjunctions,  110.  The  shifting  char- 
acter of  relational  function,  111. 

VI.    Parataxis 113-149 

The  methods  in  use,  113.  Three  points  of  view,  115.  The 
psychological  foundation  of  parataxis,  115.  Absolute 
independence  between  successive  concept-groups  impossi- 
ble, 115.  Varying  degrees  of  closeness  in  the  relation, 
117.  Groups  connected  as  wholes,  118.  Similarity  and 
contrast  between  groups,  118.  The  synthetic  summary  of 
a  group,  119.  The  analysis  of  a  member  of  a  group,  120. 
The  means  which  suggest  the  paratactic  relation,  121. 
Contiguity,  121.  Order,  124.  Inflection,  127.  Single 
words,  127.  The  resulting  forms  of  sentence,  130.  Cor- 
relative parataxis,  131.  Defining  parataxis,  132.  Psycho- 
logical definitions  of  parataxis,  142.  Formal  definition,  147. 
The  extent  of  the  field,  147.    Lines  of  work  suggested,  148. 

VII.  The  Subordinating  Conjunctions  in  Latin  150-182 
Their  origin,  150.  Inferences  from  etymology,  151.  From 
case-form,  152.  The  problems  presented,  155.  Stable 
and  unstable  elements  of  meaning,  155.  The  acquisition 
of  subordinating  force:  quin,  159;  ne,  160;  ni,  166; 
quamuis,  167;  simul,  168;  modo,  168;  et  and  atque,  169. 
Summary  of  different  types,  171.  Tables  of  relationship, 
173,  175,  178.  Classification  of  Latin  subordinating  con- 
junctions, 181. 

VIII.    The  Grouping  of  Words 183-196 

Explanation  of  the  term,  183.  The  distribution  of  group- 
meanings,  184.  The  germ-concept,  185.  The  expansion 
of  the  germ,  187.  The  accommodation  of  meanings,  190. 
The  re-transfer  of  meanings  to  the  group,  191.  The  for- 
mation of  idioms,  192.  Partial  re-analysis,  193.  The 
association  of  analyses,  194.  Analogy  between  word- 
groups,  195. 

X 


CONTENTS 

Page 

IX.    Form,  Function  and  Classification    .     .     197-232 

Syntactical  form,  197.  Form  and  content,  198.  Syntacti- 
cal function,  199.  Classification  by  function:  its  advan- 
tages, 204.  Its  defects,  206.  The  reasons  for  the  continued 
use  of  functional  classification,  213.  Its  connectiou  with 
logic  and  metaphysics,  214.  Its  unsuitability  for  historical 
syntax,  218.  Formal  classification;  its  disadvantages, 
225.  Its  advantages,  227.  Its  use  in  psychological  inter- 
pretation, 228.   Classification  as  a  tool  of  investigation,  230. 


XI 


LATIN  SYNTAX 


INTRODUCTORY  AND   HISTORICAL 

Intelligent  scientific  work  demands  an  intelligent 
understanding  of  method,  upon  its  theoretical  as  well 
as  upon  its  practical  side,  and  method  is  intelligible 
only  through  its  history.  It  is  proposed,  therefore,  in 
this  introductory  chapter  to  sketch  briefly  the  methods 
employed  during  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  in  syn- 
tactical work  in  Latin. 

The  subject  of  itself  imposes  certain  limitations 
which,  to  prevent  misunderstanding,  must  be  laid  down 
at  the  outset.  In  the  first  place,  the  sketch  will  be 
confined  to  work  in  Latin.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
students  of  Latin  syntax  are  not  more  familiar  with  the 
work  in  Germanic  and  Romance  philology,  where  the 
influence  of  earlier  systems  has  been  less  strongly  felt 
and  where  originality  of  view  and  of  method  is  easier; 
but  it  is  apparently  a  fact  that  Latin  syntax  has  not 
been  influenced  by  the  syntax  of  the  spoken  languages. 
To  a  considerable  extent  this  appears  to  be  true  also  of 
Greek  work,  but  as  the  methods  employed  are  in  the 
main  identical,  the  influence  is  more  difficult  to  detect 
and  at  the  same  time  less  important.  The  methods  of 
comparative  syntax,  however,  must  be  to  some  extent 
i  1 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

included  within  the  discussion.  In  the  second  place, 
this  is  a  sketch  of  methods,  not  of  results,  and  some 
contributions  to  Latin  syntax  which  would  deserve  a 
large  place  in  a  complete  history  of  Latin  philology 
may  be  passed  over  in  a  sketch  of  the  history  of  method. 
Nor  will  any  attempt  be  made  to  pass  judgment  upon 
the  merit  of  the  works  mentioned.  Great  discoveries 
have  been  made  in  poorly  equipped  laboratories,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  excellence  of  the  method  em- 
ployed may  be  unnoticed  because  of  the  writer's  imper- 
fect use  of  it  or  his  ignorance  of  the  facts.  In  the 
third  place,  I  am  not  sufficiently  acquainted  in  a  prac- 
tical way  with  the  controversies  about  the  case-system 
to  be  willing  to  enter  upon  that  field.  This  is,  cer- 
tainly, a  large  omission,  and  I  regret  it  the  more  because 
case-syntax  seems  to  be  in  advance  of  mode -syntax  in 
freeing  itself  from  the  dominant  influences  of  the  half- 
century.  Yet  it  may,  I  think,  be  assumed  that  the 
general  course  of  case-syntax  has  been  the  same  as  the 
course  of  investigation  into  the  meaning  of  modal  and 
temporal  forms. 

Of  the  syntax  of  the  middle  of  the  century  much  has 
been  written  and  its  characteristics  are  well  known. 
It  was  not  a  special  science,  working  for  its  own  ends, 
but  like  palaeography  or  text-criticism  it  was  still  in 
service  to  classical  philology.  Even  in  this  field  the 
amount  of  detailed  work  was  still  small,1  and  the  range 
was  narrow.  The  sub-title  of  Weissenborn's  Syntax 
der  Lateinischen  Sprache  (Eisenach,  1835)  is  fur  die 
oberen  Klassen  gelehrter   Sclmlen ;   that  is,  it  was  in- 

1  See  Draeger's  statement  of  the  extent  to  which  he  was  obliged  to  rely 
upon  his  own  collections  {Vorrede  to  Vol.  I,  pp.  iv  ff.)  and  compare  the 
small  number  of  syntactical  works  referred  to  in  Ritschl's  first  edition  of 
Plautus  with  the  long  list  in  the  final  edition  of  Goetz,  Schoell  and  Loewe. 

2 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

tended  to  be  a  descriptive  and  practical  statement  of 
the  facts  of  usage. 

But  in  one  respect  the  early  syntax  was  theoretical, 
—  in  the  philosophical  or  logical  conceptions  which 
formed  the  basis  of  its  schemes  of  classification.1  Much 
of  this  has  now  been  swept  aside,  sometimes  with  an 
insufficient  appreciation  of  its  real  meaning  and  of  its 
lasting  value,  but  in  two  directions  it  still  influences 
our  syntactical  work.  The  first  of  these  is  in  the  classi- 
fication of  subordinate  clauses,  where  the  logical  or 
metaphysical  categories  of  time,  purpose,  condition, 
etc.,  still  prevail  in  most  grammars,  though  they  are 
not  so  largely  used  in  the  actual  work  of  investigation. 
The  second  and  perhaps  more  important  influence  is  in 
the  definition  of  modes  and  cases. 

It  is  of  the  essence  of  philosophy  and  logic  to  reduce 
all  phenomena  to  system  by  definition,  to  find  the  single 
underlying  truth  about  which  all  things  are  to  be 
grouped.  And  therefore  the  chief  object  of  a  logical 
scheme  of  the  modes  was  to  discover  the  Grundbegriff, 
and  the  chief  inheritance  which  we  still  preserve  from 
the  syntax  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  first  half 
of  the  nineteenth  is  the  belief  that  the  enigma  of  modal 
use,  and  indeed  of  syntax  generally,  is  to  be  solved  by 
some  kind  of  definition,  psychological  if  not  metaphys- 
ical or  logical.  The  content  and  basis  of  the  definition 
have  changed;  the  feeling  that  a  definition  of  the  modes 
is  necessary  has  remained  a  dominant  force  in  syntax  up 
to  the  present  time. 

The  first  significant  break  from  these  systems  was 
made  by  Lange  in  the  paper  entitled  Andeutungen  iiber 

1  On  all  this  see  the  valuable  programs  of  K.  Koppin,  Deitrarj  zur  Ent- 
wickelung  und  Wurdigung  der  Ideen  iiber  die  Grundbedeutungen  der  grie- 
chischen  Modi;  I,  Wismar,  1877;  II,  Stade,  1880. 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

Ziel  und  Methode  der  syntalctischen  Forschung.1  Lange's 
prime  object  was  to  claim  a  place  for  syntax  as  a  special 
science,  with  aims  and  methods  of  its  own,  and  this 
object  was  so  far  attained  that  he  has  been  recognized 
as  the  founder  of  modem  historical  syntax.  But  this 
is  not  the  only  merit  of  the  paper.  It  touches  upon 
nearly  all  the  problems  which  have  occupied  the  science 
since  that  time  —  the  distinction  between  form  and 
function,  the  relation  of  syntax  to  semasiology,  para- 
taxis, the  formal  classification  of  the  subordinate  clause 
—  and  frequently  suggests  in  single  sentences  most 
remarkable  anticipations  of  the  method  and  aim  of  later 
work. 

Its  immediate  influence,  however,  was  not  great,  at 
least  so  far  as  appears  in  the  printed  work  of  the  time. 
Holtze's  Syntaxis  Priscorum  Scriptorum  Latinorum, 
1861-62,  which  was  of  course  planned  and  largely  com- 
pleted before  Lange's  paper  appeared  (et  est  hie  labor 
.  .  .  plus  viginti  annorum,  Praef.,  p.  v),  still  followed 
the  older  lines,  and  Draeger's  greater  work,  superior  as 
it  was  in  logical  precision  and  in  detail,  introduced  no 
new  principle.  Holtze's  selection  of  the  early  Latin 
as  a  special  field  was  in  fact  a  recognition  of  the  desir- 
ability of  historical  treatment  quite  as  distinct  as  was 
indicated  by  the  word  historische  in  Draeger's  title. 
For  historical,  in  the  sense  in  which  Draeger  uses  the 
word,  is  scarcely  more  than  chronological ;  that  study  of 
the  sequence  of  causes  and  effects  which  is  suggested 
to  our  minds  by  the  phrase  historical  syntax  was  un- 
known to  Draeger.  In  his  frank  and  interesting 
Vorrede  he  compares  himself  to  an  entomologist  or  a 
botanist,  that  is,  his  work  was  like  the  classifying  and 

1  Printed  in  the  Verhandlungen  d.  13ten  Versammlung  Deutscher  Philo- 
logen,  pp.  96  ff.,  Gottingen,  1853. 

4 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

descriptive  sciences,  before  the  publication  of  "The 
Origin  of  Species."  The  influence  of  the  book,  the 
extent  of  which  can  be  seen  in  the  great  number  of 
doctor-dissertations  which  follow  its  system,  is  due  to 
the  extreme  clearness  and  precision  of  the  scheme  of 
functional  classification,  rather  than  to  any  originality 
in  the  syntactical  method. 

In  general,  Kuhner's  Ausfuhrliche  Grrammatik  der 
Lateinischen  Sprache  belongs  to  the  same  school  of 
thought,  as  it  belongs  to  the  same  period  of  time,  as 
Draeger's  Syntax.  There  is  the  same  functional  classi- 
fication, the  same  elaboration  in  subdivision.  But  the 
fact  that  Kuhner's  plan  involves  explanation  of  facts, 
as  well  as  classification,  necessitates  definition,  and  the 
definitions  reintroduce  the  logical  conceptions  of  lan- 
guage from  which  Draeger,  except  in  his  system  of 
classification,  was  more  nearly  free.  Kuhner's  defini- 
tion of  the  sentence  —  that  dangerous  point  for  all 
syntacticists  —  is  logical,  and  his  scheme  of  the  modes, 
though  he  repudiates  the  philosophical  categories  (Vol. 
II,  p.  126,  Anm.\  is  only  partially  psychological. 
Even  where  the  point  of  view  is  correct,  the  practice  of 
beginning  each  subject  with  definitions,  of  which  the 
succeeding  sections  afford  illustrations,  leads  to  a  priori 
statements  which  in  their  spirit  and  tendency  belong  to 
philosophical  syntax.  See,  for  example,  the  distinction 
between  the  dative  and  the  ablative,  II,  256,  and 
between  the  ablative  and  the  adverb,  II,  257;  these 
are  not  the  result  of  induction,  but  are  deduced  from 
general  definitions  of  the  cases  and  the  adverb;  they 
are  rather  descriptions  of  what  a  logically  precise  lan- 
guage ought  to  be  than  statements  of  the  actual  usage 
of  so  irregular  and  hap-hazard  a  mass  of  phenomena  as 
language  presents. 

5 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

Draeger  and  Kiihner  may  be  taken  as  the  last  and 
best  representatives  of  logical  grammar.  The  traces  of 
that  school  of  syntax  which  still  remain  in  our  gram- 
mars do  not  indicate  an  active  working  of  the  older 
conceptions,  but  a  passive  survival,  a  traditional  preser- 
vation of  the  ideals  of  the  previous  half-century. 

Meanwhile  the  main  work  of  classical  philology  dur- 
ing the  middle  years  of  the  century  was  in  text-criticism, 
and  the  main  work  of  philology  in  the  narrower  sense 
was  in  comparative  philology  and  in  morphology.  The 
influence  of  this  work  was  not  greatly  felt  by  Draeger, 
nor,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  first  volume  is  a  com- 
pendium of  Latin  morphology,  by  Kiihner,  perhaps 
because  the  original  plan  of  both  works  dates  back  to 
a  period  when  classical  philologists  were  still  somewhat 
suspicious  of  the  newer  science,  but  upon  later  methods 
in  syntax  the  influence  of  comparative  morphology  has 
been  very  great.  Georg  Curtius  may  be  taken  as  the 
representative  of  this  influence,  not  so  much  for  what 
he  did  as  because  it  was  he  who  more  than  any  other 
philologist  interpreted  to  classical  scholars  the  work  of 
comparative  philology.  The  beautiful  clearness  of  his 
system  as  taught  in  his  lectures  and  in  his  writings 
especially  fitted  him  for  this  office,  and  gave  to  his 
teachings  an  authority  with  classical  scholars  greater 
even  than  the  authority  which  was  conceded  to  him  by 
other  comparative  philologists,  great  as  that  certainly 
was.  It  was,  in  particular,  through  his  application  of 
the  theory  of  agglutination  that  he  affected  the  method 
of  investigation  in  syntax.  For  that  theory  taught  that 
the  inflected  forms  of  the  Indo-European  languages 
were  the  result  of  the  appending  of  elements  once  dis- 
tinct and  having  distinct  meanings  to  stems  which  also 
had  distinct  meanings.     The  result  of  such  composition 

6 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

would  be  a  form  of  distinct  meaning,  and  where  it  was 
possible,  as  it  appeared  to  be  in  the  case  of  many  verb- 
forms,  to  analyze  a  compound  into  its  component  parts, 
the  original  meaning  of  the  inflected  form  could  be 
known,  and  would  be  the  proper  starting-point  of  any 
syntactical  or  semasiological  study  of  its  historical  uses. 
In  some  form,  and  with  reference  chiefly  to  the  morpho- 
logical side,  this  theory  is  perhaps  still  the  passively 
accepted  belief  of  philologists,  but  it  was  held  thirty 
years  ago  with  a  much  stronger  and  more  unquestion- 
ing conviction,  and  especially  with  more  confidence  in 
the  explanation  of  meanings  by  the  process  of  analysis. 
Reservations  and  scientific  caution  are  less  easily  learned 
than  general  theories,  and  it  is  probably  true  that  clas- 
sical scholars  accepted  the  results  of  comparative  phi- 
lology with  an  unjustified  degree  of  confidence,  and 
applied  them  more  sweepingly  than  their  authors  would 
have  ventured  to  do.  There  is,  indeed,  evidence  that 
Curtius  himself  did  not  draw  from  the  theory  of  agglu- 
tination the  conclusions  which  were  drawn  by  syntac- 
ticists,  but  sanction  from  without,  from  another  science 
which  is  imperfectly  understood  and  therefore  the  more 
respected,  almost  always  carries  undue  weight.  In  this 
case  the  tendency  was  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  the 
habit  of  definition,  inherited  from  philosophical  syntax, 
the  predisposition  to  explain  a  case  or  a  mode  by  some 
single  word  broad  enough  to  cover  all  its  uses,  still 
remained  after  the  views  of  language  which  gave  rise 
to  it  had  been  discredited.  To  this  predisposition  com- 
parative philology  seemed  to  give  a  scientific  support. 
Definition  by  a  process  of  analysis  which  determined 
the  significant  elements  of  an  inflected  form,  and  which 
thus  determined  the  original  meaning  of  the  form  itself, 
took  the  place  of  definition  by  philosophical  categories. 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

The  basis  of  the  definition  was  changed,  but  the  habit 
of  regarding  the  discovery  of  some  single  meaning,  about 
which  all  other  meanings  and  uses  could  be  grouped,  as 
the  proper  and  sufficient  explanation  of  an  inflected 
form  still  remained  and  became  the  dominant  influence 
upon  syntactical  method  for  many  years. 

It  is  not  unlikely,  also,  that  the  disposition  to  seek 
for  the  ultimate  explanations  of  syntax  in  the  primitive 
meanings  of  forms  was  strengthened  by  the  general 
drift  of  the  thought  of  the  nineteenth  century  toward 
the  study  of  origins.  Some  other  branches  of  philology 
were  distinctly  affected  by  the  methods  of  natural  sci- 
ence, and  the  early  use  of  the  comparative  method  and 
its  application  to  text-criticism  show  that  philology 
shared,  if  indeed  it  may  not  be  said  to  have  started,  the 
current  of  its  time,  just  as  it  had  shared  the  philosoph- 
ical tendencies  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  influence  of  the  views  of  Curtius  is  well  illus- 
trated in  Liibbert's  first  work,  Der  Conjunctiv  Perfecti 
und  das  Futurum  Exactum.  This  was  published  in 
1867,  before  Draeger's  Syntax  or  Kiihner's  Grammar. 
The  question  which  it  discussed,  the  difference  between 
fecero,  fecerim  and  fazo,  faxim,  had  been  treated  before 
by  other  scholars,  especially  by  Madvig,  and  their  ex- 
planations had  involved  a  theory  of  the  morphology  of 
faxot  faxim;  but  in  Liibbert  the  morphological  argu- 
ment is  not  incidental,  it  is  one  of  the  two  main  sup- 
ports of  his  conclusion.  In  the  order  of  the  sections, 
those  which  deal  with  the  form  precede  those  which 
deal  with  the  syntactical  usage,  and  the  conclusion  of 
the  whole  book  is  plainly  based  upon  the  belief  that 
faxo  is  aoristic  in  form  and  that  this  fact  determines 
the  fundamental  meaning  and  therefore  the  later  usage. 
It   is   true   that  in  some  of  the   details  of  the    argu- 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

ment  Lubbert  follows  Bopp  rather  than  Curtius  (e.g., 
pp.  67-68),  but  in  the  general  character  of  the  argu- 
ment from  formal  analysis  to  Q-rundbedeutung  and  from 
this  to  usage,  he  is  following  the  method  of  which 
Curtius  is  the  most  conspicuous  exponent.  Since  Liib- 
bert's  time  it  has  become  the  standard  and  orthodox 
method  to  begin  the  syntactical  treatment  of  an  inflec- 
tional form  with  a  morphological  argument  —  which  in 
many  cases  is  in  truth  a  necessity  —  and  to  make  the 
meaning  which  is  obtained  by  means  of  morphological 
analysis  the  foundation  of  all  later  usage. 

The  supplanting  of  philosophical  views  of  language 
by  psychological  conceptions  has  been  a  long  process 
and  is  not  yet  complete.  Koppin,  in  his  program  of 
1880,  pp.  3-12,  shows  that  at  least  as  early  as  the  be- 
ginning of  the  century  psychological  definitions  of  the 
Greek  modes  were  attempted,  and  during  the  first  half 
of  the  century  the  gradual  falling  away  from  logical 
systems  was  due  in  part  to  the  gradual  rise  of  other 
views,  as,  for  example,  of  the  localistic  theory  of  the 
cases  (1831),  which  in  spite  of  its  use  of  semi-logical 
categories  is  in  essence  psychological.  Kuhner's  modal 
scheme,  as  has  been  said  above,  is  partly  psychological ; 
begehren  and  vorstellung  are  used  together  in  describ- 
ing the  subjunctive.  Lubbert's  first  section  is  headed 
Psychologische  Grrundanschauungen  in  der  Sprache, 
though  it  is  very  brief  and  the  psychology  is  scarcely 
distinguishable  from  philosophy.  In  the  wider  field 
of  general  linguistics  the  intimate  relation  between  psy- 
chology and  philology  was  of  course  recognized  much 
earlier  than  in  syntax;  Steinthal's  Grrammatik,  Logih 
und  Psychologie  was  published  in  1855.  But  the  sub- 
stitution of  psychological  fundamental  meanings  for 
philosophical  in  the  field  of  the  modes  marks,  never- 

9 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

theless,  the  beginning  of  a  new  epoch  in  syntactical 
method. 

The  book  which  brought  about  this  change  was  Del- 
briick's  Conjunctiv  und  Ojptativ,  the  first  volume  of  the 
Syntaktische  Forschungen,  published  in  1871. 1  It  is 
not  necessary  to  make  a  detailed  statement  of  the  con- 
tents of  this  well-known  work.  Of  its  two  main  theses 
the  second,  that  all  subordinating  function  is  acquired, 
was  the  less  original  and  has  been  the  more  widely 
accepted.  The  first  proposition  (pp.  11-30),  that  the 
earliest  meaning  of  the  subjunctive  was  Will,  of  the 
optative  Wish,  has  been  at  the  same  time  more  impor- 
tant in  its  influence  upon  later  work  and  more  earnestly 
questioned.2  The  method  used  in  establishing  this 
proposition  therefore  demands  special  comment. 

1.  The  field  of  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  earliest  mean- 
ing of  the  modes  is  narrowed  by  the  exclusion  of  inter- 
rogative sentences  on  the  ground  that  the  question 
represents,  psychologically,  a  check  in  the  natural 
movement  of  the  train  of  concepts,  and  of  negative 
sentences  on  the  ground  that  they  are  modifications  of 
the  declarative  sentence.  It  is  difficult  not  to  see  in 
these  exclusions  an  unconscious  survival  of  the  logical 

1  Delbriick's  earlier  work,  Ablativ,  Localis,  Instrumental 'is,  Berlin,  1867, 
I  venture  with  some  hesitation  to  leave  out  of  this  brief  sketch,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  basis  of  all  later  treatment  of  the  Latin  ablative.  Its 
method  is,  in  my  judgment,  superior  in  some  respects  to  that  of  the  Con- 
junctiv, in  that  the  uses  of  the  cases  are  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the 
accompanying  verbs  and  prepositions.  But  in  part  the  method  is  the  same  ; 
usages  are  held  to  be  connected  when  they  have  a  common  element  in 
meaning.  It  is  this  part  of  the  method  which  has  apparently  found  most 
followers. 

2  This  was  later  modified  by  Delbriick  so  far  as  to  make  futurity  a 
more  prominent  element,  either  because  of  the  criticism  of  other  scholars 
(see  Greenough's  review  in  The  North  American  Review,  1871,  CXIII, 
415)  or  as  a  result  of  the  author's  own  revision  of  his  position. 

10 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

view  of  language,  which  took  the  unemotional  declara- 
tive sentence  as  the  normal  type.  On  the  contrary,  the 
unemotional  narrative  sentence  is  the  later  and,  so  to 
speak,  the  more  artificial  form,  nor  is  the  exclamatory 
and  questioning  attitude  of  mind  any  less  natural  and 
primitive  on  the  psychological  side.  In  following  only 
the  modal  development  of  the  non-interrogative,  non- 
negative  sentence,  Delbriick  ran  the  risk  of  omitting 
elements  which  entered  into  the  primitive  meaning  and 
of  reaching  an  incomplete  and  one-sided  result. 

The  exclusion  of  all  persons  except  the  first  person 
singular  is  still  more  important.  In  Latin  the  subjunc- 
tive is  used  but  rarely  in  the  first  singular  in  indepen- 
dent non-interrogative  sentences.  In  Plautus  the  ratio 
in  the  present  tense  is  about  1:12;  excluding  the  form 
uelim,  it  is  only  about  1 :  35.  The  ratio  may  be  much 
greater  for  Homer,  but  the  probability  that  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  second  and  third  persons  has  distorted  the 
result  is  still  considerable.  The  reason  given  for  this 
narrowing  of  the  field  is  (p.  13)  that  the  wish  in  the  first 
singular  involves  only  one  person  while  the  wish  in  the 
second  or  third  singular  involves  at  least  two;  we  must 
therefore  suppose  that  the  earliest  use  of  the  optative  is 
found  in  the  first  singular  and  may  expect  the  same 
thing  in  the  subjunctive.  This  is,  so  far  as  the  optation 
is  concerned,  a  pure  assumption,  for  the  attitude  of 
mind  involved  in  wishing  that  another  person  may  come 
to  harm  is  not  more  complex  than  that  of  wishing  for 
one's  own  well-being,  and,  so  far  as  the  subjunctive 
(and  the  will)  is  concerned,  it  is  a  mistaken  assump- 
tion. The  situation  in  which  one  expresses  his  will  in 
regard  to  his  own  action  is  comparatively  rare  and 
artificial,  except  when  the  will  takes  the  form  of  deter- 
mination, which  is  usually  expressed  by  a  future.     The 

11 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

will,  in  the  somewhat  unfortunate  sense  in  which  that 
word  is  used  in  English  by  philologists,  is  most  natu- 
rally felt  and  expressed  in  regard  to  the  action  of  other 
persons  than  the  speaker. 

2.  The  object  of  the  investigation  was  to  find,  not 
the  most  abstract  term  which  would  cover  all  the  uses 
of  the  modes,  but  the  earliest  meaning,  the  primitive 
meaning.  This  is  a  question  of  chronology,  of  dates, 
or,  where  the  evidence  of  actual  usage  is  not  accessible, 
of  relative  antiquity.  Such  a  question  is  of  course 
surrounded  by  immense  difficulties  and  the  solution 
can  be  at  best  only  an  approximation.  But  the  greater 
the  difficulties,  the  more  distinctly  must  they  be  faced 
and  the  more  clearly  must  we  keep  in  mind  the  fact 
that  the  investigation  is  fundamentally  chronological. 
It  is  at  this  point  that  Delbruck's  method  is  least  clear. 
There  are  no  criteria  of  the  relative  age  of  different 
usages  beyond  the  criteria  implied  in  the  exclusions 
noted  above,  with  the  accompanying  reasons,  and  after 
the  first  few  pages  the  question  shifts  from  the  position 
taken  at  the  outset  and  becomes  a  question  of  the  psy- 
chological analysis  of  certain  usages. 

3.  As  a  basis  for  subdivision,  after  the  main  classi- 
fication by  form  of  sentence  and  person  and  number  of 
the  verb,  Delbruck  selected  the  intensity  of  the  expres- 
sion of  will  or  the  proportion  of  will  to  expectation  and 
opinion,  rejecting  the  attempt  to  classify  by  the  content 
or  object  of  desire,  that  is,  by  the  meaning  of  the  verb. 
This  selection  and  rejection  was  the  parting  of  the 
ways.  It  has  had  two  consequences.  In  the  first 
place,  the  sub-classes  thus  made  are  large  and  vague 
abstractions,  —  will,  exhortation,  command,  obligation, 
wish,  concession,  futurity,  —  abstractions  which  cannot 
be  defined  with  precision  nor  discussed  without  the  danger 

12 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  confusion.  The  determination  of  the  class  to  which 
a  particular  case  belongs  must  be  chiefly  by  translation, 
and  though  in  Delbruck's  hands  the  tendency  to  rely 
upon  translation  and  to  treat  abstractions  as  realities  is 
checked  by  scientific  reserve  and  candor,  in  the  hands 
of  some  of  his  followers  it  has  been  distinctly  mislead- 
ing. In  the  second  place,  the  grouping  of  expressions 
of  desire  according  to  the  intensity  of  the  desire  brings 
together  things  which  may  be  associated  in  a  system, 
but  are  not  associated  in  our  actual  psychological  expe- 
rience. In  experience  we  associate  our  desires  in  groups 
according  to  the  thing  desired.  Hunting,  fishing,  sail- 
ing; reading,  studying,  thinking;  eating,  drinking,  rest- 
ing, smoking;  gardening,  carpentering,  tinkering:  it  is 
in  such  groups  that  our  desires,  whether  in  the  form  of 
advice  or  concession  or  exhortation  to  others  or  with 
reference  to  our  own  action,  are  associated  in  our 
minds.  And  it  is  these  lines  of  association  which  give 
rise  to  analogies  and  assimilations  of  expression,  and 
which  therefore  indicate  the  fruitful  lines  of  syntactical 
inquiry.  The  turning  aside  from  this  field  of  study  to 
the  classification  according  to  intensity  of  will  and  wish 
is  the  serious  defect  of  the  book. 

The  criticisms  which  followed  Delbruck's  attempt  to 
establish  the  Grundbegriff  of  the  subjunctive  and  the 
optative  need  not  be  taken  up  here.  They  came  from 
Lange,  Ludwig,  Bergaigne,  and  Koppin,  but  did  not 
prevent  a  rather  general  acquiescence  in  Delbruck's 
results.  The  most  elaborate  of  them,  Bergaigne's  De 
conjunctivi  et  optativi  in  indoeuropaeis  Unguis  informa- 
tione  et  vi  antiquissima,  Paris,  1877,  has  apparently 
attracted  less  attention  than  it  deserves.  It  is,  how- 
ever, mainly  a  discussion  of  questions  of  comparative 
philology,  and  must  be  passed  over  here  with  a  general 

13 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

commendation  of  its  method  to  any  who  may  be  inter- 
ested in  these  questions. 

In  America  Delbriick's  work  has  been  accepted  with 
enthusiasm,  though  Greenough,  in  the  review  mentioned 
above,  questioned  its  results  and  proposed  to  substitute 
futurity  as  the  common  beginning  of  both  modes.  The 
method  of  Greenough's  own  pamphlet  on  the  Analysis 
of  the  Latin  Subjunctive,  1870,  is  not  dissimilar  to 
Delbriick's,  but  it  was  privately  printed,  and  its  bril- 
liant speculations  and  fruitful  suggestions,  though  they 
doubtless  prepared  the  way  for  the  acceptance  of  Del- 
briick's more  elaborate  work,  have  not  directly  in- 
fluenced the  course  of  Latin  syntax  in  this  country.1 
After  Greenough  three  American  scholars  may  be 
named  as  representing  in  different  ways  the  prevalent 
school  of  Latin  syntax  in  this  country.2  Hale's  work 
is  in  The  Cum  Constructions,  Part  I.,  1887,  Part  II., 
1889  (German  translation,  Teubner,  1891),  in  The  An- 
ticipatory Subjunctive  in  Greek  and  Latin,  1894,  and  in 
various  articles.  Bennett's  work  is  in  the  Appendix  to 
his  Latin  grammar,  Boston,  1895,  and  in  his  Critique 
of  Some  Recent  Subjunctive  Theories  (Cornell  Stud- 
ies, IX,  1898),  and  more  recently  in  The  Stipulative 
Subjunctive  in  Latin  (Transactions  of  the  Amer. 
Philol.  Assoc,  XXXI,  223  ff.).  Elmer's  chief  contri- 
butions to  syntax  appeared  in  the  American  Journal 
of  Philology,  XV,  2,  3,  reprinted  as  a  pamphlet  en- 
titled The  Latin  Prohibitive,  and  in  Vol.  VI  of 
the    Cornell    Studies    (Studies    in    Latin    Moods    and 

1  Indirectly,  through  the  Allen  and  Greenough  grammar,  some  of  these 
suggestions  have  exerted  a  considerable  influence.  But  for  various  rea- 
sons school  and  college  grammars  must  be  passed  over  in  this  sketch. 

2  Et  monere  et  moneri  proprium  est  uerae  amicitiae  et  alterum  libere  facere, 
non  aspere,  alterum  patienter  accipere,  non  repugnanter. 

14 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

Tenses).  I  venture  thus  to  place  the  work  of  these 
three  scholars  together,  because  the  question  is  not  of 
results,  in  regard  to  whicli  they  differ,  but  of  method, 
and  their  method  is  in  all  essentials  nearly  enough  iden- 
tical to  justify  general  rather  than  individual  descrip- 
tion and  comment. 

It  has  been  said  above  that  the  methods  and  results 
of  the  Conjunctiv  und  Optativ  have  met  with  general 
acceptance  in  America.  This  is  so  far  true  that  it  is 
proper  to  speak  of  the  American  work  as  a  continuation 
of  Delbruck's  work  and  an  application  of  his  methods 
to  Latin  syntax.  It  is  not  necessary  therefore  to  repeat 
the  characterization  of  that  method  attempted  above, 
but  only  to  show  what  aspects  of  it  have  been  espe- 
cially emphasized. 

The  most  important  of  these  are  the  result  of  a  failure 
to  distinguish  sharply  between  the  work  of  comparative 
syntax  and  the  work  of  Latin  syntax.  In  consequence 
of  this  there  appears  in  the  work  of  American  scholars 
an  undue  emphasis  upon  inferences  as  to  the  prehistoric 
stage  and  a  tendency  to  make  too  large  use  of  the 
methods  of  comparative  sjrntax ;  that  is,  there  is  con- 
fusion both  as  to  aim  and  as  to  method.  The  aim  of 
comparative  philology  is  the  construction  of  hypotheses 
and  the  suggestion  of  possibilities  which  will  be  in 
harmony  with  the  facts  of  the  historic  periods  and  will 
throw  additional  light  upon  the  phenomena  of  the  single 
language.  This  aim  is  primarily  historical  and  direc- 
tive. The  aim  of  Greek  or  Latin  syntax  is  to  study 
processes  and  to  formulate  laws;  it  is  primarily  psy- 
chological and  linguistic,  and  only  secondarily  histor- 
ical. It  is  hazardous  to  attempt  to  interpret  the  aim 
and  purpose  of  others,  but  it  is  difficult  to  resist  the 
impression  that  the  contribution  which   Latin   syntax 

15 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

may  make  to  prehistoric  syntax  has  occupied  a  place 
of  undue  importance  in  the  work  of  American  schol- 
ars. Accepting  without  reserve  the  categories  of  modal 
function  which  Delbriick  has  made  for  the  Indo- 
European  speech,  the  endeavor  of  syntacticists  has 
been  to  discover  survivals  of  these  functions  in  Latin. 
Thus  Hale  has  connected  the  future  force  of  the  sub- 
junctive in  certain  sentence-forms  with  the  primitive 
future,  and  Elmer  would  establish  a  function  of 
obligation  reaching  back  to  the  Indo-European  stage. 
The  emphasis  placed  upon  this  side  of  the  work  — 
a  perfectly  legitimate  side  in  itself  —  has  brought  about 
a  tendency  to  regard  such  connection  with  the  earlier 
period  as  the  most  important  part  of  syntactical 
work  and  as  the  ultimate  and  sufficient  explanation 
of  Latin  usage.  The  inevitable  result  is  a  with- 
drawing of  interest  from  the  proper  work  of  Latin 
syntax. 

Of  aims  one  must  speak  with  some  hesitation,  but  in 
regard  to  methods  one  may  speak  with  more  positive- 
ness.  By  the  necessity  of  the  case  the  student  of  pre- 
historic speech  must  depend  upon  inference,  since  he 
has  no  contemporary  data  and  can  look  only  for  some- 
what general  results.  The  nature  of  his  problem  com- 
pels him  to  run  the  risk  of  dealing  with  abstractions 
and  with  bare  probabilities.  But  the  student  of  Latin 
may  and  therefore  should  use  a  method  which  keeps 
closer  to  the  facts.  His  work  is  one  of  observation  and 
of  accurate  induction  within  narrow  limits.  The  use 
of  large  functional  classes,  like  the  volitive,  the  poten- 
tial, the  optative,  as  the  tools  of  investigation,  when 
more  precise  formal  classification  is  made  possible  by 
the  possession  of  abundant  data,  is  a  considerable  defect 
in  method  —  in  this  case  the  result,  apparently,  of  a 

16 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

too  complete  adoption  of  the  methods  of  comparative 
syntax.1 

One  other  characteristic  of  the  method  of  American 
syntax  deserves  special  mention ;  it  has  been,  in  Greek 
as  well  as  in  Latin,  conspicuously  systematic.  There  is 
doubtless  some  danger  in  the  use  of  tables  and  graphic 
schemes  of  syntax,  the  danger  that  they  may  become 
traditional  and  may  lead  to  the  ignoring  of  the  irregu- 
lar, the  exceptional.  Language  is  so  hap- hazard,  so 
complex,  that  the  exceptional  cases  which  do  not  fit 
into  systems  are  the  cases  which  deserve  most  attention 
and  may  afford  suggestions  for  new  discovery.  But 
the  dangers  of  formlessness  and  absence  of  system  are 
still  greater.  Facts,  if  they  are  truly  and  fully  appre- 
hended, will  in  the  end  always  group  themselves  sys- 
tematically, and  the  emphasis  which  American  syntax 
has  laid  upon  system  is  a  real  contribution  to  the  science. 

1  These  remarks  are  perhaps  liable  to  misconstruction.  I  certainly  do 
not  mean  to  take  the  position  of  undervaluing,  or  even  of  criticising,  so 
monumental  a  work  as  Delbriick's  Comparative  Syntax,  either  as  to  its 
method  or  its  results.  But  the  methods  of  comparative  syntax  are  entirely 
inapplicable  to  the  syntax  of  Latin  or  of  Greek.  It  is  the  results  that  are 
of  interest  to  the  Latin  scholar.  And  even  with  reference  to  these  he 
must  exercise  some  reserve,  not  only  because  the  science  is  still  somewhat 
young,  and  many  of  its  results  not  yet  a  part  of  the  accepted  doctrine,  but 
also  because  the  classical  scholar  must  take  them,  if  he  takes  them  at  all, 
in  a  rather  uncritical  way.  The  linguistic  equipment  of  most  Latin 
scholars,  to  speak  frankly,  consists  of  a  knowledge  of  Latin  and  Greek,  a 
reading  and  speaking  knowledge  of  English,  German,  French,  and  per- 
haps Italian,  and  a  fading  recollection  of  Sanskrit.  The  ability  to  read 
the  examples  in  a  number  of  languages  is  a  poor  foundation  for  critical 
judgment,  and  the  only  part  of  this  equipment  that  is  of  much  value  is 
the  Latin  and  Greek.  It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  we  must  forego 
entirely  the  enlightenment  which  comes  from  finding  parallel  phenomena 
in  another  language,  or  in  many  Indo-European  languages,  but  only  that 
we  must  face  our  limitations  and  do  our  work  where  we  are  competent  to 
do  it.  Otherwise  we  shall  run  into  parallel  grammars  of  Greek  and 
Latin  and  other  scientific  anachronisms. 
2  17 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

Dittmar's  Studien  zur  Lateinischen  Moduslehre  opens 
with  an  elaborate  discussion  of  Hale's  Cum,  and  in  its 
general  outline  so  much  resembles  that  book  that  it 
may  properly  be  regarded  as  a  continuation  of  the  same 
method,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  some  details  of 
treatment  and  in  its  results  it  is  a  protest  against  the 
prevalent  views.  The  main  thesis  is  that  the  confu- 
sions of  modal  syntax  can  be  removed  if  the  subjunctive 
be  regarded  in  all  its  uses,  either  in  independent  or  in 
subordinate  clauses,  as  the  expression  of  an  attitude 
of  mind  which  is  described  by  the  adjective  polemisch, 
while  the  indicative  in  like  manner  expresses  the 
souverdn  attitude.  It  is  evident  that  this  is  a  form  of 
psychological  Grundbegriff  and  that  the  book  belongs 
therefore  in  the  line  of  work  in  which  the  discovery 
of  a  fundamental  meaning  is  the  ultimate  aim,  but  in 
many  details  the  method  employed  is  unusual.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  not  Dittmar's  purpose  to  show  that 
the  polemic  element  underlying  the  subjunctive  is  its 
earliest  meaning,  though  in  a  brief  summary  he  ex- 
presses the  opinion  that  this  meaning  was  found  in  the 
Indo-European  period,  but  rather  to  show  that  it  is 
found  in  equal  measure  in  all  uses  of  the  subjunctive 
from  Ennius  to  Juvenal,  substantially  unchanged.  He 
does  not,  therefore,  deal  largely  in  prehistoric  specula- 
tion, but  cites  a  considerable  number  of  cases  without 
much  regard  to  chronology,  and  finds  in  each  subjunc- 
tive a  polemisch  element,  in  each  indicative  something 
souveran.  In  the  second  place,  the  cases  of  the  sub- 
junctive are  all  (except  half  a  dozen  repudiating  ques- 
tions) taken  from  subordinate  clauses.  Whether  this 
is  because  the  polemic  character  of  the  subjunctive  in 
leading  clauses  is  regarded  as  self-evident  or  because 
Dittmar  believes  that  the  true  character  of  the  mode  is 

18 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

most  apparent  in  the  subordinate  clause,  is  not  stated. 
A  third  characteristic  of  the  method  is  the  arrangement 
of  many  of  the  cases,  e.  g.,  the  cases  of  ^uj-clause,  in 
groups  by  form,  not  by  function.  There  are  thirty-six 
such  groups  under  qui,  nineteen  under  cum.  But  this 
is  not  followed  out  systematically;  there  are  many  more 
than  thirty-six  formal  varieties  of  ^wi-clause,  and  the 
three  groups  of  w^-clauses  are  still  more  short  of  com- 
pleteness. But  the  beginning  of  a  formal  classilication 
is  worthy  of  note. 

I  have  thus  far  followed  the  dominant  school  of  syn- 
tax down  to  the  present  time.  The  characteristic  of 
its  method  which  connects  the  later  work  with  the 
earlier  in  an  unbroken  line  is  the  conception  of  a  Grund- 
begriff  as  the  goal  of  syntactical  investigation.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  century  the  fundamental  meaning  was 
sought  in  metaphysical  or  logical  definition;  under  the 
influence  of  Bopp  and  Curtius  and  the  comparative 
etymologists  it  was  sought  by  analysis  of  inflected 
forms  into  their  significant  elements;  under  Delbriick's 
leadership  it  has  been  sought  by  psychological  defini- 
tion. The  method  of  the  search  has  varied,  the  object 
sought  has  been  essentially  the  same. 

In  thus  following  down  to  the  present  time  the  lead- 
ing school  of  syntactical  method  I  have  passed  by  much 
work  which  was  going  on  upon  slightly  different  lines. 
The  greater  amount  of  work,  especially  the  dissertation 
work,  of  this  period  has  been  along  the  lines  laid  down 
by  Draeger.  A  good  illustration  of  its  character  is 
Dahl's  Die  Lateinisehe  Partikel  VT,  Kristiania,  1882. 
In  his  treatment  of  the  modes  Dahl  shows  the  influence 
of  Delbriick,  but  the  general  scheme  of  classification  is 
functional,  more  elaborate  than  Draeger's  or  Kuhner's, 
as  the  narrower  field  permits,  but  essentially  the  same 

19 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

in  method.  The  book  deserves  mention  in  such  a 
sketch  as  this  merely  as  a  reminder  of  the  fact  that 
no  single  school  has  completely  occupied  the  ground; 
descriptive  and  functional  syntax  has  held  its  own  by 
the  side  of  speculative  and  comparative  methods. 

Meanwhile  two  movements  had  begun  within  the 
general  field  of  philology  which  have  already  influenced 
the  methods  and  even  the  aims  of  syntax  and  which 
are  destined  to  influence  them  still  more  deeply  in  the 
future.  These  are  the  modern  school  of  phonetic  sci- 
ence, often  called  the  Junggrammatisch  school,  and  the 
science  of  general  linguistics. 

The  history  of  the  neo-grammatical  movement  has 
been  sketched  in  various  places1  and  need  not  be  at- 
tempted here.  To  an  outsider  the  doctrine  that  pho- 
netic laws  work  without  exception  does  not  seem  to  be 
so  much  a  fundamental  principle  as  an  incidental  doc- 
trine, a  step  in  the  progress  of  the  movement,  raised 
into  a  somewhat  factitious  importance  by  the  fact  that 
it  happened  to  become  a  point  of  attack  and  of  defence. 
But  it  behooves  one  who  looks  at  the  question  from  the 
outside  to  speak  with  caution ;  the  doctrine  is  at  least 
illustrative  of  the  shift  of  the  center  of  interest  from 
morphology  to  phonology.  The  three  steps  have  been 
etymology,  morphology,  phonology.  In  the  second 
stage  the  laws  of  sound-change  were  studied  in  order 
to  explain  forms ;  in  the  third  stage  forms  were  studied 
in  order  to  discover  the  laws  which  had  been  at  work 
in  producing  them.  The  effect  of  this  shift  of  center 
upon  syntactical  method  is  indirect  but  strong.  In  the 
first  place,  it  has  to  a  considerable  extent  withdrawn 
interest  and  conviction  from  the  earlier  conception  of 

1  E.  g.  Delbriick,  Einleitung  in  das  Sprachstudium,  especially  pp.  54  ff., 
Ziemer,  Junggrammatische  Streifziige,  pp.  1-29. 

20 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORIC  A  I. 

agglutination  (cf.  Delbruck,  Einleitung,  p.  55),  and 
without  actually  proposing  a  substitute  lias  led  to  the 
suggestion  of  various  hypotheses  which  are  not  easily 
reconciled  with  any  theory  of  agglutination,  that  is, 
of  composition  of  significant  elements.  The  scientific 
support  which  the  teaching  of  Curtius  had  given  to  the 
explanation  of  inflectional  forms  by  definition,  by  a 
Griuidbegriff,  whether  psychological  or  metaphysical, 
thus  falls  away;  the  use  of  this  term  to  describe  the 
sphere  of  application  of  syntactical  forms 1  is  evidence 
of  this.  In  the  second  place,  the  newer  attitude  toward 
forms  and  the  laws  of  sound  turns  the  attention  from  re- 
sults to  processes,  to  laws.  Syntax  has  been  mainly  oc- 
cupied with  results,  with  the  tabulation  and  description 
of  the  facts  of  sentence-structure;  such  attention  as  it 
has  given  to  laws  and  processes  has  been  vague  and 
lacking  in  precision  because  it  has  been  on  too  large  a 
scale.  The  science  of  phonetics  sets  to  the  sister  sci- 
ence an  example  of  minute  and  patient  observation, 
and  one  instance  of  the  direct  transfer  of  a  method 
of  study  from  phonetics  to  syntax  will  be  mentioned 
below. 

The  second  great  movement  of  recent  years  in  phi- 
lology is  the  rise  of  the  science  of  linguistics.  It  is 
the  result  of  the  work  of  many  scholars  2  who  have  con- 
tributed to  it  from  various  sides,  phonetic  and  psycho- 
logical, and  as  the  movement  of  the  Neugrammatiker 
is  gathered  together  in  Brugmann's  G-rundriss,  so  the 
science  of  linguistics  is  summarized  in  Paul's  Prin- 
ciples, der  Sprachgeschichte.     The  close  connection  be- 

1  Delbriick  in  Brugmann's  Grundriss,  III.  I,  p.  81 ;  Brugmann,  Indog. 
Forsch.,  V,  p.  93,  n.  2. 

2  Among  them  an  American  may  with  justifiable  pride  name  "Whitney 
of  Yale. 

21 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

tween  the  two  movements  is  sufficiently  attested  by  the 
fact  that  the  lists  of  contributors  to  them  consist  largely 
of  the  same  names.  To  a  considerable  degree  the  field 
covered  is  also  the  same,  namely,  the  unconscious  and 
automatic  psychology  of  the  production  and  reproduc- 
tion of  articulate  sounds.  The  aim  and  method,  too, 
are  similar.  The  science  of  linguistics  is  interested  in 
processes,  in  the  process  of  speech-learning  and  speech 
transmission,  in  the  accumulated  variations  which  re- 
sult in  dialect,  in  the  steps  which  separate  the  popular 
from  the  written  language,  and  in  all  the  forces  and 
laws  which  bring  about  and  control  these  processes.  In 
these  respects  its  methods  would  naturally  exert  an  in- 
fluence upon  syntactical  method  like  the  influence  of 
the  new  phonology,  but  greater.  Both  sciences  suggest 
also  the  inadequacy  of  older  classifications  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  language  or  their  uselessness  for  the  solving 
of  the  newer  questions.  Phonology  cuts  across  the 
parts  of  speech,  taking  its  illustrations  indifferently 
from  nouns  or  adverbs  or  verbs,  and  linguistics  finds 
proofs  of  the  working  of  analogy  alike  in  sounds  or 
word-forms  or  word-meanings;  it  is  in  part  this  dis- 
regard of  distinctions  which  have  been  regarded  as 
fundamental  that  made  these  sciences  at  first  so  con- 
fusing to  the  ordinary  classical  philologist.  But  the 
example  is  one  which  the  syntacticist  may  well  lay  to 
heart. 

These  contributions  to  syntactical  method  are  in- 
direct, in  the  way  of  suggestion  merely ;  but  linguistics 
is  concerned  also  with  the  conscious  psychology  of 
speech,  with  the  train  of  thought  which  accompanies 
and  is  associated  with  utterance,  and  in  this  respect  it 
approaches  the  field  of  syntax  more  closely.  Between 
semantics  and  syntax  it  is  not  possible  to  draw  a  sharp 

22 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

line,  and  the  principles  and  methods  of  semantics  as  set 
forth,  for  example,  in  Brdal's  Essai  de  Simawtigue  or 
in  Darmesteter's  La  Vie  des  Mots  are  immediately  avail- 
able, with  but  slight  change,  for  the  uses  of  syntax. 

The  influence  of  the  newer  phonetics,  of  linguistics 
in  general,  and  of  semantics  may  be  illustrated  by  a 
consideration  of  the  methods  of  three  books  published 
within  the  last  twenty  years. 

Ziemer's  Junggrammatische  Streifzilge  (Colberg,  1883) 
first  appeared  as  a  program  in  1879  under  the  title  Das 
Psychologische  Moment  in  der  Bildung  Syntaktischer 
Sprachformen.  In  the  enlarged  form  a  historical  intro- 
duction gives  a  sketch  of  the  neo-grammatical  move- 
ment, and  discusses  the  possible  application  of  its 
methods  to  syntax.  The  body  of  the  book  treats  of  the 
psychological  element  in  speech,  discusses  the  nature 
of  assimilation  as  it  appears  in  syntactical  forms,  defines 
three  kinds  of  syntactical  assimilation,  and  illustrates 
them  at  length  with  many  examples  taken  chiefly  from 
the  Latin.  The  book  is  thus  a  direct  transfer  of  the 
methods  and  the  aims  of  morphology  to  syntactical 
investigation ;  the  laws  of  assimilation  under  the  influ- 
ence of  analogy  were  discovered  and  worked  out  in  the 
field  of  morphology,  and  Ziemer's  purpose  is  to  show 
that  good  results  may  be  obtained  by  a  like  method  in 
the  field  of  syntax.  But  while  the  results  are  interest- 
ing and  the  explanation  of  many  peculiar  constructions 
is  clearer  than  any  previous  explanation,  the  value  of 
the  book  is  in  its  method,  in  the  fact  that  it  does  not 
aim  primarily  at  rules  for  case-constructions  or  for  the 
use  of  the  subjunctive  mode,  but  at  the  establishment 
of  a  law  of  speech  which  underlies  case-construction 
and  modal  use  alike.  It  directs  the  attention  away 
from  classifications  and  fixes  it  upon  the  working  of 

23 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

the  mind  of  the  speaker,  suggesting  thus  a  profounder 
syntax  working  in  the  sphere  of  causes. 

The  influence  of  this  original  and  significant  book  has 
not  been  as  great  as  might  have  been  expected.  Its 
merits  were  recognized  by  other  scholars  in  the  neo- 
grammatical  school,  to  whom  the  method,  in  its  mor- 
phological applications,  was  already  familiar,  but  it 
was  perhaps  too  bold  a  departure  from  the  ordinary 
method  of  syntax  to  meet  with  an  immediate  acceptance 
at  the  hands  of  classical  scholars.  Even  Ziemer  him- 
self in  his  Indogermanische  Oomparation  (1884)  returned 
to  the  older  method,  analyzing  the  comparative  forms 
into  supposedly  significant  elements  and  deriving  later 
uses  from  the  fundamental  meaning  thus  obtained,  and 
no  one  has  taken  up  the  fruitful  line  of  study  sug- 
gested in  the  StreifziXge.  For  this  method  is  capable 
of  wide  extension.  Historical  syntax  consists  in  part 
in  the  tracing  of  relationships  between  different  struc- 
tures, in  the  determining  of  the  influence  of  one  mode 
of  expression  upon  another,  either  in  the  way  of  attrac- 
tion or  of  competition.  But  all  this  historical  and 
genetic  study  of  syntax  is  in  danger  of  remaining  vague 
and  inconclusive,  unless  it  is  completed  and  fortified  by 
the  most  minute  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  under- 
lying psychological  resemblances  and  differences  which 
are  the  cause  of  relationships  and  competitions.  Such 
analysis  may  be  employed,  as  Ziemer  has  employed  it, 
in  wider  fields. 

Ziemer's  Streifziige  may  properly  be  connected  par- 
ticularly with  the  school  of  morphology  to  which  he 
belongs,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  often  refers  to 
Paul's  Principien  and  uses,  as  is  natural,  the  terms 
of  general  linguistics.  In  like  manner  Gutjahr-Probst, 
though  he  quotes  and  refers  to  the  Neugrammatiker, 

24 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

may  be  properly  regarded  as  more  distinctly  an  expo- 
nent of  the  influence  of  general  linguistic  science  upon 
syntax. 

His  Beitrcige  zur  Lateinischen  G-rammatik  appeared  in 
three  parts:  the  first  (1883)  dealing  with  the  verb,  the 
second  (1883)  with  particles  and  conjunctions,  the  third 
(1888)  with  ut  in  Terence  (und  Verwcmdtes).  It  is  in 
the  second  and  the  earlier  portions  of  the  third  part  that 
the  characteristics  appear  which  make  it  worth  while 
to  mention  the  book  in  this  sketch.  These  sections 
deal  with  the  history  of  the  subordinating  conjunctions 
and  particles.  Since  the  fact  was  first  recognized  (by 
Lange  and,  in  more  detail,  by  Delbriick)  that  the  sub- 
ordinating function  is  an  acquired  function,  little  had 
been  done  in  the  way  of  precise  study  of  the  steps  of 
this  acquisition,  at  least  in  Latin.  Kienitz'  study  of 
quin  (1878)  is  cited  by  Probst  in  the  bibliography  pre- 
fixed to  the  second  part,  and  O.  Brugmann's  Gebrauch 
des  condicionalen  Ni  (1887)  in  the  third  part,  but  even 
now,  though  there  are  many  useful  contributions  to  our 
knowledge  of  conjunctions,  there  has  been  but  little 
study  of  their  early  conjunctional  history  that  goes 
beyond  the  very  general  principles  laid  down  by  Del- 
briick. The  main  contribution  which  Probst's  work 
makes  to  syntactical  method  is,  therefore,  in  its  general 
attitude,  in  the  author's  perception  of  this  large  gap  in 
our  knowledge  of  the  steps  of  the  process  of  acquiring 
subordinating  power.  In  his  manner  of  approaching 
this  question,  also,  Probst  is,  in  general,  guided  by 
correct  principles,  for  he  emphasizes  and  to  some  degree 
illustrates  the  true  linguistic  ideas  that,  in  the  first 
place,  a  particle  may  start,  so  far  as  our  knowledge 
goes,  from  a  variety  of  applications  and  uses,  not  from 
some  single  fundamental  meaning,  and  that  the  process 

25 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

which  is  to  be  studied  is  a  movement  toward  precision, 
not  away  from  it.  And,  in  the  second  place,  he  recog- 
nizes the  general  principle  that  a  conjunction  or  particle 
acquires  its  meaning  from  the  sentence,  not  the  sen- 
tence from  the  conjunction.  These  two  leading  prin- 
ciples come  from  the  science  of  linguistics,  and  it  is 
their  recognition  which  makes  Probst  a  fair  representa- 
tive of  the  influence  of  linguistics  upon  Latin  syntax. 

As  in  the  case  of  Ziemer's  Streifzuge,  the  recognition 
which  Probst's  work  has  received  has  been  chiefly  from 
scholars  of  the  neo-grammarian  and  linguistic  schools, 
who  looked  primarily  at  the  method.  Students  of  Latin 
syntax,  who  were  concerned  chiefly  with  the  results, 
have  been  much  less  favorable  in  their  judgment.  Some 
of  the  details  of  Probst's  work  will  come  up  later  for 
consideration ;  but  it  must  be  said  that  it  contains  some 
surprising  errors  of  fact  and  of  inference,  e.  g.,  the 
statements  that  quod  passed  through  an  interrogative 
stage,  that  an  acquired  a  special  function  in  competi- 
tion with  nonne,  that  enim  was  originally  interrogative ; 
indeed,  the  whole  theory  of  the  interrogative  sentence 
is  incorrect.  Such  errors,  however,  should  not  prevent 
a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  in  its  fundamental  prin- 
ciples the  book  will  teach  much  which  cannot  be  learned 
from  the  far  more  precise  and  careful  work  of  Dahl  or 
of  Schnoor  on  ut  in  Plautus. 

The  third  book  which  deserves  mention  as  illustrat- 
ing the  influence  of  other  branches  of  philology  upon 
syntax  is  Ries's  Was  ist  Syntax?  Marburg,  1894,  almost 
the  only  work  of  recent  years  except  Koppin's  programs, 
mentioned  above,  which  deals  at  any  length  with  ques- 
tions of  the  method  and  theory  of  syntax.  Its  main 
thesis  is  that,  as  single  words  are  studied  with  refer- 
ence both  to  their  form  (morphology)  and  their  mean- 

26 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

ing  (semasiology),  so  groupings  of  words  should  be 
studied  with  reference  to  their  structure  (formal  syn- 
tax) and  their  meaning  (functional  syntax).  The  dis- 
tinction between  form  and  function  is  a  very  old  one, 
and  its  application  to  sentences  was  suggested,  as  so 
many  other  developments  of  modern  syntax  were  sug- 
gested, in  Lange's  paper  (1852).  Ries,  however,  while 
giving  full  credit  to  Lange,  has  much  enlarged  the  sub- 
ject and  applied  it  with  all  the  added  light  which  the 
advance  of  semantics  since  Lange's  time  has  thrown 
upon  it.  All  this  (the  details  are  too  well  known  to 
call  for  mention)  constitutes  a  large  and  very  direct 
contribution  to  syntactical  method.  So  far  as  the  syn- 
tax of  inflected  forms  is  concerned  (case-construction 
and  much  of  modal  syntax),  the  laws  which  govern  the 
change  of  meaning  of  single  words  apply  almost  with- 
out change,  and  the  problem  of  the  acquisition  of  sub- 
ordinating force  is,  quite  strictly,  a  semantic  problem. 
The  treatment  of  ut  in  a  lexicon  should  be  essentially 
the  same  as  its  treatment  in  a  scientific  grammar.  A 
larger  modification  is  necessary  in  transferring  the 
methods  of  semasiology  to  the  syntax  of  groups  of 
words ;  meaning  plays  but  a  subordinate  part  in  deter- 
mining the  form  of  words,  but  in  the  grouping  of  words 
meaning  is  the  shaping  and  controlling  force. 

The  three  works  last  mentioned,  embodying,  respec- 
tively, the  suggestions  which  syntacticists  may  receive 
from  morphology,  from  general  linguistics,  and  from 
semantics,  may  be  said  to  be  on  the  outskirts,  or  per- 
haps to  be  outposts,  of  syntactical  work.  The  main 
current  of  work  has  kept  somewhat  closer  to  the  lines 
of  descriptive  and  statistical  grammar,  though  it  has 
been  affected  in  varying  degree  by  the  influences  of  the 
other  schools   of  philology.     Of   this  solid  and  intel- 

27 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

ligible  work  the  articles  and  books  of  H.  Blase  may 
be  taken  as  representative.  They  consist,  beside  the 
doctor-dissertation  on  conditional  sentences  in  Plautus 
(1885),  of  the  Gescldchte  des  Irrealis  (1888),  the  Gre- 
schichte  des  Plusquamperfekts  (1894)  and  various  articles 
in  Wolfflin's  Archiv.  The  method  employed  in  them 
is  characterized  by  its  close  adherence  to  facts ;  much 
of  the  work  is  descriptive  and  interpretive,  with  statis- 
tics in  condensed  tables  and  with  careful  observance 
of  the  local  and  stylistic  peculiarities  of  the  writer. 
An  unusual  amount  of  attention  is  given  to  late  Latin 
and  to  the  connection  with  the  Romance  syntax.  The 
article  on  the  futures  and  the  perfect  subjunctive  in 
Wolfflin's  Archiv,  X,  3,  starts  from  the  state  of  things 
in  certain  Romance  languages  and  traces  this  back  to 
its  origin  in  Latin.  On  the  negative  side  the  method 
is  no  less  noteworthy.  The  PlusquamperfeJct  and  the 
Irrealis  both  begin  with  the  material  in  Plautus,  and  in 
all  the  work  there  is  a  complete  avoidance  of  speculation 
or  even  of  the  simplest  inference  in  regard  to  prehistoric 
syntax.  The  whole  question  of  the  fundamental  mean- 
ing of  the  subjunctive  is  ignored,  with  all  the  related 
questions  in  regard  to  a  supposed  Indo-European  origin 
of  this  or  that  usage.  The  discussion  in  regard  to 
absolute  and  relative  time,  the  most  extensive  if  not 
the  most  important  discussion  in  modern  syntax  of  the 
verb,  is  briefly  dismissed  in  a  few  pages  of  the  Plus- 
quamperfekt.  In  all  this  the  connection  of  Blase  with 
the  work  in  the  syntax  of  early  Latin  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Studemund  is  apparent;  his  method  is  in  general 
that  of  E.  Becker  and  Richter  and  Bach  in  Stude- 
mund's  Studien.  But  while  he  thus  ignores,  appar- 
ently of  deliberate  choice,  much  of  current  work,  he  is 
not  uninfluenced  by  the  thought  of  the  general  science 

28 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  linguistics.  The  explanation,  for  example,  of  the 
Plautine/M eram  (=fui)  is  by  a  Kombinations-Ausgleich- 
ung,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  Ziemer. 

The  work  of  Schmalz  in  the  revision  of  Krebs's 
Antibarbanis,  and  especially  in  the  Latin  Syntax  of 
Vol.  II  of  Midler's  Handbuch  is  too  well  known  to 
need  description.  In  general,  his  method  of  treatment 
is  like  that  of  Blase,  exhibiting  the  same  tendency  to 
avoid  speculation  and  to  keep  close  to  facts.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  Antibarbarus  is  mainly  stylistic,  and  the 
habit  of  close  observation  of  stylistic  peculiarities  is 
carried  over  into  the  Syntax.  The  introduction,  in- 
deed, dwells  at  somewhat  disproportionate  length  upon 
the  need  of  distinguishing  between  the  spoken  and  the 
written  Latin  and  upon  the  individual  and  local  pecu- 
liarities of  authors,  so  that  in  the  third  edition  only  a 
few  lines  are  given  to  the  explanation  of  the  system 
which  is  followed  in  the  book.  The  object  of  the  Syn- 
tax, also,  —  to  serve  as  a  compendium  or  exhibition  of 
the  accepted  results  of  syntactical  science,  —  tends  to 
exclude  theory,  and  in  many  parts,  where  no  reasonably 
satisfactory  theory  exists,  only  a  bare  presentation  of 
facts  is  possible.  The  result  of  these  limitations  is 
that,  valuable  as  the  work  has  been  to  syntactical 
scholars,  it  makes  but  slight  contribution  to  the  theory 
or  method  of  syntax.  The  only  novelty  is  the  substi- 
tution of  a  formal  classification  of  subordinate  clauses, 
by  the  introducing  word,  for  the  prevailing  functional 
arrangement.     This  was  proposed  by  Jolly  in  1874. 

The  foundation  of  the  Archiv  fur  Lateinische  Lexico- 
graphic unci  G-rammatik  in  1884,  and  the  inclusion  of 
syntax  within  its  scope,  has  brought  together  many 
syntactical  articles.  They  vary  somewhat  in  method, 
but  there  is  a  large  enough  common  element  to  justify 

29 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

a  general  comment  without  mentioning  individual  work, 
even  that  of  the  editor,  Wolfflin. 

1.  There  is  little  comparative  or  prehistoric  syntax, 
little  speculation,  little  consideration  of  fundamental 
meanings,  and  the  influence  of  the  methods  of  mor- 
phology and  general  linguistics  is  not  great. 

2.  But  there  are  many  articles  on  the  border-land 
between  syntax  and  semantics,  especially  the  "Was 
heisst  .   .  .    ? "  articles. 

3.  Much  attention  is  paid  to  local  varieties  of  Latin 
speech,  particularly  to  African  Latin,  and  to  the  pecu- 
liarities of  late  Latin  and  the  connection  with  the 
Romance  languages. 

4.  Many  of  the  articles  follow  single  constructions 
through  all  periods,  making  perpendicular  sections,  so 
to  speak,  instead  of  following  a  group  of  related  con- 
structions horizontally  through  a  single  author  or  period. 

5.  The  most  noticeable  characteristic  is  that  which 
has  been  already  noted  in  the  work  of  Schmalz,  the 
tendency  to  be  satisfied,  at  least  for  the  present,  with 
recorded  and  unconnected  observation.  The  journals 
of  the  natural  sciences  are  full  of  such  work,  e.  g.,  in 
chemistry  or  natural  history,  and  the  value  of  it  is  un- 
questionable. But  it  is  also  evident  that  it  is  mere 
material  until  it  is  organized  by  theory. 

The  period  which  has  been  under  survey  in  the  pre- 
ceding pages,  covering  a  little  more  than  a  quarter  of  a 
century,  is  not  easily  summarized,  yet  certain  lines  of 
historical  connection  run  through  it,  as  I  have  attempted 
to  show,  and  serve  as  a  basis  for  understanding  its  aims 
and  methods. 

It  has  been,  in  part,  a  period  of  healthy  variety. 
Perhaps  the  largest  portion  of  it  in  bulk,  if  all  doctor- 

30 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

dissertations  be  included,  is  descriptive,  and  this  por- 
tion varies  considerably  from  the  unconnected  record 
of  facts,  such  as  may  be  found  in  the  briefer  notes  in 
Wb'lfflin's  Archiv,  to  the  systematized  and  classified 
description  in  Dahl's  ut  or  the  papers  in  Studemund's 
Studien.  Much  of  this  description  is  given,  of  course, 
as  a  foundation  for  scientific  induction,  and  is  arranged 
with  reference  to  that  end.  There  has  been  also  much 
functional  study,  the  ultimate  end  of  which  is  the  more 
precise  statement  of  a  syntactical  rule  or  the  more  exact 
determination  of  the  means  used  to  express  a  function 
like  the  causal  or  the  conditional  relation.  Nearly  all 
study  of  conditions  has  been  functional.  There  has 
been  also  a  considerable  amount  of  speculative  work, 
the  result  mainly  of  a  desire  to  systematize  the  observed 
phenomena.  But  discussion  of  the  principles  of  syntax 
has  been  almost  wholly  passed  over.  In  this  respect 
syntax  has  been  remarkably  conservative. 

This  variety  in  aim  and  method  is,  I  have  said,  a 
natural  and  healthy  variety.  There  is  no  single  aim 
for  such  a  science  as  syntax,  and  there  is  therefore  no 
single  method  which  can  properly  claim  superiority  at 
all  points.  Aims  vary  in  importance,  and  the  methods 
appropriate  to  them  also  vary,  but  knowledge  is  many- 
sided,  and  all  aspects  of  it  are  legitimate.  Descriptive 
syntax  has  by  no  means  covered  the  whole  field;  of 
such  an  important  subject  as  the  relative  clause  we 
have  still  but  a  fragmentary  and  incomplete  description. 
And  the  methods  of  descriptive  and  statistical  syntax 
are  still  inexact;  it  is  not  possible  to  describe  species 
by  the  present  method  so  that  single  cases  of  the  species 
can  be  identified  beyond  dispute.  Functional  study, 
also,  has  a  legitimate  place ;  it  increases  the  precision  of 
interpretation,  and  is  often  the  best  means  of  approach- 

31 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

ing  a  mass  of  cases  and  of  discovering  formal  differences. 
But  it  also  offers  many  opportunities  for  improvement 
in  method.  Its  categories  are  still  too  vague  and  sweep- 
ing. }  And  of  speculation  in  its  proper  place,  not  as  a 
substitute  for  knowledge  but  as  directive  of  investiga- 
tion, there  must  always  be  need.  It  is  perhaps  the 
highest,  as  it  is  certainly  the  most  difficult  and  the 
most  attractive,  exercise  of  the  mind  in  scientific  work. 
But  it  must  be  controlled  by  knowledge  of  what  has 
already  been  attempted  or  accomplished,  lest  it  fall  into 
the  error  of  repeating  in  slightly  changed  form  hypoth- 
eses which  have  been  already  suggested.  This  danger 
is,  of  course,  common  to  all  kinds  of  investigation,  but 
the  necessary  vagueness  of  speculation  makes  it  pecu- 
liarly open  to  it. 

Through  the  variety,  however,  which  has  marked  the 
period,  there  has  run  one  dominant  note.  The  power 
and  brilliancy  of  Delbriick  as  an  investigator,  his  im- 
mense knowledge  and  the  clearness  and  persuasiveness 
of  his  presentation,  which  pointed  him  out  as  the  natural 
co-worker  of  Brugmann  on  the  Grundriss,  have  made 
him  easily  the  first  scholar  of  the  period  in  syntax.  Of 
either  the  results  or  the  methods  of  his  work  in  compara- 
tive syntax  no  one  is  competent  to  speak  who  is  not  him- 
self a  comparative  philologist,  but  Delbriick  has  in  his 
Greek  Syntax  set  the  example  of  applying  the  same 
method  to  a  single  language,  and  other  scholars  have  in 
like  manner  applied  it  to  Latin.  My  reasons  for  believ- 
ing that  the  epoch  which  has  been  especially  characterized 
by  this  method  is  approaching  its  conclusion  have  been 

1  See,  for  instance,  the  programs  of  Imme,  Die  Fragesatze  nach  psycho- 
logischen  Gesichtspunkten  eingeteilt  und  erlautert  (Cleve,  1879,  1881),  and 
compare  the  fruitful  results  there  reached  with  the  ordinary  careless  three- 
fold division  of  interrogative  sentences  according  to  the  answer  expected. 

32 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

suggested  incidentally  above,  and  may  be  put  together 
here  in  a  more  formal  way. 

1.  The  method  of  explaining  the  meaning  of  an 
inflected  form  by  means  of  a  Qrundbegriff  is  an  uncon- 
scious survival  of  the  logical  or  metaphysical  view  of 
language,  which  made  definition  the  ultimate  explana- 
tion. It  received  scientific  sanction  from  the  etymo- 
logical system  of  Bopp  and  Curtius,  which  analyzed 
inflected  forms  into  significant  elements  and  suggested 
the  substitution  of  a  psychological  for  the  metaphysical 
content  of  the  definition. 

2.  It  belongs  to  the  earlier  and  looser  period  of  the 
study  of  origins,  when,  in  the  first  application  of  the 
comparative  method  to  living  organisms,  biological  sci- 
ence was  sufficiently  occupied  with  the  tracing  of  rela- 
tionships between  species  by  finding  or  inferring  a 
common  ancestor.  That  method  of  study  has  long  ago 
given  place  in  biology  to  more  exact  methods  and  other 
problems,  as  it  has  in  morphology,  and  as  it  must  in 
syntax. 

3.  The  permanent  value  of  the  method  —  and  it  is 
great  —  lies  in  its  introduction  of  psychological  expla- 
nation and  in  the  emphasis  which  it  places  upon  the 
historical  method.  These  are  indirect  and  suggestive, 
but  it  is  now  some  years  since  any  direct  result  in  the 
syntax  of  the  modes  has  been  attained  which  commands 
general  assent.  Its  continued  use  in  Latin  has  brought 
out  many  new  names  for  certain  groupings  of  subjunc- 
tive usage  —  anticipatory,  Active,  polemical,  obligation, 
stipulation  —  and  these  have  their  value,  which  I  would 
not  underestimate,  in  bringing  into  clearer  light  the 
common  elements  in  groups  of  usage,  but  they  have 
not  proved,  and  in  the  nature  of  the  method  cannot 
prove,  historical  relationships  or  contribute  to  the  under- 

3  33 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

standing  of  the  problem  of  inflection.  On  the  contrary, 
this  loose  genetic  method  tends  to  substitute  vague 
phrases  and  vague  references  to  an  Indo-European 
origin  for  precise  knowledge.  The  method  is  becom- 
ing barren  of  results. 

To  these  indications  that  we  are  at  the  end  of  a 
period  may  be  added  some  others  more  general  in  char- 
acter. They  are  to  be  seen  in  the  dissatisfaction  of 
the  general  philological  public  with  the  vagueuess  and 
lack  of  intelligibility  of  syntactical  work;  in  the  in- 
creasing inclination  to  turn  back  to  general  principles, 
as  shown  in  Koppin's  programs,  in  Ries's  book,  and  in 
the  first  part  of  Ziemer's  Streifziige ;  in  the  reaching 
out  after  new  methods,  illustrated  by  Ziemer  and  Probst 
and  Ries;  and  perhaps  most  distinctly  in  the  falling 
back  upon  simpler  methods,  upon  description  and  sta- 
tistics, in  Wb'lfflin's  Archiv  and  other  work  of  the  same 
school.  These  are  indications  which  students  of  syntax 
are  bound  to  note  and  to  interpret. 

New  epochs  in  science  come  as  the  result  of  the  in- 
jection of  new  ideas  into  the  thinking  of  scientific 
students.  The  revolution  is  most  striking  when  it  is 
brought  about  by  some  single  leader  or  by  some  one 
book,  but  it  is  quite  as  often  a  gradual  change,  the 
effect  of  many  causes  working  together.  Such  influ- 
ences are  now  at  work  upon  syntax  from  the  side  of 
morphology  and  phonetics,  of  general  linguistic  science 
and  of  semantics.  So  far  as  one  may  venture  to  antici- 
pate the  course  of  syntactical  thought,  they  indicate 
that  syntax  is  turning  away  from  genetic  problems  and 
from  grammatical  rules  and  will  be  directed  to  the  dis- 
covery and  illustration  of  the  psychological  phenomena 
which  underlie  the  grouping  of  words,  and  to  the  inves- 
tigation of  the  laws  which  have  governed  the  process 

34 


INTRODUCTORY  AND  HISTORICAL 

of  group -making.  The  method  by  which  this  research 
will  be  conducted  will  involve  a  return  to  more  minute 
observation  of  the  details  of  the  process. 

Such  a  change  as  this  may  be  hastened  and  made 
more  secure  and  regular  by  a  discussion  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  syntax;  it  is  in  the  hope  of  con- 
tributing to  such  a  discussion  that  the  following  papers 
have  been  put  together. 


35 


II 

THE  GROUPING  OF  CONCEPTS 

The  psychology  of  speech *  may  be  divided  into  two 
parts:  first,  the  psychology  of  sound-production,  which 
has  to  do  with  the  reflex  and  unconscious  action  of  the 
organs  of  speech,  including  the  memory  of  such  action 
by  which  sounds  are  repeated  and  in  which  they  are 
associated  and,  so  to  speak,  preserved ;  and,  second,  the 
psychology  of  the  train  of  thought  which  consciously 
accompanies  utterance  and  which  speech  is  felt  to  ex- 
press. It  is  with  the  latter,  of  course,  that  syntax 
deals,  though  not  with  all  of  it.  So  far  as  words  can 
be  separated  for  scientific  purposes  from  the  sentences 
in  which  they  are  used,  their  meaning  belongs  to  seman- 
tics.    Syntax  may  claim  as  its  special  province 2  on  the 

1  The  main  points  in  this  chapter  have  been  anticipated  by  Wundt, 
Vdlkerpsychologie,  I,  2,  234  ff.,  in  pages  which  I  read  with  mingled  dismay 
and  pleasure.  But  such  unity  as  the  papers  in  this  book  possess  is  depend- 
ent upon  this  chapter,  and  I  have  therefore  left  it  substantially  as  it  was 
written  out  some  two  years  ago.  Perhaps  the  fact  that  it  is  a  venture  of 
a  philologist  into  the  field  of  psychology  will  justify  the  repetition,  as  I  had 
hoped  that  it  would  excuse  the  mistakes  which  I  have  no  doubt  made  in 
an  unfamiliar  science. 

2  I  have  not  cared  to  discuss  here  or  later  the  delimitation  of  syntax 
from  semasiology,  though  the  question  of  distinguishing  the  meaning  of  a 
word  from  its  function  as  an  inflectional  form  might  come  up  below  (Chap. 
IX).  The  matter  has,  indeed,  been  so  clearly  treated  by  Ries  that  it  may 
be  considered  to  be  settled. 

36 


THE   GROUPING   OF  CONCEPTS 

psychological  side  only  those  concepts  which  find  ex- 
pression in  and  through  the  combination  of  words,  and 
the  fundamental  question  for  syntax  is  the  question  as 
to  the  nature  of  these  concepts.  In  order  to  under- 
stand them  it  is  necessary  first  to  trace  the  mental 
processes  which  precede,  accompany  and  follow  the 
utterance  of  a  group  of  words. 

Both  thought  and  utterance,  going  on  at  the  same 
time,  are  so  rapid  as  to  seem  almost  automatic.  So  far 
as  we  give  attention  consciously  to  the  process,  it  is 
ordinarily  rather  to  the  process  of  utterance,  to  the 
selection  of  words,  than  to  the  selection  of  concepts. 
A  hindrance  or  obstacle  to  easy  speech  seems  to  be  a 
difficulty  in  the  finding  of  words  rather  than  in  the 
finding  of  ideas.  But  the  fact  that  thought  also  calls 
for  selection  and  arrangement  is  apparent  enough  upon 
a  moment's  reflection,  especially  when  the  thought  is 
somewhat  careful,  as  in  writing  upon  a  serious  topic. 
In  such  a  case  we  begin  with  the  general  subject, 
which  lies  in  the  mind  in  vague  and  general  form. 
The  first  step  is  the  directing  of  the  attention  upon 
some  special  aspect,  which  is  one  of  many  aspects  sug- 
gested to  the  mind  by  association,  and  the  separation 
of  this  from  the  rest.  It  is  not,  however,  a  complete 
separation,  for  the  mind  retains  a  sense  of  the  relation 
of  the  special  aspect  to  the  general  topic.  Then,  as  a 
second  step,  either  some  other  special  aspect  is  brought 
before  the  attention,  or  the  aspect  first  noticed  is  in 
its  turn  subjected  to  a  like  process.  The  mind  again 
selects  from  the  concepts  which  are  suggested  by  asso- 
ciation one  to  which  the  attention  is  given,  and  this  also 
is  viewed  apart  from  others  and  yet  at  the  same  time  in 
relation  to  the  more  general  concept  of  which  it  formed 
a  part.     This  process   of  arrangement,  by  successive 

37 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

analysis,  will  be  carried  far  before  the  thought  is  suffi- 
ciently digested  for  expression  in  written  words. 

In  this  elaborate  preparation  of  thought  for  speech 
three  steps  may  be  distinguished.  First,  there  is  an 
analysis  of  the  germ-concept,  by  means  of  the  fixing  of 
the  attention  upon  some  single  one  of  the  concepts  sug- 
gested by  association.  Second,  the  suggested  concept 
is  not  so  much  separated  from  the  germ  as  viewed  in 
its  relation  to  the  germ;  the  mind  is  always  conscious 
of  the  relation,  and  it  is  because  of  the  nature  of  the 
relation  that  the  mind  selects  that  particular  concept 
rather  than  some  other.  Third,  there  is  through  the 
whole  process  a  more  or  less  conscious  reference  back 
to  the  original  idea,  a  comparison  of  the  analyzed 
group  with  the  original  unanalyzed  germ  in  order  to 
see  how  far  the  result  of  analysis  has  corresponded  to 
the  preconceived  idea.  These  three  steps  go  on  simul- 
taneously, though  in  a  long  analysis  the  third  process 
may  be  somewhat  intermittent. 

In  ordinary  experience  the  arrangement  of  thought  is 
of  course  less  orderly  than  this.  The  association  may 
be  aided  by  accumulated  notes  which  disturb  the  regu- 
larity of  the  process,  or  the  subject  may  be  one  which 
requires  little  analysis,  like  a  narrative  of  events  already 
connected  by  the  order  of  their  occurrence.  In  the  still 
more  rapid  processes  of  conversation,  where  the  thought 
is  constantly  diverted  by  the  suggestions  of  others,  it  is 
quite  impossible  to  follow  the  action  of  the  mind  into 
details.  The  interaction  of  associations  from  within 
and  from  without,  the  variety  in  our  modes  of  thinking 
under  different  conditions,  and  the  differences  which 
result  from  the  subject  of  thought  all  result  in  great 
variations  in  the  arrangement  of  ideas.  But  the  essen- 
tials of  the  process,  namely,  the  existence  of  the  thought 

38 


THE   GROUPING   OF   CONCEPTS 

as  a  whole,  as  a  germ-concept,1  and  the  immediate 
analysis  of  it,  seem  to  remain  the  same,  and  may  often 
be  detected  by  observation  of  our  own  thought  preced- 
ing speech.  We  may,  for  example,  in  listening  to 
another  person,  believe  that  we  detect  an  error  in  state- 
ment or  a  fallacy  in  reasoning.  At  the  first  instant 
this  is  entirely  vague,  scarcely  more  than  would  find 
expression  in  the  exclamation  "Wrong!"  Then  we 
may  become  conscious  of  the  nature  of  the  correction 
or  the  counter-argument  in  a  like  vague  way,  that  is, 
as  a  whole,  unanalyzed.  If  the  circumstances  make 
interruption  permissible,  an  impulsive  person  will  often 
break  in  while  his  own  thought  is  as  yet  unanalyzed, 
and  will  find  himself  for  an  instant  conscious  of  what 
he  wishes  to  say  and  yet  unable  to  say  it.  At  such  a 
moment  one  may  detect  in  his  own  mind  a  kind  of 
whirl  of  thought,  almost  a  mental  dizziness,  as  the 
swift  process  of  analysis  goes  on.  Then  the  thought 
begins  to  clear  itself  and  to  find  expression  in  words. 
Or  it  may  be,  if  interruption  is  not  possible  and  we  go 
on  listening  to  the  speaker,  that  the  germ-concept  is 
lost  and,  as  the  phrase  is,  we  "forget  what  we  were 
going  to  say."  So  when  we  see  a  child  doing  some- 
thing dangerous  or  otherwise  undesirable,  the  impulse 
to  interfere  is  at  first  no  more  than  a  willed  negative, 
ne  without  a  verb ;  then  the  process  of  analysis  begins, 
if  clearness  demands  anything  more  than  a  prohibition 
like  don't.  The  germ  of  a  question  is  in  like  manner 
often  to  be  detected  before  analysis,  at  first  in  the  form 
of  a  mere  desire  for  information  excited  by  a  suggestion 
from  without,  and  then  associated  with  the  circum- 
stances or  the  speech  which  excited  it.  Many  questions 
need  but  slight  analysis;  they  consist  of  an  interroga- 

1  Gesammtvorstellung  is  the  term  used  by  Wundt. 
39 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

tive  sign  and  of  a  phrase  which  refers  to  the  source 
that  suggested  the  question.  An  interrogative  sentence 
which  contains  more  than  this  is  something  more  than 
a  question,  involving  also  assertion  or  argument.  A 
narrative,  especially  a  short  narrative,  is  remembered 
as  a  whole  and  may  be  so  recalled  by  a  single  phrase, 
as  "P's  whistling  story"  or  Livy's  account  of  the  de- 
struction of  Alba  Longa.  Just  so  a  picture  may  be 
remembered  as  a  whole.  The  analysis  which  precedes 
the  telling  of  a  story  is  particularly  simple  and  easy  to 
follow  because  the  association  is  one  of  mere  succession 
and  the  effort  of  the  mind  in  fixing  upon  the  order  of 
events  is  a  familiar  one.  Even  the  briefest  remarks  or 
comments,  uttered  in  the  midst  of  conversation,  may 
frequently  be  caught  by  careful  observation  at  the  in- 
stant before  analysis,  and  we  may  detect  the  germ- 
concept  and  may  be  aware  of  some  rapid  process  of 
thought  which  must  precede  speech,  though  it  may  be 
impossible  to  follow  it  in  all  its  details. 

The  process  of  analysis  is  dependent  upon  associa- 
tion. It  is  through  association  that  the  mind  passes 
from  the  original  germ-concept  to  the  separate  concepts. 
Among  the  concepts  thus  suggested  the  choice  of  the 
one  upon  which  the  attention  shall  settle  is  determined 
by  its  relation  to  the  germ  or  its  relation  to  the  general 
course  of  thought.  Each  concept  which  is  singled  out 
from  the  germ  for  special  attention  stands,  therefore,  in 
a  definite  relation  to  the  germ,  a  relation  determined  by 
the  line  of  association.  And  because  each  is  related  to 
the  original  concept,  each  is  also  related  to  every  other 
and  a  concept-group  is  thus  constituted,  bound  together 
by  a  network  of  mutual  relations.  All  the  elements 
of  such  a  group  are  held  in  consciousness  at  the  same 
time,  though  the  attention  is  not  directed  upon  all  at 

40 


THE   GROUPING   OF  CONCEPTS 

once.  The  group  as  a  whole  is  consciously  felt,  with 
its  relation  to  the  preceding  group  and  its  associations 
reaching  out  toward  the  groups  which  are  to  follow. 
By  them  it  is  a  member  of  a  still  larger  group  of  groups. 
The  separate  concepts  in  which  the  analysis  ends  are 
also  held  in  mind,  and  the  attention  is  directed  upon 
them  in  succession.  And  the  relations  also  are  present 
in  consciousness,  though  less  clearly  and  distinctly, 
serving  to  direct  the  analysis  and  to  retain  the  sense 
of  its  unity. 

If  it  be  asked  what  brings  the  analysis  to  a  close,  the 
answer  will  be  that  speech  may  begin  at  almost  any 
point  in  the  process.  The  prohibition  may  be  expressed 
by  "Don't!"  the  question  by  "What?"  or  "Who?" 
The  story  may  be  introduced  by  "  That  reminds  me,"  and 
in  fact  such  phrases,  which  are  attempts  to  speak  before 
the  analysis  is  complete,  are  very  common  in  colloquial 
speech ;  thus  quid  ?  is  used  as  an  introductory  question 
or  quid  again  f  quid  faciam  ?  precedes  a  more  detailed 
question.  So  a  whole  oration  might  be  in  an  imperfect 
way  expressed  in  a  single  sentence,  "  Catiline  is  danger- 
ous," "Archias  deserves  citizenship."  But  ordinarily 
the  process  will  go  on  until  the  analysis  is  complete 
enough  to  exhibit  all  that,  to  our  thinking,  was  in- 
volved in  the  original  germ.  The  aim  and  end  are  the 
same,  the  satisfaction  of  the  desire  to  express  in  its 
details  the  concept  which  was  originally  in  mind. 

The  process  which  I  have  been  attempting  to  describe 
precedes  speech.  In  its  outline  and  in  most  of  its 
details  it  must  be  completed  before  the  words  which  are 
to  suggest  it  to  the  hearer  begin  to  be  uttered.  The 
effect  of  hurrying  forward  the  words  before  the  analysis 
is  fairly  complete  is  to  make  the  sentence  confused  in 
its  ending ;  this  is  one  of  the  most  frequent  causes  of 

41 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

confused  and  inaccurate  sentence-structure.  But  when 
the  analysis  is  completed,  the  fitting  of  sufficiently 
accurate  words  to  the  grouped  concepts  is  almost  auto- 
matic. Because  thinking  is  so  generally  associated 
with  words,  the  analysis  is  instinctively  directed  toward 
concepts  which  have  been  before  associated  with  words. 
These  are  the  natural  ends  toward  which  the  analysis 
moves,  and  when  the  analysis  reaches  this  point,  the 
words  are  already  suggested.  The  only  thing  neces- 
sary, therefore,  during  utterance  is  that  the  concepts, 
grouped  by  their  relations,  should  pass  in  succession 
before  the  mind,  or,  more  precisely,  that  the  attention 
should  be  directed  upon  them  in  the  succession  which 
their  grouping  suggests.  This  operation  is  so  nearly 
automatic  that  the  conscious  activity  of  the  mind  may 
at  the  same  time  call  up  the  next  group  and  perform 
upon  it  the  necessary  analysis. 

After  a  group  of  words  is  uttered,  a  reverse  process, 
one  of  recombination,  begins.  As  soon  as  the  attention 
is  withdrawn  from  the  distinct  concepts,  they  begin, 
as  it  were,  to  sink  back  into  the  unanalyzed  condition. 
The  sentence  which  is  in  process  of  utterance  is  held 
until  it  is  finished,  but  the  sentence  which  had  been 
uttered  just  before  is  held  in  the  mind  less  distinctly 
and  the  preceding  sentence  is  still  less  clear.  If  it  is 
recalled  by  an  effort  of  memory,  the  words  will  prob- 
ably be  called  up  first  and  the  concepts  will  be  recalled 
by  means  of  the  words,  or  the  general  group-concept 
will  be  recalled  and  analyzed  a  second  time.  In  a  long 
speech,  lasting  for  several  minutes,  the  speaker  will 
remember  what  he  has  said  only  in  the  most  general 
way.  The  thought  will  lie  in  his  mind  very  much  as 
it  was  before  the  analysis  and  utterance,  except  that 
the  fact  that  the  groups  have  been  once  analyzed  will 

42 


THE   GROUPING  OF  CONCEPTS 

render  a  second  analysis  easier.  It  is  in  this  unana- 
lyzed  or  only  partially  analyzed  form  that  any  connected 
series  of  thoughts  lies  in  the  mind  ready  to  be  recalled. 
And  as  short  sentences,  prohibitions  or  brief  questions, 
or  short  anecdotes  or  illustrations,  may  by  a  little  self- 
examination  be  found  to  arise  in  the  mind  for  an  instant 
as  wholes,  so  after  they  have  been  uttered  in  words  they 
may  for  an  instant  be  detected  in  the  mind  as  wholes, 
undivided  groups,  accompanied  by  a  sense  of  satisfac- 
tion, just  as  before  utterance  they  were  accompanied 
by  a  feeling  of  desire  which  called  for  satisfaction. 

The  three  successive  stages  are  therefore  these :  first, 
the  group-concept  is  analyzed  into  a  group  of  concepts 
with  their  connecting  relations;  second,  the  group  in 
its  analyzed  form  is  clearly  held  in  mind  while  the 
associated  words  are  uttered ;  third,  the  group  of  con- 
cepts immediately  begins  to  fade  back  into  its  unana- 
lyzed  form. 

The  action  of  the  hearer's  mind  most  nearly  resembles 
the  second  and  third  of  these  stages.  The  uttered 
words  excite  in  his  mind  the  associated  concepts  with 
all  their  suggestions  and  implications  of  relation,  and 
these  he  instantly  begins  to  combine  into  a  group, 
which,  if  the  whole  operation  is  skilfully  performed, 
will  be  essentially  the  same  as  the  unanalyzed  group  in 
the  mind  of  the  speaker.  This  is  done  so  immediately 
and  unconsciously  that,  if  the  attention  of  the  hearer  is 
fixed  upon  the  thought,  he  will  often  be  quite  unaware 
of  the  analyzed  elements  and  be  conscious  only  of  the 
result  of  the  recombination,  the  group-concept.  It  is 
the  power  of  performing  this  process  of  recombination 
rapidly  and  unconsciously  which  enables  a  practised 
reader  to  grasp  whole  sentences  or  even  whole  para- 
graphs at  a  glance;   he  dispenses  with  the  laborious 

43 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

analysis  and  by  catching  a  word  here  and  a  word  there 
is  able  to  divine  the  group.  Where  the  subject  is 
unfamiliar  or  the  language  is  foreign  and  only  imper- 
fectly known,  the  reader  or  hearer  must  perform  the 
recombination  slowly  and  carefully. 

To  some  extent,  also,  the  mind  of  a  quick  hearer  or 
reader  is  at  work  upon  the  unexpressed  thought,  per- 
forming also,  as  does  the  mind  of  the  speaker,  an  analy- 
sis ahead  of  the  point  of  utterance  and  anticipating  to 
some  extent  and  tentatively  the  course  of  the  speaker's 
thought.  This  enables  the  hearer  to  grasp  the  group 
of  concepts,  when  it  is  suggested  by  words,  to  some 
extent  as  a  whole,  and  still  further  lessens  the  amount 
of  analysis  necessary. 

The  psychology  of  speech  has  not  hitherto J  occupied 
a  large  space  in  the  standard  works  on  psychology,  but 
some  confirmation  of  these  views,  which  are  the  result 
of  an  attempt  to  understand  the  basis  of  syntactical 
expression,  may  be  had  from  the  extremely  interesting 
chapter  in  James's  Psychology,2  entitled  "The  Stream 
of  Thought."  The  fact  is  there  stated  and  illustrated 
that  two  elements  are  present  in  the  succession  of  con- 
cepts which  follow  each  other  in  the  mind.  Of  these 
the  more  obvious  consists  of  the  more  definite  and,  so 
to  speak,  concrete  concepts.  When  one  attempts  to 
arrest  the  stream  of  thought,  as,  for  example,  in  answer 
to  the  question  "What  are  you  thinking  about?"  the 
attention  is  likely  to  be  fixed  upon  some  definite  object, 
—  a  thing,  a  person,  an  institution,  an  event.  This 
will  be  the  case  even  when  the  definite  object  is  really 
quite  secondary,  when  the  thought  was  really  fixed 
upon  a  question  of  duty  or  expediency.     But  a  closer 

1  Before  the  appearance  of  Wundt's  Volkerpsychologie. 

2  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  I,  chap,  ix,  pp.  224  ff. 

44 


THE   GROUPING   OF  CONCEPTS 

self-examination  shows  that  such  definite  concepts  are 
always  connected  by  relations  which  form  a  part,  and 
an  important  part,  of  the  stream  of  thought.  To  these 
two  elements  James  gives  the  names  substantive  and 
transitive.  It  is  evident  that  the  substantive  concepts 
correspond  in  general  to  the  separate  and  distinct 
concepts  into  which  a  germ-concept  is  analyzed,  and 
that  the  transitive  elements,  which  are  also  themselves 
concepts,  correspond  to  the  relations  which  bind  the 
concepts  into  a  group. 

Speaking  broadly,  the  substantive  concepts,  the  sepa- 
rate concepts  upon  which  the  analysis  comes  to  an  end, 
are  expressed  in  language  by  words,  and  the  laws  which 
govern  their  association  with  words  make  up  the  science 
of  word-meanings.  The  science  of  word-combinations 
has  to  do  with  the  meaning  of  the  whole  group  and 
with  the  relations  by  which  its  parts  are  held  together. 
The  following  papers  will  contain  some  illustrations 
of  the  ways  in  which  these  general  characteristics  of 
thought-structure  are  repeated  in  sentence-structure. 
Meanwhile  some  general  observations  are  in  place  here, 
with  reference  to  the  emphasis  which  these  facts  may 
lead  us  to  place  upon  certain  general  principles  of  syn- 
tactical investigation. 

1.  The  unity  of  a  concept-group  is  not  something 
produced  by  the  act  of  expressing  it  in  words,  nor  is  it 
in  any  way  the  result  of  the  putting  of  words  together. 
It  is,  on  the  contrary,  antecedent  to  expression,  and  is 
an  inherent  element  of  thought.  The  various  defini- 
tions of  the  sentence  which  imply  that  a  sentence  ex- 
presses the  completion  of  an  act  of  combination  define 
the  process  from  the  wrong  end ;  the  sentence  expresses 
the  result  of  an  analysis,  and  ever}rthing  in  it  which 
binds  the  words   together  is  the  sign   of  the  original 

45 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

unity,  not  the  means  of  producing  unity.  This  is  true 
also  of  sentences  or  verbs  in  the  paratactic  structure 
(see  Chap.  VI);  the  relation  is  not  created  by  putting 
the  verbs  together,  but  is  the  reason  for  combining 
them  into  one  group.  The  principle  of  first  importance 
in  following  the  growth  of  syntactical  expression  is  to 
recognize  the  fact  that  all  that  finds  expression  exists 
first  in  thought  and  must  be  felt  with  some  degree  of 
distinctness  before  it  can  find  any  kind  of  expression. 

All  this  justifies  the  use  of  the  term  semasiology  and 
the  application  of  semantic  laws  and  methods  to  the 
association  between  the  concepts  of  relation  and  the 
means  of  syntactical  expression.  But  the  semasiology 
of  word-groups  is  more  difficult  than  the  semasiology  of 
single  words,  both  because  the  concepts  are  more  shift- 
ing and  evanescent,  and  because  they  are  expressed  by 
means  so  varied  and  complex  as  sentence-structure. 

2.  The  importance  of  studying  words  in  groups, 
which  is  often  recognized,  is  further  emphasized  by 
what  has  been  said  in  regard  to  the  action  of  the  mind 
of  speaker  and  hearer.  The  isolation  of  a  word  for 
detailed  study  must  be  followed  and  corrected  by  a 
study  of  it  in  its  true  condition  as  part  of  a  group. 
The  fact  that  each  concept  exists  for  the  sake  of  the 
group,  that  the  speaker  is  endeavoring  to  express  the 
group-concept  and  is  using  the  analyzed  group  of  con- 
cepts only  for  this  purpose,  makes  it  possible  for  him  to 
use  words  with  greater  freedom ;  meanings  need  not  be 
precise,  because  they  are  limited  by  the  other  concepts 
of  the  group.  This  applies  to  inflectional  forms  as  well 
as  to  words.  The  precision  which  they  seem  to  have  is 
often  due  to  the  rest  of  the  group,  and  they  can  there- 
fore be  properly  interpreted  only  when  the  limitations 
which  surround  them  are  taken  fully  into  account. 

46 


THE   GROUPING   OF  CONCEPTS 

3.  The  relations  between  the  concepts  are  dependent 
upon  the  associations  between  them,  and  these,  when 
they  are  not  purely  accidental,  depend  upon  the  nature 
of  the  concepts  themselves.  The  relation  of  cause  and 
effect  can  exist  only  between  objects  in  the  same  sphere 
of  causation,  not,  for  instance,  between  a  cloud  and  a 
house;  purpose  implies  personality,  a  time-relation  im- 
plies a  time-word.  In  other  words,  the  meaning  of 
words  has  much  to  do  with  syntactical  expression. 
There  is  sometimes  an  apparent  disposition  to  separate 
these  two  means  of  expression,  single  words  with  their 
meaning  being  put  into  one  science,  while  syntax  is 
treated  as  if  inflection  were  independent  of  word-mean- 
ing, and  as  if  the  syntactical  forms  were  shells  which 
could  be  filled  with  any  content  without  altering  their 
character.  This  is,  of  course,  the  result  of  the  perfectly 
proper  effort  to  isolate  syntactical  expression  in  order 
to  study  it  without  the  disturbance  of  anything  foreign 
to  it.  But  it  is  quite  certain  that  syntax  can  be  under- 
stood only  when  it  is  studied  in  the  closest  association 
with  word-meaning  and  that  a  large  field  of  work  is 
opening  out  in  this  direction. 


47 


Ill 

THE  MEANS  OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

The  means  employed  in  language  for  the  expression 
of  the  relations  between  concepts  are  in  part  the  same 
as  the  means  at  the  command  of  language  for  express- 
ing the  concepts  themselves,  and  in  linguistic  discussions 
the  two  are  often  treated  together  without  distinction. 
It  is  not,  in  fact,  possible  to  draw  a  clear  line  of  distinc- 
tion. In  general,  single  words  correspond  to  distinct 
substantive  concepts  and  the  study  of  their  associa- 
tion with  such  concepts  belongs  to  lexicography  and 
semantics.  But  when  a  relation,  as  a  result  of  frequent 
use,  comes  to  be  clearly  and  vividly  felt,  it  has  itself 
become  a  concept,  apparently  much  as  any  concept  is 
formed  from  percepts,  and  may  then  be  expressed  by  a 
single  word  —  a  preposition  or  conjunction  —  the  study 
of  which  belongs  alike  to  semantics  and  to  syntax.  In- 
flected words  also  have  both  meaning  and  function  and, 
just  as  in  Latin  the  stem  is  never  found  without  an 
inflectional  ending,  so  the  meaning  and  the  function 
always  go  together  and  are  inseparable.  Even  the 
parts  of  speech  have  to  do  partly  with  word-meaning 
and  partly  with  syntactical  function,  since  the  differ- 
entiation is  brought  about  within  the  sentence  in  the 
effort  to  express  relation.  The  verb  does  not  differ 
from  the  noun  in  meaning  only,  but  also  in  use.     The 

48 


THE  MEANS  OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

ordinary  definition  of  the  verb  as  a  word  which  denotes 
action  or  state  and  of  the  noun  as  the  name  of  a  person 
or  thing  is  evidently  one-sided  and  defective,  since  a 
noun  may  denote  action  or  existence  and  a  verb-form 
may  be  the  name  of  a  thing.  Another  and  truer  dis- 
tinction is  based  upon  the  use  to  which  words  are  put 
in  combination,  and  the  differentiation  of  parts  of  speech 
is  a  means  of  expressing  at  the  same  time  substantive 
concepts  and  concepts  of  relation.  No  definite  line, 
therefore,  can  be  drawn  between  the  means  employed  in 
language  for  suggesting  concepts  and  those  which  are 
at  the  command  of  language  for  the  expression  of  rela- 
tions. But  it  is  nevertheless  worth  while  to  group 
together  those  characteristics  of  speech  which  have 
been  more  distinctly  appropriated  to  the  expression  of 
relation,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  consideration  of  the 
process  by  which  they  have  been  adapted  to  such 
expression. 

The  musical  elements  of  speech  have  to  do  chiefly 
with  emotion,  not  with  the  intellectual  side  of  speech. 
But  a  change  of  tone,  indicating  primarily  a  change  of 
emotional  attitude,  may  also  serve  to  suggest  in  a  very 
general  way  the  relation  of  that  which  follows  to  that 
which  precedes  the  change.  This  is  especially  clear  in 
the  utterance  of  a  parenthetic  explanation  or  comment, 
where  the  lowered  tone  and  perhaps  quickened  time  aid 
in  suggesting  the  parenthetic  and  unimportant  char- 
acter of  the  thought.  A  change  of  tone  will  also 
accompany  and  partially  express  a  change  from  argu- 
ment to  narrative  or  the  reverse,  and  may  thus  vaguely 
suggest  even  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  two 
groups  of  words.  The  tone  in  which  a  conditional 
clause  is  uttered  differs  from  the  tone  of  a  causal  clause. 

The  pauses  between  groups  of  words  are  more  directly 
4  49 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

contributory  to  an  understanding  of  the  grouping  of 
concepts.  They  are  in  origin  physiological,  that  is, 
they  are  due  to  the  necessity  of  refilling  the  lungs. 
If  it  were  possible  to  conceive  of  thought  as  a  perfectly 
homogeneous  stream,  as  unvarying  in  quality  as  it  is 
unbroken  in  its  continuity,  the  pauses  would  occur  at 
substantially  equal  intervals.  But  as  thought  is  con- 
tinually varying  in  quality  and  concepts  occur  in 
groups,  the  pauses  in  speech  have  been  accommodated 
to  the  suggestion  of  groupings  and  occur  not  regularly 
but  at  varying  intervals,  so  as  to  mark  the  fact  that  one 
group  of  concepts  is  completed  and  another  is  about  to 
begin.  Further,  the  length  of  the  pause  may  indicate 
the  size  and  complexity  of  the  group,  especially  in  very 
deliberate  speech  when  the  pause  is  utilized  by  the 
speaker  for  the  analysis  of  the  next  group.  The  slight 
pause  at  the  end  of  a  clause,  such  as  is  indicated  in 
printed  language  by  a  comma,  suggests  in  conjunction 
with  the  raised  inflection  of  voice  the  conclusion  of  a 
small  group  which  is  part  of  a  larger  group ;  the  longer 
pause  and  falling  inflection  mark  the  close  of  a  more 
fully  completed  group,  and  the  end  of  a  still  larger 
group  of  groups  is  marked  by  a  longer  pause  and  a 
change  of  tone,  as  it  is  indicated  in  print  by  a  new 
paragraph. 

The  pauses  thus  mark  groups  and  suggest  slightly 
the  relations  between  them,  though  they  do  not  indi- 
cate the  relations  within  the  group,  and  they  illustrate 
well,  in  an  elementary  way,  the  process  of  adaptation ; 
in  their  origin  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  speech  as  a 
means  of  expression,  but  are  the  result  of  physiological 
conditions,  yet  they  become  one  of  the  most  funda- 
mental means  of  indicating  the  nature  of  the  stream  of 
thought. 

50 


THE  MEANS  OF  EXPRESSING   RELATIONS 

The  three  most  direct  means  of  expressing  relations 
are  inflection,  single  words,  and  groupings  of  words. 

A  natural  starting-point  for  considering  the  nature  of 
inflection  would  be  its  origin  and,  if  there  were  a  satis- 
factory and  generally  accepted  theory  upon  this  impor- 
tant point,  it  would  simplify  some  of  the  problems  <.f 
syntax.  But  there  is  no  such  theory.  The  explana- 
tion of  inflection  as  due  entirely  to  a  process  of  agglu- 
tination, once  a  part  of  the  orthodox  philology,  is  quite 
certainly  no  longer  accepted  without  serious  question  as 
to  its  value.  The  grounds  for  this  change  of  opinion 
it  is  not  for  a  syritacticist  to  discuss,  but  in  general  the 
theory  appears  to  lack  a  good  psychological  basis,  to 
involve  an  appeal  to  laws  and  forces  other  than  those 
which  are  in  operation  in  historic  periods  and  to  be 
too  sweeping  in  its  conclusions.  Composition  of  some 
kind  must  be  supposed  to  have  taken  place  in  order  to 
account  for  some  verb  forms  —  e.  g.,  for  fueram  or  the 
imperfect  in  -bam  —  but  composition  can  scarcely  ex- 
plain all  the  phenomena.  At  any  rate,  the  acquiescence 
of  morphologists  in  the  agglutinative  theory,  so  far  as 
acquiescence  exists,  is  dissatisfied  and  agnostic,  the 
result  mainly  of  the  fact  that  no  substitute  has  been 
proposed,  and  the  attempts 2  that  have  been  made  within 
the  last  few  years  to  explain  Indo-European  inflection 
look  in  other  directions.  If  this  view  of  current  opin- 
ion seems  too  unhopeful,  it  must  at  the  least  be  said  that 
syntax  has  at  present  little  to  gain  from  the  theories 
and  speculations  in  regard  to  the  general  nature  of  in- 

1  Bergaigne,  de  conjunctivi  et  optativi  in  Indoeuropaeis  Unguis  informatione 
et  vi  antiquissima ;  E.  W.  Fay,  Agglutination  and  Adaptation,  Amer. 
Journ.  of  Philol.,  XV,  4,  XVI,  1 ;  Audonin,  de  la  declinaison  dans  ies 
langues  Indoeurope'ennes,  Paris,  1899;  Greenough,  in  Harvard  Studies  in 
Classical  Philology,  X,  1 . 

51 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

flection.     They  are  more  likely  to  mislead  than  to  fur- 
nish a  substantial  basis  for  syntactical  work. 

In  these  circumstances  it  is  all  the  more  desirable  to 
get  as  broad  and  clear  a  view  as  possible  of  the  nature 
of  inflection  as  it  appears  in  historical  times.     Looked 
at  broadly,  the   most  striking   characteristic   of   Latin 
inflection  is  that  it  is  not  a  system,  but  is  on  the  con- 
trary highly  unsystematic.     This  statement  may  seem 
unnecessary,  but  the  opposite  opinion,  held  more  or  less 
consciously,  underlies  much  of   the  recent  syntactical 
work,  especially  in  America.     The  impression  of  sys- 
tem comes,  no  doubt,  from  the  way  in  which  we  learn 
the  facts  of  inflection.     For  the  purposes  of  teaching, 
the  grammars  very  properly  emphasize  as  much  as  pos- 
sible such  measure  of  system  as  Latin  inflection  permits, 
producing  at  the  beginning  of  one's  acquaintance  with 
Latin  the  impression  of  a  series  of  graded  forms  and 
meanings  covering  most  accurately  and  completely  the 
whole  range  of  expression.     But  it  is  obvious  that  this 
is  a  false  impression  and,  so  far  as  we  retain  it,  we  are 
building  upon  a  wrong  foundation.     Neither  the  forms 
nor  the  meanings  are  systematic.     The  perfect  stem  is 
not  one,  but  is  an  irregular  mixture  of  at  least  four 
different  stems:   the  reduplicated  (cecidi),  the  length- 
ened (ueni),  the  s  stem  (dixi)  and  the  -ui  form  (amaui). 
Of  these  a  few  verbs  have  two  (parsi,  peperci)  and  the 
rest  have  one  or  another  termination  for  reasons  which 
are   apparently  phonetic  and  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  meaning  either  of  the  verb  or  of  the  termination. 
The   subjunctive   has    two   formations   (dicam,    amem) 
with  a  mixture  of  optative  forms,  also  without  distinc- 
tion of  meaning.     Or,  taking  the  tenses  in  order,  the 
present  stem  has  many  variations  in  form,  some  of  them 
significant,  others  apparently  without  meaning ;  the  im- 

52 


THE  MEANS   OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

perfect  indicative  is  an  Italic  formation ;  the  imperfect 
subjunctive  is  entirely  different  and  is  of  unknown 
origin;  the  future  is  either  an  Italic  formation  {-bo)  or 
it  is  a  modal  form,  different  in  the  different  persons 
(-am,  -es).  The  personal  endings  are  not  more  system- 
atic; the  first  and  second  singular  may  be  connected 
with  the  pronouns,  but  the  second  and  third  plural  are 
inexplicable.  To  these  illustrations  from  verbal  inflec- 
tion must  be  added  the  irregularities  of  pronouns  and  of 
the  third  declension  of  nouns,  the  immense  variety  of 
word-building  suffixes  and  all  the  irregularities  which 
have  been  brought  together  by  Osthoff  in  his  papei 
on  Suppletivwesen.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  heap  up 
evidence  on  this  point.  A  glance  at  the  facts  of  Latin 
morphology  as  they  are  presented  in  any  full  Latin 
grammar,  or  in  Brugmann's  Grundriss,  or  in  Lindsay's 
"Latin  Language,"  where  large  masses  of  facts  which 
defy  classification  are  brought  together,  furnishes  con- 
vincing evidence  that  irregularity  and  absence  of  system 
are  not  merely  occasional  but  are  the  fundamental  char- 
acteristics of  Latin  form-building.  It  is  the  regularity 
that  is  unusual  and  exceptional. 

The  same  absence  of  system  appears  in  the  mean- 
ing and  use  of  inflected  words.  Forms  do  not  have 
single  meanings  but  many  and  varied  meanings,  which 
do  not  combine  into  a  system  but  overlap  one  another. 
The  present  tense  of  the  indicative  overlaps  the  future 
(quam  mox  seco  ?  quid  ago  f)  and  the  past  (historical 
present) ;  the  imperfect  is  often  indistinguishable  from 
the  perfect  and  it  has  conative  and  inchoative  uses 
which  are  really  modal.  The  future  is  often  used  to 
express  determination  (ibo),  thus  confusing,  as  the  im- 
perfect does,  the  distinction  between  mode  and  tense. 
The  perfect,  from  at  least  four  distinct  sources,  has  two 

53 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

distinct  uses,  which,  however,  do  not  coincide  with 
any  of  its  forms.  Tables  of  tenses  of  the  indicative, 
in  which  present,  future,  past  combine  with  beginning, 
duration,  completion  into  a  symmetrical  scheme  are  far 
from  the  facts  of  language.1  In  the  subjunctive  the 
tenses  are  so  confused  and  overlaid  by  the  modal  force 
that  it  is  a  question  whether  they  may  properly  be 
called  tenses.  The  scheme  of  case-constructions  given, 
e.g.,  in  Draeger  is  so  elaborate  as  to  cover  apparently 
all  possible  uses ;  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  this 
is  a  presentation  of  all  case -uses  of  all  nouns  and  pro- 
nouns. The  range  of  a  single  noun  is  quite  limited. 
To  take  an  example  almost  at  random,  tempus  is  not 
used  in  the  accusative  of  the  place  to  which,  in  the 
dative  of  possessor,  of  agent,  in  the  ethical  dative,  in 
the  genitive  subjective  or  the  genitive  of  value  or 
after  refert,  in  the  ablative  of  place,  of  source,  of  man- 
ner, of  accompaniment,  of  price  or  of  agent,  to  mention 
only  some  of  the  more  common  constructions.  With 
reference  to  meanings,  it  might  be  said  that  almost  any 
noun  is  extremely  defective  in  its  case -uses,  just  as 
many  nouns  are  defective  in  case-forms. 

The  unsystematic  character  of  inflection  appears  even 
more  clearly  in  word-formation.  The  suffixes  used  in 
the  building  of  words  are  so  irregular  that  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  match  forms  with  any  system  of  meanings. 
For  example,  the  terminations  denoting  action  are  given 
in  a  particularly  careful  grammar 2  as  a,  io,  ia,  <min,  ion, 
tion,  la,  ma,  na,  ta,  tu,  er,  or^  or ;  these  are  attached  to 
stems  of  various  kinds  with  a  confusion  of  minor  varia- 
tions in  meaning.     This  of  course  is  not  system ;  it  is 

1  Compare  the  scientifically  correct  statement  of  Greenough  in  Allen 
and  Greenough's  Grammar,  p.  291. 

2  Lane's  Latin  Grammar,  §  212. 

54 


THE  MEANS   OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

wholly  unsystematic  speech-material,  not  yet  adapted  to 
the  expression  of  differentiated  meanings.  The  suffixes 
which  make  diminutives  may  perhaps  be  taken  to  repre- 
sent the  nearest  approach  to  regularity ;  they  are  few  in 
number  and  the  meaning  is  to  some  extent  specialized, 
so  that  an  interpreter  with  a  theory  can,  by  the  exercise 
of  some  ingenuity,  call  them  all  diminutives.  But  the 
kind  of  interpretation  which  finds  a  diminutive  mean- 
ing in  all  the  diminutive  forms,  e.  g.  in  Catullus,  is  in 
truth  interpretation  under  the  prepossession  of  a  defini- 
tion ;  a  freer  study  would  find  much  diversity  of  mean- 
ing in  even  the  most  regular  of  word-building  suffixes. 

These  facts  justify  or  even  necessitate  one  inference 
in  regard  to  the  condition  of  Latin  inflection  in  the 
earlier  period  for  which  we  have  no  data.  The  strong- 
est force  in  language  is  assimilation  by  analogy  and 
this  force  tends  toward  regularity  and  to  a  certain 
limited  extent  toward  system.  That  is,  it  does  not 
bring  about  system  on  a  large  scale  —  the  kind  of  sys- 
tem which  starts  from  a  single  idea  —  but  it  produces 
similarity  and  regularity  within  certain  ranges,  and 
then  again  a  different  similarity  within  certain  other 
ranges.  This  is  fairly  descriptive  of  what  we  find,  for 
instance,  in  Latin  case-forms.  Within  certain  limits 
all  nouns  form  their  genitives  in  one  way,  with  -ae ; 
within  certain  other  limits  the  genitive  is  formed  with 
-i ;  a  few  words  make  the  genitive  in  -ius.  In  this  we 
recognize  the  working  of  assimilation,  which  does  not 
produce  system  in  the  large  sense,  but  limited  similar- 
ities. From  this  it  is  almost  necessary  to  infer  an 
earlier  condition  of  less  uniformity,  of  greater  irregu- 
larity. And  an  actual  indication  of  what  such  a  con- 
dition was  we  may  see,  with  some  reservations,  in 
word-building.     For  in  the  word-formative  suffixes  we 

55 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

have  a  general  kind  of  variation,  of  which  case-inflec- 
tion is  only  a  particular  type,  specialized  by  adaptation 
to  a  particular  use  and  assimilated  to  a  certain  degree 
of  regularity.  Facts  pointing  in  this  direction  might 
be  accumulated  to  any  extent.  They  can  be  interpreted 
in  only  one  way,  as  indicating  that  a  syntactical  method, 
which  presupposes  an  orderly  development  of  meanings 
and  forms  [from  single  starting-points,  is  fundamentally 
wrong.  The  condition  of  things  which  must  be  taken 
as  the  starting-point  of  functional  evolution  is  a  con- 
dition of  irregularity  and  make-shift.  Syntax  must 
presuppose  a  variety  of  forms,  some  of  definite  and 
individual  meaning,  some  of  varied  and  shifting  appli- 
cation ;  the  functions  of  these  forms  did  not  fit  together 
into  a  system,  but  overlapped  and  duplicated  one  an- 
other and  at  the  same  time  left  gaps  unfilled  by  any 
form.  Some  nouns  had  many  cases,  others  had  few; 
some  verbs  had  both  optative  and  subjunctive  forms, 
some  had  only  one,  some  had  neither.  There  was  no 
perfect  of  esse  and  no  present  of  fui ;  melior  was  not 
the  comparative  of  bonus  and  optimus  was  a  simple 
adjective  with  a  meaning  of  its  own.  A  long  process 
of  assimilation,  of  function  as  truly  as  of  form,  was 
necessary  to  produce  the  approximation  to  system  which 
exists  in  the  Latin  of  literature.  It  is  upon  a  recogni- 
tion of  this  fact  that  a  correct  treatment  of  the  functions 
of  inflected  forms  must  be  based. 

The  material  for  the  expression  of  relation  by  single 
words  is  also  various  in  origin.  In  Latin  conjunctions 
are  made  from  verb-forms  (licet,  uel),  from  nouns  (modo, 
dum?),  from  adjectives  (uero,  ceterum),  from  pronouns 
(quippe,  quin  ;  quod,  quoin  ;  hinc  —  illinc  in  responsion). 
Other  conjunctions  are  probably  from  pronominal  stems 
(nam,  enim,  itaque,  si,  tamen),  and  still  others  (et,  atque, 

56 


THE  MEANS   OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

-que,  at),  though  they  go  back  to  so  early  a  period  that 
they  cannot  be  traced  to  their  source,  are  doubtless  of 
similar  origin.  Of  all  of  them  it  may  be  said  or  as- 
sumed that  their  conjunctional  function  is  not  inherent 
but  acquired,  the  result  of  a  shift  of  meaning.  This  is 
true  also  of  prepositions,  which  express  the  relation  of 
a  substantive  to  the  rest  of  the  sentence.  They  were 
originally  participles  (uersus,  aduersus,  secundum)  or 
nouns  (tenus,  circum,  foris  in  late  Latin)  or  adverbs 
{citra,  extra),  which  gradually  acquired  the  function  of 
governing  the  substantive,  that  is,  became  in  part  or 
wholly  the  bearers  of  the  relational  concept.  As  in  the 
case  of  a  few  conjunctions  like  modo  and  licet,  the 
acquisition  of  the  function  of  expressing  relation  is  in 
some  cases  incomplete  and  the  steps  of  the  process  may 
be  followed  in  Latin.  Thus  contra  is  an  adverb  in 
Plautus,  coram  is  an  adverb  till  Cicero's  time,  palam  is 
not  used  as  a  preposition  before  the  Augustan  poets, 
and  foris  has  prepositional  force  only  in  very  late  Latin. 
The  shift  of  the  expression  of  relational  concepts 
from  inflectional  forms  to  single  words  (including  the 
expression  of  modal  and  temporal  meanings  by  auxiliary 
verbs)  constitutes  the  greatest  change  that  has  taken 
place  in  the  structure  of  language.  It  implies  an 
increasing  clearness  in  the  realization  of  relations,  a 
growing  precision  in  the  grasp  of  the  transitive  ele- 
ments of  the  stream  of  thought  —  to  use  the  terms 
which  James  employs.  In  general,  association  between 
a  concept  and  a  single  word  can  be  established  only 
when  the  concept  is  distinctly  recognized.  It  does  not, 
however,  follow  from  this  that  inflection  may  not  ex- 
press relation  with  great  precision ;  the  relation  of  sub- 
ject and  verb,  doubly  expressed  in  the  case-form  and  in 
the  personal  ending,  is  even  unnecessarily  precise,  so 

57 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

that  the  case-inflection  may  be  lost,  as  in  English,  with- 
out sacrifice  of  precision.  But  on  the  whole  the  change 
has  been  a  movement  toward  more  definite  expression, 
and  it  therefore  emphasizes  what  has  been  said  above  as 
to  the  vagueness  of  inflection  as  a  means  of  conveying 
concepts  of  relation. 

Thus  far  the  means  used  in  language  for  the  expres- 
sion of  relation  belong  only  in  part  to  syntax ;  in  part 
they  lie  within  other  departments  of  philology,  espe- 
cially within  the  sphere  of  semantics.  But  the  group- 
ing of  words,  to  correspond  to  the  grouping  of  concepts, 
belongs  especially  to  syntax. 

By  the  grouping  of  words  is  meant  something  more 
than  the  separation  of  words  into  groups  by  pauses. 
This,  it  is  true,  is  a  first  step,  but  it  serves  only  to 
mark  the  conclusion  of  one  concept-group  and  the  be- 
ginning of  another.  The  more  important  grouping  is 
that  which  brings  the  words  together  so  that  they  are 
felt  as  a  unity  and  are  so  grasped  by  the  hearer  or 
reader.  The  most  evident  illustrations  of  this  are  in 
idioms,  ut  ita  dicam,  quod  sciam,  quidfaciam?  In  such 
brief  phrases  the  separate  words  have  partially  lost  their 
meaning  and  a  kind  of  composition  has  taken  place,  by 
which  the  phrase  has  come  to  express  a  single  idea, 
without  sense  of  its  component  parts.  At  the  other 
extreme,  long  relative  clauses  have  indeed  that  kind  of 
unity  which  every  sentence  has,  but  it  is  a  unity  which 
does  not  suppress  the  consciousness  of  the  elements  that 
compose  it.  The  relative  pronoun,  the  verb  in  the 
indicative,  the  dependent  infinitive,  are  all  felt  in  such 
a  clause  as  distinctly  as  in  an  independent  sentence. 
Between  these  extremes  are  many  degrees  of  unifica- 
tion, more  or  less  close.  It  is  the  peculiar  province 
of  syntax  not  only  to  understand  the  elements  of  such 

58 


THE  MEANS   OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

unified  combinations,  but  also,  and  especially,  to  treat 
them  as  unities,  to  see  bow  far  the  process  of  unifica- 
tion has  gone,  to  place  them  in  the  scale  between  the 
extremes  of  the  idiomatic  and  almost  compounded 
phrase  and  the  loosely  connected  succession  of  words 
in  a  long  clause. 

These  three  modes  of  expressing  relation  will  be 
taken  up  in  more  detail  in  the  following  chapters. 
Meanwhile  two  or  three  comments  may  be  made  bear- 
ing upon  their  general  character. 

The  material  for  the  expression  of  relational  concepts 
is  plainly,  in  most  cases,  not  something  invented  for 
the  purpose  for  which  it  has  come  to  be  used.  It  is 
perhaps  true  that  no  competent  philologist  would  now 
consciously  look  at  it  in  this  way.  The  doctrine  that 
language  is  mainly  an  unconscious  product  is  firmly 
fixed  and  no  one  would  venture  to  dispute  it.  Yet  it 
is  apparently  true  also  that  syntacticists,  dealing,  as 
they  do,  with  the  conscious  train  of  thought  which  lan- 
guage expresses  and  using  of  necessity  terms  tinged 
with  ideas  of  purpose,  are  especially  liable  to  entertain 
views  of  their  science  which  really  rest  upon  the  old 
idea  that  inflection  was  in  some  way  produced  for  the 
purpose  of  expressing  function.  And  as  long  as  so 
much  doubt  still  exists  as  to  the  true  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  inflection,  some  ground  will  always  be  left 
for  views  of  this  character.  In  regard  to  all  other 
means  of  expression  except  inflection,  however,  it  can 
be  made  plain  that  the  expressiveness,  that  is,  the 
function,  is  the  acquired  result  of  a  process  of  adapta- 
tion. The  pauses  in  utterance,  due  to  prrysiological 
causes,  have  been  adapted  by  an  unconscious  process  to 
the  function  of  marking  the  limits  of  concept-groups. 
The  musical  elements,  also  purely  unconscious  in  origin 

59 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

and  still  in  some  respects  beyond  the  control  of  the 
conscious  will,  have  become  highly  expressive  and  are 
in  some  cases,  as  in  the  interrogative  sentence,  directly 
associated  with  a  particular  kind  of  concept,  which  they 
express  just  as  clearly  as  an  interrogative  particle  or 
the  written  sign  of  a  question.  The  same  thing  is  even 
more  evidently,  though  not  more  truly,  the  case  with 
single  words.  The  adaptation  of  word-groups  requires 
somewhat  more  detailed  consideration  (see  Chap.  VIII), 
but  it  is  certainly  in  the  main  unconscious.  If  there  is 
anything  radically  different  in  the  history  of  inflection, 
it  is  a  single  and  a  notable  exception  to  the  general  rule. 
It  may  be  said  also  in  regard  to  the  other  means  of 
expressing  relation  that  a  knowledge  of  their  earliest 
uses,  if  it  could  be  had,  would  not  contribute  largely 
to  the  solution  of  syntactical  problems.  It  would  push 
the  problem  back  to  earlier  and  perhaps  to  simpler 
stages,  but  the  problem  would  still  remain.  It  is 
undoubtedly  worth  while  to  discover  all  that  can  be 
known  from  any  source  about  the  early  history  of 
dum  and  donee;  these  conjunctions  would  then  be 
advanced  into  the  class  of  mode-  and  licet,  whose  acqui- 
sition of  relational  function  falls  within  historic  periods, 
but  the  general  problem  would  not  thereby  be  solved. 
No  knowledge  such  as  can  ever  be  reached  by  combina- 
tion and  inference  will  be  of  much  value  in  regard  to 
et  or  atque ;  it  would  not  even  direct  the  course  of 
investigation  in  regard  to  these  conjunctions.  The  ori- 
gin of  an,  if  it  could  be  determined  with  considerable 
probability,  would  contribute  but  little  toward  the  cor- 
rect theory  of  the  use  of  an  in  single  and  in  double 
questions.  The  most  valuable  and  interesting  part  of 
the  history  of  this  particle  is  fairly  well  known  and 
would  not  be  changed  by  any  facts  bearing  upon  its 

60 


THE  MEANS   OF  EXPRESSING  RELATIONS 

origin  and  early  relationships.  As  this  is  true  of  single 
words,  so  it  is  probably  true  also  of  inflection.  For  its 
own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  widening  our  knowledge, 
an  intelligible  and  well-founded  theory  of  the  nature 
of  inflection  is  much  to  be  desired;  perhaps  no  other 
set  of  connected  facts  in  the  whole  range  of  philology 
call  so  earnestly  for  explanation;  but  no  such  theoiy 
will  give  us  a  definite  and  precise  starting-point  for  the 
syntactical  study  of  inflected  forms.  To  think  other- 
wise is  in  effect  to  hold  in  a  rather  bald  form  the  notion 
that  inflections  were  invented  to  express  definite  rela- 
tions in  a  definite  manner.  The  utmost  that  can  be 
hoped  for  from  such  a  theory  is  that  it  may  afford  sug- 
gestion and,  if  it  be  very  clear,  direction  to  our  general 
method  of  approaching  the  problem.  But  over  against 
this  is  to  be  set  the  other  fact  that  the  theory  of  the 
function  of  inflection  must  be  worked  out  in  the  direct 
study  of  actual  forms,  not  in  the  study  of  inferential 
forms  belonging  to  a  remote  period. 

To  what  has  been  said  above  in  regard  to  the  unsys- 
tematic character  of  the  material  for  expressing  rela- 
tions may  now  be  added  a  further  consideration  bearing 
in  the  same  direction.  Not  only  is  inflection  highly 
irregular  in  its  origin  and  its  application,  but  it  is  not 
even  divided  by  a  clear  line  from  the  other  means  de- 
scribed above,  single  words  and  word-grouping.  The 
relation  which  is  at  one  time  expressed  by  an  inflec- 
tional change  is  at  another  time  expressed  by  a  single 
word  or  by  a  grouping  of  words  or  only  by  time  and 
tone.  In  the  same  language,  at  the  same  period  and, 
indeed,  even  in  the  same  sentence  an  auxiliary  verb 
and  a  modal  form  may  be  used  side  by  side  to  express 
in  different  ways  the  same  modification  of  a  verbal  idea. 
Thus   the  sense   of  propriety  is   expressed  in  Plaut. 

61 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

Pers.,  123  ff.,  cynicum  esse  egentem  oportet  parasitum 
probe :  .  .  .  soccos,  pallium,  marsupium  habeat,  by  opor- 
tet and  by  the  subjunctive;  in  Bacch,.,  139,  non  par 
uidetur  neque  sit  consentaneum,  the  statement  is  modi- 
fied to  an  opinion,  first  by  the  meaning  of  the  verb 
uidetur  and  then  by  the  potential  meaning  of  the 
subjunctive  mode.  So  an  adverb  with  the  present  tense 
may  be  equivalent  to  the  perfect  tense;  one  sentence 
may  be  marked  as  interrogative  by  order  and  tone,  the 
next  by  an  interrogative  particle.  In  the  narrative  style 
of  Livy  four  successive  acts,  no  one  of  more  impor- 
tance than  another,  may  be  expressed  by  a  cum  clause, 
a  perfect  participle  of  a  deponent  verb,  an  ablative 
absolute  and  an  indicative.  An  adjective,  a  genitive 
and  a  qui  clause  may  describe  three  entirely  similar 
qualities.  There  are  protases  to  which  the  presence  of 
si  is  indifferent,  and  ablatives  which  have  a  preposition 
or  express  the  relation  without  it  according  as  the  noun 
stands  alone  or  has  an  adjective;  there  is  absolutely 
no  distinction  of  meaning.  This  criss-cross  of  various 
means  used  for  the  same  end  and  of  the  same  means 
used  for  widely  different  ends,  this  tangle  of  hap- 
hazard associations  and  useless  duplications,  cannot  be 
interpreted  by  any  theory  which  makes  system  and 
regularity  its  starting-point.  The  movement  has  been 
all  the  other  way  and  the  partial  regularities  of  lan- 
guage in  historical  times  are  not  the  scanty  survivals 
of  a  primitive  system,  but  the  indications  of  the  partial 
victory  of  analogy  and  assimilation  over  the  centrifugal 
forces  working  in  language. 


62 


IV 

THE  PROCESS  OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

The  process  by  which  the  materials  briefly  described 
in  the  preceding  paper  have  been  adapted  to  the  ex- 
pression of  the  relation  of  concepts  is  in  part  direct 
and  simple,  but  in  part  it  is  indirect  and  very  complex. 
Of  the  musical  elements  of  speech  it  has  already  been 
said  that  they  are  in  themselves  the  result  of  reflex 
action  and  that  they  remain  vehicles  of  emotion  rather 
than  of  thought.  But  the  heightening  or  lowering 
of  nervous  force  which  produces  a  more  or  less  rapid 
utterance,  on  a  higher  or  lower  key,  is  an  experience 
common  to  all  and  therefore  immediately  intelligible. 
A  child  or  even  a  domesticated  animal  interprets  these 
evidences  of  emotion,  and  they  become  at  once,  in  a 
rudimentary  way,  expressive.  It  is  but  a  step  beyond 
this  to  the  instinctive  interpretation  of  change  of  time 
and  tone,  by  which  vague  suggestions  of  the  relation  of 
the  past  thought  to  the  coming  thought  are  conveyed. 
Beyond  this  point  time  and  tone  and  sentence-accent  do 
not  go  except  in  conjunction  with  words  and  phrases; 
these  carry  the  thought,  to  which  the  musical  elements 
merely  add  an  accompaniment  of  emotion.  Thus  cer- 
tain words,  like  honor,  splendor,  brilliant,  noble,  eager, 
have  a  certain  tone  and  time  permanently  associated 
with  them;  to  use  any  other  intonation  is  evidence  of 

63 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

irony  or  humorous  intent.1  The  expressiveness  of  these 
means,  too,  is  more  consciously  felt  by  the  hearer  than 
by  the  speaker;  to  the  speaker  they  remain  almost 
entirely  reflex,  except  in  studied  speech  like  that  of 
the  actor  or  orator,  but  the  hearer  interprets  them  and 
receives  their  suggestions  more  consciously. 

The  adaptation  of  the  pauses  to  suggest  the  comple- 
tion of  a  group  of  concepts  is  equally  direct  and  imme- 
diate, and  calls  for  no  comment  beyond  that  given  in 
the  preceding  chapter.  But  the  pauses  are  more  directly 
and  explicitly  suggestive  of  the  grouping  of  concepts 
and  have  therefore  a  greater  importance  to  syntax.  An 
exact  determination  of  the  length  of  pauses  and  of  the 
quality  imparted  to  them  by  the  tone  of  the  last  words 
of  the  preceding  phrase  would  be  of  value  in  studying 
the  gradual  steps  from  parataxis  to  hypotaxis  or  in 
distinguishing  different  kinds  of  relative  clause.  But 
any  such  determination  must  be  made  in  the  spoken 
languages. 

The  more  distinct  means  used  in  language  to  express 
the  relation  of  concepts,  inflectional  variation  of  form, 
single  words,  and  groupings  of  words,  both  because  of 
their  variety  of  origin  and  because  of  the  greater  pre- 
cision to  which  they  attain,  have  required  a  much 
longer  and  more  indirect  process  of  adaptation.  The 
study  of  that  process  belongs  peculiarly  to  syntax. 
The  description  of  syntactical  phenomena,  which  has 
occupied  and  must  still  occupy  so  much  of  the  attention 
of  syntacticists,  is  fundamental,  but  it  is  only  a  foun- 
dation.    The  determination  of  historical  sequence,  in 

1  This  permanent  association  may  become  a  means  of  differentiating 
two  distinct  meanings  of  a  word,  so  that  they  become  really  different 
words.  Thus  tell,  to  be  effective,  to  make  an  impression  (every  shot  tells), 
has  an  intonation  different  from  tell,  to  relate. 

64 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

regard  to  which  there  has  been  much  speculation  and 
making  of  hypotheses,  is  a  further  step  toward  the 
understanding  of  the  process,  and,  in  so  far  as  it  has 
been  precise  and  detailed,  it  is  a  necessary  step.  But 
syntax,  both  descriptive  and  historical,  has  been  con- 
stantly under  the  influence  of  the  older  views  of  the 
nature  of  language  and  much  of  this  preparatory  work 
has  led  away  from  the  minute  and  detailed  study  of  the 
forces  and  laws  under  which  inflectional  forms  have 
become  expressive.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  at  this 
time  to  formulate  a  system  of  syntactical  principles, 
since  these  principles  remain  in  large  part  still  to  be 
discovered.  All  that  is  now  possible  is  to  attempt  to 
state  the  nature  of  the  problem  and  to  suggest  some  of 
the  methods  of  solution. 

The  nature  of  the  problem  may  be  stated  somewhat 
as  follows :  — 

In  regard  to  meaning,  words  are  constantly  gaining 
in  precision.  Through  the  associations  set  up  in  the 
process  of  expression  the  meaning  of  a  word  is  being 
constantly  deepened  and  enriched.  The  connotation  is, 
in  general,  increasing  and  the  denotation,  that  is,  the 
range  of  application,  is  narrowing.  But  the  process  is 
not  a  perfectly  simple  one.  While  the  range  of  un- 
differentiated application  is  narrowing,  the  number  of 
special  and  differentiated  meanings  may  be,  and  in  gen- 
eral is,  increasing.  But  such  special  meanings  are  not, 
so  to  speak,  meanings  of  the  word,  but  only  meanings  of 
the  word  in  certain  connections.  The  source  of  both 
movements  is  the  same,  and  is  indeed  the  source  of  all 
word-meanings,  from  the  differentiation  of  parts  of 
speech  down  to  the  most  delicate  shades  of  syntactical 
function;  it  all  comes  from  the  partial  or  complete 
transfer  of  group-meanings  to  members  of  the  group. 
5  65 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

There  is  an  over-plus  of  unexpressed  group-meaning 
and,  in  the  process  of  use  to  express  one  of  the  dis- 
tinct concepts  of  a  group,  a  word  acquires  some  ele- 
ments of  the  partially  undifferentiated  meaning  of  the 
group.  The  acquisition  may  be  general  and  perma- 
nent, or  it  may  be  only  partial.  In  the  latter  case  the 
association  is  not  between  the  meaning  and  the  word, 
but  between  the  meaning  and  the  group,  including  the 
word,  or  between  the  meaning  and  the  word  as  a  part 
of  that  particular  word-group.  Such  a  special  meaning 
the  word  may  carry  with  it  to  other  similar  groups,  but 
not  to  any  and  every  group.  The  general  meaning  of 
the  word  pipe  is  very  simple,  and  its  range  of  applica- 
tion is  wide,  but  it  has  many  special  meanings  which 
belong  to  it  only  in  certain  connections.  In  planning 
the  plumbing  of  a  house  it  is  one  thing,  in  connection 
with  tobacco  another;  used  while  one  is  playing  an 
organ,  there  is  only  one  meaning,  and  in  the  High- 
lands the  pipes  is  just  as  distinct  a  phrase  as  the  bag- 
pipes. 

These  general  principles  apply  also  to  the  means  used 
to  express  relations.  Inflectional  forms  have  in  a  simi- 
lar way  taken  meaning  from  frequent  association  with 
certain  concept-groups.  In  so  far  as  the  associated 
meanings  are  simple  and  general,  they  are  capable  of 
wide  use  and  may  be  said  to  be  permanently  attached 
to  the  form,  but  very  frequently  the  transfer  from  the 
group  to  the  inflectional  form  is  not  complete,  and  the 
meaning  is  then  only  a  special  meaning,  which  is  at- 
tached to  the  form  only  when  it  is  used  in  certain  con- 
nections. The  problem  then  is  to  determine  how  the 
meaning  is  shared  between  the  inflectional  form  and 
the  rest  of  the  group,  with  what  kind  of  group  the 
special  meaning  is  associated  and  what  influences  have 

66 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

limited  it;  in  other  words,  to  determine  and  to  localize 
the  restrictive  and  specializing  influences. 

The  problem  of  the  acquisition  of  relational  function 
by  single  words  is  in  general  of  the  same  character,  but 
with  the  difference  that  such  words  are  often  known  to 
have  had  other  meanings  which  have  been  partially  lost 
in  the  process  of  acquiring  the  power  of  expressing 
relation.  The  problem  must  in  such  cases  be  extended 
to  explain  the  loss,  partial  or  total,  of  the  earlier  mean- 
ing, as  well  as  the  acquisition  of  special  conjunctional 
or  prepositional  senses. 

The  study  of.  word-groups  is  somewhat  different.  It 
deals  with  an  earlier  stage  of  the  same  process  or  with 
the  process  from  a  different  side,  with  the  dividing  of 
the  concept-group  between  the  members  of  the  word- 
group  and  with  the  retention  of  group-functions  by 
the  whole  word-group.  This  is  in  effect  a  study  of  the 
analysis  described  above  (Chap.  II)  and  of  the  use  of 
analytic  means  of  expression,  by  which  the  power  of 
expression  is  enormously  increased  without  an  incon- 
venient increase  in  the  word-vocabulary. 

Of  the  method  by  which  these  problems  are  to  be 
approached  three  characteristics  call  for  special  men- 
tion. In  the  first  place,  while  the  general  similarity 
of  the  problem  as  it  has  to  do  with  inflectional  forms, 
with  single  words  or  with  groups  of  words  should  not 
be  forgotten,  the  differences  also  must  be  fully  recog- 
nized. In  the  second  place,  it  is  worth  while  to  repeat 
what  was  said  above,  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  know 
the  early  history  or  the  prehistoric  conditions.  It  is 
the  nature  of  the  process  and  the  forces  at  work  that 
are  the  objects  of  research.  In  the  third  place,  the 
problem  has  to  do  primarily  with  the  specialization  of 
meaning,  by  which  precision  of  expression  is  brought 

67 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

about.  It  cannot  be  solved  by  the  study  of  general 
meanings  alone,  either  the  broad  meanings  of  inflec- 
tional forms  or  the  subordinating  function  taken  as  a 
whole.  The  fruitful  field  is  in  short  sequences  and 
within  narrow  ranges. 

In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  some  of  the  influ- 
ences which  have  tended  toward  precision  of  meaning 
in  inflectional  forms  are  stated  and  illustrated. 

1.  Inflection  and  word-meaning.  —  It  is  commonly 
assumed  that  whatever  of  definiteness  an  inflected  form 
may  have  comes  from  and  resides  in  the  inflectional 
termination.  I  propose  to  put  together  here  some  con- 
siderations which  seem  to  point  in  the  other  direction 
and  to  indicate  that  in  many  cases  the  meaning  of  the 
inflectional  ending  always  remains  vague,  while  what- 
ever degree  of  precision  the  form  may  have  is  due  rather 
to  the  stem-meaning.  In  other  words,  the  word-mean- 
ing is  a  cause  of  definiteness  in  inflections,  a  force 
tending  toward  limitation  and  precision. 

The  suffixes  which  are  used  in  word-building  are  of 
course  similar  in  character  to  case-endings  or  personal 
or  modal  signs.  The  suffix  -eus  (-eo-)  is  said  to  denote 
material  or,  more  cautiously,  material  or  resemblance. 
But  the  meaning  of  ligneus,  aureus,  ferreus,  is  deter- 
mined mainly  by  lignum,  aurum,  ferrum.  The  termina- 
tion does  no  more  than  indicate  the  adjective  character 
of  the  word,  showing  that  it  expresses  a  quality  or 
characteristic  of  the  stem.  This  is  evident  enough  if 
one  runs  down  the  list  of  usages,  from  which  it  is 
apparent  that  many  shades  of  meaning  other  than  that 
of  material  are  associated  with  this  termination.  The 
dependence  of  the  ending  upon  the  stem  is  also  appar- 
ent from  such  words  as  uirgineus,  where  the  termina- 
tion does  not  indicate  material  because  the  stem  is  not 

68 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

material.  So  the  ending  -ensis,  as  used  with  names  of 
towns,  Vero?iensis,  Carthaginiensis,  expresses  of  itself 
only  the  vaguest  kind  of  relation  to  Verona  or  Car- 
thage; standing  alone,  without  a  context  to  define  it, 
the  only  precision  of  meaning  comes  from  the  stem. 
Or,  from  a  somewhat  different  point  of  view,  the  most 
definite  adjectives  are  those  which  are  formed  upon  defi- 
nite stem-meanings,  Ciceronianus,  Veronensis,  ligneus, 
while  adjectives  formed  from  words  of  more  varied 
meaning  share  the  variety  of  their  stems.  Compare 
ciuicus  with  modieus,  Momanus  with  humanus,  glacialis 
with  socialis. 

It  is  perhaps  less  easy  to  recognize  the  fact  that  case- 
endings  in  like  manner  depend  largely  upon  the  stem- 
meaning  for  their  apparent  definiteness;  the  very  fact 
that  so  much  labor  has  necessarily  been  expended  upon 
the  categorical  distinction  of  case-constructions  tends 
to  fasten  upon  the  terminations  a  precision  of  meaning 
which  they  do  not  in  fact  have  and  to  obscure  the 
influence  of  the  stem-meaning.  But  every  instance  in 
which  a  particular  case-construction  is  found  to  be 
coincident  with  a  particular  set  of  stem-meanings  is 
evidence  that  the  stem-meaning  is  a  determining  ele- 
ment in  the  construction.  Evidence  of  this  kind  is 
best  taken  from  some  standard  work  where  the  facts 
are  brought  together  without  prepossession.  Of  two 
such  constructions  as  the  ablative  of  time  and  the  abla- 
tive of  place  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the 
only  distinction  between  them  is  in  the  meaning  of  the 
words.  The  termination  is  the  same,  but  die,  hord, 
Kalendis  cannot  be  ablatives  of  place  nor  glaeie,  mensd, 
Athcnis,  ablatives  of  time.  In  these  two  ablatives  word- 
meaning  and  case-meaning  run  parallel.  So  the  cases 
which  Draeger,  I.  543,  cites  of  the  ablative  of  cause, 

69 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

especially  of  the  ablative  of  the  inner  motive,  are  almost 
all  nouns  of  emotion  or  the  like:  jiducia,  gaudio,  sus- 
picione,  imprudentia,  amove,  studio,  etc.  The  list  which 
Kiihnast,  p.  164,  gives  from  Caesar  is  spe,  studio,  con- 
suetudine,  ratione,  odio,  expectatione,  and  the  indefinite 
ea  re,  reliquis  rebus.  Livy  uses  (Kiihnast,  p.  164) 
fiducia,  studio,  caritate,  cupidine,  indignatione,  ira, 
terrore,  labore,  metu,  cupiditate,  auiditate,  taedio.  In 
other  words,  the  ablative  of  the  inner  motive  is  the 
ablative  of  words  which  express  an  emotion  or  a  state 
of  mind  which  may  serve  as  a  motive.  The  ablative  of 
military  accompaniment  (Draeger,  537)  is  an  ablative 
of  manner  denned  by  the  military  meaning  of  the 
nouns,  copiis,  milite,  exercitu,  etc.  The  list  of  ablatives 
of  manner  from  the  writers  of  the  classical  period 
and  later  is  (Draeger,  I.  536)  ordine,  ratione,  uia  et 
ratione,  more,  iure,  iniuria,  consensu,  clamore,  silentio, 
dolo,  fraude,  ui,  uitio  (creatus),  cursu,  agmine,  uersibus 
(scribere).  Most  of  these  words  are  limited  to  manner 
by  their  own  meaning,  a  few  only  by  the  context, 
which  Draeger  feels  it  necessary  to  add  in  three  cases 
(uia  et  ratione,  uitio,  uersibus)  in  order  to  make  it  plain 
that  the  ablative  is  one  of  manner.  The  genitive  of 
indefinite  value  is  of  course  confined  to  a  certain  class 
of  words  (flocci,  nauci ;  nihili ;  magni,  tanti),  which  are 
by  their  meaning  capable  of  such  use;  there  could  be 
no  genitive  of  indefinite  value  of  dies,  gladius,  puer. 
The  dative  of  advantage  (commodi,  incommodi)  is  almost 
wholly  personal ;  the  only  exceptions  in  Draeger's  list 
(432  f.)  are  uae  capiti  tuo  (=  tibi),  uae  uostrae  aetati 
(=  uobis),  reipublieae,  patriae,  prouinciae,  pecori,  capellis. 
The  ethical  dative  is  strictly  personal,  and  in  general 
the  dative  is  usually  spoken  of  as  a  personal  case,  that 
is,  this  case  is  confined   to  a  certain  range  of  word- 

70 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION— INFLECTIONS 

meaning.  These  lists  are  given  by  way  of  illustration 
rather  than  of  proof,  but  they  are  enough  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  large  degree  to  which  word-meaning  and 
case-construction  run  on  parallel  lines.  To  put  it  in  a 
different  way,  it  is  by  the  meaning  of  the  nouns  alone 
that  we  are  able  to  make  many  of  the  functional  dis- 
tinctions of  case,  e.  g.,  to  call  gladio  occuus  an  instru- 
mental ablative,  foro  occisus  a  locative  and  node  occi%u% 
an  ablative  of  time.  The  variation  in  case-meaning 
even  follows  variation  in  the  meaning  of  a  single  word. 
Thus  nomen  consults  would  be  a  possessive  genitive,  if 
consul  designated  a  particular  person,  but  it  might  be 
a  genitive  of  apposition  if  consul  stood  for  the  office. 
The  word  dies  may  be  used  as  an  ablative  of  the  degree 
of  difference  when  it  means  a  certain  period  of  time, 
but  it  cannot  be  so  used  when  it  means  daylight.  All 
these  indications  point  in  the  same  direction.  Most 
nouns,  through  the  working  of  analogy  and  by  virtue 
of  a  considerable  range  of  meaning,  have  the  complete 
system  of  six  (or  at  least  of  five)  case-forms,  but  no 
noun  has  a  complete  system  of  case-constructions.  All 
are  defective,  many  extremely  defective,  in  their  case- 
uses  and  the  force  which  thus  limits  and  specializes 
them  is  the  word-meaning. 

The  connection  between  verb-meaning  and  modal  or 
temporal  use  is  less  obvious,  but  it  is  equally  certain. 
I  have  made  elsewhere  1  an  attempt  to  show  that  the 
meaning  of  the  verb  often  influences  its  modal  be- 
havior. Where  two  or  more  verbs  are  used  together, 
without  distinction  so  far  as  modal  force  is  concerned, 
a  difference  in  stem-meaning  often  appears  to  color  the 
mode.     Thus  Plaut.  Amph.,  928,  ualeas,  tibi  habeas  res 

1  The  American  Journal  of  Philology,  XVIII  (1897),  Nos.  70,  71,  72, 
especially  pp.  282  ff. 

71 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

tuas,  reddas  meas,  is  a  wish,  a  permission  and  a  de- 
mand, in  spite  of  the  identity  of  modal  force.  So  in 
Plaut.  Cas.,  611,  ducas  [uxorem]  easque  in  maxumam 
malam  crucem,  the  first  verb  expresses  a  permission,  the 
second  a  curse.  When  verbs  like  these  stand  alone, 
without  defining  context,  they  generally  define  them- 
selves by  their  own  meaning;  ualeas  is  regularly  a 
wish,  turned  by  custom  into  a  farewell,  habeas  usually 
expresses  a  permission  and  reddas  a  command.  The 
first  person  singular  of  the  present  subjunctive  is  rare, 
occurring  in  Plautus  only  about  thirty  times  with  all 
verbs  but  one,  but  that  verb,  uelim,  is  found  more  than 
seventy  times,  that  is,  more  than  twice  as  often  as  all 
other  verbs  together.  Whatever  one  may  think  of  the 
meaning  of  uelim,  the  frequency  of  the  form  can  be  due 
to  nothing  else  than  the  harmony  between  the  verb  of 
willing  and  the  mode  of  desire.  More  general  indica- 
tions pointing  toward  the  influence  of  verb-meaning 
upon  modal  and  temporal  use  are  well  known.  Such 
are  the  peculiar  pluperfects,  oportuerat,  debuerat,  the 
perfects  fui,  habui,  the  indicative  optimum  erat  in  apod- 
osis,  and  similar  usages  in  which  mode  or  tense  and 
word-meaning  unite  to  define  the  construction.1 

The  precise  influence  of  verb-meaning  upon  particu- 
lar modal  or  temporal  uses  is  less  easy  to  detect;  the 
modal  uses,  and  to  a  considerable  extent  the  tense-uses 
also,  are  less  sharply  distinguished  than  the  different 
case-uses.  But  a  few  instances  may  be  given.  The 
subjunctive  in  the  indefinite  second  person  singular  is 
found   almost  always  with  verbs  of   mental  action  or 

1  Blase,  Geschichte  des  Plusquamperfekts ;  Foth,  Verschiebung  latein- 
ischer  Tempora,  in  Bohmer's  Roman.  Studien,  1876,  p.  243;  Hultsch,  die 
Erzahlenden  Zeitformen  bei  Polybios ;  Wheeler,  Uses  of  the  Imperfect  In- 
dicative in  Plautus  and  Terence,  in  Trans,  of  the  Amer.  Philol.  Assoc,  1899, 
XXX,  14  ff. 

72 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

uerba  sentiendi  et  declarandi.1  The  connection  between 
certain  kinds  of  prohibition  and  verbs  of  particular 
meaning  is  used  as  a  basis  for  argument  by  Elmer, 
Studies  in  Latin  Moods  and  Tenses,  pp.  9  ff.,  108  ff. 

These  are,  of  course,  mere  suggestions.  Given 
briefly,  as  they  are  here  given,  some  of  them  may  per- 
haps seem  to  prove  nothing  and  to  suggest  but  little, 
but  taken  all  together  they  will  serve,  it  is  hoped,  to 
point  out  a  direction  in  which  investigation  may  prove 
fruitful  and  may  in  the  end  shed  light  upon  the  whole 
subject  of  the  meaning  of  inflection.  If  evidence,  suffi- 
ciently clear  and  in  sufficient  mass,  can  be  brought 
together  to  show  that  in  one  and  another  case  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  has  been  one  of  the  moving  causes  in 
giving  precision  to  inflectional  forms,  then  a  step  will 
have  been  taken  toward  an  understanding  of  one  cause 
which  operated  to  give  meaning  to  inflection  in  the 
beginning.  If  it  can  be  shown,  for  example,  that 
ligneus  is  simply  the  adjective  form  of  lignum,  that  it 
does  not  necessarily  mean  wood-en  but  may  mean  wood-y, 
wood-like,  and  that  it  is  only  by  a  process  of  isolation, 
due  to  various  causes,  especially  to  frequency  of  usage, 
that  it  has  come  prevailingly  to  mean  wooden,  then  it 
is  only  by  adaptation,  not  by  any  original  or  inherent 
meaning  that  the  termination  -eus  forms  adjectives  of 
material.  So  far  as  it  may  appear  that  only  words 
denoting  an  instrument  are  used  in  an  instrumental 
ablative,  the  hypothesis  of  an  Indo-European  instru- 
mental case,  with  a  termination  attachable  to  all  nouns, 
falls  away  as  unnecessary.  It  can  scarcely  be  supposed 
that  annus  or  uirtus  or  uictor  or  aquila  ever  had  a  true 
instrumental  case.  It  is  altogether  probable  that  the 
occasional   instrumental   uses  of  nouns  which, do  not 

1  Amer.  Joum.  of  Philol.,  XVIII,  386  f. 
73 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

properly  denote  an  instrument  are  the  result  of  analogy 
and,  if  this  is  a  correct  supposition,  the  source  and  ex- 
planation of  the  instrumental  case  is  to  be  found  within 
the  circle  of  nouns  which  denote  an  instrument,  by 
studying  the  working  of  word-meaning  upon  suffix- 
meaning. 

The  kind  of  evidence  needed  to  give  support  and 
clearness  to  these  hypotheses  is  to  be  found  in  any  one 
of  three  ways.  First,  there  are  many  words  which  are 
actually  defective  in  forms,  where  the  non-occurrence 
of  forms  is  so  marked  as  to  make  it  certain  that  these 
forms  were  not  in  use.  This  defectiveness  must  be 
due,  in  general,  to  something  in  the  meaning  of  the 
word.  It  is  the  meaning  of  memini  and  coepi  which 
leads  to  the  use  of  perfect  forms  without  a  present  and 
the  same  reason  should  explain  the  fact  that  inchoative 
verbs  have  the  perfect  of  the  simple  verb,  or,  what  is 
the  same  thing,  no  perfect.  Analogy  may  have  worked 
in  the  case  of  some  of  the  pluralia  tantum,  but  in  most 
cases  it  is  something  in  the  history  of  the  meaning.  A 
study  of  the  kind  of  material  of  which  Osthoff  has 
given  a  few  illustrations  in  his  Suppletivwesen  would 
have  the  advantage  that  the  fact  of  defectiveness  is 
clear,  while  in  other  cases  it  is  always  difficult  to  say 
that  a  particular  noun  might  not  occasionally  occur  in 
almost  any  construction.  A  second  line  of  investiga- 
tion would  be  to  follow  the  syntactical  use  of  certain 
nouns  or  verbs  or  certain  groups  of  nouns  or  verbs  of 
like  meaning,  in  order  to  determine  the  degree  to  which 
their  meaning  limits  their  syntactical  use.  Thus  a 
study  of  a  group  of  nouns  denoting  time  or  place,  to 
find  out  the  extent  of  their  case-use,  would  lead  to  a 
better  understanding  of  the  time  and  place  construc- 
tions and  would  illustrate   the  defective  character  of 

74 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION-  —  INFLECTIONS 

case-usage.  Probably  an  investigation  of  the  uses  of 
names  of  persons,  names  of  official  positions,  words 
denoting  instrument,  would  give  good  results.  It  is 
much  to  be  desired  that  the  modal  use  of  certain  verbs 
should  be  carefully  studied,  especially  verbs  which  con- 
tain an  element  of  will  or  desire,  like  uolo,  cupio,  opto, 
and  those  which  bear  some  special  relation  to  potential 
uses,  like  possum.  The  verba  sentiendi  et  declarandi 
would  certainly  repay  special  study.  A  third  method 
would  be  to  begin  with  the  construction  and  to  classify 
and  study  by  meaning  the  nouns  that  are  found  in  a 
particular  kind  of  dative  or  ablative,  e.  g.,  the  dative  of 
limit  of  motion,  the  ablative  of  cause.  Some  general 
statements  in  this  direction  may  be  found  in  all  gram- 
mars, with  reference  to  the  locative  forms  and  the 
accusative  of  limit  of  motion  and  a  few  other  marked 
constructions. 

2.  The  effect  of  other  inflectional  terminations  is  simi- 
lar to  the  effect  of  wTord-meaning  in  narrowing  and  giv- 
ing precision  to  inflection.  The  form  faciat  is  not  only 
in  the  subjunctive  mode  but  also  in  the  third  person, 
the  singular  number,  the  active  voice  and  the  present 
tense.  Each  one  of  these  characteristics  limits  and 
defines  the  others  or,  more  exactly,  those  which  are 
most  inflexible,  like  person  and  number,  affect  the  more 
impressible.  The  meaning  of  the  mode  is  in  this  case 
by  so  much  the  most  variable  and  shifting  that  it  may 
be  said  that  person,  number,  voice,  and  tense  all  affect 
the  mode,  so  that  the  subjunctive  has  not  the  same 
force  in  the  first  person  that  it  has  in  the  second  or 
third.     A  few  illustrations  will  make  this  clear.1     The 

1  These  points  are  treated  somewhat  at  length  In  the  Amer.  Journ. 
of  PhiloL,  XVIII,  276  ff.  The  illustrations  given  here  are  taken  from 
that  article  and  are  all  from  Flautus. 

75 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

subjunctive  is  in  general  a  mode  of  desire.  In  the  first 
singular,  maneam,  taceam,  the  desire  is  felt  by  the 
speaker  in  regard  to  his  own  action.  But  such  desire 
is  very  rarely  felt  or  expressed;  usually  it  would  take 
the  form  of  determination,  intention,  etc.,  and  in  that 
case  would  be  expressed  by  the  future  or  by  some  peri- 
phrastic phrase.  That  is,  the  subjunctive  and  the  first 
singular  are  almost  incompatible  in  non-interrogative 
sentences  and  the  use  is  rare.  When  it  is  found,  the 
meaning  of  the  subjunctive  is  almost  always  modified 
to  meanings  of  necessity  or  opinion  or  obligation.  In 
the  second  singular,  on  the  contrary,  the  speaker  ex- 
presses his  desire  in  regard  to  the  action  of  the  second 
person,  the  hearer.  The  presence  of  the  person  whose 
action  is  desired  is  favorable  to  all  the  most  direct 
forms  of  desire,  command,  advice,  entreaty,  permission 
and  the  like,  and  illustrations  of  the  subjunctive  as  a 
jussive  or  volitive  mode  are  almost  always  taken  from 
the  second  person  singular.  This,  of  course,  is  the 
most  frequently  used  person  of  the  imperative,  which 
further  illustrates  the  effect  of  person  upon  a  mode  of 
will  by  the  fact  that  it  lacks  the  first  person.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  the  third  singular  the  speaker  expresses 
his  desire  that  a  person  not  present  should  act,  but  he 
expresses  it  to  a  second  person  who  is  present,  and  the 
peculiarities  of  meaning  in  the  third  singular  are  due 
to  the  presence  of  the  second  person.  For  the  desire 
would,  in  general,  not  be  addressed  to  him  if  he  were 
not  in  some  way  involved  in  the  action.  Either  the 
speaker  desires  that  he  shall  carry  the  command  to  the 
third  person  or  that  he  shall  permit  or  cause  the  third 
person  to  act.  These  implications  are  so  plainly  con- 
veyed to  the  hearer  by  the  very  fact  that  he  is  addressed 
that  they  become,  in  effect,  parts  of  the  meaning  of  the 

76 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION— INFLECTIONS 

form,  and  when  the  action  is  further  defined  by  para- 
taxis, as  it  often  is,  the  added  verb  is  usually  a  defini- 
tion or  explanation  of  the  action  of  the  second  person. 
Thus  euoeate  hue  Sosiam:  .  .  .  Blepharonem  arcessat 
(Amph.,  951)  is  an  undeveloped  form  of  euoca  .  .  . 
aliquem  ocins,  roga  circumducat  {Most.,  680)  ;  so  ueniat 
and  tube  ueniat ;  in  the  same  way  accipiat  means  "  see 
that  he  gets  it,"  and  might  have  been  more  fully  ex- 
pressed by  fac  accipiat,  as  adeat,  siquid  uolt.  ||  siquid 
uis,  adi,  mulier  (M.  6r.,  1037)  is  parallel  to  sine  mulier 
ueniat  (M.  6r.,  1244).  A  difference  in  number  also 
affects  the  mode.  The  first  plural,  which  includes  the 
speaker  and  the  hearer  as  actors,  is  much  more  frequent 
than  the  first  singular,  but  is  quite  narrowly  limited  in 
meaning,  since  it  can  have  no  meaning  which  is  not 
common  to  both  the  first  person  and  the  second;  this 
leaves  only  a  narrow  range  of  meaning  and  the  narrow- 
ing is  the  direct  result  of  the  influence  of  person  and 
number  together  upon  the  mode. 

The  effect  of  tense  upon  modal  meaning  is  not  so 
easily  seen,  since  the  tense-force  in  the  subjunctive  is 
much  less  direct  and  clear.  It  appears,  however,  in 
the  small  extent  of  use  of  some  of  the  tenses,  especially 
the  pluperfect,  in  independent  sentences.  In  Plautus, 
out  of  about  sixteen  hundred  instances  of  the  subjunc- 
tive in  independent  sentences,  only  seven  are  in  the 
pluperfect  and  nine  more  in  the  passive  with  perfect 
participle,  which  is  in  effect  an  adjective.  The  pluper- 
fect subjunctive  is,  in  the  main,  a  tense  for  subordinate 
clauses.  In  the  imperfect  there  are  about  twenty  cases 
in  Plautus  of  the  subjunctive  of  desire  (hortatorj^,  jus- 
sive, volitive,  etc.).  They  are  chiefly  in.  the  second 
person  singular.  In  this  person  and  number  in  the 
present  tense  the  most  direct  forms  of  desire  are  ex- 

77 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

pressed,  command,  prohibition,  entreaty,  permission, 
demand,  obligation.  But  most  of  these  forms  of  desire 
are  possible  only  in  present  time  and  with  reference  to 
the  future;  they  are  almost  all  incompatible  with  the 
idea  of  past  time,  which  the  imperfect  distinctly  ex- 
presses. The  only  one  of  them  that  is  consistent  with 
past  time  is  the  idea  of  obligation ;  the  imperfect  second 
singular  therefore  retains  this  one  meaning  out  of  the 
variety  of  meanings  possible  in  the  present  tense.  So 
Plaut.  Merc,  634,  requaereres,  rogitares,  "you  should 
have  looked  for  her,  have  asked  questions;  "  Hud.,  842, 
quin  occidisti  extemplo  f  j|  gladius  non  erat.  ||  caperes  ant 
fustem  aut  lapidem,  "  You  should  have  taken  a  club. ' ' 
In  such  cases  the  fact  that  the  form  is  thrice  inflected 
—  for  tense,  mode  and  person  —  gives  to  it  a  consider- 
able degree  of  precision,  the  weakest  or  most  variable 
element,  the  modal  meaning,  yielding  to  the  more  in- 
flexible personal  and  temporal  meanings. 

The  limiting  effect  of  the  meaning  of  one  inflectional 
termination  upon  the  meaning  of  another  is  evidently 
narrower  in  its  range  than  the  effect  of  word-meaning. 
It  cannot  have  much  force  in  the  noun-inflections,  since 
the  only  doubling  there  is  in  case  and  number,  the 
gender  being  unimportant.  There  are  some  ablatives, 
e.  g.,  of  manner,  which  are  confined  mainly  to  the  singu- 
lar, but  this  is  like  the  confining  of  abstract  nouns 
mainly  to  the  singular.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  a  modi- 
fication of  the  meaning  of  some  constructions  might  be 
observed,  if  the  singular  and  the  plural  were  carefully 
compared,  as  abstract  nouns  are  usually  modified  in 
meaning  when  they  are  used  in  the  plural.  But,  in 
general,  this  kind  of  modification  appears  most  clearly 
in  verbs  and  especially  in  its  effect  upon  the  meaning 
of  the  modes.     There  it  may  be  most  fully  observed, 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

and  its  effect  in  the  production  of  distinct  and  well- 
marked  meanings  is  most  interesting. 

3.  The  context  is  a  third  limiting  and  defining  influ- 
ence tending  to  give  precision  to  inflectional  forms. 

By  context  is  meant  ordinarily  the  words  which  pre- 
cede or  follow  a  particular  word  within  a  group.  This 
is  a  sufficient  definition  from  the  word-side  of  language. 
From  the  psychological  side  more  must  he  included, 
and  the  word  context  is  perhaps  too  narrow.  It  should 
include  all  the  circumstances  attending  the  speech, 
the  occasion  which  called  it  forth,  the  relation  of  the 
speaker  to  the  hearer,  the  emotional  tone,  the  nature 
of  the  general  topic  of  conversation.  The  fact  that 
all  these  attendant  circumstances  in  part  determine  the 
choice  of  words  by  the  speaker  and  even  more  directly 
interpret  them  to  the  hearer  is  well  known.  They  are 
directive  influences,  aiding  the  mind  of  the  hearer  to 
the  selection  of  the  right  concepts.  But  selection  and 
interpretation  are  in  part  the  result  of  exclusion.  The 
fact  that  the  topic  of  conversation  is  of  a  certain  kind 
excludes  from  the  attention  all  concepts  not  connected 
with  that  topic  or  that  general  range  of  concepts.  It 
is  this  selective  force  of  circumstances  which  enables 
the  hearer  to  understand  a  word  in  the  particular  sense 
in  which  the  speaker  meant  it,  so  that  single  words  may 
have  the  large  range  of  meanings  given  in  any  English 
dictionary  and  yet  may  be  used  without  any  consider- 
able danger  of  confusion.  It  is  a  reasonable  inference 
to  surmise  that  it  was  in  part  through  the  influence  of 
such  limiting  forces  that  words  acquired  definiteness 
of  meaning. 

The  same  line  of  reasoning  is  equally  applicable  to 
inflections,  though  the  applicability  has  been  less  freely 
recognized.    With  inflections  also,  case-forms  and  mode- 

79 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

forms  and  tense-forms,  a  like  exclusive  and  selective 
influence  is  exerted  by  all  the  circumstances  accom- 
panying the  speech,  and  to  a  considerable  degree  the 
definiteness  which  seems  to  attach  to  inflections  is  in 
reality  the  result  of  these  more  general  causes.  The 
question  quid  agam  f  is  in  itself  vague,  both  as  to  the 
meaning  of  the  words  and  as  to  the  modal  meaning, 
but  it  begins  to  assume  a  more  precise  meaning  when 
the  circumstances  in  which  it  is  asked  are  supplied. 
Addressed  by  the  speaker  to  himself,  in  soliloquy,  it  is 
an  expression  of  uncertainty  which  might  be  expanded 
into  nescio  quid  agam;  addressed  to  another  person  it 
may  be  a  real  question,  varying  again,  though  within 
narrower  limits,  according  to  the  circumstances.  If 
the  occasion  is  one  in  which  the  speaker  really  desires 
advice,  it  means  "What  do  you  think  I  had  better 
do?"  If  the  hearer  is  in  need  of  immediate  help,  it 
means  "What  do  you  want  me  to  do?"  If  the  speaker 
has  already  declared  his  inability  to  act,  that  fact,  aided 
by  the  appropriate  tone  and  inflection,  limits  the  mean- 
ing to  a  rejecting  exclamation,  "What  can  I  do?  "  But 
it  is  evident  that  these  various  meanings  are  not  local- 
ized in  the  modal  termination ;  it  is  not  the  subjunctive 
mode  which  gives  these  meanings  or  some  one  of  them  to 
the  sentence,  but,  roughly  speaking,  the  sentence  which 
gives  them  to  the  subjunctive.  To  reason  in  the  other 
way  is  to  reverse  the  whole  relation  of  thought  to  speech. 
The  influence  of  surrounding  circumstances  is  per- 
haps not  stronger,  but  is  certainly  more  distinct,  when 
they  are  of  such  a  kind  as  to  be  expressed  in  words. 
Of  these  the  form  of  the  sentence  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting.  It  does  not  greatly  affect  case-syntax,  but 
the  meanings  of  modes  and  tenses  are  often  largely 
determined  by  it.     The  most  obvious  illustration  is  in 

80 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

the  subordinate  clause,  where  the  mere  fact  that  the 
whole  group  is  subordinated  excludes  all  the  most 
direct  kinds  of  desire,  as  it  excludes  almost  completely 
the  stronger  mode  of  will,  the  imperative.  In  the  sub- 
ordinate clause,  therefore,  subjunctive  forms  are  of 
necessity  confined  almost  entirely  to  other  functions 
and  become  in  the  end  signs  of  particular  kinds  of 
subordination.  The  modal  meaning  yields  to  the  more 
determining  subordinating  meaning. 

The  same  general  effect  is  produced  when  a  subjunc- 
tive form  is  used  in  an  interrogative  sentence,  espe- 
cially when  the  first  person  singular  of  the  present 
tense  is  so  used.  This  form,  faciam,  dicam,  is  but 
rarely  used  in  non-interrogative  sentences,  as  has  been 
said  above,  because  in  such  sentences  the  speaker,  the 
wilier  and  the  actor  are  all  united  in  one  person ;  this 
is  a  rare  situation  and  when  it  occurs  the  subjunctive 
force  is  always  considerably  modified.  But  in  ques- 
tions the  speaker  asks  in  regard  to  the  desire  of  the 
hearer;  the  speaker  and  the  actor  are  one,  but  the  de- 
sire is  felt  by  another  person,  the  hearer.  The  ques- 
tion quid  faciam?  in  its  fullest  expansion  means  "What 
do  you  want  me  to  do?"  This  situation  is  common 
and  natural,  and  it  favors  the  use  of  the  subjunctive 
forms.  In  such  questions,  therefore,  the  more  direct 
and  usual  meanings  of  the  subjunctive  reappear,  so 
that  faciam  in  questions  really  corresponds  to  facias  in 
non-interrogative  sentences  rather  than  to  faciam.  The 
special  forms  of  the  <?iMs-question  also  illustrate  the 
effect  of  context  upon  the  meaning  of  an  inflected  form 
in  some  curious  and  instructive  ways.  Questions  with 
quomodo  and  the  first  singular  present  subjunctive  are 
almost  always  repudiating,  implying  a  negative  like 
nullo  modo.  This  sweeping  implication  of  impossibility 
6  81 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

we  most  easily  express  by  attaching  it  to  the  modal 
form  and  translating,  e.g.,  quomodo  ego  uiuam  sine  te? 
by  "How  can  I  live  without  you?  "  That  this  sugges- 
tion was  to  some  extent  felt  in  the  Latin  appears  from 
the  fact  that  posse  is  sometimes  used  in  such  ques- 
tions (Plaut.  Pseud.,  236,  quonam  uincere  pacto  possim 
animum  ?).  Questions  with  cur  (quor)  and  the  subjunc- 
tive are  argumentative,  because  they  question  the  motive 
of  the  speaker,  often  with  the  implication  of  repudia- 
tion. Thus  cur  ego  adflicter  ?  becomes  a  question  as  to 
the  justice  or  propriety  of  the  course  of  action  recom- 
mended and  this  sense  of  obligation  attaches  itself  to 
the  mode ;  we  translate  "  Why  should  I  .  .  .  ?  "  Even 
a  variation  in  the  case-construction  of  the  interrogative 
word  may  give  a  color  to  the  question  which  seems  to 
affect  the  meaning  of  the  mode.  When  quid  is  the 
direct  object  of  the  verb  as  in  quid  faciam?  quid  agam? 
the  question  is  either  in  regard  to  the  desire  of  another 
person  or  it  is  in  soliloquy  and  deliberative,  but  when 
quid  is  the  accusative  of  compass  and  extent  and 
means  "why?"  the  question  is  almost  always  repudi- 
ating, and  the  mode  has  the  meaning  of  obligation  or 
propriety,  as  with  cur.  In  all  such  cases  as  these  the 
apparent  meaning  of  the  mode  varies  with  its  surround- 
ings. The  context  becomes  a  limiting  and  selective 
force,  operating  just  as  other  inflectional  terminations 
operate,  to  exclude  a  considerable  number  of  the  pos- 
sible meanings  of  the  inflected  form.  The  meaning 
which  the  context  favors  then  predominates,  and  if  the 
combination  of  that  particular  context  with  a  particular 
form  of  the  verb  is  frequently  used,  so  that  it  becomes 
a  standing  combination,  the  meaning  becomes  perma- 
nently attached  to  the  group  and,  in  particular,  to  the 
inflected  form. 

82 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

This  principle,  that  inflected  forms  should  be  inter- 
preted  with  their  setting,  is  applicable  to  many  combi- 
nations of  words.  Thus  the  presence  of  potius  and  of 
some  other  comparatives,  perhaps  of  any  comparative, 
is  favorable  to  potential  uses  of  the  subjunctive.  The 
presence  of  the  negative  has  a  similar  effect.  Adverbs 
of  time  often  greatly  influence  the  tense-force  (iamdu- 
dum  with  the  present).  The  order  of  clauses  may  be 
of  great  importance;  a  clause  which  follows  a  very 
distinct  and  detailed  main  sentence  will  be  determined 
and,  as  it  were,  anticipated  by  that  sentence,  but  if  it 
precedes  the  main  clause  it  may  often  in  its  turn  form 
the  setting  to  which  the  following  sentence,  even 
though  it  be  grammatically  independent,  must  accom- 
modate itself.  In  all  such  cases  the  meaning  of  the 
inflected  form  (mode  or  tense)  will  be  to  a  considerable 
degree  affected  by  its  context. 

Within  narrower  limits  the  immediate  context  in- 
fluences case-constructions.  The  genitive,  which  has 
already  been  used  to  illustrate  the  effect  of  word- 
meaning  upon  function,  may  also  be  used  to  illustrate 
the  influence  of  the  context,  for  every  genitive,  when  it 
depends  upon  another  noun,  is  defined  by  the  combined 
meaning  of  its  stem  and  of  the  noun  upon  which  it 
depends.  This  is  in  part  recognized  by  the  employment 
of  the  meaning  of  the  governing  noun  as  a  part  of  the 
definition.  The  partitive  genitive  is  the  case  of  a  noun 
denoting  a  whole  depending  upon  a  word  denoting  a 
part;  without  the  latter  portion  it  would  be  impossible 
to  define  the  partitive  genitive.  In  defining  the  objec- 
tive genitive,  also,  it  is  usual  to  add  some  statement 
about  the  governing  noun,  that  it  must  denote  action, 
agency,  feeling,  or  that  it  must  have  verbal  force.  It 
is  by  such  characteristics  that  we  recognize  the  case 

83 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

as  objective.  The  genitives  depending  upon  adjectives 
have  no  other  definition  than  that  which  comes  from 
the  governing  word,  and  the  genitives  which  depend 
upon  verbs  are  not  only  defined  in  a  general  way  by 
the  fact  that  the  governing  word  is  a  verb,  but  are  also 
subdivided  according  to  the  meaning  of  the  verb  — 
verbs  of  valuing,  refert  and  interest,  judicial  verbs, 
impersonal  verbs  of  mental  distress,  verbs  of  memory, 
verbs  of  participation  and  mastery,  verbs  of  fulness  and 
want.1  The  conclusion  drawn  from  this  state  of  things, 
by  all  who  are  hot  involved  in  the  logical  network  of 
the  localistic  theory  of  the  cases,  is  that  the  genitive  is 
a  grammatical  case,  but  the  matter  should  be  pushed 
a  little  further.  The  genitive  is  a  case  of  the  vaguest 
possible  meaning  in  itself.  Its  termination  has  less 
definite  meaning  than  most  of  the  adjective  termina- 
tions, which  are  vague  enough.  The  ground  upon 
which  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  genitives  and  to 
make  a  dozen  or  more  of  categories,  sufficiently  well- 
marked,  is  not  something  in  the  nature  of  the  case  or 
in  the  meaning,  either  original2  or  acquired,  of  the 
termination ;  it  is  the  meaning  of  the  two  words  which 
are  brought  into  relation  that  defines  the  nature  of  that 
relation.  Language  does  not  go  beyond  this  because 
no  more  precise  definition  is  needed.  Phrases  like  pars 
militum,  aliquid  boni,  pondus  auri,  nomen  amicitiae,  ira 
deorum,  fugitans  litium,  fessi  rerum,  carry  their  own 
definition  with  them  when  the  meaning  of  the  two 
words  is  known.     Any  difficulty  that  is  felt  in  placing 

1  This  list  is  from  Lane's  Grammar,  §§  1271-1294. 

2  In  Bennett's  Grammar  the  attempt  to  trace  constructions  to  some 
original  or  primitive  meaning  is  carried  out  more  elaborately  and  more 
sweepingly  than  in  any  other  Latin  Grammar.  But  of  the  genitive  Ben- 
nett says  (App.  p.  177),  "There  is  no  one  type  from  which  the  others  de- 
veloped, but  all  of  the  varieties  .  .  .  are  equally  primitive." 

84 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

a  particular  case  in  a  particular  category  of  subject, 
object,  part,  value,  possession,  is  not  a  difficulty  in 
language,  for  it  would  remain  if  the  phrase  were  trans- 
lated into  English,  but  is  due  to  the  vagueness  of  the 
definition  of  the  category  and  the  inherent  difficulty  of 
classifying  modes  of  thought.  It  is  at  bottom  a  logical 
difficulty. 

There  is  no  other  case  in  which  the  influence  of  the 
context  is  so  obvious  and  so  varied  as  it  is  in  the 
genitive.  The  nominative  is  plainly  a  case-form  whose 
termination  has  no  other  purpose  (if  we  set  aside  for 
the  moment  the  secondary  indications  of  number  and 
gender,  the  latter,  at  least,  an  acquired  function)  than 
to  show  its  relation  to  a  verb.  It  does  not  indicate 
that  it  is  the  actor,  for  often  the  subject  is  not  the 
actor.  It  is  purely  grammatical.  But  the  relation  to 
the  context  is  in  this  case  so  simple  that  it  does  not 
show  the  interesting  variations  which  appear  in  the 
genitive.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  accusative, 
which,  besides,  owes  some  of  its  definiteness,  as  in  the 
accusative  of  time  and  space,  partly  to  the  meaning  of 
the  noun  itself,  as  well  as  to  its  context.  The  various 
meanings  of  the  ablative  are  still  more  largely  due  to 
the  word-meaning.  But  whenever  a  case-construction 
is  defined  in  part  by  naming  the  kind  of  verb  upon 
which  the  noun  depends,  it  must  be  said  that  the  mean- 
ing of  the  construction  is  due  in  part  to  the  context. 
Of  this  kind  are  the  dative  after  verbs  of  pleasing, 
favoring,  trusting,  after  verbs  compounded  with  certain 
prepositions,  the  double  accusative  after  verbs  of  nam- 
ing and  calling,  the  ablative  after  utor,  the  genitive 
after  verbs  of  remembering.  In  all  these  constructions 
the  meaning  of  the  word  itself  may  influence  the  case- 
meaning,  but  the  influence  of  the  context  is  the  stronger. 

85 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

And,  of  course,  analogy  here  plays  a  large  part,  so  that 
it  is  always  possible  that  the  explanation  of  a  particular 
case-construction  is  not  to  be  found  in  itself,  either  in 
its  word-meaning  or  in  its  context,  but  merely  in  its 
likeness  to  some  other  word  or  words  with  which  the 
construction  originated. 

It  was  said  above  that  adjectives  are  determined  in 
their  meaning  largely  by  the  meaning  of  the  stem  upon 
which  they  are  formed.  This  is  true  of  the  general 
range  of  meaning.  The  widest  limitation  and  defini- 
tion comes  from  the  termination,  which  defines  them 
as  adjectives;  within  this  field  they  are  still  further 
restricted  by  the  meaning  of  the  stem;  the  greatest 
degree  of  precision  is  due  to  the  context,  to  the  sub- 
stantive which  they  qualify.  The  meaning  of  an  adjec- 
tive of  color,  e.g.,  purpureus,  is  the  particular  shade 
which  the  speaker  has  consciously  in  mind  at  the  mo- 
ment when  he  uses  the  word  and  which  he  is  able  to 
suggest  to  the  hearer  by  the  use  of  this  particular 
adjective.  Of  the  various  elements  which  go  to  make 
up  this  particular  meaning  that  which  is  suggested  by 
the  termination  is  the  most  vague,  that  the  word  is  an 
adjective  and  describes  a  quality  or  characteristic;  the 
meaning  of  the  stem,  from  purpura,  Tropfyvpa,  still 
further  limits  it  and  gives  precision  and  body  to  its 
meaning.  But  it  is  still  capable  of  a  very  wide  range 
of  meaning,  so  wide  that  of  itself  it  would  fall  far  short 
of  suggesting  any  definite  shade  of  color  to  the  hearer. 
And  this  would  really  be  the  case  if  the  speaker  were 
describing  an  object  unknown  to  the  hearer  or  an  object 
of  varying  color.  We  do  not  know  the  color  of  a  flos 
purpureus  nor  whether  it  was  a  thistle  or  a  rose  or  a 
poppy;  we  do  not  know  the  shade  of  the  purpureus 
pannus  except  as  we  may  be  guided  by  the  fact  that 

86 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION —  INFLECTIONS 

it  was  a  piece  of  cloth  and  therefore  dyed.  It  is  only 
when  the  object  is  known  that  purpureus  carries  defi- 
nite suggestion,  of  rose-color,  of  a  blushing  cheek,  of 
blood,  of  poppies,  of  wine,  of  ripe  figs  and  even  of  let- 
tuce and  of  the  sea  roughened  by  the  wind.  Of  itself 
the  adjective  is  sufficiently  vague  to  be  used  of  any  of 
these  objects,  but  when  used  with  one  of  these  words, 
rosa,  merum,  jicus,  in  the  context,  the  meaning  has  all 
the  precision  that  the  color-sense  of  speaker  and  hearer 
can  perceive.  The  adjective  uirgineus  was  used  above 
to  illustrate  the  fact  that  the  material  meaning  of 
aureus,  ferreus  is  not  given  by  the  termination,  but 
by  aurum,  ferrum  as  nouns  of  material.  It  might  be 
further  said  that  the  context  in  which  uirgineus  stands 
excludes  the  idea  of  material  and  gives  to  it  other 
meanings,  uirginea  figura,  forma,  uirgineus  pudor,  decor, 
—  meanings  which  may  be  still  so  vague  as  to  need  the 
definition  of  the  more  remote  context,  as  in  uirginea 
ara,  uirgineum  helium. 

In  what  has  been  said  thus  far  the  word  context  has 
been  employed  chiefly  in  the  usual  sense,  to  denote  the 
word  or  words  which  precede  or  follow  a  particular 
word.  From  the  psychological  side  the  meaning  of 
context  is  somewhat  different,  and  a  consideration  of 
it  from  this  side  may  shed  some  further  light  upon  the 
problem  of  the  extent  and  manner  in  which  context 
affects  the  meaning  of  inflection. 

No  concept  arises  in  consciousness  alone.  The  larger 
concepts,  which  require  analysis  before  they  can  be 
adequately  represented  in  words,  stand  in  relations  to 
similar  preceding  and  following  groups,  and  the  more 
definite  concepts  which  are  the  result  of  analysis  come 
into  consciousness  already  fringed  about  with  a  network 
of  mutual  relations.     It  is  only  by  a  difficult  process  of 

87 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

abstraction  that  they  can  be  freed  from  such  associations 
and  isolated.  In  the  ordinary  processes  of  thought  pre- 
ceding speech  each  concept  is  part  of  a  group,  exists 
for  and  in  the  group  and  has  no  other  end  than  the 
putting  into  clearer  light  of  some  aspect  of  the  group. 
Grammatically  it  is  correct  to  speak  of  an  adjective  as 
modifying  the  noun,  but  psychologically  the  adjective 
and  the  noun  are  but  two  related  elements  of  a  group- 
concept  which  is  a  unity,  not  a  compound.  The  phrase 
statua  argentea  comes  into  the  mind  as  a  whole  and 
could  perfectly  well  be  represented  by  a  single  word, 
if  that  particular  idea  were  often  enough  thought  of. 
The  two  words  therefore  stand  in  the  most  intimate 
relation  to  each  other,  not  one  modifying  the  other,  but 
both  together  expressing  a  single  concept  and  dividing 
between  them  the  function  of  expression.  Each  there- 
fore limits  the  other,  neither  is  intelligible  without  the 
other.  So  of  two  substantives  united  by  some  gram- 
matical bond  like  the  putting  of  one  into  the  genitive, 
the  relation  is  mutual  because  both  are  parts  of  a  whole. 
Phrases  like  gaudium  certaminis,  militis  gladius,  furor 
animi,  finis  laboris,  causae  rerum  are  single  concepts,  so 
felt  by  speaker  and  hearer,  though  for  the  purpose 
of  precise  expression  no  single  word  exists  which  will 
suffice  and  a  slight  analysis  is  necessary.  But  because 
they  are  elements  of  a  whole  they  are  intelligible  only 
in  their  mutual  relation  and  that  relation  is  intelligible 
only  when  both  elements  are  taken  into  account.  For 
this  reason  no  genitive  can  be  understood  or  classified 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  word  upon  which  it  de- 
pends grammatically,  that  is,  of  the  other  half  of  the 
concept.  Such  genitives  as  flocci,  tanti,  are  not  excep- 
tions to  this  principle,  because  their  habitual  limitation 
to  a  particular  use  makes  it  easy  to  supply  the  context. 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

In  larger  fields,  also,  when  the  group  of  concepts  is 
more  complex,  the  same  principle  holds.  Each  concept 
is  what  it  is,  not  by  itself  but  because  it  is  a  part  of  an 
analyzed  whole,  and  it  is  not  comprehensible  except 
when  it  is  thus  viewed,  modified  and  colored  by  its 
surroundings.  The  total  concept-group  is  never  so 
perfectly  analyzed  and  so  precisely  matched  by  words 
and  by  inflectional  forms  that  it  is  possible  to  say  that 
this  concept  is  expressed  wholly  and  solely  by  this  one 
word  or  form,  and  that  concept  by  another  word  or 
form.  This  is  perhaps  obvious  enough,  but  the  applica- 
tion of  it  to  syntax,  the  extent  to  which  the  syntactical 
relations  are  dependent  for  their  expression  upon  the 
context  and,  therefore,  the  degree  of  vagueness  inher- 
ent in  all  inflection,  has  not  been  fully  recognized. 

The  lines  of  work  which  this  principle  suggests  are 
obvious  and  have  been  mentioned  above.  Wherever  it 
is  necessary  in  defining  a  case-construction  or  a  modal 
or  temporal  use  to  do  so  by  stating  the  kind  of  word 
upon  which  the  case  depends  or  the  kind  of  sentence  in 
which  the  modal  or  temporal  use  is  found,  that  fact  is 
of  itself  an  indication  that  the  function  is  not  expressed 
by  the  inflectional  form  alone,  but  is  also  in  part  a 
function  of  the  group.  The  duty  of  the  syntacticist  is 
to  determine  as  nearly  as  possible  how  far  the  function 
has  been  shifted  to  the  inflectional  form,  how  far  it  is 
expressed  by  other  members  of  the  group,  how  far  it 
is  still  unlocalized  and,  in  each  case,  why.  In  other 
words,  the  most  elaborate  possible  analysis  of  the  con- 
text is  here  suggested  as  a  means  of  understanding 
more  fully  just  what  is  the  office  of  inflection.  In  one 
respect  the  influence  of  the  context  upon  the  meaning 
of  words  or  of  inflectional  forms  differs  from  the  influ- 
ence either  of  the  word-meaning  or  of  the  secondary  in- 

89 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

flections ;  these  are  more  constant  in  their  effect,  while 
the  context  changes.  The  context  therefore  not  only 
tends  to  give  precision  of  meaning,  but  also  tends  to 
bring  about  a  shift  of  meaning.  The  latter  tendency  is 
not  essentially  different,  however,  from  the  former;  in 
either  case  the  context  defines  and  fixes  an  occasional 
meaning  so  that  it  becomes,  when  the  word  is  used 
often  enough  in  the  same  setting,  a  fixed  and  recog- 
nized meaning.  Such  a  process  is  usually  nothing  more 
than  a  change  of  emphasis  from  one  element  of  mean- 
ing to  another.  The  fact  that  each  word  represents 
only  a  part  of  the  total  meaning  of  the  group  and  that 
each  concept  is  to  a  considerable  extent  defined  by  the 
other  concepts  of  the  group,  makes  it  possible  for  the 
speaker  to  choose  somewhat  freely  among  the  words 
associated  with  a  particular  concept.  He  may  select  a 
word  of  a  particular  coloring,  poetical  or  humorous  or 
colloquial.  It  is  this  possibility  which  allows  a  poet 
to  choose  a  word  of  a  particular  metrical  value  or  a 
word  charged  with  imaginative  suggestion.  The  reader 
grasps  the  thought  in  groups  and,  unless  the  freedom 
of  selection  be  pushed  to  an  extreme,  as  it  sometimes 
is,  he  is  rather  stimulated  than  confused  by  the  novelty 
of  the  words.  Or  the  speaker,  aiming  simply  at  clear- 
ness and  precision  of  expression,  may  select  a  word 
which  has  as  a  secondary  element  of  its  meaning  the 
exact  concept  that  he  desires  to  express,  and  he  may 
do  so  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  dominant  element  is 
something  different.  For  the  other  concepts  of  the 
group,  that  is,  the  context,  so  fix  the  tone  of  the  whole 
that  the  dominant  element  will  be  excluded  and  the 
only  possible  meaning  will  be  the  one  which  the  speaker 
desires  to  express.  For  the  moment,  the  secondary 
element  becomes  dominant  and  the  dominant  element 

90 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION —  INFLECTIONS 

becomes  secondary ;  a  shift  of  meaning  has  taken  place. 
To  make  the  shift  permanent  it  is  only  necessary  that 
the  word  should  be  used  repeatedly  in  the  same  con- 
text. Under  the  influence  of  this  kind  of  process, 
which  may  vary  considerably  in  its  details,  the  meaning 
of  words  is  constantly  changing.  The  only  difference 
between  the  change  of  word-meaning  and  a  shift  of 
function  of  an  inflectional  form  is  that  the  latter  is 
much  the  easier.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  The 
first  is  that  the  relational  concepts  which  find  their 
expression  in  inflection  are  less  stable,  more  evanescent, 
than  the  substantive  concepts  which  are  associated  with 
single  words.  If  in  some  cases  the  association  becomes 
fixed,  in  many  more  it  remains  always  vague  and  liable 
to  shift.  The  best  evidence  of  the  unstable  equilib- 
rium between  relational  concepts  and  their  expression 
in  inflectional  forms  is  the  extreme  difficulty,  not  to 
say  impossibility,  of  defining  a  case  or  a  mode.  A 
second  cause  which  renders  the  meaning  of  inflectional 
forms  more  unstable  than  the  meaning  of  words  is  the 
ease  with  which  such  forms  are  made  under  the  work- 
ing of  analogy.  Owing  to  this  cause  many  forms  which 
were  not  in  actual  use  had  what  might  be  called  a 
potential  existence.  They  would  be,  for  example,  forms 
which  were  excluded  from  actual  use  by  their  stem- 
meaning  or  by  secondary  inflections.  An  instrumental 
termination,  once  fixed  in  use,  would  be  extended  by 
analogy  to  other  words  which  were  incapable  of  a  pre- 
cise instrumental  meaning,  as  to  the  names  of  persons, 
or  a  locative  termination  would  be  capable  of  attachment 
to  abstract  nouns.  Forms  thus  made,  or  rather  capable 
of  being  thus  made,  would  not  be  in  actual  use  as 
instrumentals  or  locatives,  but  would  be  speech-mate- 
rial ready  for  use  in  meanings  approaching  the  locative 

91 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

or  the  instrumental.     With  them  a  shift  of   meaning 
would  be  not  only  easy  but  really  inevitable. 

The  extent  to  which  shifts  of  this  kind  have  taken 
place  in  case-meaning  and  in  modal  meaning  must  be 
very  great.  The  subjunctive  in  subordinate  clauses 
furnishes  abundant  illustration,  upon  which  it  is  not 
necessary  to  dwell.  The  fact  of  subordination,  if  it  is 
clear,  is  the  most  important  element  in  the  meaning  of 
the  whole  group,  and  under  its  influence  the  mode  is 
so  shifted  that  only  uncertainly  and  by  the  most  careful 
tracing  can  any  connection  be  found  between  its  mean- 
ing and  the  meaning  of  the  same  form  in  independent 
sentences. 

The  working  together  of  these  three  forces,  word- 
meaning,  secondary  inflections  and  context,  to  give 
precision  to  the  meaning  of  inflectional  forms  or  to 
produce  shift  of  meaning  may  be  illustrated  briefly  from 
certain  uses  of  the  subjunctive,1  the  use  in  some  kinds 
of  wish  and  some  of  the  uses  which  are  included  under 
the  term  potential. 

The  wish  is  not  distinguished  from  other  expressions 
of  desire  either  by  a  sharp  line  of  demarcation  or  by 
any  essential  difference  in  the  nature  of  the  desire  felt. 
It  seems  quite  certain  that,  if  the  Greek  and  the  San- 
skrit had  not  developed  a  second  mode,  and  if  this 
mode  had  not  been  called  Optative  from  one  of  its 
most  obvious  functions,  the  sharp  distinction  commonly 
made  between  Will  and  Wish  would  have  had  no  place 
in  syntax.  Such  a  phrase  as  Quod  hales  ne  habeas  et 
illuc  quod  nunc  non  habes  habeas  uelim  (Plaut.  Trin., 
351)  is  a  wish,  but  quod  agis  ne  agas  would  not  be 
optative  and  many  expressions  of  desire  lie  in  a  border- 

1  See  Amer.  Journ.  of  Philol.,  XVIII,  4,  pp.  383  ff. 
92 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION—  INFLECTIONS 

land  between  wish  and  will.  The  distinction,  so  far 
as  any  distinction  can  be  made,  lies  in  the  object  of 
desire  and  in  the  circumstances.  This  is  also  the  dis- 
tinction between  other  expressions  of  desire,  between 
command  and  entreaty,  between  demand  and  permis- 
sion. Standing  alone,  as  it  might  in  conversation, 
uenias  is  almost  undefined ;  only  in  the  light  of  further 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  coming  and  the  circum- 
stances of  speaker  and  actor  is  it  possible  to  say  whether 
uenias  is  a  command  or  an  entreaty  or  a  permission.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  decide  whether  the  object  desired 
and  the  circumstances  are  the  cause  of  the  difference 
in  the  nature  of  the  desire;  they  are,  at  any  rate,  the 
invariable  accompaniments  and  the  criteria  by  which 
the  nature  of  the  desire  is  determined.  And  it  is  by 
these  criteria  that  the  wish  is  distinguished  from  the 
command,  precisely  as  the  command  is  distinguished 
from  the  entreaty.  It  is  true  that  the  wish  is  some- 
times indicated  by  particles,  as  by  utinam  or,  in  Plautus, 
by  uelim,  but  the  very  fact  that  such  distinguishing 
words  have  come  into  use  shows  that  without  them  the 
wish  was  not  always  clearly  differentiated  in  expression 
from  other  kinds  of  desire.  It  is  true  also  that  the 
presence  of  utinam  indicates  that  the  need  was  felt  of 
distinguishing  wish  from  command  more  clearly  than 
the  need  of  distinguishing  command  from  entreaty  or 
permission,  but  it  is  almost  wholly  in  cases  which  lie  in 
the  border-land  that  utinam  is  used.  The  most  distinct 
forms  of  wish  do  not  need  a  particle ;  they  are  clearly 
marked  by  the  other  criteria,  the  object  of  desire  and 
the  attendant  circumstances. 

The  object  of  desire  is  expressed  mainly  in  the  mean- 
ing of  the  verb,  the  circumstances  in  the  secondary 
inflectional  elements  (person   and  number)  and  in  the 

93 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

context.  In  such  a  phrase  as  di  te  perdant  the  object 
of  desire  is  denned  by  the  verb  as  the  destruction  of 
some  person  or  thing.  In  itself  perdant  might  be  en- 
treaty or  command  or  almost  any  kind  of  desire,  but 
when  the  person  and  number  are  also  taken  into  account, 
the  desire  is  more  closely  restricted ;  perdant  is  then  an 
expression  of  desire  that  certain  persons  shall  destroy, 
a  desire  expressed  to  some  person  other  than  the  actors. 
When  te  is  added  to  complete  the  definition  of  the 
object  of  desire,  the  phrase  is  limited  more  closely;  te 
perdant  could  be  a  form  of  direction  or  command  only 
in  very  peculiar  circumstances.  The  further  addition 
of  di  completes  the  limitation  to  a  wish,  for  the  gods 
are  to  be  the  actors  and  their  action  is  beyond  the 
control  of  human  desire.  Thus  the  elements  which 
distinguish  the  wish  from  other  kinds  of  desire  are 
defined  by  word-meaning,  by  secondary  inflections  and 
by  context.  It  is  to  these  that  the  peculiar  meaning 
of  di  te  perdant  is  due;  it  is  a  wish  because  of  these 
influences,  or,  to  put  it  from  a  different  point  of  view, 
the  particular  kind  of  desire  which  we  call  optative  dis- 
tinguishes itself  from  other  forms  of  desire  and  becomes 
recognizable  as  a  wish  by  these  means.  It  is  by  the 
detection  of  these  and  the  analysis  of  their  influence 
that  the  phrase  is  truly  explained,  not  by  attributing  to 
the  modal  form  alone  the  power  of  carrying  this  par- 
ticular shade  of  desire.  The  influence  of  the  modal 
form  is  so  general  and  so  insignificant  in  such  a  sen- 
tence and  the  other  elements  are  so  much  more  deter- 
minant, that  they  can  give  the  force  of  a  wish  to  di  te 
amabunt,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  future  does  not 
ordinarily  express  desire  at  all. 

The  problem  of  the  various  modal  uses  which  are 
included  in  the  term  potential  is  perhaps  an  insoluble 

94 


THE  PROCESS   OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

one.  It  is,  in  brief,  to  find  a  connection  between  the 
group  of  will  subjunctives  and  the  group  of  subjunc- 
tives expressing  opinion,  possibility,  contingency  and 
so  on.  The  method  by  which  Delbriick  has  treated  this 
problem  in  the  Conjunktiv  und  Optativ,  by  showing 
various  intermediate  steps  in  which  the  elements  of  will 
and  determination  gradually  fade  out,  is  perhaps  the 
best  possible,  but  it  is  not  an  explanation.  It  classifies 
the  grades  of  will  and  opinion  which  lie  between  the 
two  extremes,  but  it  does  not  show  how  a  form  which 
had  will  for  its  fundamental  meaning  came  to  pass 
through  these  various  stages  over  to  uses  in  which 
there  is  no  trace  left  of  that  original  meaning.  Elmer 
(Studies  in  Latin  Moods  and  Tenses,  Part  III)  has 
tried  to  show  that  there  are  but  two  varieties  of  the 
potential,  that  all  are  reducible  to  the  "'  would '-idea" 
and  the  "'  should  '-idea."  This,  if  it  were  correct, 
would  not  lessen  the  difficulties  of  the  problem,  and 
it  involves  much  forced  translation.  The  suggestion, 
first  made  by  Greenough,  that  all  subjunctive  uses 
come  from  an  original  future,  shifts  the  problem  with- 
out really  solving  it,  in  spite  of  the  evident  elements 
of  truth  in  it.  A  better  knowledge  of  the  process  by 
which  inflectional  forms  acquire  and  shift  their  mean- 
ings must  be  reached  before  this  problem,  perhaps 
the  most  difficult  in  Latin  syntax,  can  be  successfully 
attacked. 

The  first  step,  however,  toward  a  solution  of  the 
problem  may  be  taken.  It  is  a  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  the  term  potential  covers  a  great  variety  of  usages, 
which  have  indeed  some  common  elements,  and  may  be 
said  to  be  partakers  in  a  general  movement,  but  which 
have  no  other  historical  or  causal  connection  with  each 
other.     When  we  place  together  such  phrases  as  dixerit 

95 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

quispiam,  quis  dubitet?  nescias  an,  uix  creaere  possis, 
quid  agam  ?  putes,  cur  ego  non  laeter  ?  Bed  maneam  etiam 
in  one  group  and  call  them  by  a  single  name,  we  are 
emphasizing  a  common  element  which  is  present  in  all. 
But  when  we  treat  these  various  expressions  as  if  they 
constituted  a  unity,  and  discuss  that  unity  as  if  it  were 
an  actually  existing  thing,  we  are  guilty  of  the  error  of 
hypostasizing  an  abstraction  —  an  error  which  underlies 
much  of  our  functional  syntax.  There  are  many  usages 
to  which  the  name  potential  may  properly  be  applied, 
as  a  convenient  syntactical  term,  but  The  Potential  Sub- 
junctive does  not  exist,  has  had  no  source,  has  no  con- 
nection with  TJie  Volitive  Subjunctive  (which  also  does 
not  exist)  and  therefore  has  no  history.  In  the  strict- 
est sense,  only  the  single  forms,  dixerit,  nescias,  putes, 
may  be  said  to  exist  and  to  have  a  history,  but  it  is 
also  possible  to  speak  of  groups  of  such  forms  whenever 
it  is  clear  that  the  similarity  between  them  is  so  great 
that  what  is  true  of  one  is  true  of  all.  Thus  the  verbs 
of  mental  action  in  the  second  person  singular  with  an 
indefinite  subject  —  uideas,  censeas,  putes,  scias,  audias 
—  are  so  much  alike  that  for  the  discussion  of  the  mode 
they  may  be  treated  as  if  they  were  all  one  verb,  that 
is,  they  form  a  group,  a  syntactical  usage.  A  like 
group  is  formed  by  the  subjunctives  in  deliberative 
questions,  though  there  are  in  such  a  group  minor 
differences,  due  to  the  form  of  the  question  or  of  the 
interrogative  word.  And  many  other  such  groups  of 
usage  might  be  named.  Now,  the  first  step  toward  an 
understanding  of  the  potential  is  in  the  more  precise 
determination  of  such  groups,  in  the  observation,  in 
other  words,  of  the  differences  between  different  poten- 
tials, rather  than  in  the  denial  or  neglect  of  such  differ- 
ences and  the  continued  attempt  to  solve  the  problem 

96 


THE  PROCESS  OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

by  reasoning  from  the  similarity  which  runs  through  all 
the  groups. 

A  second  step  would  naturally  be  taken  at  the  same 
time.  The  determination  and  definition  of  these  usages 
involves  also  the  observation  of  all  their  characteristics, 
the  meaning  of  the  verbs  used  in  them,  the  person, 
number,  and  tense,  as  well  as  the  mode,  of  the  verb, 
and  the  influence  of  the  context.  It  may  be  thai  other 
elements  than  these  are  involved  and  that  the  analysis 
of  these  elements  alone  will  not  suffice  to  show  how 
the  potential  meaning  has  become  attached  to  the  sen- 
tence, but  it  will  certainly  contribute  to  that  end. 
Thus  the  group  of  potential  usage  which  consists  of 
verbs  of  mental  action,  audias,  uideas,  putes,  censeas, 
inuenias,  desideres,  etc.,  is,  in  part  at  least,  explained 
by  the  meaning  of  the  verb  and  by  the  indefinite  sub- 
ject. Verbs  of  mental  activity  are  to  a  considerable 
extent  incompatible  with  the  jussive  ideas.  Commands 
in  the  strictest  sense  can  be  given  only  in  regard  to 
actions  which  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  actor  to  perform 
or  to  refuse  to  perform.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  use 
in  English  such  imperatives  as  "  Perceive !  "  "  Compre- 
hend! "  and  when  verbs  of  mental  activity  are  employed 
in  jussive  forms  it  is  with  a  shift  of  meaning.  Thus 
the  imperative  know  means  something  like  allow  me 
to  tell  you  as  scito  in  Cicero's  letters  has  a  similar 
meaning;  think  means  either  try  to  think  or  fancy, 
imagine,  and  cense  must  be  a  very  rare  form,  if  it  is 
found  at  all ;  audi  does  not  mean  to  hear  comprehend- 
ingly,  but  to  listen.  The  incompatibility  of  these  verbs 
with  imperative  uses  leads,  whenever  by  analogy  their 
imperative  forms  are  employed,  to  the  dropping  out  of 
the  elements  of  mental  activity  and  the  narrowing  of 
their  meaning  to  the  use  of  the  organs  of  seeing  and 
7  97 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

hearing  or  to  other  activities  which  are  within  the 
control  of  the  will.  This  tendency  away  from  the 
jussive  is  increased  by  the  incompatibility  of  the  indefi- 
nite second  person  with  commands.  The  direct  forms 
of  willing  imply  almost  the  physical  presence  of  speaker 
and  actor;  where  the  actor  is  not  present,  the  verb 
being  in  the  third  person,  something  of  directness  is 
generally  lost,  and  when  the  subject  of  the  verb  is  in 
the  plural,  describing  a  class  of  persons,  reges,  matronae, 
serui,  the  jussive  force  of  the  mode  is  toned  down  to  an 
expression  of  obligation  or  propriety.  So,  when  the 
subject  and  actor  is  entirely  indefinite,  the  direct  im- 
perative is  impossible.  In  English  the  phrases  which 
contain  the  indefinite  one  —  one  should  try,  one  must 
see,  one  would  (necessarily)  suppose  —  imply  obligation 
or  necessity  or  propriety,  and  this  appears  to  be  true 
also  of  the  German  man  denke  ;  in  man  siehe  (uide), 
man  vergleiehe  {confer)  a  certain  degree  of  definiteness 
is  given  to  the  command  by  the  fact  that  the  reader 
applies  it  to  himself. 

There  is  a  considerable,  though  narrow,  group  of 
phrases  like  aliquis  dixerit,  aliquis  dicat,  to  which  the 
same  reasoning  will  apply.  The  verbs  are  verbs  of 
speaking  and  the  subject  is  indefinite.  These  two  facts 
mark  the  class  distinctly  and  separate  it  from  ordinary 
potential  or  hypothetical  uses. 

Deliberative  questions  are  sometimes  said  to  be  poten- 
tial or  to  be  allied  to  the  potential  in  their  modal  sense. 
Enough  has  been  said  above  to  suggest  a  different  line 
of  explanation.  The  subjunctive  in  these  questions  is 
but  one  of  the  expressions  of  deliberation  and  not  the 
strongest  of  them.  The  meaning  of  the  verb  in  these 
questions  plays  a  curious  part ;  it  is  usually  a  repetition 
of  an  idea  already  suggested  in  the  preceding  context, 

98 


THE  PROCESS  OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

either  repeating  precisely  a  verb  already  used  or  em- 
bodying an  idea  previously  implied  in  different  words, 
or  it  is  a  verb  of  very  general  and  vague  meaning,  like 
faciam,  agam.  In  either  case  the  emphasis  of  the  sen- 
tence is  not  upon  the  kind  of  action;  especially  whi ire 
the  verb  is  faciam  or  agam  the  kind  of  action  is  left 
undefined,  and  this,  when  combined  with  an  interroga- 
tive word,  helps  much  to  convey  the  impression  of 
indecision  and  hesitation.  But  the  main  influence  here 
is  the  form  of  the  sentence.  Questions  properly  delib- 
erative are  rare  in  the  uses  with  the  particles  -ne,  num, 
nonne  or  without  interrogative  words.  Such  sentences 
are  more  nearly  exclamatory  and  repudiating,  and  they 
are  too  definite  for  deliberation.  Usually  the  delibera- 
tive question  has  some  form  of  quis,  that  is,  it  is  put 
in  the  most  indefinite  form,  the  form  which  allows  the 
widest  range  of  possible  answer,  and  therefore  most 
easily  conveys  the  idea  of  deliberation.  It  is  chiefly  to 
the  two  influences  of  verb-meaning  and  sentence-form 
that  quid  faciam  ?  owes  whatever  potential  or  delibera- 
tive effect  it  has,  not  primarily  to  the  mode,  which  has 
rather  accommodated  itself  to  the  tone  of  the  sentence 
than  been  active  in  producing  that  tone. 

It  would  require  a  longer  discussion  than  is  possible 
here  to  show  in  any  detail  the  way  in  which  the  context 
influences  the  meaning  of  the  mode  in  the  ordinary 
potential  (hypothetical)  use,  but  it  is  evident  that  the 
influence  of  an  informal  protasis  upon  the  apodosis  is 
of  the  same  nature  as  the  influence  of  a  formal  protasis. 
Either  sets  a  hypothetical  tone,  to  which  the  rest  of 
the  sentence  must  accommodate  itself.  The  presence 
of  such  an  element  in  the  context,  marking  the  whole 
concept-group  as  unreal,  is  the  invariable  accompani- 
ment of  the  hypothetical  potential  and  it,  rather  than 

99 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

the  mode,  is  the  point  of   attack  in  the  endeavor  to 
explain  this  usage.1 

The  foregoing  remarks  upon  the  potential  are  not 
presented  with  any  notion  that  they  solve  the  problem 
of  potential  uses,  but  only  by  way  of  illustration  of  the 
general  principle  that  the  analysis  of  the  effect  of  word- 
meaning  and  context  offers  a  method  of  approach  to 
the  problem.  In  general,  it  is  the  context  which  most 
strongly  affects  the  potential  and  it  is  in  part  to  the 
variability  and  complexity  of  this  kind  of  influence  and 
the  difficulty  of  reducing  it  to  system  that  the  elusive- 
ness  of  the  potential  is  due.  This  is  the  reason  also 
why  there  are  sentences  in  which  even  the  indicative, 
especially  the  future,  has  potential  shadings. 

The  substance  of  this  chapter  may  be  briefly  stated. 

Whether  inflected  forms  were  originally  the  result  of 
some  kind  of  composition  or  not,  their  earliest  meanings 
can  never  be  recovered.  It  is  probable,  however,  that 
their  early  sphere  of  use  was  wider  than  the  later  and 
that  their  meanings  were  less  precise  and  fixed.  When 
later  meanings  are  precise  and  fixed,  it  is  because  the 
inflectional  form  has  been  repeatedly  used  in  certain 
connections  and  under  certain  conditions.  An  associa- 
tion thus  set  up  between  a  form  and  a  certain  meaning 
may  become  so  permanent  that  it  remains  after  the  con- 
ditions which  at  first  accompanied  it  have  been  changed, 
but  in  many  cases  the  meaning  of  the  form  still  varies 
with  the  conditions.  In  such  cases  it  is  chiefly  or 
wholly  by  observation  of  the  conditions  that  the  mean- 
ing of  the  inflectional  form  in  a  particular  case  is 
recognized.  The  tendency  of  syntacticists  has  been  to 
lay  too  much  stress  upon  the  inflectional  form,  to  attrib- 

1  See  also  Chap.  VIIL 
100 


THE  PROCESS  OF  ADAPTATION  —  INFLECTIONS 

ute  to  it  a  larger  portion  of  the  meaning  than  it  really 
carries  and  to  neglect,  comparatively,  the  influence  of 

surrounding  conditions.  A  closer  observation  of  these 
conditions  —  such  as  word-meaning,  other  inflectional 
terminations,  context  and  no  doubt  still  others  not 
mentioned  here  —  will,  on  the  one  hand,  be  of  value  in 
interpretation  and,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  expected 
to  lead  toward  an  understanding  of  the  process  by 
which  inflectional  forms  have  acquired  at  least  their 
precision  of  meaning,  if  not  their  original  meaning. 
This  method  of  investigation  may  thus  contribute  from 
a  somewhat  untouched  side  to  the  solution  of  one  of 
the  greatest  problems  of  linguistics,  the  nature  and 
history  of  inflection. 


101 


V 

THE  EXPRESSION  OF  RELATION  BY  SINGLE  WORDS 

The  general  movement  by  which  single  words  have 
in  part  taken  the  place  of  inflection  is  the  most  sweep- 
ing and  radical  change  in  the  history  of  the  Indo-Euro- 
pean languages.  It  is  at  once  the  indication  and  the 
result  of  a  clearer  feeling  of  concept-relation.  Inflec- 
tion in  the  main  rather  suggests  than  expresses  rela- 
tions ;  it  is,  certainly,  not  correct  to  say  that  in  every 
case  the  expression  of  relation  by  a  single  word,  e.  g., 
a  preposition,  is  clearer  than  the  suggestion  of  the  same 
relation  by  a  case-form,  but  it  is  correct  to  say  that  the 
relation  can  become  associated  with  a  single  word  only 
when  it  is  felt  with  a  considerable  degree  of  clearness. 
The  relation  between  concepts  must  itself  become  a 
concept.  To  this  extent  the  movement  toward  the 
expression  of  relations  by  single  words  is  a  movement 
toward  precision,  and  the  correct  interpretation  of 
its  phenomena  must  recognize  this  as  a  fundamental 
principle. 

Syntactical  investigation  in  this  direction  is  in  gen- 
eral less  difficult  than  the  study  of  inflection.  It  does 
not  lead  back  so  directly  to  prehistoric  conditions,  nor 
does  it  involve  any  general  hypothesis  so  intricate  as 
those  which  the  very  complex  phenomena  of  inflection 
must  require.  It  is  on  the  very  border-land  of  semasi- 
ology, for  it  deals  with  the  meaning  of  words,  function 
and  meaning  being  in  this  case  quite  indistinguishable. 

102 


EXPRESSION  OF  RELATION  PY  SINGLE    WOP  PS 

The  fact  that  the  meaning  is  a  concept  of  relation  adds 
somewhat  to  the  difficulty,  but  the  semasiology  of 
preposition  is  not  more  difficult  than  that  of  many 
verbs.  The  syntax  of  prepositions  and  particles  and  of 
many  conjunctions  is  in  fact  a  matter  chiefly  of  obser- 
vation. For  this  reason  it  has  moved  on  more  Bteadily 
than  the  syntax  of  inflection,  and  in  many  directions  it 
may  be  said  to  be  substantially  complete.  What  still 
remains  to  be  done  in  the  study  of  prepositions  is  really 
stylistic  rather  than  syntactical;  more  can  be  learned 
in  regard  to  the  usage  of  particular  writers,  but  not 
much  more  in  regard  to  the  history  of  prepositions  or 
in  regard  to  the  laws  of  language  under  which  they 
perform  their  function. 

In  one  respect,  however,  the  study  of  prepositions 
has  shared  in  the  advance  of  the  last  half-century,  that 
is,  in  the  application  to  it  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
power  of  expressing  relation  was  not  inherent  in  these 
words,  but  was  acquired  in  the  process  of  use.  This 
doctrine  is  comparatively  simple  in  its  application  to 
prepositions,  and  is  the  more  easily  accepted  because 
a  considerable  number  of  prepositions  have  passed 
through  the  change  within  the  historical  period,  so  that 
the  process  can  be  followed  in  detail.  In  Latin,  how- 
ever, there  is  still  work  to  be  done  in  tracing  more 
accurately  the  steps  of  the  change,  and  in  studying 
from  the  semasiological  standpoint  the  laws  which 
govern  it.  Such  study  would  be  of  more  value  for  the 
light  it  might  throw  upon  the  nature  of  case-construc- 
tions than  for  its  contribution  to  the  knowledge  of 
prepositions.  For  the  adverb  would  not  have  been 
added  to  the  case-construction  at  all,  had  not  the  in- 
flectional form  been  felt  to  be  in  some  respect  inade- 
quate.    The  adverb-preposition   is   the   expression  in 

103 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

more  distinct  form  of  some  element  of  meaning  which 
was  latent  in  the  case-form.  It  serves  therefore  as  a 
definition  of  the  meaning  of  the  case-form  and,  when 
viewed  in  this  light,  may  assist  in  solving  the  problem 
of  inflection.1 

The  application  of  the  same  doctrine  of  the  acquisi- 
tion of  relational  function  to  conjunctions,  especially  to 
subordinating  conjunctions  and  to  the  relative  pronoun, 
introduces  greater  difficulties  because  it  is  interwoven 
with  the  question  of  the  use  of  the  subjunctive  in  sub- 
ordinate clauses.  These  two  questions,  of  the  con- 
junction and  of  the  mode,  cannot  be  wholly  separated. 
The  function  of  a  subordinate  clause,  e.  g. ,  the  expres- 
sion of  cause  or  of  purpose,  is  a  function  of  the  group, 
which  has  been  in  part  transferred  to  the  conjunction, 
in  part  to  the  modal  form,  and  is  in  part  retained  by 
the  word-group.  Where  a  function  is  so  divided  it  is 
not  possible  to  make  a  complete  study  of  one  portion 
of  it  without  taking  into  consideration  the  other  parts 
also.  Yet  the  process  by  which  the  modal  form  has 
been  accommodated  to  aid  in  the  expression  of  purpose 
is  different  from  the  process  through  which  the  con- 
junction has  passed,  and  to  some  extent  the  two  ques- 
tions must  be  kept  apart.  The  work  which  has  been 
done  in  recent  years  upon  the  subjunctive  in  subor- 
dinate clauses  is  in  general  correct  in  outline  and  of 
considerable  value.  The  subjunctive  in  the  ut  or  the 
qui  clause  of  purpose  is  certainly  connected  with  the 
independent  uses  of  the  subjunctive  to  express  will  and 
desire  and  the  mode  in  qui  clauses  of  characteristic 
resembles  the  potential  uses.  Other  clauses  have  been 
worked  out  in  more  detail   and  still  others  have  been 

1  Compare  Chap.  VI,  on  a  similar  interpretation  of  modal  meaning  by 
means  of  a  prefixed  verb. 

104 


EXPRESSION   OF  RELATION  BY  SINGLE    WORDS 

attempted  with  industry  and  ingenuity,  if  with  only 
partial  success.  This  kind  of  work  is  the  best  fchat  the 
syntax  of  the  last  twenty-five  years  has  produced.     But 

it  is  still  unsatisfying.  It  is  open  to  the  criticism 
which  has  been  made  before  and  which  applies  to  much 
of  our  work  in  historical  syntax,  that  it  is  too  vague, 
that  it  stops  with  the  discovery  of  resemblances  or,  at 
the  best,  with  the  establishment  of  connections.  By 
what  steps  the  subjunctive  in  an  ut  clause  of  purpose 
is  connected  with  the  independent  subjunctive  of  will 
and  desire,  what  changes  it  has  undergone  to  enable  it, 
with  the  ut,  to  express  purpose,  what  linguistic  laws 
have  governed  the  change  —  in  a  word,  the  details  of  the 
linguistic  process  —  these  questions  are  still  for  the  most 
part  unanswered.  Indeed,  they  are  scarcely  asked.  To 
some  extent  we  are  still  answering  the  old  grammatical 
question  of  the  class-room,  "  Why  is  this  verb  in  the 
subjunctive?"  and  are  answering  it,  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  study  of  origins,  by  saying,  "  Because  it  is 
derived  from  an  independent  subjunctive  of  will." 
This  is  better  than  to  say,  "  Because  it  is  in  a  clause 
of  purpose,"  but  neither  question  nor  answer  is 
final. 

Beside  the  questions  in  regard  to  the  mode  there  are 
two  other  questions  raised  by  the  doctrine  that  all  sub- 
ordinating function  is  acquired.  They  relate  to  the 
nature  of  parataxis,  the  middle  stage  through  which 
conjunctions  are  thought  to  have  passed,  and  to  the 
history  of  the  Latin  conjunctions  in  particular.  These 
will  be  taken  up  in  the  following  chapters,  but  mean- 
while a  word  may  be  said  here  in  regard  to  the  present 
state  of  knowledge  on  each  of  these  points. 

Parataxis  is  commonly  thought  of  as  a  kind  of  melt- 
ing together  of  two  independent  sentences.     The  ex- 

105 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

amples  given  by  Schmalz  3,  §  265,  Die  Sonne  scheint.  — 
Wir  wollen  spazieren  gehen,  with  the  other  steps  which 
show  how  this  thought  passed  from  independence  to 
subordination,  probably  represent  with  fair  accuracy 
the  average  understanding  of  parataxis.  There  is  in 
existence  no  complete  collection  of  the  cases  of  para- 
taxis from  any  author,  to  give  a  basis  for  classification 
and  determination  of  varieties,  and  the  most  recent 
work  does  not  indicate  any  great  advance  beyond  the 
functional  classification  of  Draeger. 

In  regard  to  the  Latin  words  of  subordination,  qui 
and  the  conjunctions,  matters  stand  somewhat  better. 
The  etymological  side  of  the  work  has  been  done, 
though  of  course  not  by  syntacticists,  and  the  formal 
connections  of  the  conjunctions  are  as  well  known  as 
the  nature  of  the  case  admits;  a  few  words,  like  donee, 
are  still  riddles  and  some  others,  like  ut,  are  still 
doubtful.  On  the  syntactical  side,  qui  (how)  and  quin 
have  been  cleared  up  by  Kienitz,  though  the  fact  that 
quin  with  the  subjunctive  in  independent  sentences  is 
so  rare  leaves  a  weak  link  in  the  chain ;  ni  in  its  earlier 
uses  has  been  settled  by  O.  Brugmann  and  quamuis  and 
perhaps  dum  are  pretty  well  understood.  As  to  the 
other  conjunctions  and  the  relative  pronoun,  it  is  now 
possible,  with  the  help  of  etymology  and  the  doctrine 
of  acquired  function,  to  imagine  a  way  by  which  any  of 
them  may  have  passed  over  into  conjunctional  use,  and 
in  some  cases  the  guess  has  much  probability.  It  is 
something  to  know  that  si  is  related  to  sic  and  is  some- 
how parallel  to  the  English  so  in  conditions  and  to  be 
able  to  say  with  some  degree  of  certainty  that  many  of 
the  conjunctions  come,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  quis. 
But  there  is  still  much  to  be  learned.  The  history  of 
each  of  these  words  is  a  problem  in  semantics,  for  the 

106 


EXPRESSION   OF  RELATION   BY  SINGLE    WORDS 

complete  solution  of  which  we  need  to  know  the  details 
of  the  shift  of  meaning,  the  elements  lost  and  gained, 
and  most  of  all  the  forces  which  operate  in  the  process. 
Without  these  our  results  are  uncertain,  because  they 
are  not  strictly  tested,  and  empty,  because  they  do  not 
reveal  the  working  of  linguistic  law.  And  they  may 
become  even  obstructive'.  For  the  tendency  of  accept- 
ing a  guess,  however  probable,  in  the  place  of  a  real 
explanation,  is  to  hinder  scientific  advance.  This  is 
well  illustrated  in  the  treatment  of  the  relative  pro- 
noun. It  is  commonly  said  that  qui  is  derived  from  the 
interrogative  quis  and  the  statement  is  supported  by 
wer  and  who  and  by  examples  like  quae  mutat  ?  ea 
corrumpit  =  quae  mutat,  ea  corrumpit.  A  still  more 
elaborate  example  of  the  same  method  of  explaining  the 
relative  is  given  by  Deecke.1  The  sentence  punietur 
uir  qui  hominem  occidit  is  supposed  to  have  come  from 
a  dialogue  between  two  speakers,  thus:  A.  Punietur 
uir  (ille). — B.  Qui  [uir  punietur)*? — A.  Hominem 
(Me)  occidit ;  then  by  self-questioning  and  combination 
of  the  words  of  the  two  speakers,  punietur  uir  qui  (?) 
hominem  occidit.  The  correctness  of  this  hypothesis  is 
not  in  question  here ; 2  in  this  or  in  some  similar  form 
it  is  generally  accepted  as  a  sufficient  explanation  of 
the  relative  pronoun  and,  with  some  functional  divi- 
sions of  relative  clauses  with  the  subjunctive,  as  a  suffi- 

1  Die  (jriechischen  unci  lateinischen  Nebensatze,  .  .  .  Buchsweiler  pro- 
gram, 1887,  p.  39. 

2  Besides  the  impossible  awkwardness  of  the  dialogue,  especially  the 
reply  of  A,  this  and  all  similar  explanations  of  qui  involve  the  supposition 
that  a  very  common  form  of  sentence  came  into  use  through  the  union  of 
the  words  of  two  speakers  or  through  self-questioning  and  answer.  This 
is  like  coining  a  word  to  heal  a  corrupt  text ;  such  a  process  as  the  uniting 
of  the  words  of  two  speakers  into  one  sentence  is  entirely  unknown  in  lan- 
guage. Sentences  like  quid  arjam  nescio  are  not  question  and  answer  nor 
are  relative  clauses  indirect  questions. 

107 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

cient  treatment  of  the  whole  subject  of  the  qui  clause. 
And  this  too  easy  acquiescence  in  a  superficial  method 
has  obstructed  scientific  advance.  Within  a  decade 
scarcely  anything  has  been  published  which  adds 
to  our  knowledge  of  this  important  field.  The  cate- 
gories of  Dittmar  (Studien,  pp.  97  ff.)  are  the  only 
exception. 

It  must  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  work  of  the  last 
thirty  years,  since  the  publication  of  Delbriick's  Con- 
juriktiv  und  Optativ,  is  not  final  nor  satisfying.  It  has 
somewhat  increased  and  cleared  up  our  knowledge  of 
the  uses  of  the  subjunctive  in  subordinate  clauses,  but 
with  the  exceptions  mentioned  above  (quin,  ni,  quamuis) 
it  has  added  little  to  our  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
the  process  by  which  subordinating  force  was  acquired 
and  has  contributed  practically  nothing  to  method. 

One  attempt  in  the  direction  of  determining  the  steps 
by  which  a  conjunction  acquired  subordinating  force 
deserves  special  mention,  not  so  much  for  what  it  ac- 
complished as  for  what  it  attempted.  Probst,  Beitrdge 
zur  lateinischen  Grammatik,  in  the  third  part,  pp. 
175  ff.,  takes  up  the  general  problem  of  the  history  of 
conjunctions,  and  on  p.  213  gives  for  the  pronominal 
particles  five  steps:  (1)  Interrogative-adverbial  (tem- 
poral, local,  causal,  etc.);  (2)  rhetorical-adverbial  (orna- 
tiv),  in  which  the  sentences  are  used  as  exclamations 
and  the  particles  also  become  exclamatory  and  to  some 
extent  merely  ornamental;  (8)  interrogate '-particular, 
in  which  the  particles  share  a  function  of  the  interroga- 
tive sentence  and  express  doubt  or  expect  a  positive  or 
a  negative  answer;  (4)  ornativ-particidar,  the  particle 
again  becoming  merely  rhetorical,  but  with  a  shading  of 
the  force  acquired  in  the  previous  stage;  (5)  the  con- 
junctional stage.     It  need   scarcely  be   said  that   this 

108 


EXPRESSION  OF  RELATION  BY  SINGLE    WORDS 

history,  either  as  an  account  of  ut  or  as  a  general  out- 
line of  all  Latin  conjunctions,  is  in  many  respects  at 
variance  with  the  facts.  There  is  nothing  in  the  his- 
tory of  ut  to  indicate  that  it  ever  had  positive  or  nega- 
tive or  dubitative  function,  and  the  third  and  fourth 
steps  are  the  result  of  a  confusion  between  the  quis- 
question  and  the  sentence-question.  The  worst  error 
is  in  supposing  that  all  conjunctions,  e.g.,  quod  (pp. 
235  fL),  enim  (p.  242  f.),  passed  through  an  interroga- 
tive stage.  But  in  spite  of  its  evident  and  serious 
defects,  which  have  naturally  somewhat  obscured  such 
merit  as  it  has^  the  aim  of  the  article  is  a  correct  one, 
namely,  to  follow  the  change  from  adverb  to  conjunc- 
tion through  its  details  and  to  discover  the  associations 
by  means  of  which  the  subordinating  force  has  been 
acquired.  The  method  also,  though  it  is  defective  at 
many  points,  is  correct  in  so  far  as  it  derives  the  sub- 
ordinating force  and  some  of  the  shades  of  meaning  of 
the  conjunction  from  its  association  with  certain  kinds 
of  sentence. 

The  failure  of  Probst  was  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that 
the  science  of  semantics  was  not  then  far  enough  ad- 
vanced to  afford  as  much  help  to  syntax  as  it  can  now 
give,  but  even  now  in  this  particular  field  it  is  still  im- 
possible to  do  more  than  state  some  general  principles. 
For  the  semasiology  of  conjunctions  presents  peculiar 
difficulties.  A  semantic  change  is  a  shift  of  meaning 
from  a  starting-point,  through  an  intermediate  step, 
toward  a  goal,  and  in  all  three  respects  the  shift  of 
meaning  of  a  conjunction  is  more  obscure  than  that  of 
a  noun  or  a  verb.  Each  of  these  points,  the  origin 
of  conjunctions,  the  nature  of  the  concept  expressed  by 
them,  and  the  intermediate  stage  through  which  many 
of  them  pass,  calls  for  special  consideration. 

109 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

The  origin  of  conjunctions  lies  for  the  most  part  back 
of  the  point  where  literature  begins.  Their  early  his- 
tory, whether  as  particles  or  as  conjunctions,  is  recover- 
able only  by  inference.  This  is  especially  true  of  the 
coordinating  conjunctions,  et,  -que,  atque,  sed,  aut;  they 
are  all  in  free  and  fully  developed  use  in  Plautus  and 
the  scattered  fragments  of  pre-Plautine  Latin  are  of 
little  value  for  syntax.  But  it  is  also  true  of  many  of 
the  subordinating  conjunctions,  si,  ut,  donee,  quia,  and 
of  the  pronoun  qui.  Only  one  thing  may  be  said  with 
confidence,  that  they  are  of  very  various  origin.  The 
majority  in  any  language  are  probably  pronominal,  but 
there  are  also  verb-forms,  cases  of  nouns,  and  particles 
and  adverbs  which,  if  they  were  originally  verbs,  nouns 
or  pronouns,  have  long  lost  all  connection  with  their 
source.  This  variety  alone  excludes  the  possibility  of 
treating  all  conjunctions  alike  and  expecting  to  find  cer- 
tain stages,  as  Probst  attempted  to  do,  through  which 
all  alike  had  passed.  The  loss  of  meaning  which  each 
conjunction  undergoes  will  be  different  in  kind  accord- 
ing to  its  origin,  and,  while  all  may  be  reducible  to 
classes  and  traceable  to  like  general  laws  of  association, 
they  will  vary  in  all  their  details.  A  verb-form,  as  the 
first  step  toward  conjunctional  use,  must  lose  person 
and  number  and  most  of  its  verbal  force ;  a  noun-case 
must  lose  the  definite  case-relation  to  other  words,  and 
this  loss  will  be  through  one  process  for  an  ablative, 
through  another  process  for  an  accusative.  A  pronoun 
must  lose  its  pronominal  reference  to  an  antecedent,  at 
least  in  part,  or,  if  it  is  an  interrogative,  may  lose  its 
interrogative  character.  Of  two  case-forms  of  an  inter- 
rogative pronoun  one  may  experience  a  greater  degree 
of  loss  in  its  character  as  an  interrogative,  retaining  the 
elements  of  meaning  which  belong  to  its  case-form,  while 

110 


EXPRESSION  OF  RELATION  BY  SINGLE    WORDS 

the  other  retains  its  interrogative  force  only  slightly 
diminished,  but  shows  little  evidence  of  connection  with 
any  particular  case  meaning.  Further  complication  re- 
sults from  the  different  order  in  which  different  words 
passed  through  the,  stages  of  change.  Thus  quin  lost 
its  pronominal  character  first,  becoming  an  interrogative 
adverb  or  particle,  and  afterward  lost  its  interrogative 
character  and  became  a  subordinating  conjunction,  but 
quod,  passing  through  qui,  lost  its  interrogative  force 
first  and  acquired  subordinating  force,  and  after  that 
change  was  fully  accomplished  lost  its  case-construction 
and  its  pronominal  reference  to  an  antecedent.  This 
variety  in  the  starting-point  of  the  shift  and  in  the  first 
steps,  the  character  of  which  was  determined  by  the 
starting-point,  greatly  complicates  the  semasiology  of 
conjunctions. 

The  nature  of  the  meaning  which  is  the  goal  of  the 
change  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  following  the  process. 
For  it  is  a  relation,  and  has  all  the  variety  and  the 
vagueness  which  belong  to  concepts  of  relation.  The 
concept  of  purpose  is  as  varied  as  the  two  actions  be- 
tween which  the  relation  exists,  and  this  variety  is  so 
great  that  no  single  method  for  expressing  it  suffices  in 
Latin,  but  the  supine,  the  gerund,  the  qui  clause  and 
various  conjunctional  clauses  exist  for  expressing  its 
different  shadings.  The  variety  of  forms  taken  by  any 
relation  may  be  seen  in  the  length  and  fulness  of  lexicon 
articles  dealing  with  the  more  important  conjunctions, 
especially  the  subordinating  conjunctions  like  ut  and 
cum.  It  is  difficult  even  to  distinguish  between  subor- 
dinating and  coordinating  force ;  et  sometimes  expresses 
a  kind  of  subordination  and  qui  connects  sentences 
grammatically  independent.  This  is  because  the  con- 
cept of  relation,  and  in  an  especial  degree  the  relation 

111 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

between  groups  of  concepts,  is  by  its  very  nature  less 
precise  and  less  definitely  felt  than  the  concepts  which 
correspond  to  nouns  or  adjectives  or  verbs.  The  analy- 
sis of  it  is  therefore  peculiarly  difficult,  and  without 
analysis  it  is  impossible  to  say  which  elements  come 
from  one  source,  e.g.,  from  its  origin,  and  which  are 
introduced  by  later  associations. 

These  difficulties  in  the  way  of  understanding  the 
history  of  conjunctions  are  dwelt  upon  at  some  length 
partly  in  explanation  of  the  comparatively  slight  prog- 
ress made  by  syntacticists  in  the  doctrine  of  conjunc- 
tions, but  more  particularly  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
hopelessness  of  searching  for  some  general  scheme  of 
method.  For  the  present,  the  study  of  conjunctions 
and  of  the  subordinate  clause  must  proceed  by  the  ac- 
cumulation of  observations.  Until  a  greater  mass  of 
observation  has  been  put  upon  record  the  doctrine  of 
conjunctions  must  remain  largely  hypothetical. 

A  third  difficulty  is  in  the  intermediate  stage,  the 
paratactic  stage  through  which  all  subordinating  words 
are  thought  to  have  passed  and  in  which  they  acquired 
subordinating  force. 


112 


VI 

PARATAXIS 

The  term  parataxis  1  was  introduced  into  scientific 
nomenclature,  apparently,  by  Thiersch  in  his  Cheek 
Grammar  (1831).  The  doctrine  was  again  stated  by 
Lange  in  his  paper  of  1852,  and  the  word  has  since 
become  an  accepted  syntactical  term.  But,  as  fre- 
quently happens,  the  term  has  remained  unchanged, 
while  the  conception  which  lies  behind  it  has  been 
deepened  and  enlarged,  and  at  the  present  time  more 
extended  observation  is  hampered  and  discouraged  by 
lingering1  reminiscences  of  the  original  and  too  narrow 
use,  or  confused  by  the  variety  of  conflicting  and  in- 
complete definitions.  In  this  chapter,  therefore,  defini- 
tions will  at  first  be  disregarded  and  the  whole  subject 
of  sentence-connection  and  of  the  means  of  expressing 
the  relation  between  concept-groups  will  be  included  in 
the  discussion. 

If  definitions  of  parataxis  have  necessarily  expressed 
different  views  of  the  subject,  so  also  has  the  method 

1  Jolly,  Die  einfachste  Form  dcr  Hypotaxis,  in  Curtius'  Studien,  VI, 
215  ff. ;  Weissenhoru,  Parataxis  Plautina,  Burghausen,  1884;  Weninger, 
de  parataxis  in  Terenti  fabulis  uesligiis,  Erlangen,  1888 ;  Becker,  Beiordnendi 
und  unterordnende  Satzverbindung  bei  den  Altromischen  BQhnendichter,  Met/, 
1888;  Hentze,  Die  Parataxis  bei  Homer,  I,  Gottingen,  1888  ;  II,  1889  ;  III, 
1891  ;  Ries,  Was  ist  Syntax?  p.  150f. ;  Ries,  Quelien  und  Forschungen,  41, 
esp.  pp.  23  ff. ;  Ries,  D.  L.  Z.,49  (1888),  1785  ;  E.  Hermann,  K.  Z.,33  (1895) 
481-535  ;  Lindskog,  Quaestiones  de  parataxi  et  hypotaxi  apud  priscos  Latinos, 
Lundae,  1896. 

8  113 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

of  treating  collections  of  paratactic  cases  varied.  The 
most  general  discussion  is  that  of  Hermann  (see  preced- 
ing note).  He  deals  with  the  most  rudimentary  means 
employed  in  language  for  the  suggestion  of  subordina- 
tion, and  while  the  outline  of  the  paper  is  instructive 
and  is  in  part  adopted  below,  the  nature  of  the  question 
which  Hermann  had  set  himself  to  answer  makes  his 
method  of  treatment  unsuitable  for  the  classification 
of  paratactic  material  in  a  single  language.  The  pro- 
grams of  Hentze  are  admirable  collections  of  material, 
arranged  most  methodically  on  a  clearly  explained  sys- 
tem and  for  a  definite  purpose.  That  purpose  is  the 
study  of  parataxis  as  an  element  of  style,  in  order  to 
show  from  the  esthetic  point  of  view  how  largely  it 
affects  the  Homeric  style.  The  classification  is  there- 
fore functional,  but  it  is  carried  out  with  such  sharp- 
ness of  distinction  and  such  detail  of  subdivision  that 
the  dangers  of  this  method  are  almost  wholly  avoided. 
After  the  functional  or  psychological  description  of 
each  subdivision,  the  peculiarities  of  mode  or  the  pro- 
nouns or  particles  which  distinguish  the  form  of  expres- 
sion are  given,  so  that  the  same  classification,  if  it  were 
reversed,  might  serve  the  purposes  of  historical  syntax. 
In  such  discussions  of  paratactic  material  as  deal  with 
Latin  the  less  accurate  scheme  of  Draeger  is  usually 
followed.  Draeger  disregards  the  form  of  sentence 
entirely  and  classifies  the  cases  according  to  the  sub- 
ordinate clause  which  each  is  supposed  to  stand  for. 
Thus  we  have  parataxis  instead  of  protasis  and  apod- 
osis,  instead  of  a  clause  of  purpose,  instead  of  a  causal 
clause,  and  so  on.  This  method  has  two  disadvantages, 
either  great  enough  to  condemn  it  for  use  in  syntactical 
investigation.  First,  it  disregards  the  signs  of  relation 
which  are,  so  to  speak,  the  seeds  out  of  which  subor- 

114 


PARATAXIS 

dinating  conjunctions  grew.  And,  second,  a  purely 
functional  classification  must  be  extraordinarily  precise 
and  detailed  (as  it  is  in  Ilentze's  programs)  or  else  it 
will  not  be  stable.  Classification  by  general  function, 
causal,  temporal,  conditional,  final,  is  so  uncertain  that 
no  two  interpreter's  working  upon  the  same  material  can 
agree  in  their  classification,  and  it  is  a  fair  question 
whether  this  method  of  treating  subordinate  clauses  is 
not  a  positive  hindrance  to  investigation.  However 
this  may  be  with  reference  to  the  subordinate  clause, 
it  is  certainly  true  of  the  classification  of  paratactic 
material,  for  here,  bjr  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  rela- 
tion is  only  suggested,  not  clearly  expressed  in  a  defi- 
nite form.  The  classification  of  a  particular  instance 
is  therefore  almost  certain  to  be  determined  by  some 
chance  association  with  a  passage  in  which  a  similar 
thought  was  expressed  by  a  condition  or  a  causal  or  a 
temporal  clause. 

Parataxis  may  be  considered,  as  may  any  syntactical 
problem,  from  three  different  points  of  view:  first,  the 
psychological  aspect;  second,  the  means  used  in  lan- 
guage to  suggest  the  paratactic  relation,  and  third,  the 
resulting  forms  of  sentence. 

It  has  been  said  above  (Chap.  II)  that  in  connected 
discourse  there  is  no  such  thing  as  complete  indepen- 
dence of  thought  between  two  contiguous  sentences. 
As  long  as  one  concept-group  remains  in  the  memory 
of  the  speaker,  so  long  a  relation  continues  to  exist 
between  that  group  and  the  thought  which  is  in  process 
of  expression.  Two  groups  of  concepts  may  be  sepa- 
rated by  intervening  groups,  and  in  that  case  the 
relation  may  be  so  round-about,  by  way  of  so  many 
intermediate  steps,  that  it  may  be  without  influence 
upon  the  form  of  expression,  but  when  the  one  concept- 

115 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

group  immediately  follows  the  other,  a  relation  always 
exists  between  them  and  it  is  always  strong  enough  to 
be  felt,  though  it  may  not  be  defined,  by  the  speaker. 
It  may  even  be  said  that  it  is  felt  by  the  hearer  also, 
unless  he  "loses  the  train  of  thought; "  that  is,  a  failure 
on  the  part  of  the  hearer  to  grasp  the  unexpressed  re- 
lation involves  the  loss  of  an  essential  part  of  the 
speaker's  thought,  just  as  truly  as  a  failure  to  compre- 
hend the  thought  which  is  expressed  in  words.  This 
fact  of  the  existence  of  relation  between  neighboring 
sentences,  not  as  something  superadded  or  discovered 
after  the  sentences  are  formed,  but  as  an  integral  part 
of  the  stream  of  thought,  is  of  the  first  importance  to  an 
understanding  of  parataxis.  It  is  often  said  that  sen- 
tences were  at  first  independent,  but  that  "  in  course  of 
time  in  such  combinations  the  one  clause  came  to  he 
felt  as  subordinate,"1  or  "dass  erst  mit  der  fortschreit- 
enden  Entwicklung  der  Sprache  sich  aus  der  Beiord- 
nung  die  Unterordnung  herausbildete,  indem  die  eine 
der  Handlungen  als  die  bedeutendere  (Hauptsatz),  die 
andere  als  die  unbedeutendere  (Nebensatz)  empfun- 
den  wurde."  2  In  so  far  as  these  expressions  are  in- 
tended to  mean  that  the  sentence-forms  were  developed 
in  short  independent  sentences  and  then  used,  at  first 
without  change,  in  subordinate  clauses,  they  are  of 
course  quite  correct.  But  the  succession  of  illustrative 
sentences  which  Schmalz  gives  seem  to  mean  more  than 
this:  "1.  Die  Sonne  scheint.  —  Wir  wollen  spazieren 
gehen.  2.  Die  Sonne  scheint;  wir  wollen  spazieren 
gehen.  3.  Die  Sonne  scheint,  deshalb  wollen  wir  spa- 
zieren gehen."  "1.  Ich  hore:  du  bist  krank;  2.  ich 
hb're  das:  du  bist  krank;    3.    ich  hore,   dass  du  krank 

1  Bennett,  Appendix  to  Latin  Grammar,  p.  197.     The  Italics  are  mine. 

2  Schmalz,  Lat.  Synt.3,  §  265,  in  Muller's  Haudbuch,  II,  2.    Italics  mine. 

116 


PARATAXIS 

bist."  The  implication  of  these  examples,  taken  in 
connection  with  the  words  quoted  above,  seems  to  be 
that  in  the  first  examples  the  sentences  are  independent 
in  thought  and  that  there  is  a  progress  toward  depen- 
dence in  thought  as  well  as  in  expression.  This  is 
entirely  mistaken.  The  connection  of  thought  in  the 
first  examples  is  just  as  real,  though  perhaps  not  so 
vivid,  as  in  the  last  examples  in  which  subordination  is 
distinctly  expressed.  And  this  is  always  true  of  two 
contiguous  sentences  in  continuous  speech.  To  put 
together  sentences  entirely  independent  in  thought, 
like  "The  sun-  is  shining.  Julius  Caesar  was  killed 
on  the  Ides  of  March,"  is  an  indication  of  mental  dis- 
order; in  fact,  the  normal  mind,  upon  hearing  two  such 
sentences  uttered  together,  instinctively  gropes  about 
for  some  situation,  fanciful  or  humorous  or  grotesque, 
which  will  afford  a  glimpse  of  a  rational  connection 
between  the  two ;  so  strong  is  the  habit  of  associating 
mere  succession  with  relation.  The  upper  boundary 
line,  therefore,  of  the  field  of  parataxis  is  not,  as  is 
sometimes  assumed,  a  condition  of  complete  indepen- 
dence of  thought,  for  there  is  no  such  independence 
between  successive  groups  of  concepts. 

It  does  not,  however,  follow  from  this  that  the  con- 
nection between  neighboring  sentences  is  always  dis- 
tinctly felt.  On  the  contrary,  the  varying  degrees  of 
clearness  in  the  expression  of  connection  must  be  sup- 
posed to  reflect  in  a  general  way  the  difference  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  relation,  and  a  consideration  of 
the  phenomena  of  parataxis  on  the  psychological  side 
must  start  with  the  hypothesis  that,  where  the  expres- 
sion of  connection  is  least  marked,  there  the  relation 
was  least  felt.  This  is  the  case  when  two  contiguous 
concept-groups    have   no   connection   with    each   other 

117 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

through  a  single  concept,  but  only  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  they  express  parts  of  one  larger  group.  The 
two  groups  would  then  be  connected  only  as  wholes 
and  only  through  a  round-about  connection  with  the 
original  germ-concept  of  which  they  were  the  analyzed 
parts.  Such  a  mediate  relation  remains  often  unde- 
fined, even  in  the  most  careful  thinking  and  .in  the 
most  elaborate  expression.  It  is  most  distinctly  felt, 
as  has  been  said  above  (Chap.  II,  p.  42),  at  the  mo- 
ment when  the  utterance  of  one  group  is  completed  and 
the  utterance  of  the  next  group  is  just  beginning;  at 
this  moment  the  analyzed  concepts  of  the  one  group  are 
sinking  back  into  recombination  and  the  next  group  is 
as  yet  only  partially  analyzed.  Both  groups  are  for  an 
instant  felt  as  wholes  and  then,  if  at  all,  the  sense  of 
the  relation  between  them  becomes  clear  enough  to  find 
expression  in  some  kind  of  connective  word.  The 
essential  point  here  is  that  mediate  connection  through 
a  common  origin  is  a  connection  of  wholes ;  no  concept 
of  either  group  is  related  by  itself  to  any  single  concept 
of  the  other  group. 

An  advance  in  closeness  of  relation  takes  place  when, 
though  the  connection  is  still  between  the  groups  as 
wholes,  there  is  also  a  relation  of  similarity  or  con- 
trast or  some  other  kind  of  association  between  single 
members  of  the  two  groups.  Such  a  relation  between 
members  of  the  groups  exists  whenever  the  relation 
between  the  groups  is  one  of  similarity  or  contrast,  since 
similarity  or  contrast  inevitably  extends  to  details.  If 
all  the  members  or  all  the  important  members  are  in- 
cluded in  the  similarity  or  the  contrast,  the  relation 
will  be  a  close  one  and  it  will  inevitably  find  abundant 
expression  in  the  structure  of  the  sentences  and  in  the 
selection  of  similar  or  contrasting  words,  but  it  will  not 

118 


PARATAXIS 

so  easily  associate  itself  with  any  single  word.  When 
the  relation  of  similarity  or  contrast  between  the  groups 
is  close,  but  is  especially  marked  between  two  single 
members  of  the  groups,  it  tends  to  associate  itself  with 
the  pair  of  words  which  represent  the  similar  or  con- 
trasting members  and  these  words  become  the  correla- 
tive expressions  of  the  connection. 

A  still  higher  degree  of  closeness  in  the  relation 
exists  between  two  concept-groups,  one  of  which  is  a 
briefer  repetition  of  the  other.  Such  a  situation  is  of 
frequent  occurrence  and  appears  to  be  associated  partic- 
ularly with  the  effort  to  express  thought  in  speech.  In 
the  process  of  utterance  the  speaker  is  conscious  of  the 
inadequacy  of  his  words.  The  group  of  words  just 
uttered  or  just  prepared  for  utterance  does  not  satis- 
factorily express  the  concepts  in  his  mind,  and  especially 
does  not  sufficiently  express  his  own  attitude  toward 
his  thought.  He  therefore  repeats  the  thought  or  more 
frequently  summarizes  it  in  a  word  or  two  in  which 
he  defines  the  total  meaning  of  the  group.  He  thus 
expresses  in  a  longer  form  of  words  his  analysis  and  in 
a  single  word  his  synthesis  of  the  concept-group,  pre- 
senting it  in  its  parts  and  also  as  a  whole.  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  synthetic  statement  should  follow 
the  analytic;  it  may  do  so,  serving  as  an  epexigetical 
addition,  but  it  may  also  occur  to  the  speaker  in  the 
very  process  of  utterance  and  be  immediately  inserted 
into  the  main  group  or  it  may  equally  well  precede  the 
main  group,  since  the  analysis  is  usually  almost  com- 
plete before  utterance  begins  and  the  inadequacy  of  the 
expression  may  be  felt  at  the  moment  when  speech  is 
beginning. 

In  all  such  cases  the  relation  is  a  close  one,  for,  in 
the  first  place,  the  synthetic  and  the  analytic  expres- 

119 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

sions  of  the  group  have  the  same  content;  they  cover 
the  same  ground  and  are  felt  to  be  in  some  sense  iden- 
tical. And,  in  the  second  place,  relation  is  most  easily 
felt  between  small  groups,  since  the  sense  of  relation 
requires  that  the  group  shall  be  felt  as  a  whole  and  a 
small  group  is  more  easily  grasped  as  a  whole  than  is 
a  larger  one.  Thus  long  and  elaborate  sentences  are 
seldom  so  completely  unified  that  they  can  be  ade- 
quately connected ;  the  connection  is  usually  the  merest 
expression  of  continuity,  not  a  definition  of  the  nature 
of  the  relation.  But  when  one  of  the  groups  is  very 
small,  as  it  is  when  it  summarizes  the  other  group,  it  is 
itself  already  felt  as  a  whole  and  therefore  most  easily 
felt  in  its  relations.  For  both  these  reasons  the  kind  of 
connection  here  described  is  close  and  distinct. 

A  relation  of  a  different  kind  and  perhaps  even  closer 
is  the  result  of  the  analysis  of  a  single  member  of  a 
concept-group  while  the  other  members  remain  unana- 
lyzed  or  less  fully  analyzed.  Various  causes  lead  to 
such  detailed  analysis.  It  may  be  because  one  particu- 
lar member  of  the  group  is  of  special  importance  to  the 
general  train  of  thought  or  because  it  is  in  itself  too 
complex  to  be  fully  comprehended  without  analysis, 
or  it  may  be  because  no  single  word  exists  which  ade- 
quately represents  it.  In  any  case  it  is  from  the  be- 
ginning on  a  level  with  other  unanalyzed  members  of 
a  group,  not  on  a  level  with  another  analyzed  group 
like  itself.  Such  a  condition  of  things,  though  it  is 
not  in  any  strict  sense  of  the  word  subordination  and 
though  it  may  find  expression  in  a  sentence  which  is 
not  grammatically  subordinate,  is  nevertheless  more 
likely  to  find  expression  in  a  subordinate  sentence- 
structure.  Indeed,  this  kind  of  relation  between  an 
analyzed  group  and  the  other  unanalyzed  members  of  a 

120 


PARATAXIS 

larger  group  is  difficult  to  describe  except  in  the  terms 
of  linguistic  science.  The  need  of  the  further  analysis 
which  results  in  such  a  relation  is  frequently  not  a  need 
on  the  psychological  side,  but  is  immediately  connected 
with  the  expression  of  thought.  Like  the  relation 
described  above  —  the  synthetic  definition  —  it  is  a  it- 
suit,  in  part  at  least,  of  the  reflex  influence  of  the  forms 
of  language  upon  the  processes  of  thought. 

The  means  emploj'ed  in  language  for  the  expression 
of  these  relations  between  concept-groups  have  already 
been  described  (Chap.  Ill),  but  certain  of  them  may  be 
here  recapitulated  with  special  reference  to  parataxis. 
Their  variety  is  so  great  and  they  are  so  generally 
found  working  together  that  a  precise  separation  and 
classification  is  not  attempted. 

It  has  been  said  above  that  in  connected  discourse 
there  cannot  be  complete  independence  of  thought  be- 
tween contiguous  sentences.  It  may  also  be  said,  with 
almost  the  same  absence  of  qualification,  that  in  con- 
nected speech  there  cannot  be  complete  independence 
in  expression  between  contiguous  sentences,  that  is, 
there  is  never  a  complete  absence  of  suggestion  of  the 
relation  which  is  felt  by  the  speaker  to  exist  between 
the  two  concept-groups. 

The  question  whether  mere  contiguity,  without  the 
assistance  of  any  other  means,  is  capable  of  suggesting 
a  relation  between  sentences  (and  words)  has  been  some- 
what discussed,1  but  it  is  not  a  question  of  practical 
importance.  In  the  extreme  case,  when  a  child  utters 
two  words  in  succession  without  indication  of  the  rela- 
tion in  any  way,  it  may  still  be  maintained  that  the 
mere  succession  is  the  result  of  a  sense  of  connection 
on  the  part  of  the  child  and  will  be  understood  by  the 
a  Ries,  Was  ist  Syntax?  p.  151  ;  Q.  u.  F.,  xli,  p.  24. 
121 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

hearer  as  an  indication  of  relation.  But  whether  that 
be  correct  or  not,  the  law  of  the  unbroken  continuity 
of  thought  is  so  universal  that  when  two  sentences  are 
thus  uttered  in  succession  it  is  impossible  to  suppress 
the  suggestion  of  continuity.  The  hearer,  on  the  basis 
of  an  unvarying  experience,  assumes  that  a  relation 
must  exist,  and  the  fact  that  one  sentence  immediately 
follows  another  is  a  fact  of  utterance,  a  phonetic  phe- 
nomenon, just  as  truly  as  is  the  utterance  of  a  special 
connective  word. 

But  this  question  is  of  the  less  importance  because 
mere  succession  is  never  the  sole  indication  of  connec- 
tion ;  it  is  always  accompanied  by  the  musical  elements 
of  speech,  tone  and  time  and  sentence-accent.  These 
reflex  elements  are  interpreted  almost  as  unconsciously 
as  they  are  used  and  it  is  easy  to  forget  how  largely 
they  contribute  to  the  expressiveness  of  spoken  lan- 
guage and  especially  to  that  sense  of  the  continuity  of 
thought  which  carries  the  speaker  over  from  sentence 
to  sentence.  A  continuance  of  the  same  tone  and  time, 
with  brevity  of  pause,  is  one  of  the  strongest  indica- 
tions that  the  two  sentences  are  closely  related,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  distinct  change  of  tone  and  time, 
with  longer  pause,  suggests  that  the  one  sentence  closes 
a  group  and  the  next  sentence  begins  another  group, 
and  that  the  relation  between  the  two  is  more  remote, 
through  the  groups  or  paragraphs  of  which  they  form 
the  closing  and  the  opening  parts.  As  the  musical  ele- 
ments are  an  integral  part  of  speech,  which  cannot  be 
uttered  without  them,  it  appears  to  be,  in  the  strictest 
sense,  correct  to  say  that,  as  the  field  of  parataxis  is  not 
bounded  on  the  upper  edge  by  complete  independence 
of  thought,  so  also  it  is  not  bounded  by  complete  inde- 
pendence of  expression.     If  hypotaxis  is  held  to  begin 

122 


PARATAXIS 

with  the  appearance  of  the  slightest  indication  of  rela- 
tion, then  there  is  no  territory  left  for  parataxis. 

Thus  far  no  distinction  has  been  made  between  co- 
ordination and  subordination.  This  is  not  only  because 
these  words  cannot  properly  be  applied  in  the  sphere 
of  concept-groups,  but  also  because  the  suggestions  of 
relation  by  proximity  and  by  the  musical  elements  of 
speech  are  not,  in  general,  distinct  enough  to  discrimi- 
nate between  coordination  and  subordination.  The  rela- 
tion is  suggested,  but  not  the  nature  of  the  relation.  It 
is  characteristic  of  the  simpler  modes  of  thought,  those 
of  the  child  or  of  the  adult  unaccustomed  to  precision  of 
expression,  that  they  dwell  but  little  upon  the  nature 
of  relations.  They  feel  them  and  reason  upon  and  by 
means  of  them,  but  they  do  not  do  so  consciously. 
Cause  and  effect,  act  and  purpose,  condition  and  con- 
clusion are  alike  felt  as  succession,  without  sharp  dis- 
tinction as  to  the  nature  of  the  succession.  Mere 
closeness  or  looseness  of  relation,  which  is  all  that  these 
simpler  modes  of  thinking  require,  is  suggested  with  a 
considerable  degree  of  adequacy  by  the  musical  elements 
of  speech.  It  may  be  that  in  the  spoken  languages 
there  is  a  discrimination  by  tone  and  by  sentence-accent 
which,  aided  by  familiarity  with  the  expression  of  sub- 
ordination by  other  means,  does  suggest  subordination. 
In  so  far  as  this  is  true,  the  field  of  parataxis  is  wider 
in  the  spoken  languages.  But  in  Latin  or  in  any  lan- 
guage no  longer  in  free  and  natural  use  as  a  means  of 
communication  the  attempt  to  supply  the  lost  tone- 
inflection  is  surrounded  with  difficulties ;  it  is  scarcely 
possible  to  be  confident  in  regard  to  so  simple  a  case 
of  relation  as  that  in  amat:  sapit  that  the  transfer  of 
modern  sentence-inflection  has  any  great  degree  of 
probability. 

123 


LATIN   SYNTAX 

If  therefore  it  is  desirable,  as  the  usage  of  most 
writers  on  syntax  seems  to  imply,  to  distinguish  be- 
tween coordination  and  parataxis  and  to  use  the  latter 
term  only  of  forms  of  speech  which  indicate  some  degree 
of  subordination,  then  the  word  parataxis  should  not  be 
used  of  these  most  rudimentary  suggestions  of  relation, 
by  which  the  nature  of  the  relation  is  not  indicated. 

The  suggestion  of  the  nature  of  relation  with  suffi- 
cient sharpness  to  distinguish  between  coordination  and 
subordination  begins  in  written  language  with  order. 
Not,  however,  with  anjr  and  every  kind  of  order.  As 
there  are  in  spoken  language  some  kinds  of  tone  and 
pause  which  may  in  a  rudimentary  way  suggest  sub- 
ordination, so  there  are  some  kinds  of  word-order  which 
imply  subordination  much  more  distinctly  than  others. 
In  general,  a  marked  degree  of  likeness  or  of  contrast 
in  the  order  of  words  in  two  clauses  is  the  result  of  the 
fact  that  the  speaker,  while  uttering  the  second  clause, 
had  the  preceding  form  of  words  distinctly  in  mind. 
Such  distinct  and  deliberate  retention  of  the  previously 
uttered  sentence  occurs  only  when  the  two  thoughts  are 
somewhat  closely  related,  so  that  the  second  can  find 
full  and  precise  expression  only  by  constant  reference 
back  to  the  first.  And  the  hearer,  also,  having  the 
previous  clause  thus  distinctly  recalled,  sets  the  two 
thoughts  together  in  his  mind.  One  of  the  most  natural 
results  of  the  vivid  recollection  of  a  preceding  sentence 
is  that  the  sentence  in  process  of  utterance  takes  the 
same  general  sentence-form  and  especially  the  same 
order.  This  experience  is  a  frequent  one  even  when  it 
is  not  desired  that  the  two  sentences  should  be  alike. 
A  contrasted  order,  e.g.,  a  chiastic  order,  would  have 
much  the  same  effect,  with  the  added  element  of  con- 
trast,   which   would    suggest   at    the    same    time    the 

124 


PARATAXIS 

likenesses  and  the  differences  between  the  two  concept 
groups.  While  in  general  mere  contrast  would  not  go 
far  to  convey  the  nature  of  the  relation  and  a  merely 
adversative  relation  does  not  necessarily  indicate  sub- 
ordination, it  is  certain  that  in  some  cases  such  contrast 
carries  the  implication  of  subordination,  though  not  of 
the  precise  kind  of  subordination.  This  would  be 
particularly  true  of  spoken  language,  where  the  con- 
trasting order  would  be  emphasized  by  tone  and  time 
and  sentence-inflection.  In  the  written  language  it  is 
usually  accompanied  and  assisted  by  repetitions  and 
contrasts  of  single  words.  But  even  without  such 
assistance,  resemblance  or  contrast  in  the  order  of  words 
in  a  clause  must  be  regarded  as  the  simplest  form  of 
correlation  and  as  the  source  therefore  of  some  impor- 
tant forms  of  subordinate  structure,  e.  <?.,  of  protasis 
and  apodosis. 

In  the  Germanic  branch  of  the  Indo-European  lan- 
guages the  order  of  words  within  a  clause  serves  as  one 
of  the  most  distinct  indications  of  subordination.  The 
questions 2  which  are  raised  by  the  position  of  the  verb, 
however,  belong  especially  to  Germanic  philology  and 
do  not  immediately  concern  the  student  of  Latin  syntax. 
In  Latin  there  appears  to  be  no  tendency  to  indicate 
subordination  by  the  position  of  the  verb. 

It  would  seem  antecedently  probable  that  the  order 
of  clauses  taken  as  wholes  would  furnish  suggestions  in 
regard  to  relative  importance  and  therefore  as  to  the 
subordination  of  one  clause  to  another.  There  are  vari- 
ous indications  in  some  subordinate  clauses  that  the 
nature  of  the  clause  is  determined  in  part  by  its  posi- 
tion before  or  after  the  main  clause.  Thus  quod,  "as 
to  the  fact  that,"  usually  precedes  the  main  clause  and 
1  See  the  bibliographies  in  Ivies,  Q.  F.,  xli. 
125 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

very  frequently  stands  at  the  beginning  of  the  sentence, 
and  there  is  good  reason  for  thinking  that  the  position 
is  the  determining  factor  in  fixing  this  shade  of  mean- 
ing upon  the  conjunction.  So  cum  inversum  regularly 
follows  the  main  clause,  and  in  a  few  other  cases  pecu- 
liarities in  the  meaning  of  a  subordinate  clause  are 
marked  by  the  position.  Delbriick,  though  he  sets 
aside  the  mechanical  classification  of  clauses  according 
to  their  position,1  employs  order  as  in  part  the  basis  for 
a  classification  of  the  relative  clause.2  But  rhetorical 
influences  are  so  strong  in  these  matters  that  as  yet 
little  has  been  made  of  the  effect  of  the  order  of  clauses 
upon  their  meaning. 

In  one  particular  case,  however,  the  order  of  two 
clauses  in  parataxis  is  important,  especially  in  combi- 
nation with  some  other  peculiarities.  A  verb  or  short 
clause  inserted  parenthetically  into  the  midst  of  a  longer 
sentence  expresses  a  thought  which  arises  suddenly  in 
the  speaker's  mind  and  which  he  utters  at  once  without 
waiting  to  finish  the  sentence  in  process  of  utterance. 
Such  inserted  verbs  are  usually  in  the  first  person, 
expressing  the  speaker's  attitude  toward  what  he  is 
saying,  or  in  the  second  singular,  expressing  the  sup- 
posed attitude  of  the  hearer.  These  verbs  for  the  most 
part  remain  parenthetic  but  not  always,  as  in  censen 
despondebit?  or  credo  inpetrabo.  A  similar  course  of 
thought  leads  to  the  prefixing  of  verbs  as  an  introduc- 
tion or  the  appending  as  a  comment  to  a  longer  sen- 
tence, and  these  verbs  also  are  usually  in  the  first 
singular,  in  the  second  singular  (especially  in  ques- 
tions), or  they  are  impersonals  which  represent  the  atti- 
tude of  the  speaker  (certum  est,  libet).  It  is  of  course 
true  that  the  person  and  number  and  the  meaning  of 

1  Conj.  «.  Opt.,  p.  35.  2  P.  43. 

126 


PARATAXIS 

the  verbs  help  out  the  effect  of  order,  as  in  general 
various  elements  combine  to  make  language  expressive. 
This  kind  of  paratactic  connection  is  one  source  of 
many  kinds  of  subordinate  clause. 

Inflection  also  may  be  a  means  of  suggesting  subor- 
dination, especially  through  the  tense  and  mode  and 
person  of  the  subordinated  verb.  But  a  consideration 
of  the  extent  to  which  the  verb-form  becomes  the  bearer 
of  the  idea  of  subordination  requires  some  discussion 
and  will  be  taken  up  later  in  this  chapter.  Meanwhile, 
for  the  sake  of  completeness,  inflection  may  be  men- 
tioned here  as  one  of  the  means  of  expressing  the 
paratactic  relation. 

The  suggestion  of  relation  by  means  of  single  words 
is  the  most  frequent  and  the  most  definite.  It  is,  in 
fact,  so  definite  that  it  soon  carries  the  suggestion 
beyond  the  limits  of  any  definition  of  parataxis  over 
into  the  expression  of  subordination  by  means  of  con- 
junctions. But  before  this  point  is  reached,  while 
there  is  still  no  definite  expression  of  grammatical  sub- 
ordination, there  are  various  ways  in  which  relation 
may  be  merely  suggested  by  single  words. 

The  most  obvious  and  one  of  the  most  frequent  is  by 
the  use  in  a  second  clause  of  a  word  referring  back  to 
something  in  the  previous  clause.  This  may  be  a  pro- 
noun, which  takes  up  a  single  concept  of  the  earlier 
sentence,  or  it  may  be  by  the  repetition  of  any  word 
from  the  preceding  sentence,  a  noun,  an  adjective,  a 
verb.  Such  a  repetition  produces  the  same  effect  that 
is  produced  by  any  other  repetition,  of  tone  or  of 
sentence-accent,  that  is,  it  recalls  the  preceding  sen- 
tence to  the  memory  of  the  hearer  and  indicates  that 
the  preceding  group  of  concepts  is  still  in  the  mind 
of  the  speaker.     It  is  almost  always,  perhaps  always, 

127 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

accompanied  by  a  resemblance  in  the  musical  elements. 
In  the  utterance  of  the  words  "  On  this  side  was  glory, 
on  this  side  fame,"  the  second  phrase  repeats  with 
little  variation  the  sentence-inflection  of  the  first,  but  if 
the  relation  is  one  of  contrast,  "  On  this  side  was  glory, 
on  that  side  shame,"  the  contrast  is  marked  by  a  differ- 
ence in  tone  and  accent.  The  form  of  sentence,  also, 
will  often  assist  the  contrast  by  balancing  dependent 
infinitives  or  prepositional  phrases  of  similar  form.  But 
in  all  cases  of  correlation,  especially  in  written  lan- 
guage, the  single  repeated  or  balanced  word,  though  it 
may  not  be  the  most  potent  means  of  suggesting  rela- 
tion, is  the  most  distinct  and  therefore  the  one  upon 
which  the  association  is  most  likely  to  become  perma- 
nently fixed.  This  is  especially  true  when  the  repeated 
word  or  the  contrasting  pronoun  is  at  the  head  of  the 
clause,  so  that  it  is  uttered  and  heard  at  the  moment 
when  the  relation  between  the  two  groups  is  most 
vividly  felt;  in  such  cases  it  is  difficult  to  say  when 
such  a  word  ceases  to  be  an  adverb  and  becomes  a  con- 
junction. Thus  hinc — hine,  hinc —  Mine,  are  scarcely 
distinguishable  as  to  function  from  si  —  sic,  and  it  is  a 
question  whether  dum  —  dum  (Catull.,  LXII,  45,  56)  is  a 
correlation  or  only  a  repetition ;  without  the  inflection 
which  the  spoken  sentence  would  have,  it  is  impossible 
to  decide.  In  some  cases  an  adverb  may  thus  become 
momentarily  a  conjunction  as  in  Tac.  Ann.,  I,  28,  tarda 
sunt  quae  in  commune  expostulantur :  priuatam  gratiam 
statim  mereare,  statim  recipias,  where  for  the  moment 
statim,  supported  by  the  influence  of  order  and  sentence- 
form,  becomes  a  conjunction. 

Upon  the  various  means  which  have  come  into  use  in 
speech  for  the  suggestion  of  relation  between  concept- 
groups  two  general  comments  may  be  made.     In   the 

128 


PARATAXIS 

first  place,  they  do  not  occur  singly,  but  always  in  com- 
bination. The  sentences  brought  together  in  parataxis 
are  always  contiguous  and  there  is  always  some  indica- 
tion of  the  relation  in  the  time  and  tone  and  sentence- 
inflection;  these  forms  of  suggestion  can  never  be 
lacking.  The  order  is  not  necessarily  such  as  to  be 
suggestive  of  relation,  though  it  will  often  be  so. 
Person,  tense  and  mode  frequently  give  no  indication 
of  the  relation,  especially  when  both  verbs  are  in  the 
indicative,  and  even  more  frequently  there  is  no  single 
word  which  by  repetition  or  correlation  shows  that  the 
sentences  are  connected.  Some  of  these  are  always 
present,  others  are  not  necessary,  but  none  of  them  will 
be  found  in  actual  usage  dissociated  from  all  others. 

In  the  second  place,  though  these  means  may  be 
arranged  in  a  scale,  as  is  done  above,  according  to  the 
frequency  of  occurrence,  the  scale  is  not  perfectly  regu- 
lar nor  is  it  a  perfect  measure  of  effectiveness.  In 
general,  order,  inflectional  peculiarity  and  single  words 
are  more  distinct  than  the  musical  elements,  but  it  can 
scarcely  be  said  that  they  are  more  effective.  Rather, 
the  musical  elements  and  the  influence  of  mere  con- 
tiguity afford  the  strongest  suggestions  of  relation, 
while  the  other  means  localize  the  suggestion  and  bring 
it  to  a  point.  The  musical  elements  have  more  to  do 
with  the  fact  of  relation,  the  others  with  the  kind  of 
relation,  and  it  is  only  when  the  relation  begins  to  be 
associated  with  single  words  that  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tion is  at  all  clearly  defined.  Order  may  sometimes  be 
more  nearly  precise  than  single  words,  and  inflectional 
peculiarities  may  be  so  effective  and  so  clear  that  the 
insertion  of  a  conjunction  adds  nothing  to  the  definite- 
ness  of  the  expression.  Regularity  and  exactness  of 
classification  are  therefore  out  of  place  here ;  it  must  be 
9  129 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

expected  that  sometimes  one,  sometimes  another  influ- 
ence will  predominate  and  if  any  classification  of  para- 
tactic  structures  were  attempted  on  the  basis  of  the 
means  of  expressing  relation,  it  would  necessarily  be 
flexible  and  somewhat  complex. 

The  forms  of  sentence  which  are  the  result  of  the 
employment  of  these  means  may  be  grouped  under 
several  heads: 

1.  Sentences  complete  in  themselves  may  stand  in 
juxtaposition  without  a  connective  word,  either  because 
they  are  so  long  and  require  so  much  analysis  and  re- 
combination that  they  are  not  easily  felt  as  wholes  or 
because  the  connection  is  so  obvious  that  it  does  not 
need  to  be  expressed.  In  the  first  case  the  sentences 
are  usually  long  and  are  in  serious  and  somewhat  elabo- 
rate thought.  The  connection  is  not  immediate,  but  is 
through  a  common  germ-concept  of  which  each  sentence 
represents  a  part.  Even  in  such  cases,  which  occur 
frequently  in  formal  writing,  pronouns  or  pronominal 
adverbs  or  repeated  nouns  or  verbs  often  assist  in  carry- 
ing the  thought  forward.  When  a  connection  is  more 
distinctly  expressed  between  sentences  of  this  kind,  it 
is  usually  by  a  coordinating  conjunction.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  short  sentences,  often  consisting  only  of 
the  verb,  are  put  together  without  conjunctions,  it  is 
because  the  connection  is  of  a  very  simple  kind  and  so 
obvious  that  it  is  felt  by  speaker  and  hearer  without  the 
help  of  a  connective  word.  It  is  because  the  connec- 
tion is  clear  that  the  absence  of  it  attracts  attention  and 
a  special  term  —  asyndeton  —  is  given  to  it. 

2.  Sentences  connected  by  conjunctions  like  nam, 
enim  are,  in  spite  of  the  connection,  separated  by  a  dis- 
tinct pause  and  are  regarded  as  grammatically  inde- 

130 


PARATAXIS 

pendent;  the  grammatical  structure  of  the  one  is  not 
influenced  by  the  structure  of  the  other.  This  is  not 
because  of  a  lack  of  closeness  in  the  relation  or  eveD 
because  the  relation  is  undefined;  it  is  frequently  quite 
as  close  and  its  nature  is  as  clearly  defined  as  when 
grammatical  subordination  is  employed  to  express  it. 
The  difference  is  mainly  in  the  size  and  complexity  of 
the  two  groups.  Syntactical  subordination  is  natural 
only  with  small  groups.  The  subordination  of  long 
clauses,  by  which  an  elaborate  periodic  structure  is 
built  up,  is  found  only  in  a  highly  artificial  style  like 
that  of  Cicero.  In  the  more  natural  speech  large  groups 
preserve  their  identity  and  are  not  merged  into  each 
other.  If  mere  succession  does  not  sufficiently  suggest 
the  connection,  such  conjunctions  as  nam,  enim,  ergo 
are  used,  but  the  identity  of  the  group  is  not  disturbed. 
The  fact  that  the  group  retains  its  identity  and  its 
grammatical  independence  justifies  the  use  of  the  term 
coordinating  of  these  conjunctions,  though  the  relation 
of  the  two  sentences  may  be  exactly  the  same  as  the 
grammatically  subordinate  relation  expressed  by  cum. 
3.  Sentences  of  the  correlative  type  are  in  general 
those  which  result  from  the  balancing  of  two  concept- 
groups  by  some  kind  of  similarity  in  sound  or  structure. 
They  range  from  short  sentences,  sometimes  consisting 
of  the  verbs  only  (amat:  sapit),  to  long  clauses  in  which 
all  the  means  of  expressing  correspondence  or  contrast 
—  order,  single  words,  similarity  of  structure  —  are  em- 
ployed. This  kind  of  sentence  has  been  frequently 
studied  and  its  characteristics  need  not  be  dwelt  upon 
in  detail.  From  it  come  various  forms  of  subordina- 
tion, especially  the  protasis  and  apodosis  and  probably 
the  dum  clause  or  at  least  some  kinds  of  dum  clause. 
It  is  also  possible  that  qui  acquired  subordinating  force 

131 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

by  being  used  as  an  indefinite  pronoun  in  correlation 
with  demonstratives. 

4.  Short  sentences,  consisting  of  a  verb  alone,  of  a 
verb  and  subject  pronoun  or  occasionally  of  a  verb  with 
object  or  adverb,  are  prefixed  to,  inserted  into  or 
appended  to  another  sentence.  The  two  verbs  then 
stand  in  close  relation,  frequently  in  immediate  juxta- 
position without  a  pause  between,  and  not  infrequently 
the  subject  of  the  longer  sentence  is  by  prolepsis  the 
object  of  the  prefixed  or  inserted  verb.  This  kind  of 
connection  occurs  so  frequently  and  is  the  parent  of  so 
many  subordinate  clauses  that  it  must  be  treated  at  some 
length.  Without  attempting  completeness  of  statement 
it  is  possible  to  select  certain  typical  forms. 

a.  Certain  verbs  of  mental  action,  scio,  uideo,  audio, 
credo,  spero,  opinor,  dico,  etc.,  are  used  in  the  first 
person  singular  of  the  present  indicative,  usually  alone 
but  sometimes  with  ego  or  with  an  adverb,  to  define  the 
speaker's  attitude  toward  the  statement  which  he  is 
making.  In  colloquial  speech  these  verbs  may  stand  at 
the  beginning  of  the  sentence  or  at  the  end  or  may  be 
inserted  into  the  middle  of  the  sentence ;  in  more  formal 
style  they  are  usually  inserted  parenthetically.  They 
are  sometimes  divided  from  the  rest  of  the  sentence  by 
pauses  more  or  less  distinct,  so  that  in  printed  texts  the 
pause  is  marked  by  a  comma  or  by  a  colon,  as  in  Ter. 
Phorm.,  110,  iam  scio:  amare  coepit,  Plaut.  Men.,  599, 
arnica  exspectat  me,  scio.  But  the  inserted  verb  may  be 
so  incorporated  into  the  sentence  that  the  pause  must 
have  been  very  brief,  as  in  Plaut.  Most.,  699,  tota  turget 
rnihi  uxor  scio  domi,  Plaut.  Poen.,  1016,  mercator  cre- 
dost.  In  all  cases  the  main  thought  of  the  sentence  is 
gathered  about  the  verb  of  the  original  sentence  and  the 
verb  of  mental  action  is  an  addition,  an  after-thought, 

132 


PARATAXIS 

by  which  the  speaker  seeks  to  define  the  total  intention  of 
the  sentence.  It  expresses  an  idea  alreadj  contained  by 
implication  in  the  sentence,  but  not  explicitly  exprefi 

b.  In  questions  the  inserted  verb  is  in  the  second 
person,  and  the  intention  of  the  speaker  is  to  ascertain 
the  attitude  of  the  hearer  toward  a  certain  question. 
Thus  in  Pud.,  1269,  censen  hodie  despondebit  earn  mihi, 
quaeso?  there  is  really  a  double  question  despondebit 
earn?  and  censen?  and  of  these  despondebit  is  the  origi- 
nal and  the  essential,  but  the  addition  of  censen  lays 
the  stress  of  desire  for  information  upon  the  hearer's 
attitude.  When  the  main  sentence  is  not  interrogative, 
the  question,  scin,  non  tu  seis,  audin,  a  in,  is  of  necessity 
separated  from  the  rest  of  the  sentence  by  the  inter- 
rogative inflection  and  pause.  This  fact  makes  it  awk- 
ward as  a  parenthetic  insertion  in  a  non-interrogative 
sentence,  as  in  Ter.  Andr.,  441,  biduist  aut  tridui  haec 
sollicitudo,  nosti?  delude  desinet,  where  it  may  be  ques- 
tioned whether  nosti  is  really  interrogative.  Most  fre- 
quently the  verb  stands  at  the  beginning  of  the  sentence 
with  a  pause  after  it,  forming  an  introduction  to  the 
following  question,  as  Plaut.  Pers.,  491,  ain,  apud  mest? 
When  the  main  sentence  is  not  interrogative,  the  pause 
is  necessarily  longer  and  is  marked  by  the  change  of 
inflection,  as  in  Plaut.  Pseud.,  172,  audit-in?  nobis, 
mulieres,  lianc  habeo  edictionem.  In  these  cases  the 
relation  between  the  two  sentences  is  a  loose  one,  but 
the  question  is  still  an  explicit  expression  and  definition 
of  a  thought  which  is  latent  in  the  situation  and  the 
main  sentence.1 

1  Examples  of  this  and  of  the  preceding  class  may  be  found  in  E.  Becker, 
Beiordnende  und  Unterordnende  Satzverbindungen  .  .  .,  Progr.  Metz,  188S. 
This  study,  so  well  begun,  has  never  been  completed.  Examples  of  the 
following  classes  are  given  in  the  Amer.  Journ.  of  PhiloL,  XVIII  (1897), 
70  and  71. 

133 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

c.  When  the  main  question  is  in  the  subjunctive,  it 
is  often  denned  by  the  addition  of  uis,  uin.  The  more 
direct  uses  of  the  subjunctive  as  a  mode  of  will  are  to 
a  considerable  extent  incompatible  with  interrogation, 
as  the  imperative  mode  is.  It  is  true  that  questions  in 
the  second  and  third  persons,  in  which  persons  the  jus- 
sive uses  are  most  prominent,  do  occur,  but  in  them  the 
mode  is  always  modified  by  the  interrogation;  questions 
with  the  subjunctive  usually  are  in  the  first  person 
singular,  in  which  the  mode  expresses  determination. 
Most  of  these  questions  fall  into  one  of  two  classes; 
they  either  take  up  and  repudiate  a  previously  expressed 
desire  by  repeating  it  in  an  exclamatory  tone  or  they 
are  deliberative,  addressed  by  the  speaker  to  himself. 
These  two  ideas,  of  repudiation  or  of  deliberation,  have 
become  so  far  permanently  associated  with  questions  in 
the  subjunctive  as  to  leave  no  clear  form  of  expression 
for  the  unemotional  question  by  the  speaker  in  regard 
to  the  desire  of  the  person  addressed.  Thus  quid 
faciam  ?  quid  agam  ?  quid  ego  credam  huic  ?  are  in 
themselves  ambiguous ;  they  may  mean  "  what  had  I 
better  do?"  or  "what  do  you  want  me  to  do?"  and 
egone  id  faciam  ?  deisne  aduorser  ?  abeam  ?  may  be  ex- 
clamatory repudiations  of  a  previous  suggestion  or  they 
may  be  real  appeals  for  direction.  It  is  to  remove  this 
ambiguity  that  uis  and  uin  are  inserted.  When  quid 
faciam  ?  is  addressed  to  another  person  than  the  speaker, 
it  is  an  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  hearer's  desire  and  the 
implied  question  is  more  distinctly  defined  by  the  ex- 
pression of  the  latent  element  by  means  of  the  word 
uis.  Thus  quid  faciam  ?  becomes  by  expansion  quid  uis 
faciam?  and  reddam?  which  alone  would  most  natu- 
rally suggest  a  repudiating  exclamation,  becomes  uin 
reddam?  and  expresses  a  question  about  the  desire  of 

134 


PARATAXIS 

the  hearer.  Compare  quid  loquar?  Plaut.  True,  789, 
with  quid  loquar  uis?  Epid.,  584.  As  in  the  classes 
above,  the  verb  of  mental  action  is  in  point  of  time  a 
later  addition  for  the  purpose  of  separating  the  element 
of  will  in  the  subjunctive  form  from  the  action  ex- 
pressed by  the  verb,  in  order  that  the  interrogation 
may  be  more  clearly  directed  upon  the  will  of  the 
hearer.  It  is  a  definition  of  an  element  already 
suggested,  but  not  clearly  expressed,  in  the  main 
question. 

The  same  kind  of  addition  is  found  occasionally  in 
deliberative  questions,  like  quam  esse  dicam  hancbeluam? 
in  which  dicam  or  praedicem  takes  the  mode  and  the 
other  verb  is  reduced  to  an  infinitive. 

d.  In  sentences  which  express  some  of  the  many 
shades  of  command,  permission,  entreaty,  advice  — 
commonly  included  under  the  general  term  jussive  — 
with  the  second  or  third  person  of  the  subjunctive,  the 
idea  of  will  or  desire  is  frequently  emphasized  by  the 
addition  of  a  verb  which  by  its  meaning  or  by  its  form 
expresses  desire.  Illustrations  of  this  form  of  sentence 
may  be  found  in  abundance  in  almost  any  Latin  author, 
but  they  are  of  course  most  frequent  in  the  less  formal 
style.  Thus  in  animum  aduortas  nolo  (Plaut.  Capt., 
383)  the  desire  is  expressed  in  animum  aduortas,  but  it 
is  emphasized  and  defined  as  a  command  by  twlo;1  in 
redde  filio  :  sibi  habeat.  ||  iam,  ut  uolt,  per  me  liabeat  licet 
{Merc,  989)  the  permissive  force  of  the  mode  is  defined 
by  licet,  as  entreaty  is  frequently  defined  by  obsecro, 
oro.     When  the  subjunctive  verb  is  in  the  third  person, 

1  I  do  not  repeat  here  the  suggestion  made  elsewhere  that  uelim  repeats 
and  emphasizes  the  optative  force  of  the  subjunctive.  The  proof  of  the 
correctness  of  that  suggestion  would  require  more  space  than  I  can  give 
to  it  here* 

135 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

which  leaves  the  part  which  the  hearer  is  to  play  largely 
to  implication,  the  added  verb  often  defines  more  pre- 
cisely what  was  before  implied  in  the  circumstances. 
Thus  die  me  aduenisse  filio  .  .  .  :  curriculo  iube  in  urbem 
ueniat  (Most.,  930) ;  in  this  sentence  ueniat  alone  would 
have  implied  that  the  slave  was  to  convey  the  father's 
command  to  his  son,  but  iube  expressly  defines  the 
slave's  duty.  With  fac,  facito  the  speaker  defines  his 
desire  that  the  hearer  shall  himself  see  that  the  action 
is  performed  by  the  third  person  (tua  jilia  facito  oret, 
Mud.,  1219;  canem  istam  a  foribus  aliquis  abducat  face, 
Most.,  854) ;  sine  not  only  expresses  the  speaker's  will- 
ingness but  also  his  desire  that  the  hearer  shall  permit 
the  third  person  to  act  (sine  mulier  ueniat).  In  fact, 
all  imperatives,  when  thus  prefixed  or  appended  to  a 
subjunctive,  both  repeat  the  idea  of  desire  which  is 
expressed  in  the  modal  form  and  add  a  second  com- 
mand to  the  hearer,  a  command  implied  less  clearly  in 
the  subjunctive. 

e.  In  the  same  way  various  impersonals  define  the 
vague  meaning  of  the  first  singular  of  the  present  sub- 
junctive and  occasionally  other  persons.  The  first  sin- 
gular is  in  general  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  will, 
as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  is  lacking  in  the  impera- 
tive and  that  with  many  verbs  it  is  indistinguishable 
from  the  future.  It  expresses  various  shades  of  deter- 
mination and  choice  and  is  therefore  defined  by  phrases 
like  optumum  est  (nunc  adeam  optumumst,  Asin.,  448), 
necesse  est  (pro  hoc  mihi  patronus  sim  necessest,  Poen., 
1244),  decretum  est  and  eertum  est.  In  all  of  these  cases 
the  impersonal  phrase  defines  the  meaning  of  the  mode 
with  slight  addition,  less  than  is  conveyed  by  fac  or 
uide  or  other  words  with  the  third  person.  Parallels 
to  all  these  subjunctives  without  the  defining  addition 

136 


PARATAXIS 

may  be  found  in  use  side  by  side  with  the  double  form 
of  sentence. 

/.  The  negative  subjunctive  sentence,  the  prohibi- 
tion, is  defined  by  a  negative  verb.  In  the  simplest 
form,  corresponding  to  nolo,  this  is  nolo.  The  genu 
of  a  negative  sentence,  the  most  undefined  form  of  the 
concept-group,  is  the  negative  itself,  not  the  verb.  A 
prohibition  does  not  arise  in  the  consciousness  as  a  con- 
cept of  action  which  is  then  modified  or  shifted  by  the 
addition  of  a  negative,  nor  does  the  expression  of  a 
prohibition  in  language  follow  any  such  course.  In 
many  cases  the  verb  is  so  much  a  matter  of  course,  the 
action  is  so  clearly  indicated  by  circumstances,  that  the 
most  empty  verb-form  is  sufficient,  as  in  the  English 
don't.  The  phrase  nolo  ames  does  not  begin  with  ames 
but  with  the  negative  or  with  the  prohibition  ne  ames. 
Then  when  the  emphasis  of  an  added  verb  of  will  is 
desired,  the  negative  verb  nolo  is  used  instead  of  the 
two  words  ne  nolo,  just  as  non  uidi  may  become  in 
indirect  form  nego  me  uidisse.1 

g.  In  cases  which  involve  the  past  tenses  it  is  a 
matter  of  indifference  whether  this  process  of  definition 
by  expansion  be  regarded  as  primary  or  as  a  secondar}^ 
process  by  analogy.  Instances  are  naturally  somewhat 
infrequent  and  the  repetition  and  definition  is  less  obvi- 
ous than  in  the  simpler  uses  with  the  present.  Stick., 
624,  dixi  in  career  em  ires,  is  essentially  the  same  as 
dico  in  career  em  eas ;  Trin.,  591,  tandem  impetraui 
abiret,  is  not   different  from  impetro  abeat  nor  is  siui 

1  This  was  somewhat  carelessly  expressed  by  me  in  A.  J.  P.,  XVIII, 
298,  so  that  Bennett  (Critique,  71  f.)  understood  it  to  mean  that  ne  nolo 
combined  into  nolo.  The  attachment  of  the  negative  idea  which  properly 
goes  with  one  verb  to  another  verb  is  of  course  common  enough  in  many 
languages  ;  if  the  added  verb  happens  to  have  a  negative  form,  that  form 
is  substituted  for  the  two  words. 

137 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

uiuerent  {Mil.  Glor.,  54)  really  more  remarkable  than 
sino  uiuant.  The  first  two  of  these  cases  are  remark- 
able for  the  verb  used,  but  all  of  them  show  the  same 
kind  of  sentence-form  that  is  found  with  the  present 
and  the  same  kind  of  definition  by  the  prefixing  of 
a  verb. 

Upon  the  kind  of  sentence-structure  of  which  these 
groups  are  illustrations  two  or  three  comments  may 
be  made. 

First,  it  is  clearly  marked  by  certain  peculiarities, 
mainly  of  form  but  partly  of  meaning.  The  principal 
modifiers,  adverbs  and  adverbial  phrases,  objects,  depen- 
dent infinitives,  all  belong  to  one  of  the  verbs ;  the  other 
verb  has  only  occasionally  an  adverb  and  sometimes  has 
the  subject  of  the  first  verb  by  prolepsis  as  its  object. 
And  the  one  verb,  usually  of  mental  action,  is  always  an 
interpretation  and  definition  of  the  main  sentence. 

Second,  it  is  impossible  to  think  that  these  construc- 
tions are  to  be  explained  by  the  omission  of  a  conjunc- 
tion ;  uolo  abeas  is  not  for  uolo  ut  abeas  nor  uin  reddam  ? 
for  uin  ut  reddam?  The  structure  grew  up  indepen- 
dently of  conjunctions  and  presumably  before  conjunc- 
tions were  in  free  use.  There  are  only  two  explanations 
possible.  One  is  the  common  one,  that  two  sentences 
uin  ?  reddam  f  or  uolo :  abeas  were  put  together  and 
then  in  the  process  of  use  came  to  be  thought  of  as  one. 
But  this  is  not  a  process  by  which  sentences  were  ever 
made.  If  uolo  and  abeas  were  used  together,  it  was 
because  they  were  thought  together.  The  other  expla- 
nation is  that  given  above,  that  the  prefixed  verb  is 
chronologically  the  later  and  is  prefixed  as  an  interpre- 
tation of  the  sentence,  as  an  expression  of  a  meaning 
latent  in  the  other  verb. 

Third,  the  same  process  shows  itself  in  many  kinds 

138 


PARATAXIS 

of  subordinate  clause.  With  many  indirect  questions 
it  is  almost  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  the  leading 
verb  be  prefixed  or  not.  There  is  no  difference  between 
quid  est?  and  die  quid  est,  between  num  laruatust  nut 
cerritus?  and  num  laruatust  aut  ccrritus  fac  sciam,  ex- 
cept that  in  the  second  examples  the  idea  is  more  fully 
and  urgently  expressed.  Compare  the  three  questions 
in  Ter.  Andr.,  877  f.,  Num  cogitat  quid  dicat?  num 
facti  piget?  Vide  num  eius  color  pudoris  signurn  usquam 
indicat.  Most  indirect  questions,  perhaps  all  in  the 
beginning,  come  by  the  prefixing  of  the  leading  verb. 
This  is  to  some  extent  the  case  with  all  subordinate 
clauses  which  are  limited  to  certain  classes  of  leading 
verbs.  Thus  all  the  simpler  kinds  of  quin  clause,  after 
nulla  causa  est  and  like  leading  sentences,  and  quominus 
clauses  after  negative  verbal  expressions;  it  is  the 
clause  which  determines  the  meaning  of  the  leading 
verb,  not  the  verb  which  determines  the  clause,  and 
strictly  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  quin  or 
quominus  "takes  "  certain  leading  verbs  than  to  say  that 
the  leading  verb  "  takes  "  a  quin  or  a  quominus  clause. 
Lane  (Latin  Grammar,  §  1949)  says  that  "the  subjunc- 
tive with  ut  or  ne  is  used  in  clauses  which  serve  to  com- 
plete the  sense  of  verbs  of  will  or  aim."  This  is  more 
nearly  correct  than  the  usual  form  of  statement,  but  it 
would  be  still  more  accurate  to  say  "verbs  of  will  or 
aim  are  prefixed  to  clauses  with  ut  or  ne  to  complete 
(or  define)  their  meaning." 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  in  sentences  of  this  t}7pe 
and  in  indirect  questions  and  ne  clauses  there  is  a  shift 
of  person,  mode  and  tense1  and  that  by  means  of  the 
shift  the  verb-form  becomes  a  sign  of  partial  subordina- 
tion.    Schmalz  makes  a  distinction  between  the  use  of 

1  Schmalz»,  §  267. 
139 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

credo,  scio,  certum  est,  fac,  nolo  ames,  capias  suadeo,  and 
similar  verbs  with  the  indicative  or  the  subjunctive,  on 
the  one  side,  and  siui  uiuerent,  bonum  haberet  animum 
iubebant,  on  the  other  side ;  the  former  he  calls  simple 
parataxis,  the  latter  he  regards  as  a  middle  stage  be- 
tween parataxis  and  hypotaxis,  because  they  involve  a 
shift  of  person,  mode  and  tense.  What  is  meant  by  the 
shift  of  mode  is  not  quite  clear,  since  many  of  the 
examples  under  simple  parataxis  have  the  subjunctive 
(capias  suadeo,  nolo  ames),  but  the  difference  between 
the  second  person  and  the  third,  between  the  present 
tense  and  the  imperfect  is  not  precisely  a  shift.  The 
fact  is  rather  that  the  third  person,  for  reasons  given 
above,  is  less  direct  as  an  expression  of  desire  than  the 
second  person  and  carries  with  it,  when  used  in  inde- 
pendent sentences,  various  latent  suggestions  in  regard 
to  the  action  of  the  second  person,  the  hearer,  which 
are  not  carried  by  the  second  person  of  the  verb.  When 
the  thought  is  partially  analyzed,  these  latent  sugges- 
tions are  expressed  by  the  added  verb,  fac,  sine,  iube, 
and  the  subjunctive  form  is  left  to  some  extent  mean- 
ingless. It  is  therefore  more  ready  to  assume  a  new 
meaning,  the  partial  subordination  which  the  prefixing 
of  a  verb  introduces,  than  the  direct  and  distinctly  jus- 
sive second  person  of  the  verb  would  be.  This  may 
properly  be  called  a  shift  of  meaning,  brought  about  by 
the  prefixing  of  fac  or  sine,  by  reason  of  which  the  com- 
bination iube  ueniat  appears  to  be  more  completely  fused 
than  is  nolo  abeas ;  in  the  latter,  abeas  appears  to  have 
very  much  the  same  meaning  that  it  has  when  it  is 
used  alone.     But  there  is  no  shift  of  person. 

It  is  not  at  all  improbable  that  siui  uiuerent  is  a 
combination  by  analogy  and  is  therefore  less  direct  than 
sino  uiuatis,  but  here  also  the  subjunctive  form  is  in  use 

140 


PARATAXIS 

in  independent  sentences,  though  not  in  frequent  use, 
to  express  or  suggest  the  idea  which  is  more  analytically 
expressed  by  the  addition  of  siui.  It  is  easy  to  arrange 
a  series  of  decreasing  directness,  like  uiuatis —  sino 
uiuant  ov  sino  uiuatis  —  siui  uiuerent,  just  as  it  is  easy 
to  bring  a  ne  clause  with  the  imperfect  subjunctive  in 
narrative  back  to  a  prohibition,  but  the  mind  of  the 
writer  went  through  no  such  series.  To  him  the  pas- 
sage from  uiuerent  to  siui  uiuerent  was  just  as  simple  as 
that  from  ueniat  to  iube  ueniat. 

While  there  is,  therefore,  a  certain  shift  of  meaning 
brought  about  by  the  prefixing  of  a  verb  to  the  sub- 
junctive form  and  while  this  shift  is  greater  in  the  case 
of  the  third  person  than  in  the  second  person  and  per- 
haps in  the  past  tenses  than  in  the  present,  there  does 
not  appear  to  be  in  a  strict  sense  a  shift  of  person  or 
tense  or  mode.  The  subjunctive  (and  especially  the 
third  person)  contains  elements  of  meaning  which  lend 
themselves  readily  to  the  partial  expression  of  subordi- 
nation, but  it  does  not  of  itself  express  subordination. 

Definitions  of  parataxis,  like  definitions  of  the  sen- 
tence, have  been  many.  But  definitions  of  the  sentence 
do  not  to  any  considerable  degree  affect  syntactical 
work,  since  the  general  understanding  of  the  word  is 
sufficiently  clear  to  admit  of  its  use  without  confusion. 
Such  definitions  are  in  truth  only  a  kind  of  record  of 
the  progress  made  toward  an  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  language.  But  the  word  parataxis  is  used 
with  such  wide  differences  of  meaning,  with  so  much 
difference  of  understanding  as  to  the  field  covered  by 
it,  that  some  general  agreement  is  almost  a  necessity, 
if  the  word  is  to  be  continued  in  use  as  a  technical 
term.     Differences  of  view  in  regard  to  the  nature  of 

141 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

an  object  designated  by  a  technical  term  will  always 
exist  and  may  exist  without  confusion,  but  differences 
in  regard  to  the  extent  of  its  application  and  the  range 
of  phenomena  designated  by  it,  such  as  appear  to  exist  in 
regard  to  the  varieties  of  sentence-structure  designated 
by  the  word  parataxis,  result  in  confusion  and  waste. 

Like  any  other  phenomenon  of  language,  parataxis 
may  be  looked  at  from  the  psychological  side  or  from 
the  linguistic  side,  or  an  attempt  may  be  made  to  com- 
bine the  two.  The  more  recent  definitions,  in  harmony 
with  the  general  drift  of  philology,  are  psychological. 
The  remarks  of  Paul,  Prineipien,  2d  ed.,  p.  121  f., 
3d  ed.,  p.  133,  which  are  sometimes  referred  to  as 
authoritative  on  this  point,  do  not  constitute  a  defini- 
tion and  were  probably  not  so  intended.  The  last 
sentence,  "es  ist  kein  anderer  begriff  von  parataxe 
mb'glich  als  der,  dass  nicht  einseitig  ein  satz  den  an- 
dern,  sondern  beide  sich  gegenseitig  bestimmen,"  is  a 
mere  remark,  correct  enough,  but  not  precise  and  not 
intended  to  be  a  precise  definition.  It  applies  to  any 
two  sentences  in  juxtaposition  or  even  to  the  two  parts 
of  a  conditional  sentence.  The  distinction  made  be- 
tween a  sentence  which  exists  for  its  own  sake,  nur 
seiner  selbst  willen,  and  one  which  exists  primarily  in 
order  to  modify  another  would  be  incorrect  in  principle, 
but  it  is  in  fact  immediately  modified  by  Paul.  The 
sentences  which  follow  and  which  conclude  with  that 
quoted  above  practically  withdraw  the  distinction,  leav- 
ing only  a  general  impression  that  parataxis  may  be 
partially  defined  by  contrasting  it  with  complete  inde- 
pendence of  thought.1  On  this  point  enough  has  been 
said  above. 

1  See  also  the  criticisms  of  this  paragraph  by  Herrmann,  K.  Z.,  33, 
pp.  481  ff.,  and  Ries,  Was  ist  Syntax?  p.  150,  D.  L.  Z.,  49  (1888),  1785. 

142 


PARATAXIS 

The  same  general  idea,  that  concept-groups  may  be 
in  juxtaposition  without  relation,  seems  to  be  involved 
in  Bennett's  statement: !  "In  order  to  exhibit  parataxis 
the  two  sentences  assumed  to  have  the  paratactic  rela- 
tion must  each  be  capable  of  possessing  an  independent 
value"  or  (in  the  next  sentence)  "capable  of  function- 
ing alone."  The  phrase  "capable  of  possessing  an  in- 
dependent value  "  is  not  quite  free  from  ambiguity. 
Independence  in  the  sense  of  absolute  separation  from 
what  precedes  and  what  follows,  absolute  freedom  from 
influence  by  other  concepts,  is  not  possible  for  any 
concept  or  concept-group.  The  succession  of  mental 
processes  is  continuous,  unbroken,  and  every  concept- 
group  is  influenced  by  those  which  precede  it.  The 
only  characteristic  of  a  concept-group  which  approaches 
independence  is  a  certain  degree  of  completeness,  such 
that  the  same  group  may  recur  a  second  time  to  the 
mind.  But  this  is  not  a  characteristic  of  a  sentence- 
group  alone ;  a  phrase  has  the  same  kind  of  complete- 
ness. The  concept  represented  by  it  goes  without  saying, 
up  to  date,  in  touch  with,  may  recur  in  all  sorts  of  con- 
nections and  the  words  may  be  used  with  wearisome 
iteration.  In  respect  to  this  kind  of  completeness  — 
which  is  not  independence  at  all  —  a  word  differs  from 
a  phrase  and  a  phrase  from  a  sentence  only  in  degree, 
not  in  kind. 

It  must  be  said  also  that  a  concept  or  concept-group, 
whether  it  is  represented  by  a  word  or  a  word -group,  is 
always  influenced  by  its  surroundings,  as  the  writing 
of  a  particular  word  is  affected  by  the  position  in  which 

1  Cornell  Studies,  IX,  Critique  of  Some  Recent  Subjunctive  Theories, 
p.  66.  Bennett  refers  to  the  passage  of  Paul's  Principien  discussed  above, 
but  I  do  not  find  in  Paul's  remarks  the  meaning  which  Bennett  attaches 
to  them ;  on  the  contrary,  Paul  seems  to  be  guarding  against  such  an 
understanding  of  his  words. 

143 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

the  pen  was  left  by  the  preceding  word.  In  one  con- 
nection a  word  or  word-group  has  one  meaning;  in  a 
different  connection  it  has  a  different  meaning.  The 
fact  that  the  meaning  of  abeas  is  shifted  slightly  when 
uolo  is  prefixed  to  it  does  not  show  that  abeas  is  subor- 
dinated to  uolo,  for  the  meaning  of  uolo  also  is  shifted ; 
it  is  not  the  same  as  in  uolo  aquam.  But  in  truth,  as  a 
test  to  distinguish  between  parataxis  and  subordina- 
tion, the  capacity  to  "  possess  an  independent  value  "  or 
to  "  function  alone  "  is  altogether  vague  and  useless. 

The  main  difficulty  in  all  psychological  definitions 
of  parataxis  or  in  all  attempts,  whether  in  the  form 
of  definition  or  not,  to  determine  upon  psychological 
grounds  what  is  parataxis  and  what  is  not,  is  that  they 
involve  a  transfer  of  logical  or  syntactical  terms  and 
conceptions  to  the  sphere  of  psychology,  where  they 
have  no  meaning  or  a  different  meaning.  A  definition 
of  parataxis  requires  that  it  be  discriminated  on  the  one 
side  from  coordination  and  on  the  other  side  from  sub- 
ordination. The  terms  coordination  and  subordination 
are  properly  logical  terms.  Within  the  field  of  abstract 
logic,  in  the  realm  of  precise  definition,  they  have  a 
place  and  meaning.  The  transfer  to  the  field  of  lan- 
guage does  not  involve  any  confusion  as  long  as  they 
are  used  in  a  somewhat  general  way.  But  it  is  increas- 
ingly evident  that  all  sentences  cannot  be  crowded  into 
one  or  the  other  of  these  categories  and  that  there  are 
many  sentences  which  we  do  not  know  whether  to  call 
subordinate  or  independent.  This  is  a  common-place 
of  modern  linguistics.  This  difficulty  is  not  to  be  met 
by  more  precise  definition  of  the  terms,  but  by  recog- 
nizing the  fact  that  the  terms  and  the  conceptions  which 
underlie  them  belong  to  another  science  and  are  not 
strictly  applicable  to  the  facts  of  language,  as  they  are 

144 


PARATAXIS 

not  applicable,  for  instance,  to  organic  life.  As  con- 
venient general  terms,  coordinate  and  independent  and 
subordinate  have  their  place  in  syntactical  nomencla- 
ture, but  they  break  down  and  become  positively  inju- 
rious and  hampering  when  they  are  pushed  into  details 
which  require  scientific  precision.  This  is  true  even  of 
their  application  to  written  language ;  it  is  doubly  true 
of  spoken  language. 

But  even  in  this  limited  way  these  terms  are  still 
more  inapplicable  to  the  phenomena  of  mental  life.1 
The  succession  of  processes  which  makes  up  the  life  of 
consciousness,  is  so  inextricably  interwoven,  so  bound 
together  by  the  most  complex  network  of  relations, 
that  logical  terms  have  no  place  in  the  science  which 
describes  it.  The  conceptions  which  they  express  be- 
long to  other  fields  of  thought.  Concept-groups  may 
bear  to  each  other  a  relation  which  has  some  resem- 
blance to  coordination  when  both  are  parts  of  a  single 
larger  group,  or,  when  one  group  is  associated  most 
closely  with  a  single  member  of  another  group,  the 
relation  may  be  in  some  respects  like  logical  or  syntac- 
tical subordination.  But  it  is  only  a  resemblance,  a 
figure,  by  which  we  attempt  to  describe  in  simple  and 
known  terms  a  very  complicated  phenomenon.  No 
psychologist  would  use  the  terms  in  any  other  than  a 
general  sense,  even  more  general  and  less  precise  than 
their  syntactical  sense. 

Psychological  definitions  of  parataxis  therefore  in- 
volve two  liabilities,  almost  certainties,  of  error.  The 
mistake  of  transferring  technical  terms,  which  are  im- 
perfect even  in  their  application  to  language,  to  the 
psychological  sphere  is  natural  enough  to  the  syntac- 

1  This  paragraph  I  owe  in  large  part  to  my  colleague,  Professor 
Ladd. 

10  145 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

ticist  who  is  seeking  for  the  basis  of  sentence-structure. 
But  it  is  a  mistake,  and  it  would  not  be  made,  it  is  safe 
to  say,  by  a  psychologist,  for  he  would  not  predicate 
independence  or  coordination  or  subordination  of  mental 
states  and  processes.1  The  other  error,  of  supposing 
that  the  relation  between  concept-groups,  if  it  could  be 
correctly  denned,  would  necessarily  determine  the  syn- 
tactical relation  of  the  corresponding  word-groups,  is 
one  which  the  student  of  language  is  peculiarly  bound 
to  avoid.  Translation  from  English  into  Latin  or  from 
Latin  into  English  is  a  reminder  of  the  fact  that  sen- 
tence-structure corresponds  to  concept-relations  only  in 
a  general  way  and  with  many  exceptions. 

Parataxis  is  a  phenomenon  of  word-combination,  of 
sentence-structure,  and  it  should  be  defined  by  its  lin- 
guistic characteristics,  not  by  the  accompanying  train 
of  thought.  If  definition  by  description  of  its  nature  is 
impossible,  as  it  is  at  present,  then  the  alternative  is 
to  fix  the  limits  of  the  term  by  describing  the  kinds  of 
sentence-structure  which  are  to  be  understood  as  cov- 
ered by  it.  In  determining  the  extent  of  the  field 
several  considerations  are  to  be  taken  into  account. 
First,  so  far  as  there  is  any  harmony  in  the  present 
usage  of  the  word,  it  tends  toward  the  inclusion  of  all 
forms  of  sentence-structure  in  which  two  finite  verbs  are 
brought  into  close  connection  without  a  subordinating 
word  to  define  the  relation.  This  is  not  meant  as  a 
definition  but  only  as  a  rough  statement  of  the  kinds  of 
sentence-form  cited  in  illustration  by  Draeger,  Kiihner, 
Schmalz,  Lane  and  by  most  school-grammars  which 
deal  with  this  kind  of  sentence.  This  is  because  the 
grammars  present  the  facts  and  their  classifications  are 

1  See  the  remarks  on  parataxis  in  Wundt,  Volherpsychologie,  I,  2,  espe- 
cially p.  302,  bottom. 

146 


PARATAXIS 

therefore  more  likely  to  be  bused  upon  the  facts;  the 
confusion  comes  in  with  the  attempt  to  find  a  psy- 
chological explanation.  This  considerable  degree  of 
harmony  in  the  use  of  the  word  affords  a  natural  start- 
ing-point for  a  definition.  Second,  the  purpose  for 
which  it  is  chiefly  desirable  that  parataxis  should  be 
carefully  studied  is  that  through  it  the  subordinate 
clauses  may  be  more  fully  understood.  It  is  therefore 
desirable  that  any  kind  of  sentence-structure  which  is 
the  parent  of  a  subordinate  clause  should  be  included 
within  the  field.  Thus  fac  ualeas  must  be  studied  in 
order  to  understand  fac  ut  ualeas  and  optumumst 
maneam  in  order  to  understand  bonum  est  ut.  Third,  it 
is  perhaps  worth  while  to  take  into  account  the  nature 
of  the  material  worked  in.  A  written  language  gives 
only  hints  of  the  musical  elements  of  speech.  The 
study  of  forms  of  sentence  which  depend  mainly  upon 
these  for  the  expression  of  relation  can  best  be  carried 
on  in  the  spoken  languages.  It  is  an  economic  waste 
to  attempt  to  study  this  subject  in  material  drawn  from 
Latin  or  Greek. 

Having  these  considerations  in  mind,  the  term  para- 
taxis may  be  applied  in  Latin  syntax  to  all  forms  of 
sentence-structure  in  which  the  relation  between  two 
finite  verbs  is  suggested  by  order,  by  the  inflectional 
form  or  by  single  words  other  than  coordinating  or  sub- 
ordinating pronouns  and  conjunctions.  It  covers  all 
that  lies  between  coordination  and  the  suggestion  of 
relation  by  musical  means,  as  the  upper  limit,  and  the 
expression  of  relation  by  subordinating  words  as  the 
lower  limit.  Some  such  definition  or  agreement  in 
regard  to  usage  is  at  present  possible;  definitions 
which  deal  with  the  nature  of  parataxis  are  at  present 
impossible. 

147 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

But  there  is  nothing  final  in  such  a  limitation  of 
usage  as  that  suggested  above.  At  the  present  state 
of  knowledge  all  discussion  of  parataxis  is  necessarily 
tentative,  and  it  must  remain  so  until  a  larger  amount 
of  orderly  knowledge  of  the  facts  is  accumulated.  In 
some  fields  of  syntax  the  facts  are  known  and  whatever 
uncertainty  remains  is  in  regard  to  the  interpretation  of 
the  facts.  But  in  regard  to  parataxis  the  reverse  is 
true;  theorizing  has  outrun  knowledge.  There  is  not 
in  existence  a  single  complete  and  properly  arranged 
collection  of  the  facts  bearing  upon  parataxis  from  any 
Latin  author,  though  there  are  some  collections  which 
have  considerable  value.  It  is  much  to  be  desired  that 
complete  collections  should  be  made  from  Plautus, 
Terence,  Cicero's  letters  and  speeches,  Pliny's  letters 
and  perhaps  from  Petronius  and  Apuleius.  In  making 
such  collections  it  will  be  a  mistake  to  start  with  a  nar- 
row definition  of  parataxis ;  that  method  would  supply 
material  for  the  defence  of  a  position  assumed  before- 
hand, but  it  would  not  greatly  advance  knowledge. 
Some  limitation  of  the  field  would  undoubtedly  be 
necessary  in  advance,  but  it  should  be  as  broad  as 
possible,  covering  all  the  phenomena  of  sentence-con- 
nection except  that  by  coordinating  or  subordinating 
conjunctions  and  pronouns.  In  the  arrangement  of 
material  the  program  of  E.  Becker  (see  note,  p.  133) 
might  well  serve  as  a  model  as  far  as  it  goes.  The 
object  to  be  kept  in  view  should  be  the  determination 
and  identification,  as  far  as  possible  by  description  of 
form,  of  the  most  minutely  differentiated  species  and 
varieties  of  sentence-connection.  In  this  part  of  the 
work  much  suggestion  can  be  had  from  Hentze's 
programs. 

148 


PARATAXIS 


When  a  basis  of  solid  knowledge,  minute  and  accu- 
rate, has  been  laid,  it  will  be  possible  to  approach  the 
subject  of  parataxis  with  more  confidence;  until  that 
time  all  discussion  of  it  is  necessarily  somewhat  in 
the  air. 


149 


VII 

SUBORDINATING  CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

The  problem  of  the  subordinating  conjunctions  in 
Latin  is,  in  brief,  to  account  for  the  peculiarities  of 
their  meaning  and  use  by  following  their  history  through 
the  process  of  adaptation  by  which  they  acquired  sub- 
ordinating force.  The  complexity  of  the  problem  is 
great,  but  two  points  are  clear:  something  can  be 
learned  by  following  conjunctions  back  to  their  origin 
and  more,  probably  much  more,  by  considering  the 
particular  kind  of  paratactic  association  through  which 
each  acquired  subordinating  force.  In  other  words, 
the  facts  must  be  interpreted  both  historically  and 
psychologically. 

As  to  the  origin  of  conjunctions,  the  fact  must  be 
faced  that  insufficiency  of  data  will  always  greatly 
limit  the  amount  of  knowledge  to  be  had  from  this 
source.  Of  the  more  important  subordinating  words 
nearly  all  are  in  free  use  in  Plautus  with  the  conjunc- 
tional force  fully  established.  The  clause  which  fol- 
lows is  in  many  cases  not  yet  fixed  or  certain  forms  of 
it  have  not  come  into  definite  and  regular  use.  This  is 
especially  true  of  the  mode,  which  in  Plautus  may  not 
be  the  same  as  the  mode  in  classical  Latin.  Thus  the 
quom  clause,  some  of  the  qui  clauses,  some  forms  of 
protasis  with  si,  and  a  few  minor  clauses  have  not  in 
Plautus  the  definite  and  stereotyped  form  which  they 

150 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

take  on  in  later  Latin.  But  this  is  not  a  difference 
which  greatly  affects  the  meaning  of  the  conjunction. 
That  meaning  was  fixed  and  the  process  which  deter- 
mined it  was  mainly  concluded  in  a  period  for  which 
we  have  no  data.  The  historical  study  of  the  acquisi- 
tion of  subordinating  force  in  Latin  is  therefore  a  diffi- 
cult one,  because  it  must  rest  upon  inferences  of  varying 
degrees  of  probability  based  upon  the  form  of  the  con- 
junction or  upon  isolated  survivals  of  archaic  sentence- 
structure  in  Plautus  and  the  later  Latin. 

Inferences  from  the  form  take  one  of  two  directions ; 
they  have  to  do  with  the  stem  or  with  the  inflectional 
termination.  Of  these  two  lines  of  inquiry  that  which 
relates  to  the  stem  gives  the  more  trustworthy  results. 
It  is  clear  enough  that  the  large  majority  of  Latin  con- 
junctions come  in  one  way  or  another  from  quis.  The 
only  conjunctions  about  which  there  can  be  reasonable 
doubt  are  those  which  have  lost  the  initial  k  sound, 
ubi,  unde  and  ut.  The  relationship  of  ubi  and  unde  is 
indeed  scarcely  doubtful,  in  view  of  ne-cubi,  si-cubi, 
ali-cubi  (Ter.  Adelph.,  453),  ali-cunde,  and  the  inter- 
rogative and  relative  uses  of  both  words  harmonize 
fully  with  the  hypothesis  of  a  derivation  from  quis. 
The  evidence  as  to  ut  is  less  clear  (see  below).  Of 
the  conjunctions  which  come  from  other  sources  ne 
and  ni  are  sure  enough,  modo  and  licet  are  clear,  simul 
(etc)  is  defined  by  its  continued  use  as  an  adverb,  and 
only  si,  dum,  and  donee  can  be  considered  to  be  of 
doubtful  origin.  Even  these  are  in  part  defined  by  the 
relationship  of  si  to  sic  and  by  the  enclitic  use  of  dum 
with  imperatives  and  with  nix  and  non ;  donee  is  the 
only  conjunction  which  defies  scrutiny.  So  far,  there- 
fore, as  the  meaning  of  Latin  conjunctions  depends 
upon  the  stem,  the  ground  is  reasonably  solid. 

151 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

But  with  regard  to  the  case-form  or  other  inflectional 
terminations  of  conjunctions  the  ground  is  less  firm. 
Quod  is  quite  certainly  an  accusative  of  compass  and 
extent,  though  there  have  been  attempts  to  connect  it 
with  the  ablative ;  ubi  is  a  locative,  qui  (quiri)  is  an  in- 
strumental or  at  least  an  ablative  of  manner,  as  is 
modo  ;  dum  and  quom  appear  to  be  accusatives,  though 
quom  is  sometimes  called  an  instrumental  and  by  some 
scholars  is  identified  with  the  preposition  cum;  quam 
has  the  form  of  an  accusative  feminine.  Some  other 
conjunctions  may  in  like  manner  and  with  varying 
degrees  of  probability  be  connected  with  case-forms. 
But  there  is  scarcely  one  of  these  connections  which 
is  not  open  to  question  and  indeed  most  of  them  have 
been  questioned.  Few  of  them  can  be  regarded  as  a 
part  of  the  accepted  doctrine  of  morphologists.  This, 
however,  is  less  important  than  is  the  fact  that  few  of 
these  connections,  even  if  they  were  fully  established, 
would  be  of  value  in  determining  the  meaning  of  con- 
junctions. They  are  made  almost  entirely  on  morpho- 
logical grounds  and  in  many  cases  they  add  to  rather 
than  remove  the  semasiological  difficulties.  Thus  if  si 
is  a  locative,  that  fact  does  not  in  any  way  throw  light 
upon  its  use  as  an  adverb  meaning  so,  thus,  or  upon  its 
conjunctional  force.  The  locative  force  of  uti,  if  this 
explanation  be  accepted,  makes  it  necessary  to  regard 
the  few  scattered  instances  of  ut  in  the  sense  of  ivhere 
as  survivals  of  an  early  meaning  and  to  derive  all  the 
how,  that  and  as  meanings  from  the  locative,  and  this 
necessity  really  increases  the  complexity  of  the  problem. 
The  hypothesis  that  quia  is  an  accusative  plural,  which 
rests  upon  a  slight  resemblance,  upon  the  analogy  of 
quod  and  upon  a  single  case  of  quiapropter  and  is 
opposed  to  the  important  fact  that  there  are  no  plural 

152 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

adverbs  or  conjunctions  in  Latin  except  those  com- 
pounded with  prepositions  (postea,  propterea,  etc.),  is 
useless  for  syntactical  purposes,  since  no  trace  of  plural 
meaning  has  ever  been  found  in  quia.  The  form  of 
quom  and  dum,  if  it  be  an  accusative  of  duration  of 
time  and  connected  with  turn,  nun-c,  would  indeed  con- 
tribute to  the  history  of  its  meaning  by  placing  the 
temporal  use  above  the  explicative  or  causal,  but  the 
accusative  of  duration  of  time  is  found  only  with  a 
limited  range  of  nouns  of  time,  and  there  is  no  sufficient 
warrant  for  thinking  that  this  idea  was  ever  so  associated 
with  the  accusative  ending  that  it  could  be  carried  over 
to  a  pronoun.  In  fact,  it  must  be  regarded  in  all  these 
instances  as  doubtful  whether  the  case-form  is  more 
than  a  formal  survival  from  a  period  when  inflectional 
endings  had  less  definite  meaning  or  perhaps  other 
meanings  than  those  which  are  associated  with  them 
in  historic  times.  This  is  almost  certainly  true  of  the 
feminine  accusative  quam.  It  must  date  back  to  a  time 
when  the  terminations  which  later  assumed  the  func- 
tion of  expressing  gender  were  still  inexpressive  or 
carried  other  meanings.  There  is  no  other  way  of 
accounting  for  such  apparently  feminine  forms  as  quam, 
qua,  tarn,  except  by  the  unsatisfactory  expedient  of  sup- 
posing the  ellipsis  of  some  feminine  noun.  It  is  better 
to  regard  both  gender-forms  and  case-forms  as  survivals 
without  definite  gender  or  case  meanings  and  all  the 
more  because  they  are  appended  to  the  stems  of  pro- 
nouns, which  are  empty  of  meaning. 

It  is  worth  while  to  recognize  frankly  the  limitations 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  early  history  of  conjunctions. 
In  order  to  understand  a  shift  of  meaning  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  starting-point  of  the  shift  should  be 
known,  known  as  meanings  of  words  are  known,  by 

153 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

contemporary  literary  evidence.     A  merely  possible  or 
plausible  inference  will  not  suffice. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  history  of  the  process  by 
which  many  conjunctions  acquired  the  subordinating 
force  cannot  now,  perhaps  cannot  ever,  be  raised  above 
the  level  of  hypothesis.  But  this  is  not  true  of  all 
conjunctions.  There  still  remain  some  which,  by  reason 
of  their  comparative  lateness  of  appearance  or  from  the 
survival  of  their  adverbial  uses,  afford  material  for  the 
study  of  the  acquisition  of  subordinating  force.  They 
are  especially  those  which  are  not  connected  with  quis, 
but  come  from  other  sources.  Thus  modo  is  known 
from  three  sides,  from  its  connection  with  modus,  from 
its  well-defined  case-meaning  and  by  its  survival  as  an 
adverb.  In  the  same  way  licet  is  good  material,  and 
neither  licet  nor  modo  is  less  valuable  because  it  does 
not  fully  acquire  the  force  of  a  conjunction,  since  there 
is  abundant  material  for  the  later  stages  of  the  process. 
The  fact  that  ne  and  ni  are  no  longer  in  use  as  general 
negatives  does  not  greatly  affect  their  value  as  mate- 
rial ;  the  evidence  for  their  early  use  is  broad  enough. 
Simul  and  to  some  extent  dum  survive  as  adverbs  or  in 
composition,  but  the  fact  that  the  etymology  of  dum 
is  not  certain  and  that  the  meaning  of  its  case-form  is 
doubtful  accounts  for  the  uncertainty  in  regard  to  its 
earliest  conjunctional  use.  Of  the  conjunctions  de- 
rived from  quis  several  do  not  go  through  the  process 
of  acquiring  the  subordinating  function.  Thus  quod 
inherits  this  force  from  the  relative  qui  and  therefore, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  in  the  process  of  changing 
from  pronoun  to  conjunction  in  Plautus,  is  not  avail- 
able for  the  questions  now  under  consideration.  Quam- 
uis  also  carries  over  at  least  a  predisposition  toward 
conjunctional  force  from  quam.     The  best  illustration, 

154 


SUBORDINATING    CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

and  oue  in  almost  all  ways  satisfactory,  is  found  in 
quin.  Its  etymology  is  plain,  its  case-form  is  known, 
it  is  in  frequent  use  as  an  interrogative  adverb  both  in 
the  form  qui  and  in  the  form  quia  and,  while  its  con- 
junctional use  begins  before  Plautus,  it  is  still  so 
recent  that  many  instances  of  the  earliest  kinds  of 
sentence-form  (iiulla  causa  est  quin,  etc.)  are  to  be 
found.  In  consequence  of  the  abundance  and  variety 
of  the  material,  the  history  of  quin  is  more  com- 
pletely and  more  surely  known  than  that  of  any  other 
conjunction. 

Within  this  somewhat  limited  range  two  different  but 
related  problems  are  to  be  worked  out.  They  are  to 
determine  what  elements  in  the  meaning  of  the  adverb 
or  particle  or  case-form  survived  the  shift  of  meaning 
and  what  elements  contributed  to  that  shift,  or,  in  other 
words,  to  distinguish  between  the  stable  and  the  un- 
stable elements  in  the  meaning  of  the  adverb  or  case- 
form.  In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  where  a  distinct 
temporal  or  locative  or  modal  meaning  was  expressed 
by  the  adverb,  that  shade  of  meaning  is  found  also  in 
the  conjunction.  The  temporal  meaning  of  dum  in 
nondum,  uixdum,  goes  over  into  the  conjunction;  the 
locative  meaning  (locative  in  space  or  time)  which  ubi 
has  as  an  interrogative  adverb  it  preserves  as  a  relative 
adverb,  and  the  modal  or  causal  force  of  the  interroga- 
tive qui  and  quin  is  still  to  be  traced  in  the  conjunction 
quin.  So  quo  ?  "  whither? "  retains  its  meaning  in  quoad 
and  the  analogy  of  turn  suggests  that  the  temporal  force 
of  cum  is  a  survival,  whether  it  comes  from  the  case- 
form  or  from  some  other  source.  Temporal  and  local 
associations  might  naturally  be  expected  to  be  per- 
sistent. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  stem-meaning 
which  remains  stable  in  modo  (from  the  adverb  modo 

155 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

and  only  indirectly  from  the  noun),  in  licet,  in  simul 
and  in  ne,  ni. 

The  determination  of  the  unstable  elements  is  more 
important.  In  every  word  which  underwent  the  shift 
from  adverb  to  conjunction  there  must  have  been  some 
element  of  meaning  which  predisposed  the  word  to  such 
a  shift,  something  which  rendered  it  more  available 
than  other  adverbs  for  use  in  associations  which  gave 
it  the  connecting  force.  In  the  case  of  some  adverbs 
it  is  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word,  involving  its  total 
meaning,  which  fits  it  for  conjunctional  use.  Thus 
modo  as  an  adverb  is  used  especially,  though  not  solely, 
to  limit  groups  of  words,  the  limitation  of  single  words 
being  expressed  in  part  by  solus,  unus  and  other  pro- 
nominal adjectives.  Modo  is  thus  peculiarly  the  word 
of  limitation  for  clauses,  and  is  fitted  for  association 
with  whole  clauses  which  contain  in  themselves  some 
element  of  limitation.  Simul  as  an  adverb  implies  the 
setting  together  of  two  events  in  time,  the  temporal 
element  being  perhaps  an  acquired  one,  but  acquired  in 
the  adverbial  stage.  But  time  is  especially  associated 
with  action  and  words  of  time  especially  associated  with 
verbs.  These  two  elements,  of  time  and  of  occurrence 
together,  make  simul  a  suitable  word  for  expressing  as 
a  conjunction  the  simultaneousness  of  two  actions.  In 
other  cases,  it  is  some  special  weakening  or  shifting  of 
the  usual  force  of  a  word  which  fits  it  for  the  conjunc- 
tional function.  The  verbal  force  of  licet  is  weakened 
by  its  use  in  answers,  as  a  bare  term  of  assent,  e.  #., 
Plaut.  Rud.,  1212  ff.,  just  as  fiat  becomes  in  like  cir- 
cumstances a  mere  term  of  assent.  A  word  which  is 
thus  used  inevitably  loses  much  of  its  meaning,  and 
it  is  this  weakening  that  prepares  licet  for  association 
with  sentences  of  assent.     The  history  of  quin  includes 

156 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

partial  loss  of  one  function  with  acquisition  of  a  differ- 
ent shading.  It  is  not  found  as  a  simple  interrogative, 
inquiring  as  cur  non  does  for  the  reason  for  an  action, 
doubtless  because  of  its  inflectional  form,  which  is  less 
definite  than  quor  (quare?).  An  inquiry  in  regard  to 
motive  or  reason  frequently  carries  with  it  the  implica- 
tion that  no  sufficient  motive  or  cause  exists.  Thus 
quin  is  associated  with  exclamatory  questions,  quin 
dicis?  quin  abis?  which,  because  of  the  implication 
that  no  cause  exists  to  prevent  the  action,  have  an 
imperative  force.  And  the  interrogative  force  is  still 
further  weakened  by  the  extension  to  quin  die,  quin 
abi.  It  is  the  combination  of  weakened  interrogative 
or  exclamatory  power  with  urgent  denial  of  cause  for 
not  acting  that  fits  quin  for  association  with  nulla  causa 
est  and  similar  phrases.  The  association  of  dum  with 
imperatives,  like  the  similar  use  of  modo,  must  have 
weakened  its  adverbial  force  and  this  weakness  is  also 
attested  by  the  disappearance  of  the  word  as  an  inde- 
pendent adverb,  though  this  was  no  doubt  caused  in 
part  by  the  conjunctional  use.  But  the  same  elements 
of  meaning  which  fitted  it  for  conjunctional  use  also 
unfitted  it  for  use  as  an  adverb,  just  as  the  survival  of 
simul  and  modo  as  adverbs  hindered  their  free  use  as 
conjunctions.  In  a  general  way  it  is  probable  that  the 
prevailingly  exclamatory  use  of  ut  is  a  step  toward  the 
conjunctional  function ;  the  simple  interrogation  is  bet- 
ter expressed  by  quomodo  and  similar  compounds.  This 
would  be  independent  of  the  question  whether  ut  is 
derived  from  quis  or  from  some  other  source.  With 
regard  to  most  of  the  conjunctions  derived  from  quis 
and  to  the  relative  qui,  it  is  possible  that  they  passed 
through  an  exclamatory  stage,  but  it  is  also  possible 
that  they  acquired  conjunctional  force  through  corre- 

157 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

lation,  and  perhaps  still  more  probable  that  different 
paths  were  followed  by  different  words  or  even  by  the 
same  word. 

The  next  stage  in  the  history  of  a  conjunction  is  the 
somewhat  complex  process  of  acquiring  the  subordi- 
nating function  by  association  with  a  sentence  which 
stands  in  close  relation  to  another  sentence. 

One  of  the  simplest  cases,  requiring  but  a  slight 
shift  of  meaning,  is  that  of  the  indirect  question.  The 
steps  by  which  a  direct  question  becomes  indirect  by 
the  prefixing  of  die,  die  milii,  eloquere,  rogo,  uolo  scire, 
scire  expeto,  fac  seiam,  uiso,  expecto,  and  other  more 
elaborate  expressions,  have  been  admirably  set  forth  by 
Becker.1  There  is  no  such  intermediate  step  as  is 
sometimes  assumed,  like  die :  quid  est  ?  or  scire  uolo : 
quoi  reddidisti  f  in  which  the  two  sentences  are  entirely 
separate,  with  a  strong  pause  between  them.  The  lead- 
ing verb,  grammatically,  is  an  after-thought  by  which 
the  speaker  expresses  the  urgency  of  his  question  or  the 
attitude  in  which  he  stands  toward  the  question.  This 
is  defining  parataxis.  It  should  be  noted  here  that  the 
question  is  subordinated  only  in  a  grammatical  sense. 
The  thought  of  the  question  is  not  less  important  than 
that  of  the  prefixed  verb;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  more 
important;  it  is  the  germ  of  the  whole  sentence,  and 
this  form  of  sentence  (die  quid  est)  is  an  interesting 
illustration  of  a  complete  reversal,  in  the  grammatical 
structure,  of  the  relative  importance  of  two  concepts. 
It  should  be  noted  also  that  the  change  of  function  of 
the  interrogative  word  is  extremely  slight,  less  than 
it  appears  to  be  in  translation,  because  the  English 
changes  the  order  of  words  in  the  indirect  question. 

1  Studemund's  Studien,  I,  1,  113  S. 
158 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS   IN  LATIN 

What  is  it?  becomes  Tell  me  what  it  is,  and  the  change 
affects  our  feeling  in  regard  to  the  interrogative. 

The  subordination  of  quin  comes  about  in  a  like 
manner,  though  the  material  for  illustrating  it  is  less 
abundant.  By  the  side  of  its  exclamatory  and  impera- 
tive use  with  the  indicative  it  might  be  expected  to  have 
a  repudiating  use  with  the  subjunctive,  and  a  few  such 
cases  occur,  the  only  sure  one  in  Plautus  being  Mil. 
Glor.,  426,  men  rogas,  homo  qui  sim?  ||  quin  ego  hoc 
rogem  ?  A  few  other  cases  occur  in  later  Latin.  The 
rarity  of  the  construction  is  due  in  part  to  the  general 
causes  which  make  quin  rare  with  the  first  person  (in 
which  these  repudiating  questions  would  usually  be 
found),  in  part,  and  still  more,  to  the  use  of  the  more 
explicit  quid  ni  for  these  repudiating  exclamations. 
The  infrequency  of  the  construction,  however,  must 
be  acknowledged ;  it  is  the  sole  gap  in  the  history  of 
quin.  In  association  with  such  questions,  of  which  it 
forms  an  integral  part,  quin  has  the  meaning  tchy  not 
with  the  implication  that  there  is  no  reason  against  the 
action.  This  implication  is  more  fully  expressed  by 
nulla  causa  est,  quid  causaest,  numquae  causa  est  and 
similar  phrases,  as  the  urgent  desire  to  have  an  answer 
to  the  question  quid  est?  is  expressed  by  prefixing  die, 
scire  nolo  and  similar  expressions.  In  such  sentences 
nulla  causa  est  is  not  the  answer  to  the  question  quin 
uerberes,  quin  iubeam ;  these  are  not  questions,  but  re- 
pudiating exclamations  requiring  no  answer,  and  the 
main  clause  almost  always  precedes  the  quin  clause. 
The  words  nulla  causa  est  represent  more  definitely  an 
idea  already  contained  in  the  quin  sentence.  As  is 
always  the  case,  the  prefixed  sentence  is  comparatively 
simple  and  the  modifiers,  object,  time,  cause,  depen- 
dent infinitive,  go  with   the  quin   clause.     The  more 

159 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

elaborate  leading  sentences,  which  are  relatively  rare 
in  Plautus,  are  a  later  development  after  the  subordi- 
nating force  had  become  firmly  attached  to  quin,  but 
they  retain  a  trace  of  their  origin  in  the  fact  that  they 
always  contain  a  negative  idea,  the  negative  which  in 
the  process  of  expansion  is  repeated  from  quin  itself. 

The  history  of  ne  in  its  transition  from  negative 
adverb  to  a  conjunction  of  negative  purpose  is  some- 
what more  complicated  than  that  of  quin,  as  might  be 
expected  from  its  wider  use  and  from  the  fact  that  it  is 
not  confined  to  so  narrow  a  function  or  to  so  restricted 
a  class  of  leading  clauses.  It  undergoes  no  preliminary 
weakening  of  meaning  except  the  restriction  to  sen- 
tences of  will  or  desire;  this  is  doubtless  a  necessary 
first  step,  for  if  it  had  remained  in  use  as  the  general 
Latin  negative,  it  could  not  have  added  to  this  large 
function  the  equally  large  and  distinct  function  of 
expressing  subordination.  But  it  is  true  of  ne,  as  of 
the  interrogative  pronoun  and  of  quin,  that  the  shift 
of  meaning,  at  least  in  its  first  stages,  was  really  much 
less  than  English  translations  would  seem  to  imply. 
As  we  do  not  precisely  translate  it  in  its  use  in  prohibi- 
tions by  not,  which  makes  no  distinction  between  non 
and  ne,  so  lest,  that  not,  in  order  that  not,  express  a 
wider  divergence  from  the  negative  adverb  than  actu- 
ally took  place. 

There  were,  apparently,  two  distinct  processes  of 
association  through  which  ne  acquired  the  subordi- 
nating force.  In  the  first  place,  the  prohibition  was 
expanded  by  a  defining  paratactic  prefix.  This  has 
been  illustrated  above  with  non-negative  sentences  (pp. 
132  ff.).  The  simplest  kind  of  prefix  with  ne  is  in  the 
imperative:  uide  ne  sies  in  expectatione ;  at  uide  ne 
titubes ;  uide  ne,  me  ludas ;  semper  curato  ne  sis  intesta- 

160 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

bills.     In  these  instances  the  imperative  sums  up   the 
prohibition  in  such  a  way  as  to  increase   its   force. 

But  in  many  cases  the  prefixed  phrase  also  adds  some- 
thing to  the  sense,  not  only  defining  and  emphasizing 
the  prohibition,  but  also  amplifying  the  idea  by  intro- 
ducing other  elements  which  harmonize  with  it.  Thus 
monendxCs  ne  me  moneas ;  cane  ne  cadas ;  tu  cauebis  nc 
me  attingas  ;  circumspicedum  te,  ne  quis  adsii  arbiter; 
da  .  .  .  operam,  ne  quo  te  .  .  .  occupes.  But  it  will 
at  once  be  seen  that  the  introduction  of  other  elements 
of  meaning  destroys  the  simplicity  of  the  relation  be- 
tween the  prefix  and  the  prohibition,  so  that  ne  is  no 
longer  felt  as  the  negative  of  a  prohibition,  but  as  a 
conjunction,  carrying  in  part  the  relation  between  the 
leading  verb  and  the  clause.  It  will  be  seen  also  from 
these  few  examples,  which  might  be  much  increased  in 
number,  that  the  addition  of  other  elements  to  the  lead- 
ing clause  affects  to  some  degree  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tion; it  begins  to  lose  the  colorless  character  of,  e.  g., 
uide  ne  titubes  and  to  acquire  shadings  of  purpose. 
Some  of  the  examples  given  above,  circumspice  ne  quis 
adsit,  da  operam  ne  occupes,  might  even,  in  the  con- 
fusing and  inaccurate  functional  division  of  clauses, 
be  called  purpose  clauses.  In  fact,  they  are  clauses 
depending  upon  verbs  which  in  part  repeat  and  define 
the  meaning  of  the  prohibition,  and  in  so  far  they  are 
object  clauses ;  but  the  verbs  upon  which  they  depend 
have  other  elements  of  meaning  beside  that  element 
which  repeats  and  defines  the  prohibition,  and,  in  so  far 
as  this  is  the  case,  suggestions  of  purpose  are  conveyed, 
and  those  who  insist  upon  having  names  for  clauses  are 
justified  in  calling  these  purpose  clauses,  provided  only 
it  is  remembered  that  the  element  of  purpose  varies 
greatly  according  to  the  meaning  of  the  leading  verb, 
n  161 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

To  pursue  this  line  of  inquiry  further  is  impossible 
here,  but  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show  that  in  a 
very  large  proportion  of  ne  clauses  at  all  periods  the 
meaning  of  the  leading  verb  contains  an  element  which 
defines  and  repeats  the  prohibition.  Wherever  this  is 
the  case,  with  verbs  of  saying,  of  commanding,  of  pre- 
caution and  prevention,  of  wishing  and  desiring  or 
fearing,  the  clause  is  an  outgrowth  of  that  kind  of 
paratactic  definition  which  appears  in  its  simplest  form 
in  uidie  ne,  fac  ne. 

It  is  of  course  impossible  in  this  kind  of  clause  to 
mark  off  a  distinct  paratactic  stage.  In  fac  metuam,  if 
this  phrase  were  in  use,  the  absence  of  a  conjunction 
may  be  held  to  indicate  the  parataxis,  but  in  fac  ego 
ne  metuam  the  adverb -conjunction  is  present  from  the 
beginning  and  while  it  may  be  regarded  as  certain,  on 
a  priori  grounds,  that  ne  would  sometimes  be  felt  and 
used  here  as  a  pure  adverb,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
written  words  to  determine  whether  this  is  the  case  or 
not.  It  is  therefore  a  matter  of  indifference  whether 
the  ne  sentence  be  regarded  as  paratactic  or  as  a  depen- 
dent clause. 

The  second  kind  of  sentence-structure  through  which 
ne  acquired  subordinating  force  leads  directly  to  the 
expression  of  purpose.  The  earliest  indications  of  this 
appear  in  sentences  which  are  grammatically  indepen- 
dent. In  a  few  cases  in  Plautus  the  prohibition  stands 
alone  or  without  a  preceding  context  in  the  same  speech, 
but  in  most  cases  it  is  preceded  either  by  an  imperative 
(or  its  equivalent),  or  by  a  statement.  When  an  im- 
perative or  other  expression  of  will  precedes,  the  two 
sentences  are  in  close  relation,  expressing  two  different 
aspects  of  a  single  concept-group.  That  is,  the  desire 
of  the  speaker  does  not  change  within  a  few  words; 

162 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

it  remains  the  same,  and  the  second  sentence  merely 
repeats  the  expression  of  desire  in  a  different  form. 
Thus  moderare  animo :  ne  sis  cupidus  (M.  G-.,  121.",  >  i> 
a  double  expression  of  the  same  concept-group.  So, 
iy  sequere  illos :  ne  morere,  M.  G.,  1301 ;  uide  ne  ties 
in  expectatione :  ne  ilium  animi  excrucies,  M.  G.,  1280; 
da  .  .  .  mi  .  .  .  ueniam :  ignosce :  iratii  nesies,  Amph., 
924;  emitte  sodes :  ne  enices  fame :  sine  ire  pastum.  Pen., 
318.  In  some  of  these  cases,  where  the  change  of  ex- 
pression is  greatest,  a  trace  of  purpose  appears  to  under- 
lie the  words;  thus  M.  G.,  1361,  might  easily  be  taken 
to  be  "follow,  them  in  order  not  to  delay  them"  or 
M.  G.,  1280,  might  be  "don't  keep  her  waiting  lest  you 
torment  her."  In  spite  of  the  grammatical  indepen- 
dence, the  relation  between  the  sentences  is  felt,  though 
not  distinctly  enough  for  certain  identification. 

This  is  equally  true  where  the  preceding  sentence  is 
a  statement.  The  statement  gives  the  ground  for  the 
prohibition  or  the  prohibition  expresses  the  object,  i. 
the  purpose,  of  the  statement.  Thus  noui:  ne  doceas, 
AuL,  241 ;  non  morabitur :  proin  tu  ne  quo  abeas  longius^ 
Men.,  327  (the  relation  is  in  part  expressed  by  proin)  ; 
istie  homo  rabiosus  habitus  est  in  Alide :  ne  tu  quod  istic 
fabuletur  auris  inmittas  tuas,  Cap.,  548.  In  some  in- 
stances the  ne  sentence  expresses  the  purpose  of  the 
speaker  in  making  the  previous  statement,  not  the 
purpose  of  the  act  stated:  dormio :  ne  occlamites,  Cure, 
183,  which  is  either  "  I  'm  asleep :  don't  make  such  a 
row  "  or  "  I  tell  you  that  I  am  asleep  in  order  to  induce 
you  to  stop  your  shouting."  So  uapulare  ego  te  uehe- 
menter  iubeo :  ne  me  territes,  Cure.,  568,  which  differs 
from  uapula :  ne  me  territes  only  in  having  the  verb  of 
saying  expressed.  In  Cure.,  565,  nil  (agit)  apud  me 
quidem  —  ne  facias  testis  —  neque    equidem   debeo   quia- 

163 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

quam,  the  ne  clause  is  a  parenthetic  insertion  and  shows 
more  clearly  its  connection  with  clauses  like  ne  erres,  ne 
frustra  sis,  ne  te  mover,  which  are  sometimes  called  par- 
enthetic clauses  of  purpose.  Instances  of  this  kind  are 
frequent  in  conversational  Latin.  It  is  probably  in  part 
upon  their  occurrence  that  the  statements  quoted  above 
(p.  116),  that  in  parataxis  two  independent  sentences 
come  to  be  thought  of  as  one,  are  founded,  but  the  facts 
do  not  bear  out  that  interpretation.  The  relation  be- 
tween the  two  sentences  is  not  expressed  in  any  word, 
and  therefore  the  two  sentences  may  be  regarded  as  in- 
dependent in  the  grammatical  sense,  but  the  relation  be- 
tween the  two  concept-groups  is  just  as  real  and  was 
probably  as  strongly  felt  as  if  it  had  been  expressed  in 
some  single  word.  It  is  suggested  by  the  juxtaposition 
of  the  sentences  and  was  doubtless  felt  in  the  tone  and 
the  length  of  the  pause,  though  these  can  now  only  par- 
tially be  recovered.  In  Amph.,  924,  the  editors  separate 
da  . .  mi . .  ueniam,  ignosce,  irata  ne  sies  by  commas,  but  in 
Pers.,  318,  emitte  sodes  :  ne  enices  fame  :  sine  ire  pastum, 
they  use  colons ;  the  length  of  the  pause  and  the  inflec- 
tion of  the  voice,  however,  cannot  be  very  different  in 
the  two  cases.  These  cases  therefore  illustrate  the  kind 
of  sentence-relation  in  which  there  is  no  expression  of 
the  relation  except  by  the  musical  elements  of  speech 
and  by  the  mere  contiguity,  while  the  fact  of  the  rela- 
tion itself  is  nevertheless  perfectly  certain.  No  one 
could  use  noui :  ne  doceas  without  relation  between  the 
two  thoughts  nor  could  a  hearer  easily  fail  to  grasp  the 
relation  in  a  general  way.  The  nature  of  the  relation, 
however,  is  undefined,  or  at  least  is  not  defined  in  terms 
which  discriminate  between  coordination  or  parataxis 
and  subordination.  It  is  sufficiently  represented  either 
by  "  I  know  and  don't  want  you  to  teach  me  "  or  by  "  I 

164 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS   IN  LATIN 

know,  and  I  say  this  lest  you  should  try  to  teach  me  " 
or  by  "I  know;  therefore  (proin^)  don'1  teach  me." 
The  attempt  to  dehne  this  relation  psychological lv  by 
deciding  upon  one  or  another  of  these  ways  of  express- 
ing it  would  result  merely  in  a  forced  and  arbitrary 
selection  which  would  not  carry  conviction  to  another 
interpreter  and  which  would  involve  the  neglect  of  other 
equally  real  though  perhaps  less  evident  elements.  The 
relation  is  real,  is  felt  by  speaker  and  hearer,  but  it  is 
not  defined.  It  is  not  the  result  of  some  process  of 
gradual  melting  into  one,  some  coming  to  be  thought  as 
one ;  that  is,  expressed  in  a  rather  inaccurate  way,  a  de- 
scription of  the  process  by  which  the  sentences  are 
brought  together,  but  not  in  any  way  a  description  of 
the  psychological  situation. 

It  is  not  possible  with  this  kind  of  parataxis,  any  more 
than  it  is  possible  with  defining  parataxis,  to  draw  a  line 
between  the  paratactic  structure  and  the  full  subordina- 
tion, and  for  the  same  reason,  because  it  is  impossible 
without  the  help  of  the  spoken  language  to  tell  just 
when  ne  begins  to  be  associated  with  the  concept  of  re- 
lation. But  illustrations  may  easily  be  found  among 
clearly  subordinate  ne  clauses,  which  are  plainly  like  the 
independent  sentences  given  above.  Thus  AuL,  340, 
si  quid  uti  uoles,  domo  abs  te  adferto,  ne  operant  perdas 
poscere,  expresses  in  the  imperative  one  view  of  the 
command,  in  the  ne  clause  another ;  compare  i,  sequere 
illos,  ne  morere,  with  intro  abite  atque  haec  cito  celerate, 
ne  mora  quae  sit,  cocus  quom  ueniat  (Pseud.,  168).  With 
Cure,  568,  compare  Poen.,  1155,  audin  tu,  patrue  ?  dico, 
ne  dictum  neges.  Similar  cases  are  Pud.,  443,  dabitur 
tibi  aqua,  ne  nequiquam  me  ames  ;  Aid.,  54,  ocidos  .  .  ., 
ecfodiam  tibi,  ne  me  obseruare  possis  ;  Pud.,  1013,  at  ego 
hinc  offlectam  nauem,  ne  quo  abeas  ;  Cas.,  394,  nunc  tu,  .  .  ., 

165 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

ne  a  me  memores  malitiose  de  hac  re  factum  aut  suspices, 
tibi  permilto  :  tute  sorti,  "  don't  say  or  think  that  I  've 
cheated,  for  I  leave  the  drawing  of  lots  to  you."  These 
are  all,  of  course,  ne  clauses  and  are  to  be  so  taken, 
but  a  slight  change  in  the  phrase  or  in  the  thought 
would  put  them  back  into  ne  sentences,  independent  of 
the  leading  clause  so  far  as  structure  is  concerned. 

The  acquisition  of  the  subordinating  function  by  ni, 
through  association  with  a  conditional  clause,  has  been 
followed  in  the  early  Latin  by  Oskar  Brugmann.1  Its 
history  is  quite  different  from  that  of  ne ;  it  does  not 
pass  through  the  stage  of  defining  parataxis,  evolving 
its  own  leading  clause  out  of  itself,  nor  has  it  precisely 
the  same  kind  of  relation  to  its  context  that  a  prohibi- 
tion bears  to  a  preceding  imperative  or  indicative  sen- 
tence. Between  a  ne  clause  and  a  preceding  or  following 
statement  there  is  no  resemblance  in  the  form  of  the 
sentences ;  the  relation  expresses  itself  in  other  ways. 
But  the  relation  of  the  ni  sentence  to  its  context,  before 
the  conditional  function  is  attached  to  ni,  is  one  of 
correlation.  The  essential  point  in  it  is  that  the 
resemblance  in  structure  is  the  result  of  the  speaker's 
retaining  the  first  member  vividly  in  memory  while  he 
is  uttering  the  second  member  and  by  this  means  induc- 
ing the  hearer  to  recall  the  first  member  as  he  hears  the 
second.  The  two  concept-groups  are  thus  set  in  con- 
trast with  each  other.  This  does  not  imply  that  the 
relation  between  them  is  necessarily  that  of  protasis  and 
apodosis ;  it  is  an  undefined  relation  which  may  be  one 
of  mere  comparison  as  to  quality  (talis  —  qualis)  or  as 
to  quantity  (tantus  —  quantus)  or  degree  {tarn  —  quam). 
In  the  case  of  ni  it  was  in  part  at  least  helped  toward 
precision  by  the  subjunctive  mode,  which  of  itself  sug- 

1  Ueber  den  Gebrauch  des  Condicionalen  Ni  .  .  .,  Leipzig,  1887. 

166 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

gests  supposition,  concession,  condition.  The  relation 
between  the  ni  sentence  and  the  corresponding  and  cor- 
related member  was  therefore  existent  without  regard 
to  the  presence  of  ni  and  was  imperfectly  suggested. 
Its  transfer  to  ni  was  due  in  part  to  the  position  of  the 
negative  before  the  verb  and  frequently  at  the  head  of 
the  sentence,  and  in  part  to  the  fact  that,  in  a  condi- 
tion, the  negative,  if  it  belongs  to  the  sentence  as  a 
whole  and  not  to  some  single  word  in  it,  naturally  asso- 
ciates itself  with  the  conditional  particle  because  that 
particle  also  goes  with  the  clause  as  a  whole.  The 
negative  particle  negatives  the  conditional  relation  and 
therefore  the  two  are  associated  together. 

The  association  of  quamuis  as  a  conjunction  with  a 
concessive  sentence  differs  from  that  of  ni  in  two  re- 
spects. The  relation  between  the  sentences  is  not  cor- 
relative and  quamuis  is  not,  as  ni  is,  a  necessary  part 
of  the  sentence  with  which  it  is  associated.  As  to  the 
relation  between  the  two  parts  of  the  sentence,  it  is 
expressed,  when  quamuis  is  not  used,  in  the  mode  only, 
being  in  this  one  respect  like  the  ni  clauses  with  the 
subjunctive.  Not  that  the  subjunctive  is  a  mode  of 
subordination,  but  the  use  of  the  subjunctive  is  in 
many  cases  by  its  necessary  relation  to  the  context  ex- 
pressive of  a  proviso  or  concession.  But  there  is  no 
suggestion  in  the  form  of  sentence  of  any  kind  of  cor- 
relation, and  it  is  unsafe  to  suppose  that  sentences  have 
been  correlated  unless  the  supposition  is  supported  by  a 
general  likeness  in  structure  between  the  two  members. 
The  other  difference  between  ni  and  quamuis  is  that  the 
former  is  necessary  to  the  sentence  in  which  it  occurs ; 
without  it  the  sentence  would  have  an  entirely  different 
meaning.  This  is  true  also  of  quin  and  of  ne.  But 
quamuis  is  an  addition  to  a  sentence  which  is  a  fairly 

167 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

adequate  expression  of  the  thought  without  quamuis. 
The  addition  of  this  word  is  only  a  further  expression 
of  an  idea  already  contained  by  implication  in  the  mode 
or  in  the  mode  with  other  accessory  expressions.  In 
this  respect  quamuis  is  like  licet  and  its  addition  to  the 
sentence  is  the  result  of  expansion.  It  would  be  in- 
exact to  call  it  defining  parataxis,  but  it  is  of  the  same 
general  nature,  definition  by  expansion.  Probably  its 
verbal  nature  is  not  wholly  lost  until  it  begins  to  be 
confused  with  quamquam,  and  the  verbal  force  would 
perhaps  predispose  it  to  a  use  so  closely  akin  to  defini- 
tion by  the  addition  of  a  verb. 

Neither  simul  nor  modo  becomes  wholly  conjunctional 
and  this  fact  perhaps  accounts  for  the  small  amount  of 
attention  that  has  been  given  to  their  use.  Neither 
appears  to  be  in  use  alone  as  a  conjunction  in  Plautus. 
Modo  is  associated  with  dura  and  simul  with  atque  (ac) 
and  each  acquires  its  conjunctional  force  by  the  asso- 
ciation. In  Plautus  dura  is  already  in  free  use  and  ac, 
atque  is  used  not  infrequently  in  correlation  with  other 
words,  aeque,  item,  aliter.  There  is  a  difference,  how- 
ever, in  the  causes  which  lead  to  the  association. 
Modo  is  added  to  the  dum  clause  as  an  adverb  to 
express  more  fully  the  idea  of  limitation  which  is  partly 
implied  in  dum,  though  not  with  sufficient  distinct- 
ness. Then,  just  as  the  negative  force  of  ni  leads  to  its 
close  association  with  the  conditional  relation  and  so 
with  si  in  nisi,  so  the  limiting  meaning  of  modo  belongs 
to  the  whole  clause  of  proviso  and  especially  to  the 
conjunction  which  introduces  the  proviso.  Thus  it 
comes  to  be  compounded  with  dum.  On  the  other 
hand,  simul  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  sentence;  it 
forms  the  necessary  correlative  to  ac,  atque,  which  is 
not  used  without  some  correlative.     The  composition 

168 


SUBORDINATING    CONJUNCTIONS   IX   LATIN 

or  close  connection  of  timid  with  ac  is  therefore  like  the 
composition  of  post-quam,  prius-quam,  not  like  dummodo. 
The  partial  displacement  of  dum  and  dummodo  by  modo 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  dum,  though  it  may  be  used  with 
a  clause  of  proviso,  has  other  and  more  important  uses. 
The  element  of  proviso  is  more  precisely  expressed  by 
modo,  which  thus  becomes  especially  the  bearer  of  this 
kind  of  relational  concept.  In  like  manner  the  particu- 
lar meaning  of  simul  ac,  which  distinguishes  it  from 
other  temporal  conjunctions,  is  the  element  of  simulta- 
neousness;  this  is  not  expressed  with  the  same  degree 
of  clearness  by  cum  or  cum  extemplo  or  postquam  or  ubi, 
and  though  the  relative  force,  the  subordinating  func- 
tion, resides  in  ac  rather  than  in  simul,  the  more  definite 
and  as  it  were  more  noticeable  element  is  that  which 
simul  supplies.  The  relative  force  therefore  passes  over 
to  simul  and  it  alone  expresses  both  elements. 

These  two  words,  then,  illustrate  the  acquisition  of 
the  subordinating  force  by  association  with  other  words 
which  already  had  that  force.  It  is  correct  enough  to 
say  in  general  that  conjunctions  have  acquired  sub- 
ordinating force  by  passing  through  a  paratactic  stage, 
but  it  is  worth  while  to  note  these  exceptions  to  the 
general  rule. 

The  acquisition  of  subordinating  force  by  a  process 
different  from  any  of  those  mentioned  above  is  begun, 
though  it  is  not  carried  to  completion,  in  certain  uses 
of  atque  and  et.  The  latter  is  the  most  colorless  repre- 
sentative of  a  purely  coordinating  conjunction  and  atque, 
in  spite  of  the  various  demonstrative  and  strengthening 
uses,  is  also  in  the  main  a  coordinating  word.  But 
with  either  conjunction  the  relation  between  the  two 
clauses  may  be  so  varied  by  the  content  of  one  clause 
or  the  other  that  it  approaches  a  subordinate  relation. 

169 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

This  appears  in  the  use  of  et  or  atque  after  words  of 
likeness  or  unlikeness,  aeque,  par,  pariter,  idem,  alius, 
of  which  there  are  many  instances  from  Plautus  down : 
pariter    hoc    atque    alias    res    soles;    germanus    pariter 
animo  et  corpore ;  par  ratio  cum  Lucilio  est  ac  mecum 
fuit ;   aeque    amicos  et   nosmet  ipsos   diligamus.      In  all 
such  cases  the  word  of  resemblance  or  difference  gives 
to  the  relation  between  the  words  or  clause  a  shading 
which  in  more  precise  expression  would  call  for  the  use 
of  quam  or  some  other  distinctly  subordinating  conjunc- 
tion.    The  use  of  atque  ut  or  ac  si  is  similar  in  charac- 
ter, as  is  the  use  of  et  to  connect  two  successive  events 
or  points  of  time,  frequently  supported  by  a  negative  or 
by  uix  in  the  first  clause  and  by  a  difference  in  tense 
between  the  two  verbs.     This  well-known  use  is  espe- 
cially frequent  in  Vergil   and  in  the  poets  after  him. 
It  is  essentially  of  the  same  character  as  the  use  by  a 
poet   or  an  imaginative  and  emotional  prose  writer  of 
common  words  in  unusual  connections,  where  they  often 
give  a  peculiarly  vivid  effect.     The  movement  of  the 
emotional  stream  of  thought  is  so  strong  that  it  is  fol- 
lowed by  the  reader  in  masses,  with  long  strides,  with- 
out the  need  of  precise  expression ;  the  writer  may  thus 
vary  his  choice  of  words  more  freely  and  may  for  the 
moment  give  to  words  a  meaning  peculiar  and  almost 
foreign  to  their   usual   sense.       It   is   thus   that  a  co- 
ordinating conjunction  may  be  used  to  express  a  tem- 
poral  relation  which  in  precise   speech  would  require 
cum   or   some   other    conjunction   of    time.       For  the 
moment  et  becomes  a  subordinating  temporal  conjunc- 
tion or  et  or  atque  a  subordinating  conjunction  of  com- 
parison.      The    overwhelming    preponderance    of    the 
coordinating  use  is  sufficient  to  prevent  this  acquisition 
of  the   subordinating  function   from  becoming  perma- 

170 


SUBORDINATING    CONJUNCTIONS   IN  LATIN 

nent;  indeed,  in  many  cases  the  order  indicates  that  the 
writer  had  the  ordinary  meaning  of  et  or  utque  in  mind 
while  he  was  nevertheless  using  it  as  a  subordinating 
word.  But  for  the  instant  and  to  a  certain  degree  the 
association  of  these  words  with  a  subordinate  relation  is 
real,  and  it  deserves  notice  because  in  this  case  also,  as 
in  the  case  of  modo  and  sunul,  there  is  no  paratactic 
stage.  The  passage  from  coordination  to  subordina- 
tion is  immediate,  without  intervening  steps. 

There  are  no  other  Latin  conjunctions  whose  early 
history  can  be  followed  with  any  considerable  degree  of 
certainty  through  the  process  of  acquiring  the  subordi- 
nating function.  Probably  dum  would  come  nearest  to 
those  mentioned  above,1  but  there  are  only  two  instances, 
neither  of  them  beyond  question,  of  the  correlation  of 
dum  —  dum  and  it  seems  possible  that  some  forms  of  the 
dum-cl&use  are  the  result  of  defining  parataxis.  In  the 
case  of  si  there  is  abundant  later  evidence,  but  this  par- 
ticle became  the  regular  conditional  conjunction  long 
before  the  time  of  Plautus.  The  quis-con junctions  and 
the  relative  pronoun  are  all  so  early  that  it  is  not  likely 
that  their  passage  from  the  interrogative  to  the  relative 
use  can  ever  be  clearly  known.  So  far  as  the  attempt 
is  made,  however,  to  reconstruct  this  early  history  by 
inference,  it  must  be  done  upon  the  basis  of  what  is 
known  directly.  No  other  kind  of  parataxis  and  no 
other  process  of  passing  from  adverb  to  conjunction 
should  be  employed  in  such  a  reconstruction  than  those 
kinds  which  can  be  actually  followed  with  sufficient 
evidence.      Briefly  summarized  they  are  as  follows :  — 

1.    Two  sentences  independent  of  each  other  in  ex- 
pression may  be  closely  related   in   thought    and    the 

1  See  Richardson,  de  dum  particulae  apud  priscos  scriptores  Latinos  usu, 
Leipzig,  1886. 

171 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

relation  may  ultimately  find  expression  by  becoming 
attached  to  a  particular  word.  This  is  the  case  with 
prohibitions  following  a  statement,  the  relation  becom- 
ing attached  to  ?ie. 

2.  Correlation  may  produce  conjunctions,  as  in  ni  and 
doubtless  in  si  and  perhaps  in  dum.  This  may  be  the 
explanation  of  qui. 

3.  An  element  contained  by  implication  in  a  sentence 
may  be  expanded  into  a  leading  clause,  as  is  the  case 
with  many  indirect  questions  and  with  nulla  causa  est 
quin. 

4.  The  denning  addition  may  itself  become  a  con- 
junction —  quamuis,   licet. 

5.  The  subordinating  function  may  be  acquired  by 
association  with  another  conjunction  —  modo,  simul  — 
or  inherited  from  the  relative  pronoun  —  quod,  quom. 

6.  Coordination  may  occasionally  pass  over  directly 
into  subordination  —  e£,  atque. 

Some  further  light,  beside  that  which  may  come  from 
detailed  study  of  the  paratactic  stage,  is  thrown  upon 
the  g'Mzs-conjunctions  by  a  consideration  of  the  direct- 
ness of  their  relationship  to  quis  and  by  an  attempt  to 
distinguish  between  interrogative  and  indefinite  uses. 

Of  these  conjunctions  a  small  group  —  quod,  quom, 
quoniam,  quo  (with  comparatives  in  a  subjunctive  clause), 
quominus  —  are  directly  from  qui  and  only  indirectly 
from  quis.  This  is  proved  most  clearly  by  the  absence 
of  interrogative  use,  and  by  other  evidence  also.  Thus 
quod  can  be  plainly  followed  in  Plautus  from  the  relative 
pronoun  in  the  accusative  of  compass  and  extent  to  the 
causal  conjunction;  the  loss  of  definite  case-relation  and 
of  reference  to  an  antecedent  may  be  traced  in  detail.1 
The  connection  of  quom  with  qui  is  supported  by  the 

1  See  Ingersoll,  The  Latin  Conjunction  Quod,  soon  to  be  published. 

172 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS   IN   LATIN 

resemblance  between  some  of  the  cum  constructions  and 
corresponding  relative  clauses,1  and  quoniam  is  an  exten- 
sion of  quom.  There  are  several  different  kinds  of  quo, 
doubtless  of  different  case-forms,  but  quo  as  used  in 
clauses  of  purpose  with  the  subjunctive  and  a  word  in 
the  comparative  degree  is  certainly  nothing  but  the 
ablative  of  degree  of  difference,  used  exactly  as  the 
pronoun  qui  is  used  with  the  subjunctive  to  express 
purpose.  And  quominus  is  a  special  variety  of  this  quo, 
permanently  compounded  with  a  particular  comparative. 
Their  relationship  to  quis  and  to  each  other  may  be 
shown  by  a  stemma :  — 

quis 


quod 


qui 


quom 


quoniam 


quo 


quominus 


The  assumption  of  the  subordinating  force  took  place  in 
the  stage  between  quis  and  qui;  no  question  of  this 
nature  therefore  can  arise  in  connection  with  any  of 
these  conjunctions;  they  inherited  the  subordinating 
function  from  qui.  The  only  question  to  be  asked  in 
regard  to  the  origin  of  quod,  quom  or  quo  is  as  to  the 
process  by  which  they  changed  from  case-forms  of  the 
relative  pronoun  to  relative  adverbs.  This  is  a  kind  of 
question  which,  fundamentally,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
subordination  or  with  conjunctions.  The  process  was 
essentially  the  same  as  that  by  which  eo,  the  adverb 
1  Hale,  The  Cum-constructions. 
173 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

meaning  "therefore,"  was  formed  from  is,  though  it  is 
complicated  by  the  later  acquisition  of  functions  of 
cause  and  time.  The  history  of  quoniam  and  quominus 
is  one  step  further  removed  from  the  question  of  acquir- 
ing subordinating  force.  With  these  conjunctions  the 
process  to  be  considered  is  that  of  the  specialization  of 
meaning  of  the  conjunctions  quom  and  quo  by  means  of 
the  strengthening  of  quom  to  quoniam  (or  its  composi- 
tion with  iam)  and  the  composition  of  quo  with  a  partic- 
ular comparative  of  negative  meaning.  These  two 
conjunctions,  therefore,  are  to  be  studied  by  methods 
entirely  different  from  those  which  apply  to  quod,  quom 
or  quo. 

A  somewhat  similar  table  of  relationships  can  be  made 
out  for  quam  and  its  compounds,  though  with  more 
uncertainty  at  some  points.  The  use  of  quam  in  inter- 
rogative sentences,  direct  and  indirect,  must  be  taken  to 
indicate  a  direct  connection  with  the  interrogative  quis, 
but  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  exclamatory  uses 
may  have  some  connection  with  the  indefinite  meanings 
of  quis.  The  compound  quamuis  seems,  when  taken 
alone,  to  be  from  an  interrogative  quam,  but  it  cannot 
be  separated  from  quiuis  nor  quiuis  from  quilibet.  The 
indefinite  force  of  quamuis  and  quiuis  appears,  however, 
to  be  due  to  the  whole  sentence,  quam  uis,  rather  than 
to  quam  alone.  In  the  same  way  quamquam  cannot  be 
separated  from  quisquis ;  the  indefinite  force  of  either  is 
the  result  in  part  of  the  doubling  of  the  stem,  and  it  is 
scarcely  possible,  on  the  one  hand,  that  quamquam  is  the 
result  of  a  doubling  of  quam,  uninfluenced  by  quisquis, 
or  that  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  direct  derivative 
from  quisquis,  uninfluenced  by  the  simple  quam.  There 
is  less  difficulty  in  regard  to  tamquam,  which  is  evidently 
the  result  of  correlation.     It  appears  to  be  phonetically 

174 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 


impossible  to  derive  qutisi  from  quam-si,  but  syntacti- 
cally it  behaves  as  a  compound  of  quam  and  si  might  be 
expected  to  behave.  The  connection  of  quando  with 
the  other  compounds  of  quam  is  entirely  uncertain. 
Omitting  these  two,  the  relationship  of  the  more  im- 
portant compounds  of  quam  may  be  represented  as 
follows :  — 


qms 


quiuis 


quisquis 


quamuis  (adv.)  tamquam    ?ttaro(than)      quamquam 


quamuis  (conj.) 


antequam 
priusquam 


postquam 


The  only  value  of  such  a  table  is  that  it  represents 
graphically  the  differences  in  the  history  of  different 
conjunctions  and  especially  the  different  points  at  which 
they  acquire  subordinating  force.  This  process  takes 
place  in  tamquam  and  quam  "  than  "  in  the  process  of 
shift  from  the  interrogative  adverb  quam  by  means  of 
correlation  with  tarn  or  with  a  comparative,  but  in  the 
case  of  quamuis  the  shift  to  a  subordinating  conjunc- 
tion occurs  at  a  later  point  in  its  history  and  by  an 
entirely  different  process,  that  of  association  with  a 
concessive  sentence.  But  antequam  and  postquam 
inherit  the  subordinating  function  from  quam  "than/' 
to  which  they  stand  in  the  same  relation  as  that  in 
which  quominus  stands  to  quo  with  comparatives.  If 
the  conjunctional  (relative)  force  of  these  words  be  con- 
sidered apart  from  their  special  adverbial  shading  (con- 

175 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

cessive,  temporal),  then  quamuis  acquires  its  special 
adverbial  shading  first  and  its  conjunctional  force  later, 
in  consequence  of  its  adverbial  force,  while  postquam 
acquires  conjunctional  force  first  and  its  special  tem- 
poral force  at  a  later  stage  and  as  a  result  of  the  use 
with  a  comparative  word.  It  is  evident  that  such  differ- 
ences in  history  require  a  difference  in  method  of  treat- 
ment. Between  quarmiis,  with  its  complicated  history, 
and  quamquam,  which  is  a  simple  derivative  from  quam 
by  doubling,  there  is  no  connection  close  enough  to 
justify  their  treatment  together. 

It  is  now  somewhat  generally  acknowledged  that  a 
classification  of  subordinate  clauses  by  function,  as 
causal,  temporal,  final,  consecutive,  etc.,  whatever  may 
be  its  value  for  school-grammars,  is  of  no  value  or  is 
even  misleading  in  scientific  work  on  historical  prin- 
ciples. The  better  mode  of  classification  is  by  the 
introducing  word,  pronoun  or  conjunction.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  to  consider  the  best  method  of  classifying 
the  subordinating  words. 

There  appear  to  be  three  methods  possible :  first,  by 
the  case-form  of  the  conjunction ;  second,  by  the  kind 
of  paratactic  process  through  which  it  has  passed ;  third, 
by  the  derivation  of  the  conjunction. 

The  first  method  was  used  by  Schmalz  in  the  first  and 
second  editions  of  his  Syntax  (Midler's  ITandbuch,  II,  2). 
It  has  two  disadvantages :  first,  the  uncertainty  in  regard 
to  the  case-forms  of  many  of  the  conjunctions ;  second, 
the  fact  that  the  character  of  the  clause  is  only  remotely 
influenced  by  the  case  of  the  introducing  relative  word. 
Thus  si  may  be  locative  and  quom  instrumental  (so 
Schmalz),  but  the  clauses  are  unaffected  by  this  fact,  as 
the  relative  clause  is  unaffected  in  general  by  the  case 

176 


SUBORDINATING    CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

of  qui.     This  arrangement  is  apparently  dropped  in  the 
third  edition.1 

The  second  method  of  classification,  by  the  kind  of 
paratactic  stage  through  which  the  sentence  passed  or, 
more  broadly,  by  the  kind  of  process  through  which  the 
word  acquired  subordinating  force,  has  some  distinct 
advantages.  It  would  bring  all  conjunctions  of  what- 
ever origin  into  a  single  scheme,  not  separating  the  quis- 
conjunctions  from  dion,  si,  ne  and  the  others  of  various 
origin.  Further,  the  character  of  the  conjunction  de- 
pends to  a  considerable  extent  upon  the  nature  of  its 
early  stages ;  these  leave  distinct  traces,  e.  g.,  in  the 
negative  of  the  leading  clause  upon  which  quin  depends, 
in  the  difference  between  ne  clauses  which  are  the  result 
of  defining  parataxis  and  those  which  have  come  about 
in  other  ways,  in  the  difference  between  si  clauses  after 
miror  and  the  ordinary  protasis.  Also,  one  of  the  ob- 
jects in  studying  the  subordinate  clause  is  to  understand 
the  process  by  which  it  became  subordinate,  and  a  classi- 
fication of  conjunctions  by  their  paratactic  uses  would 
lead  directly  toward  this  end.  On  the  other  hand  there 
are  some  disadvantages,  equally  distinct,  connected  with 
this  method.  While  it  is  true  that  some  of  the  pecu- 
liarities of  conjunctions  are  the  result  of  a  peculiar  par- 
atactic structure,  other  characteristics  not  less  important 
are  to  be  explained  by  the  origin  of  the  conjunction. 
All  ne  clauses  are  strongly  colored  by  the  negative  char- 
acter of  ne  and  this  coloring  is  really  more  important 
than  the  distinction  between  ne  clauses  after  verbs  of 
special  meaning  (object  clauses)  and  those  after  other 

1  The  same  order  is  retained  in  the  third  edition,  though  the  main 
divisions  into  accusative,  locative,  modal  and  ablative  case-forms  are  not 
used,  and  the  case  forms  of  some  conjunctions  are  differently  given  (e.  g., 
quom  instrumental,  not  locative). 

12  177 


LATIN  SYNTAX 


verbs  (purpose  clauses).  The  meaning  of  licet  has  as 
much  to  do  with  its  conjunctional  use  as  the  fact  that  it 
was  prefixed  to  a  concessive  clause  as  a  synthetic  defini- 
tion. It  must  also  be  said  that  at  present  too  little  is 
known  about  the  varieties  of  parataxis  to  furnish  a  solid 
basis  for  classification  and  it  is  possible  that  the  para- 
tactic  stage  of  many  of  the  ^Mis-conjunctions  and  espe- 
cially of  the  relative  pronoun  qui  must  always  remain 
obscure. 


.qum 


-qum 


tquiuis- 
quam  ?- 


-quamuis- 
'  (adv.) 
-tamquam 


quam- 


(than) 
quis quisquis quamquam 

^■quo-ad  ? quoad 

W  ? —      — ut 


— quamuis 
(conj.) 

(  postquam 
J  antequam 
|  priusquam 


(abl.) 


quoniam 
quominus 


A  third  method  of  classifying  conjunctions  is  by  their 
origin.  The  disadvantage  of  this  is  that  it  is  applicable 
or  at  least  is  valuable  only  with  reference  to  the  con- 
junctions derived  from  quis.  Conjunctions  from  other 
sources  have  no  common  starting-point  for  genealogical 

178 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

classification;  they  are  derived  from  a  noun  (mo  Jo),  a 
verb  (licet),  a  negative  (ne,  ni)  or  from  some  other 
source  and  have  nothing  in  common.  The  (/wi's-conju na- 
tions, however,  may  be  arranged  in  a  table  as  the  com- 
pounds of  quam  were  arranged  above  and  this  method 
leads  to  a  partial  classification. 

This  table  is  of  course  questionable  at  various  points. 
The  most  important  distinction  suggested  by  it  is  the 
distinction  between  those  conjunctions  which  are  derived 
from  quis  with  only  one  intermediate  step  and  those 
which  go  through  two  or  more  middle  stages.  Wher- 
ever an  interrogative  form  corresponding  to  the  conjunc- 
tion is  still  in  use,  it  may  be  taken  to  indicate  that  the 
conjunction  is  derived  from  quis  through  the  interroga- 
tive adverb.  This  is  the  case  with  quin,  quam,  quoad 
and  ut.  But  as  the  forms  of  the  relative  pronoun  would 
in  general  be  similar  to  those  of  quis,  it  is  always  pos- 
sible that  the  relative  use  of  the  conjunction,  e.  g.,  of 
quam,  may  have  been  influenced  also  by  qui,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  there  may  have  been  a  quam  from  qui,  as 
well  as  a  quam  from  quis  through  the  interrogative  quam. 
This  is  very  unlikely  to  have  been  the  case  with  quin, 
because  the  connection  between  the  interrogative  and 
the  conjunction  is  well-marked  and  the  range  of  quin  is 
narrow.  It  is  more  easily  supposable  in  the  case  of 
quam,  especially  if  qui  acquired  its  subordinating  force 
through  correlation,  as  tamquam  and  quam  with  com- 
paratives did.  On  the  other  hand,  quod  and  quom  are 
never  interrogative  and  the  history  of  quod  shows  clearly 
that  it  comes  from  the  relative ;  this  appears  to  be  the 
case  also  with  the  ablative  quo,  though  it  is  less  certain. 
As  to  quia,  it  is  a  much  older  word  than  quod  and  is  in 
Plautus  the  usual  causal  conjunction.  It  is  found  in  a 
great  number  of  cases  beginning  the  answer  to  a  ques- 

179 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

tion  with  quid  or  some  other  word  for  why  and  this  fact 
must  be  the  starting-point  of  any  theory  as  to  the  inter- 
mediate stage  between  quis  and  the  conjunction.  Nor 
does  quia  show  in  Plautus  any  trace  of  those  uses 
through  which  quod  passed  from  the  accusative  to  the 
causal  meaning ;  the  accusative  of  compass  and  extent 
is  properly  a  singular.  The  few  cases  of  quianam  ?  may 
perhaps  indicate  an  interrogative  use,  but  it  is  also  pos- 
sible that  the  interrogative  sense  is  here  due  to  nam. 
For  these  reasons  the  middle  step  of  quia  must  be  re- 
garded as  doubtful  and  the  same  must  be  said  of  the 
intermediate  stage  of  qui.  Some  of  the  difficulties  pre- 
sented by  the  ordinary  explanation  of  the  passage  from 
quis  to  qui  have  been  pointed  out  above  (p.  107). 

The  inclusion  of  ut  in  this  table  of  <^is-conjunctions 
rests  upon  syntactical  grounds.  The  phonetic  difficulty 
of  accounting  for  the  loss  of  the  initial  qu  sound  is 
stated  by  Brugmann,  Grrundr.,  II,  772.  It  is  partly 
met  by  the  parallel  of  ubi,  unde,  and  si-cubi,  ne-cubi, 
ali-cunde  and  by  the  Oscan  puz,  Umbrian  puze.  But 
the  main  reason  for  connecting  ut,  ubi,  unde  with  quis 
is  the  fact  that  all  their  uses  find  in  this  way  their 
most  natural  explanation.  They  are  all  found  as  in- 
terrogatives  and  go  through  the  shift  to  the  relative 
function  precisely  as  they  would  do  if  they  were 
derived  from  quis.  To  explain  them  in  any  other 
way  is  to  do  violence  to  a  considerable  mass  of  syn- 
tactical evidence.  It  is  unfortunate  that  such  a 
dilemma  should  present  itself  in  the  history  of  so 
important   a   conjunction. 

Upon  the  basis  of  this  table  the  principal  quis- 
conjunctions  fall  into  three  main  classes  according  to 
the  directness  of  their  connection  with  quis  and  the 
point  at  which  the  subordinating  function  is  acquired, 

180 


SUBORDINATING   CONJUNCTIONS  IN  LATIN 

and  each  class  is  subdivided  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  shift  of  meaning :  — 

1.  From  a  <^a's-adverb,  by  means  of  some  kind  of 
paratactic  association. 

a.  By  defining  parataxis  —  quin,  some  uses  of  »t 

with  the  subjunctive,  and  perhaps  quia. 

b.  Under  the  influence  of  an  indefinite  pronoun  — 

quamuis,  quamquam. 

c.  By     correlative      parataxis  —  tamquam,     quam 

(than),  ut  with  the  indicative,  and  perhaps 
qui,  ubi,  unde,  quoad. 

2.  From  quis  indirectly,  through  a  word  having 
subordinating  force. 

a.  Through  qui  (the  pronoun) — quod,  quom  and 

probably  the  ablative  quo. 

b.  Through    quam    (than) — postquam,    antequam, 

priusquam. 

3.  From  quis  by  two  stages,  through  a  specialized 
form  of  a  relative  conjunction. 

a.  Through  quom  —  quoniam. 

b.  Through  the  ablative  quo  —  quominus. 

This  tabulation  does  not,  of  course,  add  anything  to 
our  knowledge  of  conjunctions;  its  object  is  to  analyze 
the  general  problem  into  classes  of  minor  problems.  The 
problem  in  regard  to  class  1  is  to  discover  the  steps  by 
which  an  interrogative  adverb  becomes  a  conjunction ; 
in  class  2  it  is  to  trace  the  passage  from  relative  pronoun 
to  conjunction  or  the  acquisition  of  temporal  meaning 
by  composition  with  adverbs;  in  class  3  it  is  to  follow 
the  specialization  and  differentiation  of  a  compound  from 
a  simple  conjunction.  These  problems  are  essentially 
different  and  are  to  be  approached  in  different  ways. 
At  the  same  time  the  tabulation  shows  the  points  at 
which  our  knowledge  is  insufficient.     The   distinction 

181 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

between  ut  with  the  subjunctive,  as  the  result  of  defin- 
ing parataxis,  and  ut  with  the  indicative,  as  the  result 
of  correlative  parataxis,  is  not  made  without  some  study 
of  these  uses,  but  it  is  assuredly  not  an  established 
connection;  it  may  be  said  to  be  important,  if  true, 
and  the  tabulation  is  meant  to  bring  out  its  importance. 
So  also  the  differences  between  quom  and  quoniam,  be- 
tween postquam  and  quom,  between  quod  and  quia,  are 
so  great  that  the  first  step  toward  the  solution  of  the 
problem  is  to  face  its  nature.  The  last  distinction, 
especially,  between  quod  and  quia,  is  often  overlooked 
because  of  the  resemblance  in  function. 


182 


VIII 
THE  GROUPING  OF  WORDS 

The  means  of  expressing  the  concepts  of  relation 
already  described  —  the  musical  elements  of  speech, 
order,  inflection  and  single  words  —  express  also  the 
unity  of  the  concept-group.  But  they  do  so  indirectly 
and  not  completely.  There  is  a  unity  of  the  group,  a 
homogeneity  and  harmony  running  through  the  whole 
sentence,  which  is  deeper  than  these  means  alone  could 
convey.  It  is  seen  at  its  highest  point  in  idiomatic 
word-groups,  like  ut  ita  dicam,  quae  cum  ita  si?it,  in 
which  the  meaning  of  individual  words  is  almost  lost 
and  the  phrase  is  felt  simply  as  a  whole.  Less  distinctly 
it  is  to  be  seen  in  longer  ut  or  cum  clauses  of  purpose  or 
cause,  in  which  the  meaning  of  individual  words  is  felt 
somewhat  distinctly  and  yet  the  meaning  of  the  whole 
group,  as  an  expression  of  purpose  or  cause,  is  also  felt. 
Less  obviously,  but  not  less  trul}r,  a  similar  unity  is  to 
be  found  in  every  sentence  and  is  a  part  of  the  total 
impression  made  by  the  word-group  upon  the  hearer.  It 
is  this  unification  and  fusion  which  the  term  grouping 
of  words  is  meant  to  describe  and  which  it  is  proposed  to 
consider  in  this  chapter. 

The  process  of  analysis  described  above  (Chap.  II) 
does  not  result  in  a  displacement  of  the  germ-concept  by 
the  separate  members  of  a  concept-group ;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  germ  of  the  thought  is  retained  more  or  less 

183 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

clearly  in  consciousness  and  there  is  a  frequent,  though 
perhaps  intermittent,  comparison  of  the  result  of  analysis 
with  the  unanalyzed  germ.  Or  it  might  be  said  that  the 
consciousness  of  the  germ  guides  and  determines  the 
analysis.  The  sense  of  the  unity  of  the  group  is  there- 
fore one  of  the  prominent  elements  of  the  thought  and 
is  the  source  and  cause  of  the  impression  of  unity  which 
the  corresponding  word-group  makes.  At  the  same  time 
the  process  of  analysis  is  distinguishing  the  various  ele- 
ments in  the  meaning  of  the  germ  and,  as  it  were,  dis- 
tributing them  for  purposes  of  expression  among  the 
different  members  of  the  word-group.  The  process  may 
be  compared  to  expansion  and  distribution,  or  may  be 
called  a  transfer  of  function  from  the  word-group  as  a 
whole  to  the  individual  members  of  the  group. 

It  is  antecedently  probable  that  both  aspects  of  this 
process,  both  the  unity  and  the  distribution  of  meaning, 
will  be  to  some  measure  reflected  in  the  growth  of 
sentence -forms.  Actual  observation  in  this  direction 
in  the  Indo-European  family  of  languages  cannot  be 
appealed  to  nor  has  the  observation  of  other  languages 
still  in  the  primitive  stage  been  sufficiently  full  and  exact 
to  justify  the  positive  statement  that  the  primitive  sen- 
tence was  short  and  simple.  In  the  most  general  way  it 
is,  however,  probable  that  the  growth  of  the  sentence 
also,  like  the  analysis  of  the  concept-group,  has  been  in 
the  way  of  expansion  from  a  germ  and  of  distribution 
among  an  increasing  number  of  words  of  functions  which 
were  once  expressed  by  few  words.  It  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected that,  after  the  transfer  of  group-meanings  to 
single  words  or  to  small  groups  has  been  going  on  for  so 
long  a  time,  it  should  now  be  possible  in  every  sentence 
to  distinguish  the  germ  from  the  later  accretions  or  to 
follow  in  all  its  details  the  process  of  expansion  and  dis- 

184 


THE   GROUPING   OF   WORDS 

tribution,  but  within  narrow  limits  the  process  is  still 
going  on  in  historical  periods  and  may  be  detected  in 
certain  kinds  of  sentence. 

In  some  few  types  of  sentence,  especially  those  which 
are  strongly  emotional  and  in  which,  for  this  reason, 
there  is  little  information  or  reasoning,  it  is  often  possi- 
ble to  detect  the  germ,  to  fix  upon  the  center  of  gravity. 
It  has  already  been  said  that  prohibitions  are  for  the 
most  part  only  willed  negatives.  The  essential  thing  in 
them  is  ne  and  often  the  verb  is  a  word  of  the  most  gen- 
eral meaning,  serving  in  truth  no  other  purpose  than  thai 
of  carrying  the  subjunctive  or  imperative  ending.  Or 
else  it  is  a  repetition  from  a  previous  sentence,  either  the 
same  word  precisely  repeated  or  a  verb  of  similar  mean- 
ing. The  circumstances  or  the  context  have  already 
defined  the  action  prohibited,  before  the  verb  is  uttered. 
In  like  manner  the  central  idea  of  many  questions  may 
be  seen  to  lie  in  some  one  word  or  in  some  two  or  three 
words.  Questions  with  non  or  nonne,  especially  in 
conversation,  where  the  particles  are  less  stereotyped, 
are  usually  only  repetitions  in  a  different  form  of  what 
has  been  previously  said  or  implied.  If  the  speaker 
desires  no  change  of  phrase,  the  single  word  non,  uttered 
probably  with  rising  inflection,  suffices  without  addition. 
In  all  these  cases  —  which  have  abundant  parallels  in 
modern  languages  —  the  germ  of  the  thought  is  the 
mere  questioning  of  the  previously  expressed  or  implied 
statement.  With  slight  differences  this  is  true  of  many 
^m's-questions.  Either  the  verb  is  an  empty  form  (quid 
faciam  ?  quid  agam  ?)  or  it  is  a  repetition  (redde.  ||  quid 
reddam?),  either  a  precise  repetition  or  a  repetition  with 
variation  of  phrasing.  And  very  frequently  the  inter- 
rogative word  (quid?  cur?  quippini?  quomodo?  quamo- 
brem?)  is  all  that  is  required,  the  rest  of  the  thought 

185 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

being  left  unexpressed  because  it  is  so  easily  supplied. 
The  germ  of  most  exclamations  is  really  the  tone,  the 
words  being  merely  repeated  with  more  or  less  amplifi- 
cation, as  in  Plaut.  Aul.,  783  f.,  Is  me  nunc  renuntiare 
repudium  iussit  tibi.  ||  repudium  rebus  paratis  exornatis 
nuptiis  !  This  is  really  in  three  parts,  repudium  —  rebus 
paratis  —  exornatis  nuptiis,  which  indicate  the  expan- 
sion of  the  thought  as  the  speaker  gradually  perceives 
the  different  aspects  suggested  by  the  word  repudium. 

In  the  more  unemotional  sentences  of  connected  writ- 
ing it  is  less  easy  to  detect  the  germ  of  the  thought,  but 
something  may  be  done  by  distinguishing  what  is  new 
in  the  sentence  from  what  is  repeated  or  carried  over 
from  the  previous  thought.  The  latter  element  is  in 
almost  all  connected  writing  larger  than  would  be 
expected  by  one  who  has  not  analyzed  the  relation  of 
sentences.  In  writings  upon  abstract  subjects,  as  in 
Cicero's  or  Seneca's  philosophical  works,  each  sentence 
carries  forward  the  thought  a  little  way,  but  each  sen- 
tence also  reaches  back  into  the  previous  thought,  in 
order  to  bring  the  known  into  relation  with  the  new  ele- 
ments which  the  sentence  contains.  Evidently  it  is  the 
new  elements  which  contain  the  germ  of  the  new  con- 
cept-group. The  following  sentences  from  a  book- 
review  illustrate  this  point :  "  It  is  impossible  to  give  any 
detailed  account  of  the  author's  position  on  these  sub- 
jects. He  assumes  throughout  a  scientific  rather  than  a 
polemical  attitude  towards  the  various  forms  of  occult- 
ism." In  the  second  sentence  throughout  is  merely  the 
opposite  of  detailed,  while  attitude  is  the  same  as  position 
and  towards  .  .  .  occultism  repeats  on  these  subjects. 
The  new  element  is  in  the  word  scientific ;  this  is  the 
germ  of  the  thought  and  the  whole  sentence  might  have 
been  briefly  though  inadequately  expressed  by  saying 

186 


THE   GROUPING   OF   WORDS 

"But  in  general  (=  throughout)  it  is  scientific."  The 
words  rather  than  polemical  are  added  as  a  definition  of 
scientific.  The  rest  of  the  sentence  is  mere  syntactical 
filling-in,  and  it  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  syntactical 
structure  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  distinction  between 
the  germ  and  the  amplifications  or  repetitions.  The 
same  mingling  of  repetitions  and  new  elements  may  be 
illustrated  from  almost  any  connected  passage  in  Cicero's 
philosophical  works,  e.  g.,  from  the  Cato  Major,  §67: 
quamquam  quis  est  tarn  stultus,  quamuis  sit  adulescens, 
cui  sit  exploration,  se  ad  uespcrum  esse  uicturum  f  (The 
next  sentence  adds  "it  is  worse  than  that,"  and  the 
germ  is  in plures.)  Quin  etiam  aetas  ilia  multo  plures, 
quam  nostra,  mortis  casus  habet.  (The  following  sen- 
tence merely  specifies ;  the  germs  are  perhaps  in  the  three 
verbs,  which  are  variations  of  one  idea.)  Facilius  in 
morbos  incidunt  adulescentes,  grauius  aegrotant,  tristius 
curantur.  Even  when  the  germ  of  the  thought  can  be 
discovered  and  located,  it  is  still  difficult  to  trace 
through  a  long  sentence  the  process  by  which  it  is  ex- 
panded and  its  meaning  is  distributed.  But  on  a  smaller 
scale  the  process  may  be  followed  in  the  formation  of 
minor  groups  within  the  sentence.  One  of  the  most 
striking  and  instructive  illustrations  is  afforded  by  defin- 
ing parataxis,  especially  the  cases  in  which  the  defined 
verb  is  in  the  subjunctive,  which  have  been  given  in 
some  detail  above  (Chap.  VI,  p.  132  ff.).  In  all  these 
cases  the  verb  in  the  subjunctive  is  the  germ.  It  con- 
tains in  an  unanalyzed  form  a  number  of  different  ele- 
ments of  meaning;  all  of  them  or  many  of  them  are 
suggested  at  once  by  the  form  of  the  verb.  But  among 
them  some  single  one  is  in  a  particular  case  more  prom- 
inent than  others.  Upon  this  the  attention  of  the 
speaker  is  directed  and  it  is  thus  made  so  prominent  as 

187 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

to  call  for  fuller  expression  by  means  of  another  word. 
Thus  the  first  singular  of  the  present  suggests  propriety 
or  obligation  and  this  element  finds  expression  in  nunc 
adeam  optumumst.  The  expression  of  feeling  in  "I 
desire  to  love  you  "  involves  a  request  for  permission ; 
te  amem  expands  into  sine  te  amem.  Further  details 
have  already  been  given  and  need  not  be  repeated.  It 
is  the  very  remarkable  vagueness  of  the  subjunctive 
taken  by  itself,  the  fact  that  it  serves  such  a  bewildering 
variety  of  purposes,  that  calls  for  such  a  variety  also  of 
definition.  Every  element  of  meaning  thus  repeated  in 
the  defining  word  was  before  contained  by  implication  in 
the  subjunctive  form.  And  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  here 
also  the  syntactical  center  and  the  center  of  meaning  do 
not  correspond;  the  clause  of  secondary  meaning  be- 
comes the  leading  clause  in  the  syntactical  structure. 

The  same  process  of  distribution  of  function  underlies 
the  use  of  prepositions  with  case-forms.  The  case -form 
carried  implications  of  meaning,  some  of  which  were 
prominent,  others  latent.  As  one  or  another  of  these 
elements  became  prominent  it  called  for  more  definite 
expression  and  to  this  end  adverbs  were  prefixed  to  the 
case -forms,  as  verbs  were  prefixed  to  the  subjunctive 
forms.  Thus  contra,  ad,  ante,  ob,  all  express  with  some 
degree  of  precision  and  with  accompanying  additions 
the  idea  of  direction  or  limit  of  motion  which  exists 
also  in  the  accusative,  and  ex,  ab,  de,  repeat  and  define 
the  ablative.  The  prepositions  thus  afford  a  definition 
of  the  cases,  as  the  prefixed  verbs  do  of  the  subjunctive, 
and  by  the  fact  that  a  definition  is  needed  they  prove 
the  vagueness  of  the  bare  case-forms. 

In  the  process  of  definition  by  expansion  and  by  dis- 
tribution of  function  a  distinction  is  to  be  made  between 
the  motive  which  leads  to  expansion  and  the  condition 

188 


THE   GROUPING   OF    WORDS 

which  permits  it.  The  motive  is  the  desire  for  more 
precise  expression,  aroused  by  the  directing  of  the 
attention  upon  elements  of  meaning  which  do  not  find 
sufficient  expression  in  the  mode  or  the  case-form.  The 
condition  which  permits  the  distribution  of  the  meaning 
between  the  two  words  is  that  the  added  word  shall  in 
part  repeat  the  meaning  of  the  word  to  which  it  is  added. 
There  must  be  a  common  element  of  meaning,  since  the 
object  of  the  expansion  is  definition;  as  the  two  ele- 
ments of  meaning  were  at  first  combined  in  the  meaning 
of  one  word,  they  must  have  been  congruous  and  har- 
monious. This  explains  the  unity  of  meaning  which 
still  exists  after  the  function  has  been  divided  between 
the  two  words,  fac  sciam,  uolo  abeas,  tube  ueniat;  though 
the  meaning  is  distributed,  the  two  elements  of  it  are 
still  closely  related  and  their  unity  is  still  felt.  This  is 
the  reason  why  they  are  usually  in  close  juxtaposition  in 
the  sentence.  They  constitute  a  word-group,  made  by 
a  process  of  analysis  and  expansion  and  bound  together 
in  the  closest  unity. 

It  appears  to  be  a  justifiable  inference  that  it  is  through 
some  such  process  as  this,  much  more  complicated  and 
doubtless  involving  steps  not  represented  in  these  simpler 
illustrations,  that  harmony  and  unity  are  preserved 
throughout  a  word-group.  These  illustrations  have  to 
do  with  the  distribution  of  the  function  of  an  inflected 
form,  but  an  uninflected  word  may  in  like  manner  con- 
tain elements  of  meaning  which  call  for  definition  or  for 
fuller  expression  than  a  single  word  can  give.  In  such 
a  case  the  most  obvious  aspect  of  the  concept  finds  ex- 
pression in  one  word  and  another  word  is  added  to  limit 
it  more  precisely.  For  the  analysis  of  a  concept  does 
not  go  on  equally  in  all  directions  at  once.  Depending 
as  it  does  upon  suggestion  by  association,  it  follows  first 

189 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

the  line  of  strongest  association  and  that  element  which 
comes  first  into  consciousness  is  the  one  which  first  finds 
expression  in  a  word.  It  is  not'  necessarily  the  first  in 
order  in  the  sentence,  when  the  sentence  is  finally  ready 
for  utterance.  Very  frequently  one  is  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  he  has  fixed  upon  some  middle  or  later  portion 
of  his  sentence  and  is  obliged  to  accommodate  the  earlier 
parts  to  it.  But  the  analysis  reaches  the  point  of  dis- 
tinctness, the  point  where  the  concepts  suggest  words, 
earlier  in  some  one  direction  than  in  others.  The  word 
thus  suggested  may  not  be  retained ;  the  further  analysis 
may  render  it  necessary  to  reject  it  and  select  a  different 
one;  but  usually  it  becomes  the  fixed  center  of  the  ex- 
pression and  about  it  all  other  words  are  grouped.  The 
distribution  of  the  remainder  of  the  meaning  is  largely 
determined  by  the  selection  already  made  and  the  mean- 
ings of  all  other  words  must,  directly  or  indirectly, 
accommodate  themselves  to  the  meaning  already  ex- 
pressed. Viewed  in  this  way  the  formation  of  a  word- 
group  is  a  process  of  accommodation  of  meanings,  in 
which  each  word,  as  it  is  selected,  forms  part  of  a  frame- 
work to  which  the  other  words  must  be  adjusted.  It  is 
this  adjustment  which  insures  the  harmony  of  the  whole 
and  thereby  reflects  the  unity  of  the  concept-group. 

Adjustment  or  accommodation  involves  partial  loss  of 
meaning.  Of  the  various  meanings  associated  with  a 
word  some  will  be  appropriate  to  a  particular  setting, 
while  others  will  be  inconsistent  with  it.  The  limita- 
tions which  the  context  places  upon  the  meaning  of  in- 
flectional forms  has  been  noted  above;  limitations 
entirely  similar  are  placed  also  upon  the  meanings  of  all 
words  by  their  use  in  combination  with  others.  It  is 
because  of  this  that  it  is  possible  to  use  without  confu- 
sion words  which  have  many  and  quite  different  mean- 

190 


THE   GROUPING   OF   WORDS 

ings.  In  a  particular  setting  only  the  meaning  which 
is  consistent  with  that  setting  is  suggested  to  the  hearer; 
the  other  incongruous  meanings  do  not  occur  to  him  at 
all  or  are  immediately  excluded  by  the  surroundings. 

The  meaning  of  the  word  is,  in  a  general  way,  inferred 
from  the  rest  of  the  group,  as  it  would  be  possible  to 
infer  the  general  tone  of  the  group  from  the  precise 
meaning  of  the  word. 

This  subject  belongs  in  strictness  as  much  to  seman- 
tics as  to  syntax.  To  the  syntacticist  its  chief  interest  is 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  function  of  inflections  and  in  the 
suggestions  it  affords  in  regard  to  the  transfer  of  mean- 
ing from  the  group  to  single  words.  To  determine 
where  and  how  group-functions  have  become  attached  to 
single  words  or  to  inflectional  forms,  and  still  more  to 
perceive  that  in  many  cases  the  transfer  is  incomplete, 
is  to  take  a  considerable  step  toward  the  understanding 
of  the  whole  process  of  grouping  words. 

The  transfer  of  group-meanings  and  functions  to 
single  words  is  matched  by  a  process  exactly  the  reverse, 
the  re-transfer  of  the  meanings  of  single  words  back  to 
the  group. 

This  is  seen  in  its  most  complete  form  in  idiomatic 
phrases,  ut  ita  dicam,  quae  cum  ita  sint,  "so  to  speak," 
"for  that  matter."  The  process  which  ends  in  such 
phrases  begins  like  any  other  utterance  with  an  analysis 
of  a  complex  concept  and  the  fitting  of  suitable  words, 
each  with  its  own  meaning,  to  the  resulting  members. 
But  if  the  concept-group  is  one  which  frequently  recurs 
in  thought  and  if  the  words  are  adequate  expressions  of 
it,  it  easily  and  surely  comes  about  that  the  process  of 
analysis  is  at  first  partially  avoided  and  then  wholly  or 
largely  omitted.     The  consciousness   of  the   whole   is 

191 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

greater  than  the  consciousness  of  the  parts ;  the  parts  are 
only  a  means,  at  the  best,  of  expressing  the  whole,  the 
germ  of  the  group.  Association  is  therefore  set  up 
directly  between  the  group-concept,  and  the  whole 
phrase,  the  word-group.  The  difficult  process  of 
analysis  is  thus  avoided;  for  the  analysis,  rapid  and 
automatic  as  it  becomes,  is  at  first  and  when  it  is 
attempted  upon  unfamiliar  material  difficult  and  slow. 
But  when  both  the  thought  and  the  words  are  familiar, 
analysis  is  no  longer  necessary.  As  the  thought,  after 
it  has  been  analyzed,  sinks  back  at  once  into  the  un- 
analyzed  condition  and  is  remembered  only  as  a  series  of 
connected  groups,  so  a  familiar  concept-group  is  for  a 
moment  the  object  of  attention  and  is  matched  by  the 
associated  word-group  without  the  necessity  of  analysis. 
The  result  of  this  direct  association  of  word-group  with 
concept-group  is  that  the  members  of  the  concept-group 
are  not  brought  forward  into  consciousness  at  all  and 
the  individual  words  therefore  lose  in  large  measure 
their  separate  meaning.  To  complete  the  process  and 
produce  a  true  idiom  it  is  only  necessary  that  the  phrase 
as  a  whole  shall  be  in  use  so  long  that  the  original  analy- 
sis shall  be  forgotten  and  perhaps  that  some  of  the  words 
in  the  phrase  shall  have  changed  their  ordinary  meaning, 
so  that  they  would  no  longer  be  combined  in  the  same 
way  or  the  same  words  would  no  longer  be  selected,  if 
the  concept-group  should  again  be  analyzed.  A  step 
further  is  taken  when,  by  shift  of  accent  or  other  change, 
such  a  word -group  suffers  phonetic  decay  and  its  parts 
are  compounded  so  that  they  are  no  longer  felt  as  sepa- 
rate words. 

When  an  idiomatic  word-group  has  reached  the  point 
of  suffering  phonetic  decay,  re-analysis,  except  in  the 
scientific  sense,  is  impossible ;  it  is  difficult  and  unlikely 

192 


THE   GROUPING   OF   WORDS 

to  occur,  even  though  the  words  remain   phonetically 

distinct,  if  an  important  word  in  the  group  has  in 
process  of  time  considerably  shifted  its  ordinary  mean- 
ing. But  in  the  case  of  many  idioms  a  partial  re- 
analysis  is  not  infrequent.  It  occurs  when  the  speaker 
happens  to  give  special  attention  to  the  concept,  either 
because  it  is  of  special  importance  to  the  thought  or 
because  he  desires  to  avoid  a  trite  form  of  expression. 
Thus  ut  it  a  dicam  may  become  ut  sic  <  lis*  rim  or  ut  hoc 
uerbo  utar;  thus  ut  seias,  ut  tu  scias,  ut  tu  sis  sciens,  ut 
scire  possis,  ut  tu  meam  sententiam  noscere  possis  (all 
from  Plautus)  represent  various  re-analyses  and  expan- 
sions of  a  single  concept.  It  is  not  necessary  to  supp<  >se 
that  one  of  these  must  have  been  the  original  from  which 
the  others  have  come,  or  that  a  distinction  as  to  age  can 
be  made  between  quid  ego  nunc  faciam?  and  quid  ego 
nunc  agam?  They  represent  two  forms  of  the  same 
analysis. 

The  likeness  between  different  analyses  of  the  same 
group  or  between  the  analyses  of  but  slightly  differing 
groups  is  not  to  any  great  extent  the  result  of  direct 
influence  of  one  word-group  upon  another,  but  of  in- 
direct association  through  the  concept-groups.  After  a 
group  has  been  analyzed,  there  remains  in  the  linguistic 
memory  a  remembrance  of  the  way  in  which  the  anal)  sis 
proceeded.  With  repetition  the  analysis  becomes  habit- 
ual and  is  more  or  less  permanently  associated  with  the 
particular  concept.  The  recurrence  of  the  concept 
brings  up  also  the  particular  analysis  and  the  memory  is, 
as  it  were,  stored  with  such  schemes  or  forms  of  analy- 
sis. There  are  thus  in  the  mind  three  connected  memo- 
ries, the  concept  itself,  the  form  of  analysis  and  the 
word-group.  These  are  all  associated  together,  but  they 
are  also  associated  with  other  memories  of  the  same 
13  193 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

kind,  concepts  with  other  like  concepts,  analyses  with 
like  analyses  and  word-groups  with  like  word-groups. 
But  of  these  series  of  associations  the  direct  association 
of  word-group  with  word -group  is  the  weakest,  that  of 
analysis  with  analysis  is  stronger  and  that  of  concept 
with  concept  is  the  closest  of  all;  the  sense  of  unity, 
upon  which  the  association  depends,  is  clearest  in  the 
concept.  The  connection  between  sentence-forms  like 
the  variations  of  ut  scias  quoted  above  is  therefore  not 
simply  a  direct  connection;  there  is  also  a  connection, 
much  stronger  and  more  important,  through  the  concepts 
represented  by  the  similar  sentence-forms. 

There  is  a  limit,  however,  to  the  formation  of  such 
associative  series.  As  the  analysis  becomes  more  com- 
plex, the  resemblances  are  less  obvious  because,  as  has 
been  said,  the  sense  of  unity  is  less  clear  and  it  is  more 
difficult  to  grasp  the  group  as  a  whole.  There  is  a 
unity,  it  is  true,  in  each  sentence,  however  long  it  may 
be,  but  long  periodic  sentences  belong  to  written,  that  is, 
to  artificial,  language.  They  represent  the  utmost  pos- 
sible extension  of  concept-grouping  and  of  word-combi- 
nation and  they  exercise  but  little  influence  upon  the 
life  and  movement  of  language.  A  greater  degree  of 
unification  is  found  in  subordinate  clauses,  even  when 
they  are  long.  A  consciousness  of  the  group-concept  is 
preserved,  e.  g.,  through  a  long  ut  or  cum  clause,  so  that 
it  is  felt  through  all  its  length  to  be  an  expression  of 
purpose  or  time  and  its  relation  to  the  leading  clause  is 
not  lost  sight  of.  But  it  is  of  course  true  that  no  long 
idioms  are  formed.  The  longer  the  phrase,  the  greater 
is  the  difficulty  of  grasping  the  group-concept  without 
analysis  and  the  less  is  the  probability  that  the  concept 
as  a  whole  will  become  associated  with  the  word-group 
as  a  whole.     No  precise  limit  can  be  set  in  such  a  mat- 

194 


THE   GROUPING   OF   WORDS 

ter,  but  it  is  true  as  a  general  principle  that  the  memory 
of  sentence-forms,  the  feeling  of  similarity  in  analyses 
and  concepts,  by  which  they  are  bound  into  series,  are 
strongest  with  short  sentences  or  phrases  and  grow 
rapidly  weaker  as  the  groups  increase  in  length  and 
complexity. 

The  tracing  of  the  influence  of  one  construction  upon 

1  another,  which  is  the  office  of  historical  syntax,  may 
thus  follow  two  or  three  different  lines.  A  word  will 
influence  another  word  directly  and  an  inflected  form  of 

•  a  noun  or  verb  may  lead  by  analogy  to  the  use  of  a  simi- 
lar form  of  another  noun  or  verb.  But  the  making  of 
one  inflectional  form  after  the  analogy  of  another  and 
with  the  same  meaning  can  take  place  freely  only  when 
the  meaning  has  become  somewhat  firmly  associated 
with  the  form,  that  is,  when  the  shift  of  function  from 
the  group  to  the  inflectional  form  is  largely  complete. 
As  long  as  the  function  requires  for  its  full  expression 
that  the  inflected  form  shall  be  accompanied  by  other 
words,  as  the  preposition  ah  must  go  with  the  ablative 
of  the  agent,  it  remains  in  part  a  group-function.  And 
so  long  as  it  remains  a  function  of  the  group,  the  influ- 
ence upon  other  forms  of  expression,  the  lines  of  ana- 
logical influence,  must  be  indirect,  through  the  similarity 
of  the  concepts.  This  has  been  already  alluded  to  with 
reference  to  the  potential  subjunctive.  This  kind  of 
shading  of  a  statement  is  almost  never  firmly  attached 
to  the  subjunctive  form  alone ;  it  requires  an  interroga- 
tive, a  comparative,  a  protasis  or  some  other  accompani- 
ment. There  can  therefore  be  no  association  between 
potential  subjunctives  except  through  the  group-con- 
cepts ;  when  these  are  unlike  there  is  no  association. 
Thus  tu  fortasse  me  putes  indulsisse  amori  meo  cannot  be 
associated  with  non  quiuis  .  .  .  describat  uulnera  Parthi 

195 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

nor  either  of  them  with  nimis  nili  tibicen  stem.  There  is 
a  single  element  of  likeness  in  all  these  phrases,  but  it 
is  not  sufficient  to  lead  to  the  association  of  the  group- 
concepts  or  of  the  forms  of  analysis,  which  are  entirely 
dissimilar.  In  the  sphere  of  word-groups  the  working 
of  analogy  must  not  be  lightly  assumed  nor  widely  ex- 
tended without  careful  consideration.  Its  place  is  in 
short  sentences  and  phrases,  where  the  similarities  of 
concepts  can  be  observed  and  finally  reduced  to  system. 


196 


IX 

FORM,  FUNCTION   AND  CLASSIFICATION 

The  distinction  between  form  and  function  in  syntax 
was  touched  upon  in  a  few  words  by  Lange  in  his  paper 
of  1852  and  has  more  recently  been  discussed  with  much 
fulness  and  with  much  resultant  clearing  up  of  the  sub- 
ject by  J.  Ries  in  Was  ist  Syntax?  It  is  a  distinction 
of  fundamental  importance  in  its  bearing  upon  the 
methods  of  syntactical  investigation. 

Syntactical  form  includes,  in  general,  all  those  ele- 
ments of  language  which  serve  in  any  way  to  bind  words 
together  and  to  express  the  relation  of  concepts.  Some 
of  these  elements  have  been  considered  in  detail  above. 
A  complete  formal  description  of  a  particular  word- 
group  calls  for  the  noting  of  the  following  particu- 
lars :  — 

1.  Pauses,  time,  tone,  sentence-accent,  especially  in 
spoken  language  and,  so  far  as  it  is  possible,  in  written 
language  also. 

2.  The  inflectional  form  of  words,  including  the  per- 
son, number  and  voice  of  verbs,  as  well  as  the  mode  and 
tense,  and  the  number  of  nouns  as  well  as  the  case. 

3.  The  order  of  clauses  with  reference  to  one  another 
and  of  words  within  a  clause.  If  the  immediate  bearing 
of  this  upon  the  expression  of  relation  is  not  evident,  as 
it  is  not,  there  is  the  greater  need  of  observation  and 
record. 

197 


LATIN   SYNTAX 

4.  The  general  sentence-structure,  as  distinguished 
from  order.  This  includes  the  presence  or  absence  of  a 
dependent  infinitive,  of  an  ablative  absolute,  of  modify- 
ing clauses. 

For  the  recording  and  exhibiting  of  these  particulars 
of  form  the  use  of  symbols  has  been  suggested,  in  order 
the  better  to  represent  sentence-form  without  including 
word-meaning,  but  no  scheme  of  much  complexity  has 
ever  been  used  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  such  schemes 
could  exhibit  in  detail  the  varieties  of  structure. 

5.  The  kind  of  sentence,  including  a  distinction  be- 
tween subordinate  and  leading  clauses,  between  inter- 
rogative and  non-interrogative  sentences  and  between 
those  which  contain  a  negative  and  those  which  do  not. 

6.  All  single  words  expressive  of  relation  and  all 
modifying  words,  adverbs,  adjectives,  pronouns  and  par- 
ticles. 

7.  The  word-meaning  of  all  inflected  words,  e.  g.,  in 
the  case  of  verbs,  whether  the  verb  is  one  of  will  or  de- 
sire, of  saying  or  thinking,  of  effort,  of  precaution,  of 
fear,  etc.,  whether  it  denotes  attempted  action  or  pro- 
gressive and  continued  action  or  a  completed  state ;  in 
respect  to  nouns,  whether  they  are  locative,  instrumental, 
temporal,  causal,  whether  they  denote  a  person  or  a 
thing,  whether  they  are  abstract  or  concrete,  and  similar 
characteristics  of  the  stem-meaning. 

In  some  of  these  particulars,  especially  in  the  last  two, 
the  line  which  divides  form  from  meaning  is  crossed. 
There  are,  in  fact,  three  points  of  view  which  might  be 
taken  into  account  in  looking  at  word-groups,  the  form, 
the  content1  and  the  function.  By  the  content  of  a  single 
inflected  word  would  be  meant  the  stem-meaning,  while 

1  This  distinction  is  suggested  by  my  colleague  Professor  Oertel,  to 
whom  I  am  already  under  many  obligations. 

198 


FORM,   FUNCTION'  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

the  meaning  of  the  case-form  would  be  the  function; 
the  content  of  a  clause  would  be  the  thing  said  in  that 
clause,  the  function  would  be  its  part  in  the  course  of 
thought,  as  an  assertion,  a  question,  an  expression  of 
purpose,  of  time.  But  for  syntactical  purposes,  the 
phonetic  form  of  a  word  or  a  word-group  is  unimportant 
except  as  a  means  of  determining  and  describing  more 
accurately  its  content,  the  meaning  of  its  several  parts. 
Syntax  is  concerned  directly  only  with  meanings  ;  its 
province  is  to  find  the  laws  which  govern  the  shifts  of 
meaning  which  accompany  inflectional  change  (a  prov- 
ince which  it  shares  with  semantics)  or  to  follow  the 
process  by  which  a  word-group  acquires  a  meaning  be- 
yond the  meaning  of  its  several  parts.  For  this  purpose 
phonetic  form  is  of  only  secondary  importance  and  the 
important  distinction  is  that  which  separates  syntactical 
function  from  word-meaning.  The  term  syntactical 
form  is  therefore  used  as  above,  to  cover  all  that  is  not 
function. 

The  word  function  has  probably  come  over  into  syntax 
from  physiology.  It  involves,  as  all  such  transferred 
terms  do,  a  figure  which  is  not  strictly  accurate  in  all 
its  details.  In  the  physiological  use  function  is  the 
peculiar  or  appropriate  action  of  an  organ  or  the  capac- 
ity for  such  action.  But  words  and  sentences  are  not 
organs ;  they  are  articulate  sounds  uttered  in  connection 
with  a  train  of  thought  as  a  means  of  exciting  a  similar 
train  of  thought  in  the  mind  of  another  person.  In  this 
operation  there  is  nothing  organic  and  nothing,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  functional.  There  is  a  certain 
train  of  thought  suggested  and  this  is  called  the  mean- 
ing of  the  sentence.     Where  then  is  the  function  ? 

To  answer  this  question  it  is  necessary  to  revert  to 
the  nature  of  the  concept-group  and  to  recall  again  the 

199 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

fact  that  it  includes  two  kinds  of  concepts,  differing 
somewhat  in  their  nature  and  in  the  clearness  with 
which  they  are  felt  in  consciousness.  The  substantive 
concepts  (p.  45)  are  the  more  distinct,  they  correspond 
more  nearly  to  objects  perceived  by  the  senses  and  they 
find  earlier  and  easier  expression  in  language.  It  is  the 
substantive  concepts  which  constitute  word-meanings. 
The  concepts  of  relation,  the  transitive  concepts,  are 
less  vividly  felt  or  the  conscious  attention  is  less  easily 
directed  upon  them  and  they  have  been  later  in  finding 
definite  expression  in  language.  It  is  of  the  expression 
of  these  concepts,  of  the  expression  of  relations,  that 
the  word  function  is  used. 

The  distinction  between  word-meaning  and  function 
is  not,  however,  made  quite  clear  by  saying  that  the 
substantive  concepts  are  the  meanings  of  words  and  the 
transitive  elements  are  functions,  for  there  has  been 
in  language  a  constant  transfer  of  words  from  the  ex- 
pression of  substantive  concepts  to  the  expression  of 
relation.  This  is  true  of  all  conjunctions,  so  far  as  their 
history  is  known,  and  of  prepositions.  In  some  earlier 
use  they  were  adverbs  or  pronouns  or  verbs  and  by  a 
gradual  shift  they  have  lost  their  "meaning"  and  have 
assumed,  wholly  or  in  part,  a  "  function."  The  word- 
meaning  of  et  or  sed  is  a  relation,  which  is  felt  with 
almost  the  same  definiteness  as  the  meaning  of  uirtus  or 
uis  or  consul.  In  the  case  of  such  complete  conjunctions 
word-meaning  and  function  are  identical.  But  other 
conjunctions  or  prepositions  which  still  retain  in  part 
their  original  use  like  modo,  licet,  supra,  prope,  may  be 
said  to  have  at  one  time  word-meaning,  at  another  time 
function,  or,  more  accurately,  to  have  both  together, 
since  the  substantive  concept  and  the  transitive  concept 
have  elements  in  common.     In  all  these  cases,  where 

200 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

single  words  have  been  transferred  to  the  expression 
of  relation  the  use  of  the  term  function  is  somewhat 
inexact. 

The  employment  of  the  term  with  reference  to  in- 
flected words  seems  at  first  sight  more  precise  ;  the 
meaning  of  mensd  is  "  table,"  the  function  is,  e.  //.,  loca- 
tive. But  this  assumes  that  the  relation  is  and  has 
always  been  expressed  by  the  termination,  an  assump- 
tion which  is  not  borne  out  by  the  facts.  It  is  rather  to 
be  assumed  that  the  word-meaning  is  the  determining 
element  in  making  die  an  expression  of  temporal  relation, 
humi  a  locative  and  gladio  an  instrumental.  The  func- 
tion is  in  part,  certainly,  limited  and  fixed  by  the  mean- 
ing of  the  stem  and,  in  so  far  as  this  is  the  case,  the 
separation  of  word-meaning  and  function  is  impossible. 
With  reference,  therefore,  to  some  inflected  words  — 
and  probably  to  the  greater  number  —  the  term  function 
is  liable  to  lead  to  confusion  of  thought  and  can  safely 
be  used  only  in  a  general  way. 

The  function  of  a  word-group  is  the  expression  of  the 
relation  of  its  concept-group  to  another  concept-group. 
In  part,  this  may  depend  upon  a  word  which  introduces 
or  "  governs  "  the  group,  a  conjunction  or  a  preposition, 
and  to  this  extent  the  function  of  the  group  is  dependent 
upon  the  function  or  the  meaning  of  one  of  its  members. 
Thus  cum  or  si  determines  the  function  of  the  clause 
which  it  introduces.  But  in  part  the  function  of 
a  clause  is  conditioned  upon  its  being  grasped  as 
a  whole,  that  is,  upon  the  clearness  with  which  the 
unanalyzed  whole,  the  group-concept,  finds  expression. 
For  relation  cannot  be  felt  except  when  the  unity  of 
each  of  the  related  concepts  is  felt.  Through  these 
two  means,  the  introducing  word  and  the  unification  of 
the  group,  the  function  may  be  expressed  and  may  be 

201 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

quite   accurately   distinguished    from    the    content  or 
meaning. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  function,  whether  of  a 
single  word,  of  an  inflected  form  or  of  a  word-group,  is 
in  itself  but  vaguely  defined.  Such  definition  as  it  has 
comes  from  word-meaning;  the  function  of  a  conjunc- 
tion is  most  clear,  because  function  and  meaning  are 
identical ;  the  function  of  a  case-form  is  less  definite  and 
that  of  a  word-group  is  still  less  defined,  unless  it  gets 
definition  from  the  meaning  of  an  introducing  word. 
The  relation  of  two  clauses  in  parataxis  illustrates  the 
vagueness  of  function,  when  it  is  suggested  merely  by 
the  unified  word-groups  without  the  aid  of  the  meaning 
of  a  conjunction.  Lacking  the  definition  which  is  given 
by  the  meaning  of  the  stem,  an  ablative  may  suggest 
cause,  manner  and  means,  all  at  once,  and  a  clause  may 
perform  both  final  and  consecutive  functions  or  may  be 
at  the  same  time  a  clause  of  time  and  of  condition.  It 
must  be  said  in  general  of  function  that  its  clearness  is 
in  inverse  ratio  to  the  degree  to  which  it  can  be  sepa- 
rated from  word-meaning. 

The  classification  of  syntactical  material,  while  it  has 
usually  been  based  either  upon  function  or  upon  form, 
has  varied  somewhat  according  to  the  object  aimed  at. 
For  pedagogical  purposes  the  usual  arrangement  is 
functional.  This  is  partly  a  matter  of  tradition,  now 
apparently  somewhat  weakened,  and  partly  because  a 
grammar  does  not  so  much  present  the  material  of 
syntax  as  its  doctrines.  A  grammar  is  made  up  in 
large  part  of  rules  to  serve  for  the  interpretation  of  a 
foreign  language  or,  in  the  older  Latin  grammars,  to 
teach  the  pupil  also  how  to  write  Latin.  For  these  pur- 
poses classification  is  a  means  of  presentation,  not  a  tool 

202 


FORM,  FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

of  investigation,  and  the  question  what  method  of  clas- 
sification is  best  adapted  to  this  purpose  is  one  to  be 
answered  by  the  experience  of  teachers.  A  functional 
arrangement,  if  it  is  clearly  stilted,  has  a  certain  unity 
of  system  and  permits  easier  parallels  between  different 
languages,  especially  between  Greek  and  Latin.  There 
is,  however,  a  tendency  at  present  in  school  grammars 
to  substitute  a  formal  arrangement  and  it  is  to  be  hoped 
that  this  method  may  be  fully  tested  in  the  class-room. 

There  is  a  considerable  amount  of  work  upon  single 
authors  which  is  usually  regarded  as  syntactical,  but 
which  is  quite  as  distinctly  stylistic  in  its  object.  It  is 
found  chiefly  in  doctor-dissertations  upon  single  cases 
or  tenses  or  prepositions  or  conjunctions,  as  used  by 
one  author  or  a  group  of  authors.  On  a  larger  scale 
Tacitus  has  been  thus  treated  by  Draeger,  Nepos  by 
Lupus  and  Livy  by  Kuhnast  and  by  Riemann.  These 
works,  however,  are  not  greatly  concerned  with  syntac- 
tical theory  or  law ;  they  afford  excellent  material  for 
theory,  but  their  real  object  is  the  study  of  an  author's 
style  by  comparing  it  in  detail  either  with  general 
usage  or  with  the  style  of  same  other  author.  The 
best  system  of  arrangement  is  therefore  one  which 
most  facilitates  comparison  with  other  similar  collec- 
tions and  for  this  purpose  some  familiar  arrangement  is 
convenient.  Draeger's  scheme  is  most  frequently  fol- 
lowed in  Latin  and  no  doubt  the  impulse  to  this  kind  of 
work  was  given  chiefly  by  his  Historical  Syntax.  This 
fixed  scheme  is  better  adapted  to  such  purposes  than  any 
novelt}^,  even  though  the  latter  might  have  scientific 
advantages. 

Classification  for  scientific  purposes,  as  a  tool  for  the 
investigation  of  a  mass  of  syntactical  material  and  a 
means  of   discovering  the  laws  of  syntax,   is  of  such 

203 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

importance  that  the  two  systems  in  use,  the  functional 
and  the  formal,  deserve  deliberate  consideration  with 
reference  to  the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of 
each. 

The  advantages  of  classification  by  function  lie  chiefly 
in  its  systematic  character.  It  presents  the  facts  in  a  logi- 
cal scheme,  showing  their  relation  to  each  other  and  giv- 
ing to  each  function  its  proper  place  in  the  whole  scheme 
of  expression.  Thus  a  functional  presentation  of  the 
tenses  shows  the  expressions  for  past,  present  and  future, 
for  action  beginning,  continued,  complete  ;  clauses  divide 
into  independent  and  subordinate,  and  subordinate 
clauses  into  temporal,  causal,  conditional,  etc.,  or  into 
substantive,  adjective,  and  adverbial.  There  is  a  com- 
pleteness and  an  ideal  simplicity  and  clearness  in  such  a 
scheme  as  is  given,  for  example,  in  Draeger's  table  of 
contents  to  Vol.  II,  which  is  not  to  be  undervalued.  In 
the  study  of  language  the  mass  of  facts  is  so  enormous 
and  the  difficulty  of  reducing  them  to  order  is  so  great 
that  the  danger  of  over-theorizing  may  well  be  risked  for 
the  sake  of  arriving  at  some  kind  of  system. 

A  second  advantage  of  functional  classification  is  the 
directness  with  which  it  leads  toward  what  must  be 
recognized  as  the  ultimate  end  of  all  linguistic  study. 
In  the  discredit  into  which  logical  grammar  has  fallen, 
the  fact  is  sometimes  overlooked  that  the  admeasure- 
ment of  language  by  logical  standards  is  a  perfectly 
legitimate  and  indeed  a  necessary  step  to  the  complete 
understanding  of  its  nature.  The  logical  standards 
supply  a  final  test  of  the  degree  to  which  language  suc- 
ceeds in  fulfilling  its  mission.  Or  perhaps  it  is  more 
correct  to  say  that  the  comparison  of  language  with  the 
ideal  standards  of  logic  affords  a  measure  of  the  differ- 
ence between  adequate  expression  —  which  is  all  that 

204 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

language  attains  —  and  absolutely  precise  expression. 
To  apply  this  test  is  to  use  one  of  the  means  of  under- 
standing the    limitations  and  the  nature   of   Language. 

This  is  the  reason  why  the  results  of  functional  syntax 
seem  to  have  so  great  a  degree  of  finality.  Winn  a 
study  of  a  certain  form  of  clause  results  in  the  con- 
clusion that  it  is  a  clause  of  purpose,  this  result  seems 
to  be  the  end  of  all  question  in  regard  to  the  nature  of 
the  clause. 

A  third  direction  in  which  functional  observation  and 
classification  may  be  used  to  advantage  is  as  a  means  to 
the  discovery  of  formal  peculiarities.  In  working  over  a 
considerable  mass  of  syntactical  material  —  two  or  three 
hundred  cases  —  it  will  at  times  be  difficult  to  discern 
variations  in  form  upon  which  a  formal  subdivision 
can  be  based.  Formally  the  cases  look  all  alike  or  else 
the}'  present  a  bewildering  variety  of  form  in  which  it 
is  impossible  to  find  a  clue  to  the  significant  variations. 
In  this  situation  it  is  sometimes  easier  to  begin  with  the 
observation  of  functional  differences  and  subdivisions 
in  the  confident  expectation  that  this  method  of  pro- 
cedure will  lead  in  the  end  to  the  detection  also  of 
formal  differences. 

The  advantages  of  functional  syntax,  it  will  be  seen, 
are  chiefly  the  result  of  its  systematic  and  logical  char- 
acter and  appear  almost  wholly  in  the  presentation  of 
results.  Its  defects  are  most  apparent  and  most  serious 
when  it  is  regarded  as  a  tool  of  the  scientific  investi- 
gator, as  a  means  to  the  establishment  of  historical 
sequence  and  the  discovery  of  laws  of  development. 

The  defects  of  functional  classification  must  be  stated 
at  greater  length,  since  it  is  the  system  in  common  use 
and  its  deficiencies  are  hidden  under  the  sanction  of 
tradition. 

205 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

1.  Classifications  based  upon  function  are  vague  and 
consequently  unstable,  that  is,  they  admit  of  wide  diver- 
gence of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  proper  class  to  which 
a  particular  instance  should  be  assigned.  Thus  differ- 
ent commentators  upon  a  passage  hesitate  between  the 
dative  of  advantage  and  the  ethical  dative,  between 
ablative  of  manner  and  ablative  of  means,  between 
ablative  of  means  and  instrumental  ablative,  even  when 
there  is  no  question  in  regard  to  the  interpretation  of 
the  passage.  In  the  classification  and  naming  of  modal 
uses  there  is  even  more  divergence  of  opinion.  No  two 
scholars  could  take  a  thousand  instances  of  the  subjunc- 
tive at  random  and  divide  them  between  the  two  ordi- 
nary classes  of  volitive  and  potential  and  expect  the 
results  to  agree.  The  system  in  use  fails  to  meet  the 
most  elementary  requirement  of  a  scheme  of  classifi- 
cation, namely,  that  it  should  be  clear  and  stable  and 
that  under  it  species  and  varieties  should  be  identified 
with  reasonable  exactness. 

This  failure  is  not  due  to  lack  of  care  or  ingenuity  in 
the  application  of  the  system,  but  to  the  radical  defect 
of  vagueness  in  the  characteristics  of  the  classes.  Func- 
tions are  not  divided  from  each  other  by  sharp  lines,  but 
by  neutral  belts.  The  simplest  kind  of  functional  divi- 
sion, like  that  between  coordination  and  subordination, 
is  not  precise ;  the  subordinating  function  is  a  relation 
which  varies  almost  infinitely  in  closeness  and  strength, 
from  the  fullest  incorporation  of  one  clause  into  another 
to  relations  which  are  so  near  to  pure  coordination 
that  they  are  expressed  by  coordinating  conjunctions. 
So  purpose  and  result  run  together  and  inference,  mo- 
tive and  efficient  cause,  as  colors  shade  into  each  other 
in  the  spectrum.  The  functional  characteristics  of  words 
and  word-groups  are  most  certainly  of  the  very  highest 

206 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

importance  ;  they  are  indeed  more  important  to  the  stu- 
dent of  syntax  than  any  other  characteristics ;  but  they 
are  an  unstable  foundation  for  classification.  A  system 
which  uses  function  for  its  measuring-rod  will  always 
be  shifting  and  uncertain. 

2.  A  partial  recognition  of  the  above-mentioned  defect 
has  led  to  some  attempts  to  remedy  it.  It  has  been 
thought  that  the  difficulty  lies  in  a  lack  of  precision 
in  the  definitions,  and  that  it  might  be  removed  by  the 
use  of  sharper  definitions.  But  this  is  an  error.  The 
variety  and  instability  lie  in  the  functions  themselves, 
not  in  the  definitions.  This  is,  on  the  whole  and  in  the 
long  run,  so  plain  that  individual  and  clear-cut  distinc- 
tions between  functions,  e.  g.,  between  relative  clauses 
of  characteristic  and  relative  clauses  of  result,  are  rarely 
acceptable  to  any  one  but  the  maker  of  them,  because 
the  precision  is  attained  by  the  omission  of  some  char- 
acteristics. Precise  definition  of  function  has  the  fur- 
ther disadvantage  of  leading  to  forced  interpretation 
and  to  interpretation  by  translation.  Being  founded 
upon  some  one  or  two  characteristics  of  the  function, 
and,  naturally,  upon  prominent  characteristics,  it  is 
almost  inevitable  that  the  maker  of  the  definition 
should  see  those  characteristics  and  only  those  wher- 
ever he  looks.  Thus  all  subjunctives  come  to  look 
polemical  or  all  Active,  all  potentials  are  translated  by 
would,  all  result  clauses  contain  a  potential.  But  the 
difficulty  lies  in  the  system,  not  in  the  definitions.  They 
are  as  precise  as  definitions  of  large  functions  ought 
to  be. 

3.  One  of  the  most  serious  defects  in  the  systems  of 
functional  classification  at  present  in  use  is  the  great 
extent  of  the  classes  and  the  lack  of  subdivisions. 
Thus  purpose  is  treated  as  a  single  function,  without 

207 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

subdivision  except  that  between  positive  and  negative  ; 
few  grammars  subdivide  the  function  of  cause ;  the 
sub-classes  of  conditional  sentences  are  few  in  number 
and  are  really  more  formal  than  functional.  With  terms 
so  general  as  these  the  investigator  cannot  do  precise 
work.  Careful  observation  is  discouraged,  because  no 
careful  observation  is  necessary,  and  the  whole  syntac- 
tical study  ends  with  the  placing  of  a  particular  in- 
stance under  one  of  these  broad  classes,  no  attention 
being  paid  to  the  minute  differences  in  the  understand- 
ing of  which  lies  the  possibility  of  all  discovery. 

To  some  extent  this  defect  is  being  remedied.  Quite 
recent  American  work  has  shown  that  functional  syn- 
tacticists  feel  the  need  of  more  subdivision,  e.  g.,  of  the 
characterizing  qui  clause,  and  some  years  ago  the  pro- 
grams of  Imme  *  gave  an  illustration  of  the  excellent 
results  which  could  be  reached  by  a  functional  subdi- 
vision of  the  interrogative  sentence,  as  compared  with 
the  older  triple  division.  The  most  brilliant  example 
of  functional  classification  carried  out  systematically 
into  the  extreme  of  subdivision  is  that  afforded  by  the 
programs  of  Hentze,  mentioned  above  (pp.  113  f.),  on 
parataxis  in  Homer.  Functional  treatment  of  this  kind, 
so  free  from  sweeping  terms,  so  detailed  and  precise, 
does  not  yield  in  effectiveness  to  any  formal  classifica- 
tion. A  glance  at  the  pamphlets  will  show  the  reason. 
Each  functional  subdivision  is  also  described  in  formal 
terms ;  the  mode  and  tense,  the  pronominal  forms,  the 
repetitions  of  words  from  a  previous  clause,  the  order  of 
clauses,  in  short,  all  the  formal  elements  are  noted  quite 
as  carefully  as  is  the  function,  and  the  functional  classi- 
fication is  in  fact  a  formal  classification  also.  One  may 
hazard  the  guess  that  in  working  it  out  the  author  really 

l  See  p.  32. 

208 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

made  use  first  of  the  formal  distinctions,  though  for  Ins 
purpose  he  finally  placed  the  functional  characteristics 
in  the  foreground.  To  some  considerable  degree  the 
same  thing  may  be  said  of  Imme's  programs. 

The  truth  is  that  an  ideal  classification  is  both  formal 
and  functional.  When  the  utmost  had  been  done  in  the 
direction  of  subdivision,  so  that  the  most  minute  pecu- 
liarities had  been  made  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  sub-classes, 
the  result  would  be  to  bring  the  two  systems  into  har- 
mony. Each  species  would  have  its  carefully  defined 
form  and  its  correspondingly  restricted  function.  But 
it  woidd  still  be  true  that  to  reach  this  ideal  correspond- 
ence and  harmony  the  path  of  formal  observation  and 
classification  is  both  surer  and  easier. 

4.  Connected  with  the  use  of  large  functional  classes 
and  made  more  dangerous  by  it  is  the  tendency  to  rea- 
son about  functions  as  if  they  were  entities,  as  if  they 
influenced  other  functions  or  were  influenced  by  them 
or  were  derived  from  similar  functions  or  became  the 
source  of  other  derived  functions.  This  is  particularly 
frequent  in  modal  syntax,  and  begins  in  fact  with  the 
treatment  of  the  subjunctive  mode  itself  as  an  existing 
reality  instead  of  a  general  term  applied  to  a  number  of 
related  forms  and  functions.  The  most  striking  —  and, 
it  may  fairly  be  said,  astonishing  —  illustration  of  this 
is  in  the  treatment  of  what  is  called  "  the  potential.*' 
Here  are  a  dozen  or  more  of  different  word-groups  hav- 
ing in  common  the  presence  of  a  subjunctive  form  and 
having  a  common  functional  element,  the  expression  of 
an  opinion  in  regard  to  an  imagined  or  ideal  or  contin- 
gent act.  But  in  syntactical  work  "  the  potential "'  is 
said  to  be  derived  from  something  or  something  else  is 
said  to  be  derived  from  it,  as  if  it  were  a  distinct  entity 
instead  of  being  a  name  for  an  abstraction.  The  result 
14  209 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

is  that,  in  the  first  place,  the  other  members  of  the  word- 
group  are  wholly  or  largely  overlooked  and,  in  the  second 
place,  the  distinctive  elements  in  the  several  functions 
are  forgotten  and  attention  is  directed  solely  upon  the 
common  element.  Thus  the  individuality  of  word-groups 
and  of  their  functions  is  lost  sight  of  and  the  whole  pro- 
cess of  reasoning  becomes  a  kind  of  ingenious  syntacti- 
cal algebra,  in  which  symbols  have  displaced  realities. 

5.  This  leads  to  still  another  tendency  which,  if  not 
inherent  in  the  functional  method,  is  at  least  commonly 
associated  with  it,  namely,  the  tendency  to  attach  the 
function  of  a  word-group  to  some  single  member  of  the 
group,  usually  an  inflected  word  or  a  conjunction. 
Thus  it  is  common  in  grammars  and  in  syntactical  work 
to  speak  of  the  deliberative  subjunctive  and  to  say  that 
it  is  derived  from  the  volitive  (or  the  potential)  and  is 
the  source  from  which  other  "subjunctives,"  e.  g.,  the 
subjunctive  in  indirect  questions,  are  derived.  But  the 
function  belongs  to  the  whole  word-group.  In  the 
typical  form  quid  ego  nunc  faeiam?  each  word  con- 
tributes to  the  total  meaning,  though  the  exact  force  of 
ego  is  less  clear  than  that  of  the  others.  If  either  ego 
or  nunc  is  omitted,  as  is  sometimes  the  -case,  the  func- 
tion is  less  distinct;  if  both  are  omitted,  the  question  is 
not  necessarily  dubitative.  The  subjunctive  form  also 
contributes  to  the  expression  of  the  function  of  the 
group,  though  it  is  not  essential,  since  the  same  function 
is  occasionally  expressed  by  sentences  with  the  present 
indicative.  But  deliberation  cannot  be  expressed  by 
any  one  of  the  four  words  alone  and  is  not  therefore  a 
function  of  any  one  of  them  alone.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  the  deliberative  or  dubitative  subjunctive;  to 
use  the  term  is  to  attribute  the  function  of  the  word- 
group  to  a  single  member  of  the  group. 

210 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

Another  and  more  striking  illustration  of  this  ten- 
dency is  given  in  Hale's  Anticipatory  Subjunctive.1 
The  subjunctive  is  used  occasionally  in  subordinate 
clauses  after  ueniet  aetas  cum,  ueniet  iterwm  (dies)  qui, 
ueniet  aliquod  tempus  quod  ;  an  example  in  full  is 

Alter  erit  turn  Tij>hys,  el  altera  quae  uehat  Argo 
Delectos  heroas. 

Verg.  Eel.  4,  34. 

Futurity  is  in  all  these  cases  plainly  a  function  of  the 
word-group,  of  the  whole  sentence.  So  far  as  it  is 
distinctly  attached  to  any  words,  it  is  to  the  verb  in  the 
future  indicative,  which  in  nearly  all  cases  stands  in  an 
emphatic  position,  and  to  the  noun  of  time  and  the 
adverb  (turn,  iterum)  or  some  other  word  (alter,  altera, 
lustris  labentibus).  These  are  the  members  of  the  group 
which  contribute  the  strong  future  function.  Into  such 
a  group  a  subjunctive  form  may  be  inserted,  because 
there  is  in  many  subjunctive  uses  an  implication  of 
futurity;  this  is  the  condition,  the  common  element, 
which  permits  the  use  of  a  subjunctive  form  in  a  group 
strongly  marked  with  future  meaning.  But  the  reason 
for  selecting  a  subjunctive  rather  than  a  future  indica- 
tive is  quite  different;  it  is  to  express  more  clearly  the 
element  of  destiny,  of  purpose  (in  the  broad  sense),  of 
fate.  It  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  expressing  more  fully 
the  future  idea,  already  epiite  sufficiently  expressed, 
that  the  subjunctive  is  used,  but  on  the  contrary  for  the 
purpose  of  differentiating  the  whole  concept-group  from 
simple  futurity  and  adding  another  slightly  different 
element  to  the  total  meaning.  Hale's  method  here 
seems  to  me  to  involve  the  error  of  attributing  a  function 
of  the  whole  sentence  to  a  single  member  of  it,  with  the 

1  Chicago,  1894,  pp.  20,  21. 
211 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

further  consequence  of  erecting  an  occasional  function 
of  a  group  into  a  permanent  function  of  a  mode.  Into 
this  error,  if  it  be  an  error,  he  is  led  by  the  fact  that  he 
is  using  a  functional  classification,  to  the  neglect  of  for- 
mal characteristics. 

6.  Classification  by  function  brings  together  objects 
which  belong  apart  and  separates  objects  which  belong 
together. 

This  is  to  some  extent  true  of  all  classification.  A 
division  of  animal  life  by  habitat,  into  land  animals  and 
water  animals,  for  instance,  brings  together  warm- 
blooded and  cold-blooded  animals.  A  classification  by 
bony  structure  neglects  color,  habits  of  life,  edible  qual- 
ities, etc.  This  is  a  matter  of  course ;  no  basis  of  classi- 
fication serves  all  purposes.  Every  permanent  system 
of  classification  is  to  some  extent  conventional.  But 
there  are  degrees  of  suitability  and  usefulness.  In  the 
division  of  subordinate  clauses  motive,  efficient  cause 
and  inference  are  thrown  together  and  clauses  intro- 
duced by  quod,  quia,  quoniam,  cum  and  quando,  taking 
sometimes  the  indicative,  sometimes  the  subjunctive, 
are  treated  as  if  they  were  all  alike.  Under  purpose  we 
put  together  clauses  with  id,  ne,  quo,  quin  (and  some- 
times quominus*)  and  we  might  include  qui,  the  gerund 
or  the  gerundive  and  the  supine.  The  list  of  conjunc- 
tions brought  together  under  the  vague  term  concession 
is  especially  remarkable:  quamquam,  quamlibet,  quam- 
uis,  quantum  uis,  ut,  ne,  cum,  licet,  etsi,  tametsi, 
etiamsi;  this  is,  from  the  functional  point  of  view  and 
for  the  purposes  of  a  grammar,  a  perfectly  correct  list, 
but  from  the  historical  point  of  view  and  for  scientific 
purposes  it  is  a  mere  jumble  of  incongruities. 

On  the  other  hand  functional  classification  separates 
things  which  ought  to  be  kept  together.     The  si-clause 

212 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

of  condition,  the  si-clause  of  concession,  viiror  %%  and  si 
quidem  are  to  be  found  under  four  different  functions. 
So  the  uses  of  ut  are  scattered  and  metuo  ne  is  in  one 
place,  abeo  ne  in  another  and  ne  clauses  of  result  in  a 
third,  if  they  are  not  entirely  ignored  on  the  functional 
ground  that  all  result  clauses  are  potential  and  thai  no 
potential  takes  ne.  But  the  history  of  the  n-clause,  of 
the  Mi-clause  or  of  the  ne-clause  is  one  connected  history 
and  a  classification  which  in  effect  denies  this  continuity 
is  a  mistaken  and  harmful  system. 

If  it  be  asked  how  a  system  so  defective  comes  to  be 
employed  by  investigators,  the  answer  is  to  be  found, 
first,  in  the  real  value  of  functional  classification  for  cer- 
tain purposes  and,  second,  in  the  history  of  syntactical 
method. 

The  real  and  lasting  value  of  the  functional  treatment 
of  sentences  has  been  in  part  pointed  out;  it  lends  itself 
admirably  to  a  clear  and  logical  exhibition  of  the  facts 
of  thought-relations.  But  beside  this  it  has  been  a  most 
useful  means  of  teaching  exact  and  critical  translation, 
either  into  Latin  or  from  Latin  into  the  vernacular.  At 
a  time  when  "natural"  methods  are  so  strongly  urged 
and  so  widely  used  as  they  are  at  present,  it  is  worth 
while  to  dwell  for  a  moment  upon  the  other  side.  The 
necessary  middle  step  in  translation  is  a  thorough  com- 
prehension of  the  thought,  a  comprehension  which  goes 
deeper  than  the  forms  in  which  thought  expresses  itself 
in  any  one  language.  Without  this,  translation  will 
not  be  flexible  or  idiomatic ;  it  will  be  tinged  with  the 
color  of  the  language  from  which  the  translation  is  made. 
The  failure  to  secure  such  a  thorough  comprehension  is 
one  cause  of  the  stiff  and  mechanical  translations  to 
which .  teachers  are  obliged  to  listen  in  the  class-room, 

213 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

as  it  is  the  source  of  much  that  is  unclassical  in  modern 
Latin.  Now  to  this  kind  of  conscious  and  elaborate 
comprehension  of  the  underlying  thought  nothing  con- 
tributes more  directly  than  the  functional  analysis  of  the 
sentence.  When  a  thorough  logical  analysis  is  based 
upon  a  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  words  and  is  fol- 
lowed by  a  synthesis,  a  re-composition  of  the  thought,  it 
results  in  an  understanding  of  the  sentence  such  as  no 
"natural"  method  can  give,  an  understanding  which  is 
the  solid  foundation  for  criticism,  for  interpretation  and 
for  translation,  and  which  is  in  itself  a  valuable  means 
of  mental  training.  It  is  in  part  the  recognition  of  this 
kind  of  value  which  has  led  to  the  retention  of  func- 
tional classification  in  grammars  and  in  the  school-room. 
And  the  fact  that  almost  all  syntacticists  are  also 
teachers  has  led  to  the  use  of  the  same  system  in  inves- 
tigation, where  its  advantages  disappear  and  its  defects 
become  prominent. 

A  second  cause  which  has  led  to  the  retention  of 
functional  classification  in  the  science  of  syntax  is  to  be 
found  in  the  history  of  syntactical  method.  It  would  be 
incorrect  to  say  that  this  system  is  purely  a  logical  sys- 
tem, but  it  is  correct  to  say  that  it  is  the  product  of 
logical  and  metaphysical  views  of  language.  The  func- 
tions upon  which  the  classes  are  based  —  time,  place, 
cause,  purpose,  etc.  — have  not  been  selected  and  named 
for  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  now  used.  Some  of 
them  are  categories  of  thought  established  by  Aristotle 
and  employed  in  logical  systems  down  to  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  others  are  terms  which  acquired 
their  meaning  and  importance  in  metaphysics,  and  they 
have  come  over  into  syntax  and  held  their  place  there 
primarily  as  a  result  of  the  influence  of  logic  and  meta- 
physics  upon  all  thought  and   especially   upon   Latin 

214 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

grammar.  This  is  the  explanation  of  some  of  the  < nidi- 
ties  of  our  functional  classification.  It  is  for  this  reason 
that  cum  clauses  with  the  subjunctive  expressing  an 
inference  and  quod  clauses  with  the  indicative  express- 
ing a  motive  are  classed  together  under  the  general  head 
of  cause;  cause  was  an  important  logical  and  meta- 
physical category,  while  inference  and  motive  were  not. 
Our  syntax  has  therefore  to  this  day  disregarded  in  clas- 
sification both  the  formal  and  the  psychological  differ- 
ences between  the  cum  clause  and  the  quod  clause  under 
the  influence  of  the  metaphysical  tradition.  In  the  same 
way  we  have  a  functional  distinction  between  the  abla- 
tive of  time  and  the  ablative  of  place,  though  in  truth 
the  functions,  so  far  as  they  can  be  separated  from  the 
stem-meaning,  are  identical  and  the  only  difference  in 
meaning  is  in  the  words  themselves.  It  is  a  curious 
fact  that,  in  spite  of  its  generally  logical  character,  the 
scheme  should  make  no  separate  class  for  clauses  of 
place ;  this  is  of  course  because  such  clauses  call  for  no 
special  "rules,"  as  the  clauses  of  time  do,  and  is  an 
illustration  of  the  influence  of  teaching  upon  science. 
All  this  does  not  mean  that  the  functional  system  is 
now  properly  to  be  called  a  logical  or  metaphysical  sys- 
tem nor  that  it  has  been  uninfluenced  by  psychological 
and  formal  considerations,  but  only  that  it  is  an  inheri- 
tance from  logic  and  metaphysics  and  that  a  large  part 
of  its  hold  upon  syntax  is  in  fact  the  tenacious  hold  of 
the  traditional. 

It  is  antecedently  probable  that  a  system  which  has 
been  unconsciously  shaped  by  various  and  incompatible 
influences  will  be  less  suited  to  entirely  new  uses  than  a 
system  which  is  the  product  of  the  newer  aims  or  is 
deliberately  devised  to  meet  the  newer  demands.  But 
it  is  a  fact,  which  should  receive  the  fullest  recognition, 

215 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

that  functional  classification  has  been  in  part  accommo- 
dated to  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  the  aims 
and  consequently  in  the  methods  of  syntax.  But  it  is 
only  a  partial  accommodation.  These  changes  are  the 
result  of  the  rise  of  syntax  to  the  rank  of  an  independent 
science.  The  service  which  it  may  render  to  interpre- 
tation and  translation  and  its  value  as  an  educational 
tool  are  not,  from  this  point  of  view,  considerations  of 
the  first  importance;  it  must  seek  its  own  ends  by 
methods  of  its  own.  These  ends  are  at  present  psycho- 
logical interpretation  and  historical  explanation,  and  to 
neither  of  these  is  a  functional  system  adapted. 

It  will  no  doubt  be  said  by  scholars  who  use  a  func- 
tional method  that  the  content  of  the  terms  for  functions 
has  changed  and  that  purpose,  cause,  time,  place  are 
now  employed  in  syntax  with  a  psychological  meaning. 
This  is  true,  but  it  is  not  quite  the  whole  truth.  The 
difference  between  logic,  metaphysics  and  psychology  is 
in  the  point  of  view;  the  objects  studied,  the  material 
of  these  sciences,  are  the  same,  namely,  the  soul  and  the 
laws  of  its  working.  This  subject-matter  logic  exam- 
ines with  reference  to  the  forms  of  thinking,  and  meta- 
physics with  reference  to  the  laws  of  being;  the  object 
of  psychology  is  not  so  much  the  testing  of  spiritual 
and  mental  activity  by  reference  to  any  laws  as  the 
understanding  of  the  actual  process  in  its  details.  It 
may  be  said  that  logic  and  metaphysics  are  more  dis- 
tinctly classifying  and  testing  sciences,  while  psychology 
is  more  interested  in  the  understanding  of  activities. 
In  logic  the  end  sought  is  the  bringing  of  a  certain  kind 
of  mental  activity  under  a  certain  category;  in  psychol- 
ogy the  end  sought  is  the  detailed  knowledge  of  the 
mental  operation,  and  to  this  end  classification,  that  is, 
comparison  with   similar   mental   operations,  is  only  a 

216 


FORM,  FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

means,  a  mere  step  in  the  scientific  treatment,  a  con- 
venience, not  an  end.  Now  in  this  respect  func- 
tional classification  more  nearly  resembles  logic  than 
psychology.  The  placing  of  a  certain  clause  in  the 
category  of  purpose  or  of  cause  is  the  end,  the  object 
aimed  at.  About  such  questions,  either  the  number 
and  naming  of  the  categories  to  be  employed,  as  in 
regard  to  conditional  sentences,  or  the  placing  of  a  par- 
ticular clause  in  this  or  that  category,  the  discussions  of 
functional  syntacticists  center.  The  inevitable  result 
of  over-attention  to  classification  is  a  diversion  of  atten- 
tion from  details.  It  has  been,  to  take  an  example, 
beyond  question  a  gain  to  have  will  and  wish  brought 
forward  as  the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Latin  subjunc- 
tive and  a  further  gain  to  have  the  potential  meaning 
regarded  as  another  distinct  function.  These  lend 
themselves  to  psychological  treatment  somewhat  more 
easily  than  the  older  meanings  of  subordination  or  sub- 
jectivity, though  the  fact  is  sometimes  overlooked  that 
even  these  terms  may  have  a  psychological  content. 
But  the  discussions  looking  toward  the  placing  of  the 
various  subjunctive  sentences  in  one  or  another  of  these 
classes  have  contributed  very  little  to  psychological  inter- 
pretation. At  its  worst  it  has  consisted  in  translating 
each  subjunctive  by  some  English  auxiliary  verb  and  on 
this  basis  settling  its  classification;  at  its  best  it  consists 
in  finding  in  a  particular  case  the  element  of  will  or 
wish  or  of  the  potential  and  on  this  ground  assigning  it 
to  its  appropriate  class.  When  it  happens  that  two  of 
these  elements  are  present  at  once,  discussion  follows,  a 
fruitless  discussion  because  the  shield  is  golden  on  one 
side  and  silver  on  the  other.  It  is,  indeed,  quite  inevi- 
table that,  starting  with  these  very  general  and  imper- 
fectly distinguished  elements  of  meaning,  the  student 

217 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

should  be  satisfied  with  finding  one  or  another  of  them 
in  a  particular  form  and  should  regard  his  task  as  ended. 
But  the  defect  of  the  method  is  that  the  meaning  of  the 
form  may  contain  many  other  elements  beside  those  of 
will  and  wish,  the  omission  of  which  leaves  the  psycho- 
logical interpretation  incomplete  and  one-sided.  The 
mere  determination  of  the  presence  of  a  single  element, 
even  if  it  be  the  dominant  element,  contributes  but  little 
to  an  understanding  of  the  working  of  the  mind  as  ex- 
hibited in  modal  forms.  The  truth  is  that,  while  the 
content  of  the  terms  of  functional  classification  have 
been  in  some  measure  adjusted  to  psychological  treat- 
ment, the  actual  process  of  classification  shows  plain 
traces,  as  the  terms  themselves  do,  of  the  logical  origin 
of  the  whole  system.  The  movement  of  syntax  toward 
psychological  interpretation  will  require  either  a  much 
greater  adjustment  of  the  functional  system  or  a  com- 
plete abandonment  of  it  as  the  principal  tool  of  scientific 
discovery. 

The  deficiencies  of  functional  classification  as  a  means 
of  determining  historical  sequence  and  the  derivation  of 
one  function  from  another  are  partly  incidental,  having 
to  do  with  the  steps  of  the  reasoning,  partly  inherent  in 
the  system.  Taken  together  they  seem  to  the  writer  to 
make  historical  investigation  by  means  of  functional 
treatment  almost  an  impossible  combination  of  terms. 
This  statement  will  no  doubt  appear  to  functional  syn- 
tacticists  either  entirely  wrong  or  greatly  exaggerated. 
The  grounds  upon  which  it  is  made  are  therefore  given 
in  some  detail. 

Either  of  the  two  sides  of  language  may  be  made  the 
subject  of  investigation  with  reference  to  its  history; 
there  may  be  a  history  of  meaning  or  a  history  of  form, 
or,  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  more  practical  point,  we 

218 


FORM,  FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

may  trace  the  history  of  a  meaning  as  it  appears  in  a 
succession  of  different  forms  (words  or  word-groups)  <>r 
we  may  trace  the  history  of  a  form  as  it  expresses  a 
succession  of  different  meanings.  Either  procedure  is 
possible,  whether  with  .single  words  and  their  meanings 
or  with  word-groups.  In  semasiology  there  appears  to 
have  been  some  hesitation  between  the  two  methods;  at 
least  the  earlier  definitions  seem  to  suggest  that  by 
semasiology  was  meant  the  study  of  the  various  forms 
through  which  a  single  idea  had  been  expressed.  Tims 
it  would  be  possible  to  begin  with  the  concept  horse  and 
to  trace  its  expression  in  successive  words  or  with  the 
concept  to  say,  to  speak,  and  follow  down  the  different 
aspects  of  this  concept  as  reflected  in  the  many  verbs 
which  have  carried  the  elements  of  it.  But  the  diffi- 
culties of  this  kind  of  investigation  are  evident; 
it  would  require  great  precision  in  definition,  great 
knowledge  of  the  actual  meaning  of  words  and  a  very 
wide  range  of  information.  It  would  be  in  fact  possible 
only  after  the  foundation  had  been  laid  by  a  great  num- 
ber of  separate  studies,  each  dealing  with  a  single  verb 
—  with  orare,  dieere,  loqui,  narrare,  etc.  That  is,  it 
would  be  a  possible  and  an  interesting  manner  of  pre- 
senting the  results  of  other  studies,  but  as  a  method  of 
investigation  it  is  practically  impossible.  Historical 
semasiology  has  therefore  chosen  the  other  course;  it 
begins  with  the  word,  the  form,  and  follows  the  history 
of  the  word  out  into  its  varied  and  historically  connected 
meanings.  It  has  been  remarked  above  that  syntax, 
which  is  the  semasiology  of  word-forms  and  word-groups, 
has  much  to  learn  from  the  semasiology  of  words,  and 
this  is  one  of  the  lessons.  For  if  the  history  of  word- 
meanings  is  too  difficult  to  be  attacked  directly  and 
must  be  approached  through  the  lexical  method,  much 

219 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

more  is  the  history  of  concept-groups  and  concept- 
relations  too  difficult  to  be  followed  directly.  To  start 
with  the  concept  of  cause,  with  the  causal  function,  and 
follow  it  into  all  the  forms  in  which  it  finds  expression 
would  carry  the  investigator  into  word-meaning,  case- 
syntax,  the  syntax  of  prepositional  phrases,  the  syntax 
of  more  than  one  subordinate  clause  and  the  syntax  of 
the  paratactic  relation.  In  the  same  way  the  function 
of  purpose  is  expressed  by  single  words,  by  preposi- 
tional phrases,  by  participles,  by  gerunds  and  gerun- 
dives, by  the  supine,  by  several  different  clauses  and  by 
parataxis.  To  follow  the  history  of  the  expression  of 
either  of  these  functions  in  Latin  would  be  an  extremely 
difficult  task,  in  fact,  an  impossible  task  until  the  his- 
tory of  each  of  the  forms  of  expression  had  been  sepa- 
rately worked  out,  that  is,  until  formal  syntax  was 
complete. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  no  such  elaborate  and  systematic 
treatment  of  the  historical  expressions  of  function  is 
ever  attempted.  The  method  in  actual  use  is  a  compro- 
mise in  which  formal  and  functional  classes  are  used 
without  distinction.  The  ablative  of  cause  and  the 
ablative  after  utor  are  placed  side  by  side ;  the  dative  of 
advantage  (functional)  and  the  dative  after  similis 
(formal)  are  treated  alike;  the  functions  of  cause  or 
purpose  are  not  followed  out  into  all  their  expressions, 
by  case,  participle,  etc.,  but  are  studied  only  in  the 
clauses  of  cause  and  purpose,  with  cum,  quod,  qui,  ut, 
etc.  This  compromise  in  the  system  results  in  a  loss 
of  breadth  of  view  and  conscious  working  toward  a  dis- 
tinct end  without  the  compensating  advantages  that 
would  follow  a  frank  abandonment  of  functional  treat- 
ment. 

In  general,  the  directions  in  which  it  would  be  said  to 

220 


FORM,  FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

have  contributed  to  historical  syntax  are,  first,  in  the 
establishing  or  suggesting  of  a  historical  connection  be- 
tween some  of  the  cases  and  their  Indo-EuTopeaD  prede- 
cessors; second,  in  making  a  similar  connection  between 
certain  subjunctive  functions  and  the  corresponding 
original  meanings;  third,  in  connecting  the  uses  of  the 
subjunctive  in  certain  subordinate  clauses  with  corre- 
sponding uses  in  independent  sentences.  These  are 
really  reducible  to  two,  connections  with  Indo-Eurdpean 
functions  and  connections  between  subordinate  clauses 
and  independent  sentences.  As  to  the  first,  it  is  not  in 
point  here  to  repeat  what  has  been  said  above  (pp.  32  f .) 
as  to  its  speculative  character ;  the  question  is  rather  as 
to  the  method  used  in  suggesting  or  establishing  histor- 
ical connection.  That  method  is  based  upon  resem- 
blance in  function.  Its  fundamental  principle,  acted 
upon  but  not  formulated,  is  that  a  sufficient  degree  of 
resemblance  between  an  earlier  and  a  later  function  of 
an  inflected  form  indicates  a  historical  connection  be- 
tween the  two  functions.  In  this  way  a  resemblance 
between  the  ablative  of  cause  and  the  early  ablative 
proper  is  held  to  show  that  the  ablative  of  cause  is  de- 
scended from  the  Indo-European  ablative  and  the  abla- 
tive absolute  from  the  locative.  In  the  same  way  uses 
of  the  subjunctive,  named  t>y  their  function  volitive, 
anticipatory,  optative,  potential,  are  regarded  as  de- 
scended from  Indo-European  functions,  and  uses  of  the 
subjunctive  in  subordinate  clauses,  of  purpose,  result, 
cause,  time,  are  connected  with  one  or  another  function 
of  the  mode  in  independent  sentences.  A  brief  sketch 
of  the  method  which  he  follows  is  given  by  Hale J  in  a 
discussion  of  the  origin  of  the  dignus  qui  clause.  It 
consists  in  asking  the  question  "  Will  the  Volitive  idea 

1  In  a  periodical  called  The  Latin  Leaflet,  Brooklyn,  April  22,  1901. 

221 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

[or  the  Anticipatory  or  the  Potential]  supply  a  natural 
and  easy  starting-point  ?  "  and  answering  it  by  saying, 
"  It  seemed  to  me  that  it  did  ...  I  therefore  .  .  .  placed 
the  construction  under  the  head  of  the  Volitive."  Hale 
explains  further  that  he  changed  his  result  by  asking  the 
question  in  regard  to  the  "  Subjunctive  of  Obligation  or 
Propriety,"  which  seemed  to  offer  a  still  easier  starting- 
point,  but  the  method  is  the  same.  It  is  nothing  more 
than  seeking  for  a  resemblance  as  close  as  possible  be- 
tween two  uses  of  the  subjunctive,  in  independent  sen- 
tences and  in  a  subordinate  clause,  and  holding  that 
such  resemblance  indicates  historical  connection.  This 
method  is  probably  the  one  followed  in  classifying  abla- 
tives as  derived  from  the  ablative  proper,  the  instru- 
mental or  the  locative  ;  the  earlier  functions  are  defined, 
though  necessarily  somewhat  vaguely,  by  comparative 
syntax  and  the  later  Latin  uses  are  classified  according 
to  their  more  or  less  close  resemblance,  the  ablative  of 
cause  as  an  ablative  proper,  manner  as  instrumental,  the 
ablative  absolute  as  locative,  and  so  on. 

This  method  is  liable  to  several  incidental  errors,  the 
possibility  of  which  lessens  the  value  of  the  result.  In 
the  first  place,  there  may  be  close  resemblance  in  func- 
tion where  it  is  clear  that  there  is  no  historic  derivation. 
The  genitive  after  similis  is  scarcely  distinguishable  from 
the  dative  and  the  ablative  of  characteristic  or  quality 
very  closely  resembles  the  genitive  of  characteristic,  yet 
we  do  not  say  that  one  is  descended  from  the  other  in 
the  sense  in  which  the  ablative  absolute  is  said  to  be  de- 
scended from  the  locative.  A  prohibition  with  the  im- 
perative is  often  indistinguishable  from  one  with  the 
present  subjunctive,  and  functions  of  the  present  indica- 
tive and  the  present  subjunctive,  of  the  present,  the 
imperfect  and  the  perfect  indicative,  of  the  perfect  and 

222 


FORM,  FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

the  pluperfect,  overlap  one  another  frequently.  It  is, 
indeed,  a  law  of  language  that  meanings  of  winds  and 
functions  of  forms  extend  themselves  until  they  are  met 
by  the  meanings  and  functions  of  other  forms  on  a  neu- 
tral ground  where  either  may  be  used.  The  existence 
of  such  doublets  is  one  of  the  common  facts  of  language 
and  the  close  resemblance  of  meanings  derived  from 
widely  distinct  sources  occasions  no  surprise. 

In  the  second  place,  even  when  similarity  of  form 
makes  a  historical  connection  of  some  kind  probable  or 
certain,  the  determination  of  the  actual  line  of  connec- 
tion cannot  be  inferred  from  the  apparent  closeness  of 
the  resemblance,  by  finding  the  "  natural  and  easy " 
line.  Here  again  syntax  may  learn  from  semasiology 
that  meaning  is  often  carried  from  word  to  word  by  the 
most  incidental  associations,  in  the  most  unexpected  and 
zig-zag  lines.  The  older  et}ymology  would  afford  illus- 
trations of  the  mistakes  which  are  likely  to  result 
through  inferring  historical  connection  from  resemblance 
in  meaning.  The  meaning  of  a  word  or  the  function  of 
a  form  is  not  single  but  composite ;  it  contains  many 
elements,  and  any  one  of  these  may  be  the  middle  step 
through  which  two  somewhat  different  meanings  are 
connected.  Moreover,  the  determination  of  the  domi- 
nant element  in  a  function  is  in  most  cases  an  impossible 
task ;  the  resemblance  between  the  ablative  absolute  and 
the  ablative,  locative  or  instrumental  depends  altogether 
upon  the  selection  of  the  typical  instances. 

These  liabilities  to  error  are,  as  has  been  said,  rather 
incidental  to  the  method  of  tracing  historical  connection 
by  function  than  inherent  in  it.  But  the  conception  of 
the  process  by  which  function  is  transmitted  and  shifted 
is  such  as  to  involve  more  fundamental  errors,  errors  of 
principle,  not  of  practice. 

223 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

The  function  of  an  inflected  form  is  the  word-meaning 
so  modified  as  to  express  the  relation  of  the  concept  of 
the  word  to  other  concepts.  It  exists  only  in  associa- 
tion with  an  inflected  form,  not  as  something  apart  by 
itself,  having  an  independent  existence.  If  the  inflected 
form  and  the  modified  meaning  continue  in  use  without 
change,  maintaining  their  association,  there  is  no  trans- 
mission of  function.  Transmission  and  extension  of 
function  is  the  carrying  over  from  one  word  to  another 
of  the  inflectional  variation  and  the  associated  modifica- 
tion of  meaning.  The  necessary  condition  of  this  is  an 
association  of  some  kind  between  the  two  words,  an 
association  which  may  come  from  a  common  element  in 
the  meaning  of  the  two  or,  what  comes  to  the  same 
thing  in  the  end,  from  their  frequent  use  together.  By 
virtue  of  this  association  the  second  word  is  varied  in 
form  and  modified  in  meaning  as  the  first  word  had  been. 
In  other  words,  function  passes  from  word  to  word  as 
inflectional  variations  are  extended,  by  analogy  resting 
upon  association.  And  shift  of  function  takes  place  in 
the  same  process.  The  second  word  is  not  identical  in 
meaning  with  the  first,  but  slightly  different,  and  the 
function  is  therefore  slightly  changed.  If  we  suppose 
that  the  ablative  form  passed  from  gladio  with  an  instru- 
mental meaning  to  poculum,  it  could  not  carry  the  instru- 
mental meaning  unchanged.  The  meaning  of  poculum, 
the  different  nature  of  the  object,  would  in  some  connec- 
tions suggest  a  locative  meaning  for  poculo,  and  if  from 
poculum  the  ending  and  the  function  passed  over  to  some 
other  word  whose  meaning  still  more  distinctly  sug- 
gested the  idea  of  in,  the  function  would  be  still  further 
modified  and  shifted.  So  also  with  word-groups ;  the 
transmission  of  function  from  one  group  to  another  is 
conditioned  upon  an  association  between  the  groups,  in 

224 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

use  or  in  form  or  in  the  meaning  of  parts  of  each.  In 
either  case  the  function  plays  the  passive  rOle;  it  is 
transmitted,  is  modified;  but  the  necessary  condition 
lies  in  the  associations  of  form  and  word-meaning. 

Now  the  defect  of  the  method  under  discussion  is  that 
it  follows  the  passive  line  of  connection.  If  there  were 
sufficient  data  and  the  facts  could  be  set  forth  in  proper 
order,  the  functional  line  would  consist  of  a  series  oi 
gradually  changed  meanings,  of  the  ablative  for  exam- 
ple, extending  from  the  meaning  separation  or  source  to 
the  meaning  cause.  The  other  line  would  consist  of  a 
series  of  words  connected  by  associations  of  different 
kinds  and  having  meanings  varying  more  or  less.  The 
first  series  would  show  the  effects  only ;  the  steps  of  the 
process  and  the  working  of  causes  would  lie  wholly  in 
the  series  of  associations.  The  following  of  the  first 
series  is  a  barren  process,  having  as  its  result  only  the 
facts  of  connection,  like  a  chapter  of  genealogy  from  the 
Book  of  Genesis.  The  following  of  the  second  series  is 
a  study  in  processes  and  causes.  The  first  is  historical 
only  in  the  sense  that  a  succession  of  events  is  history ; 
it  is  historical  syntax  with  almost  all  that  is  instructive 
and  interesting  left  out. 

Classification  by  syntactical  form  is  in  general  the 
direct  opposite  of  functional  classification.  Its  advan- 
tages and  defects  have  therefore  been  suggested  by  con- 
trast in  discussing  functional  treatment  and  may  now 
be  the  more  briefly  described. 

Its  disadvantages  are  chiefly  in  the  presentation  of 
results  and  in  its  use  in  teaching.  A  presentation  of  the 
forms  of  a  particular  construction,  if  it  is  full  enough 
to  gain  the  advantages  which  the  system  offers,  will  be 
very  elaborate  and  complex.  A  formal  exhibition  of  the 
is  225 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

subjunctive  in  independent  sentences  will  divide  the 
cases  according  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  nega- 
tive and  according  to  the  kind  of  negative  (ne,  non, 
nullus,  etc.).  Each  class  might  then  be  subdivided  into 
purely  independent  and  paratactic.  The  next  subdivi- 
sion would  be  by  the  kind  of  sentence,  interrogative  or 
not,  then  by  tense,  by  person,  by  number,  by  voice, 
and  by  the  meaning  of  the  verb  itself.  The  presenta- 
tion of  the  si-clause  in  Lane's  Grammar,  §§  2025-2088, 
which  takes  into  account  only  the  mode  and  tense  of 
the  two  verbs,  gives  more  than  fifty  classes,  not  includ- 
ing some  special  uses  like  miror  si.  As  compared  with 
the  ordinary  classification  into  four  or  six  forms,  this  is 
extremely  elaborate.  Yet  it  does  not  make  a  subdivi- 
sion by  person  or  by  verb-meaning  or  by  the  presence  or 
absence  of  adverbs,  negative  or  other,  all  of  which  have 
a  distinct  bearing  upon  the  expression  of  the  relation  of 
protasis  and  apodosis.  A  complete  and  detailed  presen- 
tation of  all  the  forms  of  the  conditional  sentence  would 
be  intolerably  long  and  complex  as  a  means  of  making  a 
student  acquainted  with  the  facts. 

A  further  disadvantage,  more  or  less  common  indeed 
to  all  schemes  of  presentation,  is  the  separation  of  things 
which  belong  together.  If  the  main  classes  are  based 
upon  mode  and  tense,  then  the  protases  containing  a 
verb  of  thinking  or  of  saying  will  be  scattered  about  in 
different  places  in  the  system.  This  is  of  no  importance 
to  the  investigator,  but  it  is  confusing  in  a  school 
grammar. 

Though  a  formal,  classification  results  finally  in  a  study 
of  functions  and  relations,  it  does  not  contribute  so 
immediately  to  interpretation  and  critical  translation  as 
a  purely  functional  arrangement  does.  This  is  no  slight 
defect  and  must  be  set  down  as  a  large  item  to  the  credit 

226 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

of  the  functional  system.  It  carries  with  it  all  that 
is  said  above  in  regard  to  the  value  of  logical  analy- 
sis of  sentences  as  a  means  of  instruction  and  mental 

training. 
The  advantages  of  detailed  formal  classification  consist 

in  the  main  in  the  avoidance  of  those  defects  which  are 
inherent   in  or  incidental  to  a   functional    scheme.      It 
lessens  the  liability  to  fall  into  forced  interpretation  and 
translation,  because  the  attention  is  fixed  upon  the  form 
in  making  divisions  and  classes  and  the  determin 
of  meaning  is  the  last  step.     It  removes   entirely  the 
danger  of  large  classes,  of  the  symbolic  use  of  functional 
names  and  of •  the  undue  prominence  of  nomenclature. 
It  distinguishes  with   much   precision  between   group- 
function  and  the  function  of  an  inflected  form.     It  is 
especially  superior  to  functional  classification  in  preci- 
sion and  in  the  statement  of  the  details  by  which  a  par- 
ticular species  maybe  identified.     Thus  the  twenty  or 
thirty  formal  categories  of  the  qui  clause  made  by  Ditt- 
mar  (see  p.  19),  though  they  are  far  from  exhaustive, 
are  immensely  superior  to  any  of  the  functional  schemes. 
e.  g.,  to  that   in  Bennett's   grammar,   appendix,   or  to 
that  in  Hale's  Cum,  as  a  means  of  identification.     It  is 
possible  to  write  of  a  Gains  primus  est  qui  clause  with 
the   expectation   that   the   reader  will    know  what  the 
object  under  discussion  is,  but  a  "Determining  [Rela- 
tive] Clause  of  the  Developed  Type"  is  a  kind  of  thing 
about  which  two  scholars  might  write  at  some  length 
only  to  find  in  the  end  that  they  had  been  talking  of  two 
different  objects.     This  superiority  of  formal  classifica- 
tion is  greatest  with  reference  to  word-groups;  in  case- 
syntax  it  is  much  less  marked,  since  a  formal  classifica- 
tion  of  ablatives   or   datives   would    depend    in    large 
measure  upon  the  meaning  of  the  noun.     The  nature 

227 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

of  the  ablative  poculo  depends  upon  the  meaning  of  the 
word,  whether  it  is  an  instrument  for  holding  wine  ready 
for  drinking  or  the  vessel  in  which  the  wine  is  spark- 
ling. But  this,  on  the  other  hand,  is  determined  with 
much  precision  by  the  context;  when  it  still  remains 
vague,  the  very  vagueness  is  a  fact  of  language,  as 
much  to  be  noted  as  any  other. 

The  most  important  point  of  contrast  between  the  two 
systems  is  that  which  relates  to  the  two  chief  character- 
istics of  the  philological  research  of  the  present  day, 
psychological  interpretation  and  historical  explanation. 
The  central  requirement  for  reaching  either  of  these 
ends  is  minuteness  of  observation.  Upon  the  small  de- 
tails of  language  both  the  psychology  and  the  history  of 
speech  depend.  The  formal  treatment  of  the  qui  clause, 
for  example,  would  depend  in  part  upon  the  form  of  the 
clause  itself,  the  mode,  person  and  voice  and  to  some 
extent  the  tense  and  number  of  the  verb,  as  well  as  upon 
the  other  significant  words  in  the  clause.  But  it  would 
depend  quite  as  much  upon  the  antecedent  and  observa- 
tion in  this  direction  would  not  be  confined  to  the  pres- 
ence or  absence  of  demonstratives  or  a  certain  number 
of  adjectives,  multus,  unus,  dignus,  a  superlative,  but 
should  be  carried  into  minute  subdivisions  based  upon 
the  meaning  of  the  noun.  Proper  nouns  should  be  dis- 
tinguished from  common,  names  of  persons  from  names 
of  things,  abstracts  from  concretes,  and  so  on.  Dis- 
tinctions even  more  minute  may  be  made  with  good 
results.  Thus  in  Plautus  the  qui  clause  after  the  name 
of  a  character  in  the  play  is  almost  always  colorless,  the 
subordinating  function  is  slightly  felt  and  suggestions 
of  cause  or  contrast  or  purpose  are  rare.  But  the  names 
of  gods  or  mythological  heroes  are  followed  by  qui 
clauses  which  even  with  the  indicative  show  traces  of 

228 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

group-function.  The  name  of  a  god  in  an  appeal  Lb  fol- 
lowed by  a  qui  clause  giving  the  reason  for  die  appeal, 
as  in  AuL,  396,  Apollo,  subueni  .  .  ..-  qui  in  re  tali  aliis 
iam  subuenisti  antidhac  (the  text  is  somewhat  corrupt). 

The  mention  of  a  god  leads  to  the  addition  of  his  special 
characteristic  (Mercurius,  Touts  qui  nuntius  perhibetur, 
numquam  aeque  patrl  Suo  nuntium  lepidum  attulit,  quam 
ego  nunc  meae  erae  nuntiabo,  Stick.,  274)  or  the  mention 

of  a  mythological  character  is  followed  by  a  7///  clause 
mentioning  his  most  famous  deed  (Nam  isti  quidem  herele 
orationi  Oedipo  Ojmst  coniectore,  qui  Sphingi  interpret 
fuit,  Poem.,  443  f.).  But  as  the  reason  for  introducing 
the  name  of  a  god  or  hero  is  usually  connected  with 
his  attributes  or  deeds,  these  clauses  almost  invariably 
have  a  causal-adversative  force:  "Mercury,  though  he 
carries  messages  to  Jove,  never  had  a  finer  piece  of 
news;"  "this  speech  needs  an  Oedipus,  for  he  could 
read  any  riddle."  Similar  minute  differences  in  tin1 
function  of  the  qui  clause  may  be  detected  by  dividing 
names  of  things  from  names  of  persons  and  concretes 
from  abstracts.  Taken  by  themselves  they  are  of  slight 
account,  but  when  a  number  of  them  arc  put  together, 
they  make  a  distinct  and  solid  contribution  to  the  psy- 
chology of  the  qui  clause.  .  Similar  variations  may  be 
noted  in  the  ne  clause  by  subdividing  according  to  the 
meaning  of  the  leading  verb.  The  history  of  the  process 
by  which  the  si  clause  has  come  to  express  various 
shades  of  probability  or  possibility  or  unreality  will  never 
be  unravelled  by  the  functional  classification  now  in 
vogue;  this  extremely  interesting  subject  has  lain  for 
years  untouched  because  of  the  barrenness  of  the  method 
of  treatment.       But  a  careful  formal  study  1   will   un- 

1  Such  as  that  begun  by  H.  C.  Nutting  in  the  Amer.  Jouru.  of  Philol., 
XXI,  3  (1900),  No.  83,  pp.  260  ff. 

229 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

doubtedly  give  results  of  interest  both  to  the  psychology 
and  to  the  history  of  the  conditional  sentence. 

The  advantages  of  a  classification  by  form,  including 
under  that  head  word-meaning,  may  be  summed  up  in 
the  statement  that  this  kind  of  syntactical  treatment 
rests  solidly  on  facts  and  leads  directly  to  processes  and 
laws.  Syntax  is  exposed  to  two  dangers  or,  it  may  be 
said,  is  at  present  suffering  from  two  evils.  The  first 
is  the  evil  of  theoretical  speculation,  dealing  with  periods 
where  no  facts  are  obtainable  or,  within  historical 
periods,  too  far  removed  from  the  facts.  The  second  is 
the  evil  of  unconnected  and  meaningless  accumulation 
of  facts.  The  corrective  of  the  first  is  more  minute 
observation,  the  corrective  of  the  second  is  more  atten- 
tion to  the  meaning  of  facts.  These  two  are  really  one, 
for  they  combine  upon  the  single  point  of  systematic 
accumulation  of  facts  interpreted  by  many-sided  obser- 
vation and  study.  For  the  accumulated  observations  of 
the  meaning  of  facts,  the  patient  interpretation  of  the 
phenomena  within  a  narrow  range,  grows  rapidly  toward 
the  understanding  of  larger  fields,  and  many  small  laws 
put  together  make  large  laws.  Speculation  as  to  Indo- 
European  origins  is  more  attractive  and  more  brilliant, 
and  the  mere  recording  of  facts  for  others  to  interpret  is 
easier,  but  neither  is  so  fruitful  as  work  which  is  at  once 
more  minute  and  more  systematic. 

There  has  been  much  discussion,  especially  with 
reference  to  the  natural  sciences,  of  the  best  methods  of 
classification.  The  points  at  issue  have  to  do  mainly 
with  classification  as  a  means  of  presenting  scientific 
knowledge  in  intelligible  form  or,  not  infrequently,  with 
a  classification  which  shall  serve  the  purposes  both  of 
presentation  and  of  investigation.  The  difficulty  of 
finding  such  a  system  comes  from  the  attempt  to  com- 

230 


FORM,   FUNCTION  AND   CLASSIFICATION 

bine  the  two  different  purposes.     In  syntax  it  is  quite 

as  great  as  in  the  natural  sciences,  but  it  is  a  difficulty 
which  the  scientific  investigator  is  not  called  upon  to 
face.     He  may  properly  re-aid  classification  as  a  mere 

convenience,  a  tool  to  lie  used  lor  a  certain  end  and  then 
put  aside.  From  this  point  of  view  the  permanence  of 
the  classes  is  of  no  account  nor  is  it  necessary  t<>  con- 
sider whether  the  characteristics  upon  which  the  classes 
are  founded  are  primary  or  secondary.  Any  number  "I 
different  classifications  may  he  made  for  different  pur- 
poses. Thus  the  ne  clauses  may  be  classified  by  the 
tense  of  the  subjunctive,  to  find  out  whether  this  affects 
in  any  way  the  function  of  the  clause.  Then  the  same 
facts  may  be  re-classified  with  reference  to  the  person  of 
the  verb  in  order  to  determine  whether  the  second 
person  shows  stronger  evidence  of  connection  with  the 
prohibition  than  appears  in  the  third  person.  A  classi- 
fication according  to  the  meaning  of  the  verb  of  the  //<• 
clause  will  bring  out  the  peculiarities  of  expectation  and 
of  thinking  wrongly,  like  ne  erres,  ne  frnstr<t  sis.  The 
meaning  of  the  leading  verb,  whether  it  is  a  verb  of 
saying,  simply,  or  of  saying  with  a  tone  of  command, 
whether  its  meaning  repeats  the  idea  of  the  negative  in 
the  ne  clause  or  not,  whether  it  contains  an  element  of 
hindering  or  of  preventing  —  each  of  these  divisions  and 
subdivisions  will  lead  up  to  a  variation  in  the  function  of 
the  clause  both  more  precise  and  more  instructive  than 
the  ordinary  functional  division  into  object  clauses  and 
clauses  of  purpose.  In  this  way  classification  is  a 
means  of  answering  the  special  questions  which  occur 
to  the  investigator  as  he  studies  the  general  problem 
from  different  points  of  view.  The  classifications  which 
are  based  upon  the  meaning  of  words  are  especially 
useful  and  especially  instructive  in  regard  to  the  way  in 

201 


LATIN  SYNTAX 

which  the  same  material  must  be  classified  differently 
with  reference  to  different  questions.  Thus,  if  the  in- 
quiry be  in  regard  to  the  uses  of  the  subjunctive  in 
independent  sentences,  the  verbs  used  may  be  classified 
according  to  their  modal  meaning,  that  is,  according  to 
the  elements  in  their  meaning  which  favor  or  hinder 
their  use  in  the  expression  of  desire  or  of  opinion.  It  is 
evident  that  the  use  of  nolo,  opto,  credo,  possum,  of  scio, 
uideo,  audio,  will  depend  largely  upon  their  meaning, 
and  that  all  verbs  may  be  arranged  in  classes  with 
reference  to  their  modal  behavior.  The  same  verbs  may 
again  be  arranged  in  a  totally  different  set  of  classes 
according  to  their  temporal  meaning,  verbs  of  begin- 
ning, of  completed  action,  of  existence  and  state.  In 
the  same  way  nouns  may  be  classified  according  to  the 
presence  in  their  meaning  of  temporal  elements  or  local 
or  modal  or  instrumental  or  causal,  and  such  a  series  of 
classifications  would  certainly  throw  much  light  upon 
the  functions  of  the  ablative.  Even  a  functional  classi- 
fication may  sometimes  be  used  in  investigation  as  a 
means  of  discovering  formal  differences  which  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  locate  and  of  breaking  up  a  large  class  into 
smaller  divisions.  For  classification  which  halts  before 
it  reaches  the  utmost  limit  of  significant  differences  is 
incomplete  and  in  the  effort  to  discover  all  significant 
differences  it  is  often  necessary  to  make  formal  classes 
which  afterward  prove  to  be  of  no  value.  It  is  easy  to 
throw  aside  a  useless  classification,  if  it  shall  appear  that 
the  formal  difference  upon  which  it  was  founded  has  no 
corresponding  difference  in  function. 

Used  in  some  such  way  as  this,  pursued  into  minute 
details,  guided  by  a  general  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
the  problem,  classification  by  form  is  the  most  useful 
tool  of  the  syntactical  investigator. 

232 


avaa^^^^^mmi 


AA    000913  841 


